

population of America was rising faster than that of Europe; molasses and rum were among the first necessities of life in that age and climate, so that the consumption must have risen greatly. The power of the planters to make more rum was as limited as their power to make more sugar; it could not go beyond a certain point without new colonies. More rum was being drunk in England, especially that of Jamaica. The prevalence of the punch-bowl favoured this trade; so did the wars with France, which diminished the imports of French brandy until after the Peace of Paris, when it seems to have come back into fashion.¹

The planters were sometimes favoured by bad harvests of grain in England, which obliged Parliament to prohibit the distilling of corn spirits in order to keep down the price of bread. This was a gift to the West Indians, for the distillers had to use molasses or even brown sugar. It might as well happen in peace as in war; but since it took place for a long time in the Seven Years War, it is worth some attention.

The harvest of 1756 was very bad and the price of corn high. The ports most concerned in the West India trade, and certain towns represented by West India members, took the lead in petitioning for the prohibition of the corn distillery. The distillers and the barley-growers struggled against this measure, but Parliament agreed to it and continued it for more than three years.² The scarcity of corn ceased, and great quantities were exported in 1759, but Parliament did not face the necessity of repeal till 1760. Meanwhile the West Indians were making

¹ H. Lascelles and son to Nicholas Wilcox, May 21, 1740, W. & G. i; to Gedney Clarke, Oct. 27, 1741, *ibid.*; Lascelles and Maxwell to John Collins, Sept. 16, 1743, vol. ii; to Robert Belgrove, Jan. 15, 1745/6, *ibid.*; to Alexander Harvie, Oct. 5, 1765, vol. x.

² *C. J.* xxvii. 664 (petition of Lancaster), 694 (distillers' petition), 707 (Ipswich merchants' petition), 847 (petition of Bristol); xxviii. 6 (Liverpool petition), 9 (Leeds petition), 322 (Bristol petition), 327 (Liverpool petition). It is worth noticing the part played in this agitation by the chief West India ports—Liverpool, Bristol, and Lancaster. The manufacturing towns were complaining at the same time of the high price of food, but it was the colonial ports which insisted that the prohibition of the distillery was the proper remedy. Bath and Salisbury were on the same side; Pitt, the greatest defender of the West India interest, was M.P. for Bath and a Beckford sat for Salisbury. The chief petition in 1760 came from the City of London, for which William Beckford was a Member. The chief petitions on the other side were those of Suffolk (1756), Norwich, Berwick-upon-Tweed, South-West Essex, and Ross and Cromarty (1759), Uxbridge, Herts. and Essex, Surrey, Lewes, Croydon, Aldborough, Southwold, Cambridgeshire, Forfarshire, the East Riding, Sheppey, and others, in 1760.

good profits. Molasses rose from about 10 shillings to 37 shillings a hundredweight, and the sugar-bakers who turned it out as a by-product were encouraged to refine more raw sugars. The price of the latter rose 6 or 7 shillings on this account alone in the spring of 1757, when the prohibition was first made; and Messrs. Lascelles and Maxwell acknowledged a year later that 'the distillation has been a great aid in the consumption of sugars, which must otherwise have been miserably low at this time'.¹

The West Indians charged the distillers with raising the price of bread; the distillers answered that it was strange the planters should feel such concern for the poor consumer of bread when they extorted so much from the poor consumer of sugar. The high price of bread did a real injury to the planters, for the more the poor spent on bread the less money they could afford for sugar; but the sugar interest did not make the most of this point in public, though it complained privately.² It accused the distillers of consuming corn which could have been exported from the country and affected the balance of trade in our favour. The distillers replied to all this that they only used the damaged corn. The planters denied it, and added an argument so far-fetched that nobody could have thought of it but a West Indian in defence of his pocket: they asserted that the flesh of hogs fattened upon distillers' refuse was unwholesome meat for the Royal Navy.

They supported their case by a pharisaical concern for the morals of the poor. The result of the prohibition was to raise the price not only of molasses but of spirits. Less was drunk, and the working class became soberer, to the great satisfaction of its employers. The City of London suggested further, in its petition to Parliament, that the soldiers and sailors became braver from the same cause. The distillers retorted that the question was not whether people should drink, but what they should drink; but the planters rejoined that if there were nothing but molasses spirits to be had, there would be less to drink altogether.³ At last in 1760 a committee of the House of

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Thomas Stevenson, Feb. 5 and Dec. 3, 1757, Feb. 25, 1758, W. & G. viii; to J. Frere, Jan. 7, 1758, *ibid.*; to Henry Allin, Feb. 24, *ibid.*

² Lascelles and Maxwell to Gedney Clarke, Sept. 3, 1757, W. & G. viii.

³ C. J. xxviii. 640 (Spitalfields petition), 718 (Lewes petition), 817 (City of London petition); *Gentleman's Magazine*, xxix. 630, xxx. 18, 22. The *Monitor*, quoted on p. 18 in favour of the prohibition, had been founded by Beckford and was probably still his property.

Commons went into the matter. It reported that the high price of liquors had indeed contributed to the health and sobriety of the people, and that the best way to keep it up was to lay a heavy duty upon all spirits. The discrimination against the corn distillery was to be removed.¹ The planters fought hard, and often divided the House. They seem to have been countenanced by Pitt, that unfailing champion of West India causes right or wrong. They tried to get the distillers confined to using malted corn, and offered to prohibit the use of sugar in molasses spirits at the same time; they also asked for a drawback on exported molasses spirits, equal to that on corn spirits. A few days later they only failed by three votes to get the Bill recommitted.² It became law in spite of them. The sugar-factors lamented in one breath the deterioration of the market and the repeal of 'that salutary and beneficial prohibition to which we attribute the reformation of the people with their increased industry and uncommon sobriety'. The price of molasses fell from 30 shillings to 13.³ A few years later the corn distillers carried the war into the enemy's country: they exported to North America great quantities of spirits which lowered the market for West India rum.⁴

The more rum was sent to England, the less there was for North America. The other islands made a weak kind of rum which was used in the Northern Colonies; Jamaica could have made much more of that strength if its finer produce had not been so popular in England.⁵

The North American traders made up the deficiency from the French islands. They were the readier to do so because the French planter was glad enough to get rid of his raw molasses

¹ *C. J.* xxviii. 746, 788, 816, and 817.

² On the first of these occasions the tellers for the ayes were Nugent, member for Bristol, and Gibbons, a West Indian; on the last, Beckford and a Mr. Coventry whose connexions are unknown to me (*C. J.* xxviii. 822, 829). For Pitt's attitude see Watkins's letter to Newcastle, March 17, 1760, Add. MSS. 32903, f. 338. Not all West Indian Members of Parliament thought as planters on this occasion; Rose Fuller, for example, was against continuing the prohibition (see his letter to Newcastle, Nov. 19, 1759, vol. 32898, f. 372).

³ Rowland and Richard Oliver to Abraham Redwood, March 18, 1760, *The Commerce of Rhode Island (M.H.S. Collections)*, i. 81; Lascelles and Maxwell to T. Stevenson and sons, April 29, 1760, *W. & G.* viii.

⁴ John Watts, New York, to Francis Clarke, Jan. 2, 1762, *Letter-book of John Watts (N.Y.H.S. Collections)*, vol. 61, p. 6.

⁵ Lascelles and Maxwell to Florentius Vassall, Nov. 21, 1751, *W. & G.* v; to Thomas Stevenson, Sept. 2, 1754, vii.

without insisting on selling it distilled into rum. There is no telling whether the trade to the French colonies was greater or less in war than in peace; since it was secret and for the most part unlawful, we cannot expect to find perfect statistics of it. To judge from the references to it in merchants' letters, it appears to have increased continually if not steadily. Perhaps this intercourse did not injure the English planters so much as they said. It was reported once or twice that no shipping was to be had for the West Indies, because the Monte Cristi trade employed so much, or that North American producers hoped for once to recover the first cost of their goods in the British West Indian market, because they were exporting so much to the French islands. Since, however, the same evidence shows that the price of flour always remained high in St. Kitts because so much was shipped off by night to St. Eustatius, it is impossible to be very sorry for the English planters. They should have put their own house in order before they complained of the Northern colonists.¹

The North Americans had even more reason than the English consumers to be thankful for the conquests of the Seven Years War. They had never been able to buy as much rum and molasses as they wanted in the English sugar colonies, and lately they had made no attempt to do so. Their commerce with the French islands presumably kept down the price of the English produce as long as it lasted; but one important branch of it—the Flag of Truce trade—was killed by the navy and the courts in 1760, though a roundabout form of the same trade survived at the Spanish free port of Monte Cristi. The annexation of Guadeloupe and Martinique enabled them to do openly what they had long done against the law. They bought vast quantities of molasses at those two islands; indeed, most of what they lawfully imported from 1760 to 1763 seems to have come from thence.² No doubt they took advantage of the opportu-

¹ Thomas Clifford to J. and T. Tipping, Oct. 6 and Nov. 16, 1759, Clifford Correspondence, xxvii. 35, 41, H.S.P.; Thomas Wharton junior to Thomas Wharton, Dec. 26, 1757, and March 16, 1758, Wharton Papers, Box II, H.S.P. A fuller description of this trade has been given in Chapter IX.

² Most of the molasses imported as from the other New England colonies, and a great deal of that classified as coming from the 'West Indies', may be presumed to be foreign produce originally smuggled in without paying the Molasses Act duties, from St. Eustatius, Monte Cristi, or the French islands. Since the figures were probably compiled by the provincial, not the imperial, revenue officers, there was no need for concealing the imports from the 'West Indies'; and as for what purported

nity, and brought in more from these sources than they could have done before the conquests; this may have been one reason for the fall of the price from 1759 to 1762, though it was not the only one. The figures probably represent commerce which had always existed but only dared to come into the open when Guadeloupe and Martinique became English possessions; there are also indications that the clearances from Guadeloupe could be bought or forged for the produce of islands which were still French. Such documents would save the traders some risk and trouble, for it was easy to tell French cask or goods from English.¹

to come from Connecticut and Rhode Island, the Collectors of those colonies had a reputation for giving false clearances to cover merchandise which was really imported from the foreign islands.

Hogsheads of molasses and rum imported into Massachusetts, 1760-1:

	1760		1761	
	<i>Molasses</i>	<i>Rum</i>	<i>Molasses</i>	<i>Rum</i>
From Guadeloupe	3,604	36	3,361	31
From Jamaica	1,211	90	636	141
From other English islands, by name	190	674	225	1,363
From 'West Indies'	1,176	6	4,421	112
From other North American colonies	1,433	229	1,275	540
Total	7,614	1,035	9,918	2,187

(M.H.S., Lowell Papers, pp. 29, 33.)

Hogsheads of molasses and rum imported into Salem, 1762:

	<i>Molasses</i>		<i>Rum</i>	
	<i>Hhds.</i>	<i>Tierces</i>	<i>Hhds.</i>	<i>Tierces</i>
Guadeloupe	1,610	1,335
Martinique	1,615	912	..	60
Jamaica	197	..	10	..
English Islands altogether	209	3	371	9

(M.H.S., MSS. 91 L, p. 41.)

These figures suggest that the North Americans bought their West India rum from the English colonies, and the molasses for their own distilling from the French—for indeed the English planters would not let them have it, preferring to sell it manufactured as rum. The same distinction is to be observed within the English sugar colonies; Jamaica was the only English colony to supply any molasses, but exported far less rum than the other islands. There was, however, a special reason for this: Jamaica rum was much better and dearer than that of the other islands, and was sent to England where it was the only kind good enough for the market.

¹ G. G. Beekman to Metcalfe Bowler, July 1, 1761, Letter-book, N.Y.H.S.

Thus the conquest of the French islands affected the market for sugar and its by-products. The planters found compensations in war-time for this breach of their monopoly. Even defensive warfare called for some increase of the colonial forces, and an active campaign for a great one. The soldiers and sailors received generous allowances of rum. The English planters supplied this demand in the West Indies, and took care to make their market of the Government. When Hosier's squadron arrived at Jamaica in 1726, the price of rum was said to have risen to three times the ordinary rate, and none to be had. The contractors for the victualling tried to protect themselves against a repetition of this extortion in 1740. They meant to use rum from Barbados and the Leeward Islands; it was cheaper though worse, and the liberty to import it into Jamaica would enable them to break the ring of planters and merchants which would certainly try to raise the price again. Jamaica had protected its own producers by a heavy duty on imported rum; the contractors knew that, and made the Duke of Newcastle recommend to the Governor to have this duty remitted on what was imported for the service of His Majesty's forces. Although Newcastle's suggestion was backed by an Order in Council, it might be ignored; in that case, the Government bound itself to indemnify the contractors for any duty that might be exacted. The agent of the contractors eventually found himself obliged—or so he said—to make use of this permission. He ordered down a hundred thousand gallons from Barbados, and asked the legislature of Jamaica to let him introduce it duty free. The legislature refused, so he advertised that he would buy Jamaica rum at three shillings the gallon. More was asked, so he resolved to import the Barbados rum after all and give bond for the duty.

The planters of Jamaica were patriotic, but they did not mean to sacrifice their profits to a victualling contractor. The Assembly addressed a long remonstrance to the King. It accused the contractors of importing French rum. (That was probably untrue; it cannot be disproved, but there are evidences that a great deal of rum was bought in Barbados for the forces at this time, and that the price went up there in consequence.)¹ The Assembly's concern for His Majesty's pocket and the welfare of his forces was quite touching: it pointed out 'how prejudicial these foreign rums are to the health of your Majesty's subjects,

¹ Henry Lascelles to Nicholas Wilcox, March 4, 1740/1, W. & G. i.

in comparison to the pure Jamaica rum, and as your Majesty allows the same price for those rums, as for the rum of this island, it is evident that your Majesty is hereby defrauded of above fifty per cent.' It complained that the loss of public revenue would be great if the duty were remitted, at the same time that the planters would be disabled from paying taxes by the reduction of the profits on their rum. A few months later, a committee went into the question and controverted the agent's history of the prices. It made him admit that he had bought rum earlier in the year at 2 shillings; it maintained that he could have had the whole year's supply at that price, and charged him with deliberately running short for the sake of an excuse to import the rum from Barbados. It denounced the large profits which the contractors had made upon this article in late years; it admitted that rum had risen from 1s. 8d. as far as 3 shillings, but asserted that it had fallen back to 2s. 3d. soon after. The contractors appealed to the Privy Council, and the Admiralty supported them. The Law Officers advised that the King had the right to import rum into Jamaica, as into England, duty free. The case seems to have been suspended for a long time, nor can a definite result be traced.¹ The Jamaica Assembly continued to protect the planters not only against rum but against wines imported for the navy. At least two of its members made a handsome profit out of this policy. William Beckford found it worth while to pay the Agent Victualler a secret rebate on a large contract for rum, and Speaker Price followed his example, though with some hesitation.²

The price of rum was raised all over the colonies by Cathcart's expedition in 1740. This had an unforeseen effect in Barbados, where some ships from Jersey, Ireland, and North America used to buy rum and draw bills of exchange for it. It

¹ Commissioners of the Victualling to Burchett, Jan. 23, 1739/40, S.P. 42/23, f. 22; Lords of the Admiralty to Lords Justices, Aug. 19, 1741, S.P. 42/24, f. 409; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, iii. 543, 545, 548, 572; *A.P.C. Col.* iii. 670-3, 713-17. The Admiralty was eager to break the ring at Jamaica (Minute of July 17, 1740, Adm. 3/44). It was finally so exasperated by the obstructions at Jamaica that it asked the Attorney-General to draw up a bill to permit the importation of provisions for the forces into the colonies without paying duty (Minute of April 21, 1742, Adm. 3/45).

² It must have been a very profitable contract indeed: the rate was 2s. 3d. or 2s. 4d. sterling a gallon, which amounted to about 3s. 4d. Jamaica currency (Jamaica Council Minutes, May 17, 1746, deposition of Richard Beckford, C.O. 137/57; May 22, deposition of Charles Price, *ibid.*).

now became too dear for them, so that they bought it no longer; there were consequently fewer bills to be negotiated at Barbados, and the rate of exchange upon London was depressed. The North Americans likewise found Barbados rum too dear, and took the payment for their cargoes in cash, which they spent in the Dutch or French colonies.¹ The decline of the distilling business in Boston was also attributed to the demand for rum in Jamaica, which encouraged the planters to distil their own molasses, and lessened the quantity which could be exported to New England. This complaint was possibly a little far-fetched. It is certain that the Boston distillery declined, but the cause of that was the rise of the industry elsewhere in North America; and in so far as the planters made more of their molasses into rum, they were partly encouraged to do so by the growing demand for it in England.²

The later West Indian expeditions, such as the conquests of Guadeloupe and Martinique, stimulated the demand for rum, which was often stored in expectation of them.³ The campaigns in North America likewise had their effect upon the market. The soldiers were supplied largely with New England rum, but the price of West India rum usually kept pace with that of the home-distilled kinds, for there was not an unlimited amount of molasses to distil. The merchants of North America often wrote as if the demand for the forces was the thing which most determined the price of rum and even molasses.⁴

§ iv. *The Market for Provisions in War-time*

The planters' gain was mixed with some loss which arose from the same kind of causes. The King's forces in the colonies increased the demand for victuals as well as rum. For the finer kinds, such as only white people ate in the colonies, they must

¹ Robinson to Newcastle, Oct. 23, 1743, C.O. 28/46; Robinson's answers to queries, Feb. 20, 1746/7, C.O. 28/47.

² Report of a Committee, March 16, 1742/3, *Boston Town Records, 1742-57*, p. 12 (*Boston Records Commission, Report no. 14*). For other petitions on this subject, see *Report no. 12*, p. 120; *Report no. 14*, pp. 100, 221, 238, 280.

³ Samuel Leacock to Thomas Clifford, May 10, 1760, Clifford Correspondence, iii, no. 55, H.S.P.; Richard Derby to Capt. John Bowditch, Jan. 1762, Derby Family MSS. xxvii, Essex Institute.

⁴ For instance, Thomas Clifford to Jonas Maynard, Aug. 11, 1759, Clifford Correspondence, xxvii. 19; W. Cunningham to W. Woodbridge, July 4, 1756, Letter-Book of Messrs. Greg and Cunningham, N.Y.H.S.; G. G. Beekman to Rhode Island Committee of War, April 19, 1756, Letter-book, N.Y.H.S.; *Letter-Book of John Watts (N.Y.H.S. Collections, vol. 61)*, pp. 3, 6.

have almost doubled it. The crew of a single third-rate ship of the line numbered more than the militia of Montserrat or Nevis; the arrival of a really large expedition like Cathcart's or Hopson's must have made a great impression on the market and raised the price considerably. The colonists of Jamaica complained in 1740 that the victualling contractors bought up all the provisions that arrived.¹ The victualling contractors themselves lamented that the price of bread and flour rose in Philadelphia and New York.

A paper sent from Jamaica in 1741 asserted that 5,000 barrels of flour could be had from New York and 5,000 from Pennsylvania without advancing the price, because a much larger quantity was sold to the Spaniards in time of peace. It is doubtful, however, whether the trade in flour with the Spanish colonies was effectively cut off. There are some interesting details about the victualling at this time in the letters of Henry Lascelles and son. Lascelles had the contract for supplying the forces on the Leeward Islands station. The year 1740 was an especially difficult year, for the harvest in England was very small, so that the victuallers could not keep down the price of North American produce by threatening to send out from England. Lascelles's correspondent at Philadelphia was disappointed of a proper supply of biscuit because a Mr. Allen, the agent for the Jamaica contractors, had engaged the town and country bakers of Pennsylvania and New York for all they could make for some months to come. The price of biscuit rose; the bills drawn on England to pay for these purchases altered the exchange in favour of the colonies, and so increased the price still more. Soon afterwards the Government took the Jamaica contract into its own hands, and appointed a different agent at New York, whose unskilfulness in handling the market was reported by an unsuccessful competitor to be the occasion of a further advance.² It is hard to see how the utmost delicacy of touch could have kept the prices down in such a year; but be that as it might, the price of provisions rose all over North

¹ 'Extract of a letter from Jamaica', Dec. 12, 1740, Add. MSS. 22677, ff. 42-5. This is really a pamphlet by James Knight, but he was in touch with many correspondents in Jamaica.

² Henry Lascelles and son to Edward Lascelles, May 10 and 17, Sept. 13, and Dec. 6, 1740, W. & G. i; to Robert Watts, New York, Nov. 21 and Dec. 11, 1740, June 5, 1741, *ibid.*; to Samuel McCall, Philadelphia, Feb. 6, 1740/1, *ibid.*; C.O. 5/41, no. 109.

America and the West Indies in 1741. Philadelphia flour still fetched 35 shillings in Antigua in August—a price unusually high when we were at peace with France. Yams had to be issued instead of flour to the men-of-war's crews in Barbados. There was very little bread in Jamaica besides what was in the hands of the Agent Victualler.¹

It was many years before so great a force came out to the West Indies again, but the squadrons were always above their ordinary strength in war-time, and kept up a demand for the finer sorts of provisions; besides, many North American privateers cruised from the West India islands and replenished their supplies there. The merchant shipping from England, which generally bought its provisions for the homeward voyage in the islands, did not increase; it did not, however, diminish very much, and it probably stayed longer and consumed more in the islands because of the infrequency of convoys.² On the whole, therefore, it may safely be supposed that the regular demand for provisions was swelled during the war by the addition of a number of mouths to feed. Moreover, the troops in North America itself diverted from the West Indies a great supply of provisions which would else have gone there; it is hard to guess whether it would have reached the English or the French islands. The conquest of Guadeloupe and Martinique opened new markets for provisions and slaves. The French islands had long been starved of both, and were ready to take off great quantities. The English traders had supplied them with these articles in peace-time, but not so freely or largely as they could do after their annexation. Since there had never been much intercourse with these islands by Flags of Truce, and the commerce of St. Eustatius had been almost suppressed in 1758, the immediate effect of the reduction of Guadeloupe upon prices and trade must have been very great in 1759. It may account partly for the upward spring of both in that year.³

It is hard to judge how much the prices of plantation neces-

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Edward Lascelles, April 20, 1741, W. & G. i; to Robert Watts, June 5; to Samuel McCall, June 5, *ibid.*; Adrian Renaudet to John Reynell, July 4, 1740, Coates-Reynell Papers, Box II, H.S.P.

² Thomas Wharton, junior, St. Kitts, to Thomas Wharton, Feb. 12, 1759, Wharton Papers, Box II, H.S.P.; John Watkins to Thomas Clifford, March 9, 1757, Clifford Correspondence, i, no. 222, H.S.P.; Birkett and Booth to John Reynell, Feb. 12, 1752, Coates-Reynell Papers, Box VII, H.S.P.

³ Thomas Wharton, junior, St. Kitts, to Thomas Wharton, July 24, 1759, Wharton Papers, Box II, H.S.P.

saries increased in the West Indies on account of the war. They varied suddenly and widely even in peace. The markets were small, and a few cargoes more or less made the difference between very high and very low prices: for instance, flour sold at 13s. 9d. upon an average in Antigua on January 5, 1752, was up to 32s. by June 27, down to 20s. 6d. on July 29, and to 15s. 6d. on January 13, 1753.¹ Unless, therefore, we could follow the market from week to week, two or three quotations might mislead us entirely about the average price for a particular year. Unfortunately there is no island for which I know of full statistics. Certain things can be said: extremes of price are worth notice so long as too much is not deduced from them.

Flour and bread seem to have been very high in Antigua in the autumn of 1741—flour at 35 shillings and ships' bread at 42s. 6d. This is to be accounted for by the embargoes, the drought, and the forces at Jamaica. The prices never rose so high, so far as I know, in the War of 1744; indeed, they were seldom more than 22 and 30 shillings respectively. They seem to have been continually low in the first years after the peace; the average seems to have been about 18 shillings for flour and 22 shillings for ships' bread. They were some 3 or 4 shillings higher in 1754 and 1755, and increased little after the war broke out. Suddenly they rose very high. Ships' bread was 52s. 6d. in March 1759 and 45 shillings in July 1760; flour bore a correspondingly high price. Then they sank quite low. The fluctuations at Barbados, which are even harder to trace, did not follow by any means the same course, but coincided on one or two of the most outstanding points. Here, too, the highest years seem to have been 1741 and from the end of 1758 to the spring of 1760; the lowest 1742-3 and 1748-51. There is no reason to expect an exact correspondence between the prices in different islands; less than ever in time of war, when some captains were glad to sell where they could, and afraid to run the risk of capture by wandering from island to island in search of a market.²

¹ The market prices at Antigua for part of the 1750's can be followed very closely in the Coates-Reynell Papers, H.S.P.

² Jonathan Cowpland was bound for Antigua in Dec. 1756 but was chased by a privateer into St. Kitts and durst not go farther, though he was sure the markets were better elsewhere; a month later John Harper, in the service of the same ship-owner, was forced in exactly the same way to sit down at Antigua instead of St. Kitts. This is a good instance of the way the risks of war interfered with the freedom of the market (Cowpland to Clifford and Penington, Dec. 23, 1756,

§ v. *War Costs*

The West India pamphleteers sometimes tried to calculate the increase of their costs. Their estimates are to be suspected, because their object was to escape a tax on sugar, and very few people had less regard for truth, even among the hack writers of the eighteenth century. There is one, however, whose figures are correct in other respects and may perhaps be trusted here; he puts the advance in the price of necessaries at 35 per cent. and that of negroes at 50 per cent.¹

The rise of insurance is easily traced; there was a standard rate for peace, and very often a standard rate for war as well at the London market.² Ships returning from Barbados were ordinarily insured at 2½ or 5 per cent. in peace according to the season of the year; from the 26th of July to the 26th of January the risks of hurricanes in the tropics and high seas in the Channel were at their greatest, and the underwriters naturally demanded a greater premium than for the other six months. The insurance home from Jamaica alternated in the same way between 5 and 8 per cent. The rates fluctuated rather more in war. The insurance for ships sailing from Barbados to London remained pretty steady about 7 per cent. in the Spanish war, while that of the ships from Jamaica sometimes got up above 12. That was natural, for Barbados was almost outside the theatre of war so long as France remained neutral, while Jamaica was the centre of it. As soon as the French war was declared, the insurance from Barbados went up to 25 guineas; it came down to 20 when the first alarm was over, but returned to 25 on the news of Caylus's expedition to the West Indies, and stayed there

Clifford Correspondence, i, no. 195, H.S.P.; Harper to Clifford, i, no. 208). The underwriters may have contributed to the same result by the terms of their policies: their custom was to insure a voyage to certain islands and return a part of the premium for each one the ship did not touch at.

¹ *Considerations Relating to a New Duty on Sugar* (2nd ed.), especially pp. 34, 41. A very much worse production of the same kind is *The State of the Sugar-Trade, showing the Dangerous Consequences that must attend any additional Duty thereon* (London, 1747). This author starts from the assumption that insurance, freights, and taxes mechanically advanced with the price of sugar in the London market. That was nonsense.

² Most of these figures are taken from the letters of Messrs. Lascelles and Maxwell. So far as possible, I give only those of their dealings with the public companies; they do not always distinguish, but they appear to have disliked dealing with private underwriters, and only did so as an exceptional thing when their correspondents pressed them very hard for low premiums.

for the rest of the war. The insurance from Jamaica seems to have been at 25 guineas. In the Seven Years War the variations were somewhat greater. For voyages from Barbados to London, the insurance went up to 20 guineas at the beginning of 1757 and to 25 at the end of the year, perhaps because of Kersaint's and Caumont's squadrons in the West Indies. It came down to 20 next year; for some time after, I have no figures, but in the middle of 1760 it was at 12 guineas. The fluctuations of the Jamaica rate can be followed more easily. It rose to 20 guineas in the autumn of 1755, when the war was still only probable; returned soon afterwards to 12, but rose again for a short time to 15 on the declaration. After a slight fall, it went up to 25 and even 30 guineas in 1757. The reason is obvious: Beauffremont's and Kersaint's squadrons at St. Domingue caused great alarm at Jamaica, which was soon reflected in the insurers' premiums. A policy was signed at 35 guineas in January 1758, but that was exceptional; the rate began to fall, and by the end of 1759 it was down to 10 guineas. For some reason it rose next year; at the beginning of 1761 it was 20 guineas, fell to 12 in the summer, but mounted to 30 on the declaration of war against Spain and the invasion scare of January 1762. The extremities of this fluctuation illustrate the temperamental anxiety of West Indians for their property and the panic which the news of a squadron at St. Domingue created. The low premiums of 1759 and 1761 are a testimony to England's mastery of the sea in the latter years of the Seven Years War.

Ships in the West India trade were insured much cheaper on the outward voyages; for instance, the premiums from London to Barbados and Jamaica never rose above 15 guineas in the war of 1744, while the homeward rate was 25. The probable reason of this difference is the greater likelihood of a convoy outwards. The ships had no reason to run for a market in the West Indies, because their cargoes were not exported for sale but were already the property of the planters. Therefore they almost always waited for a convoy.

These are the rates at which ships were insured which sailed without the protection of a man-of-war. For those which took convoy the premium was reduced by as much as 7, 10, or even 15 guineas. Sometimes, however, the underwriters refused to return anything for convoy. They pointed out that a ship might part company with her escort in a storm and be taken; no doubt

this was one of the considerations which moved them to stipulate in 1746 that the return of premium should only be made if the ship sailed with convoy and arrived safe. For a few months at the beginning of 1747 they gave up this claim, but insisted on it more than ever after some of Commodore Legge's convoy had met with exactly the accident against which this condition was meant to safeguard them.¹ They were also very reluctant to allow for partial convoy clear of the islands. On the other hand, they consented readily to deductions for partial convoy through the Channel. This difference shows that the really dangerous part of the voyage to and from the West Indies was the Channel and the Soundings. Once clear of them, the outward trade ran a much smaller risk at the landfall of the West Indies; but a convoy clear of the islands on the way home left the ships just as much exposed to the greater danger in the Channel as no convoy at all.²

The convoy system was a necessary evil. The planters did not like it, for the arrival of so much produce together glutted the market.³ It rendered the fluctuations of prices more violent than in times of peace. The London sugar markets generally suffered great oscillations when the trade fleets returned from the West Indies. The prices usually rose very high in the spring, before the convoys could begin to be expected. For a month or two the buyers lived from hand to mouth in the hope of holding out until the new sugars should arrive. When they did so, the prices came down with a run. The planters suffered by the depreciation of their goods in the London market without receiving any compensation from that of their plantation supplies, because they ordered out manufactures from Europe on their own account and bought most of their victuals from the North Americans who did not come in convoys. They thus lost at one end without gaining at the other. The convoy system was also hard on the factors, and obliged them to find a very large capital at once for the duties which had to be paid before the sugars could be landed. According to Kinnoull, a good judge and a clever observer, the money market was disturbed by the

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Edward Pare, Sept. 17, 1746, W. & G. iii; to John Fairchild, March 25, 1747, to Lucas and Scott, Jan. 25, 1747/8, *ibid.*

² For a further discussion of convoys from the naval point of view, see pp. 303-11.

³ Letter of James Knight, Aug. 15, 1745, Add. MSS. 22677, f. 48. There are many confirmations in the correspondence of Messrs. Lascelles and Maxwell,

annual withdrawal from circulation of the great sums necessary for this purpose.¹

I cannot estimate the cost to the planters of these consequential injuries, but must be content with calculating that of the increased insurance itself. If the premium from London to Barbados rose from $2\frac{1}{2}$ guineas per cent. to 15, and that of the homeward voyage from $3\frac{3}{4}$ to 25 (the figures in the war of 1744), the whole addition to the sugar-planter's expenses was $12\frac{1}{2}$ guineas out and $21\frac{3}{4}$ home; or, if convoy was always taken, $7\frac{1}{2}$ guineas out and $11\frac{3}{4}$ home. These two figures cannot simply be added together, because the value of the goods brought out from England was only a fraction of that of the crop which returned.

The insurance also rose, of course, upon the vessels which carried slaves and provisions to the islands. I have hardly any statistics for the African trade and too many for the North American; it is hard to fix an average from the bewildering multitude of premiums at different towns, for different voyages, in different conjunctures to which the North American insurers were more sensitive than anybody. So far as I can tell, the average insurance for a voyage between North America and the English sugar colonies seems to have been about 4 per cent. in time of peace; it was usually a little less for the Barbados trade and a little more for that of Jamaica. The rates were vastly higher in war. Insurances were made at Salem for voyages to Barbados at 18 to 23 per cent. in 1747 and 1748, and to Jamaica at 22 to 25 per cent. At the beginning of the next war the premiums rose to about 20 per cent.—rather more for the Leeward Islands, where the French privateers were most dangerous. They declined after the beginning of 1758; policies were signed for ships bound to Barbados and Jamaica at 10 and 12 per cent. The success of the Martinique privateers raised them in 1760 to 14 or 16 per cent. and the Spanish war affected those

¹ Kinnoull to Newcastle, Oct. 17, 1759, Add. MSS. 32897, f. 181; Lascelles and Maxwell to James Bruce, Jan. 27, 1747/8, W. & G. iii. There were also some smaller inconveniences which barely deserve a mention. When a large convoy came home there was a run on the lighters which carried the sugars to the wharf; a captain who had got a lighter was in a hurry to disembark his cargo and sent the cask on shore in bad condition so that it sometimes burst. The crews of the merchant ships in the convoy were often pressed as soon as they arrived in the river, and the factors could only get the goods into the warehouses by hiring 'lumpers' who pilfered whatever they could (Lascelles and Maxwell to John Frere, Feb. 22, 1744/5, W. & G. ii; to Gedney Clarke, Feb. 1, 1762, vol. ix).

of the Jamaica trade still further. The premiums for the homeward voyages were usually 4 or 5 per cent. below these rates. The trade of North America to the islands differed from that of England, in that the outward voyage was much more dangerous than the return. The traders could hardly ever get convoy to the islands, but could very often get themselves escorted clear of them on the way home; enemy privateers were seldom met with on the coasts of North America.¹

Since this trade was commonly carried on at the risk of the North American merchants, it is to be questioned how much of the extraordinary premiums they made the planters pay in the prices of their goods. At any rate, it need not be reckoned here, because it entered into the cost of necessaries. The only part of the additional insurance which can be taken into consideration here is that of the trade between the West Indies and England, which may perhaps be reckoned at 21 per cent.²

Nobody was compelled to insure; some planters preferred to be their own insurers, and to divide their risk by shipping a small consignment on as many vessels as possible.³ That makes little difference to the calculation: if the risk was rightly represented by the premium, the uninsured planter must lose as much in the long run as he would have done if he had paid it. Some instructed their factors to have no insurance made if their goods were shipped with convoy. This was inconvenient and dangerous. It was sometimes uncertain, until she was actually gone, whether a ship would sail with convoy. She might be separated from the escort in a storm and taken by the enemy.⁴ Others increased the crews and armament of their ships and trusted

¹ John Moffatt, Portsmouth, N.H., to John Reynell, Sept. 14, 1758, Coates-Reynell Papers, H.S.P. The best collections of insurance policies, or lists of premiums, are to be found in the insurance note-book of Obadiah Brown, R.I.H.S., and the Timothy Orne MSS., vols. i to iv, Essex Institute; there are a few more notices for Salem in the Derby family MSS., vol. i, *ibid.*, and many other details scattered among the merchants' letters in the collections of other Historical Societies of the United States. Lascelles and Maxwell also made some insurances for these voyages, but the London premiums were considerably higher than those of the colonies, and less responsive to conjunctures.

² I have assumed that three-quarters of the planters took convoy out and home; that the cargoes brought out from England were only a third as valuable as the consignments of sugar; and that the valuation of sugars on which insurance was made rose in the islands about a quarter. This appears to give the figure of 20·3/8 guineas per cent. for the increase. That is to say, the premiums rose not by 21 per cent. of themselves but by 21 per cent. of the sum insured.

³ Lascelles and Maxwell to Benjamin Charnocke, Sept. 10, 1744, W. & G. ii.

⁴ Lascelles and Maxwell to Lucas and Scott, Jan. 25, 1747/8, W. & G. iii.

to their own defences. This only answered when they were to run without convoy, for the underwriters made no allowance for it. Besides, it increased the shipowner's expense; but it entitled him to charge more for the freight.¹

The common rate of freight from Barbados to London was 3*s.* 6*d.* a hundredweight of sugar. It rose a shilling at the beginning of the Spanish war; the shipowners were not satisfied with that, but they had to put up with it. The rate seems to have been 7*s.* 6*d.* or 8 shillings at the height of the war with France. The absentee planters in London agreed with the shipowners in February 1746 that 9 shillings should be charged that year, but the colonists repudiated the bargain. They could well afford to do so, because there was plenty of shipping at the island to take home the crop; the captains had to sign their bills of lading at 7*s.* 6*d.*² The rates do not appear to have been very different in the Seven Years War: freight from St. Kitts to London was at 8 shillings in May 1757, from Antigua to London at 7 shillings in May 1758. At some time in the Seven Years War the freight from Jamaica was 10 shillings, but in 1758 it was only 6.

The rate between North America and the islands did not rise quite so much: 5 shillings a hundredweight seems to have been a fair freight from Philadelphia to the Leeward Islands in peace; in war it seems to have varied between 7*s.* 6*d.* and 9 shillings.

Although particular bargains like that of 1746 might fail, the rate of freight was governed more or less by the shipowners' costs. There was nothing mechanical in this determination, for there was quite as much English shipping at the islands in war as in peace, and hardly more goods to carry home.³ Since the size of each island's crop varied considerably from year to year, there might be too many or too few ships to take it to market and their competition would lower or raise the rate, regardless of war and peace. Thus sugar was carried home from Antigua for only 5 shillings a hundredweight in 1747, because that year's crop was less than half the average, and those of all the islands

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Richard Gosling, Sept. 12, 1744, W. & G. ii; to A. Lynch, Jan. 7, 1744/5, *ibid.*; to Gedney Clarke, Sept. 4, 1756, vol. viii; to Samuel Carter, July 9, 1760, vol. ix.

² Lascelles and Maxwell to Thomas Applewhaite, March 1, 1745/6, W. & G. iii; to Foster March, Feb. 13, 1746/7, *ibid.*

³ Prize goods were sent to England, but usually in prize ships.

were low. The shipowners appear to have relied on the equity of the planters to fix a reasonable rate; and though they often complained that the advance in freight did not keep up with the increase of their costs, they acknowledged at other times that the planters had treated them better than they were obliged to do.¹ They had always a remedy in reserve, for if they were disgusted by too many losses they might employ their vessels in another trade next year, or get them into the service of the Government.²

That threat, however, was not so easily executed, because most of the regular ships in the trade were partly owned in the island. The arrangement was useful to both parties in time of peace; the planter hoped to be sure of a passage for his goods on a vessel in which he was interested, and in the same way the shipowner counted on finding enough goods to make him a fair profit. Perhaps it was partly because they were also interested in the profits of shipping, that the planters sometimes consented to raise the rates of freight higher than they need. This connexion of interests must, however, have made it difficult to divert the ships to other uses, and the interest of the captains must have added to the embarrassment. The captains were very important people in this trade, for it was their influence as much as anything else which procured the homeward freights; indeed, it was often the captain rather than the ship, or even the shipowner, that determined the planters to load their goods on a particular vessel. This experience and prestige would be wasted if the ship were taken out of the trade; moreover, many captains were also part-owners, and seem to have had a veto on anything they did not like.³ For these

¹ H. Lascelles and son to Thomas Applewhaite, March 17, 1739/40, Sept. 13, 1740, Aug. 29, 1741, W. & G. i; to Richard Morecroft, Feb. 20, 1740/1, *ibid.*; Lascelles and Maxwell to Applewhaite, Aug. 6, 1748, vol. iii.

² There were not enough ships in the West Indies to take off the crops of 1740, because so many owners had been tempted to take Government contracts (H. Lascelles and son to Francis March, Jamaica, Sept. 13, 1740, W. & G. i). At the same time it was reported in Philadelphia that the freight to the West Indies was very dear, because so many vessels were taken up for transports; shipowners refused cargoes of lumber which could only afford to pay a low rate, and reserved their vessels for cask goods (John Reynell to Samuel Dicker, Oct. 29, 1740, Reynell Letter-book, H.S.P.).

³ Lascelles and Maxwell to Samuel Husbands, Feb. 5, 1757, W. & G. viii. In 1750 they talk of building a ship for Captain Husbands, as if it were his goodwill rather than theirs or the ship's that was important (to John Fairchild, Dec. 29, 1750, vol. v; to Samuel Husbands, Jan. 10, 1750/1, *ibid.*).

reasons many ships continued in the trade through good years and bad, and took whatever rates of freight the planters could be brought to give. If they had not done so, there were always some North Americans ready to take a cargo from the islands to England. The London shipowners particularly disliked their competition, and dwelt on the folly of trusting sugars to cheap and bad vessels.¹

The war increased the cost of shipowning. Wages went up from 30 and 35 shillings a month to 70 and 80. This was not all the sailors' doing, for the press-gang made them really scarce. Sometimes they were not to be had at all; the delay of waiting for them added to the expense and made the vessel late for her market. The wage-bill was also increased by the necessity of waiting for convoy. Ships' stores and repairs were dearer, and the price of the ships themselves was kept up until 1759 by the demand for privateering; on the other hand the scarcity was somewhat eased by the sale of prize ships. In spite of all these discouragements, Messrs. Lascelles and Maxwell believed in 1744 that war was the best time to make a profit out of shipping; though they sometimes complained of difficulties in the Seven Years War, they afterwards looked back to it with regret.²

Many planters seem to have felt that these high rates of freight and insurance made all remittances of produce unprofitable. They did more than air this opinion in pamphlets;³ some of them ceased to consign their sugars to London on their own account, and sold them in the islands, remitting bills to England for such expenses as they might have there. This often answered their purpose very well, but involved the buyer in a loss.⁴ Besides, there were limits to it. Somebody had to send the produce to England, and if the planters would not do it on

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Thomas Applewhaite, March 1, 1745/6, W. & G. ii. They appear to have meant what they said (Henry Lascelles to John Frere, W. & G. A, p. 5).

² Henry Lascelles to Edward Lascelles, Nov. 6, 1740, W. & G. i; to Richard Morecroft, Jan. 30, 1740/1, *ibid.*; Lascelles and Maxwell to Nicholas Wilcox, Sept. 11, 1744, vol. ii; to John Newton, Jan. 10, 1750/1, vol. v; to Harriet Lynch, April 27, 1756, vol. vii; to Gedney Clarke, June 2, 1756, *ibid.*; to Samuel Husbards, June 6, 1768, vol. x.

³ *Considerations relating to a New Duty upon Sugar* (2nd ed., with supplement, 1746), pp. 33, 41.

⁴ Lascelles and Maxwell to John Harvie, Nov. 6, 1745, W. & G. ii; to John Brathwaite, March 25, 1747, vol. iii; to Nicholas Wilcox, Nov. 20, 1747, *ibid.*; to Philip Gibbes, Oct. 9, 1758, vol. viii.

their own accounts, they must accept some questionable bills from the merchants, whose credit was probably less established than their own.

§ vi. *War Taxes*

There remains to be considered one other charge upon the sugar-planter. He was more heavily taxed in war than in peace, both by Parliament and by his own legislature. With the worst will in the world, the islands could not avoid raising money for their defences; they sometimes had to pay for the years of neglect by a heavy and sudden increase in taxation. Thus the poll-tax of Montserrat rose from 7 shillings in 1743 to 32 in 1747; Mathew called this last tax the highest that any island had raised, and he was probably right.¹ It appears, however, from the figures that taxes by no means always rose in war time; some of the highest were laid in times of peace, or in the Spanish war which affected the Leeward Islands very little. There was nearly always some delay in passing the accounts, so that it is hard to tell whether the money was paid for present expenses or old debts. On the other hand, the levies of negro labour for the fortifications cost the slave-owners a great deal,

¹ I give the figures of all the islands for the sake of comparison:

	<i>Antigua</i>	<i>Barbados</i>	<i>Montserrat</i>	<i>Nevis</i>	<i>St. Kitts</i>	<i>Jamaica</i>
1739			6s. 9d. negro tax	4s. 6d. negro tax		
1740			..	9s. 6d.		
1741			4s. 6d.	7s.		
1742			5s. 6d.	3s. 7½d.		
1743			7s.	2s. 6d.		
1744			11s.	3s.		
1745			22s. 6d.	..		
1746			..	3s. 6d.		
1747			32s.	4s. 6d.		
1748			..	3s.		
1754		1s. 3d. negro tax		8s.	15s. negro tax	
1755		1s. 3d.		4s. 6d.	6s.	
1756	Sugar 9d. per cwt.	1s. 3d.			5s.	1s. negro tax
1757	8d.	7½d.			10s.	2s.
1758	1s.	1s. 10½d.			8s.	1s.
1759	6d.	2s. 6d.			7s.	1s.
1760	..	1s. 3d.			2s.	
1761	6d.	5s.				
1762	1d.					

for they were usually exacted without payment; the amount cannot be estimated.

The Assemblies were elected by the resident planters, and were naturally ready to throw as much of the burden as they could upon the absentees. St. Kitts and Antigua discriminated against them by taxing them at more than the ordinary rates. There was some excuse for this policy. If the tax had any effect upon the absentees, it would make them return to their plantations, where they would add to the military strength of the island and reinforce the discipline of the negroes.¹ It seemed a little hard that some planters should enjoy themselves in London or Bath upon the profits of estates which they left others to defend. There might, however, be some doubt whether a colonial legislature could decently or even lawfully punish His Majesty's subjects for living in whatever part of his dominions they thought fit; and since every planter aspired to be an absentee as soon as he could afford it, the Assemblies might be said to be discouraging honest industry.² Be that as it might, the absentees were a powerful body and could look after themselves. They had the ear of the Government; the Board of Trade allowed some of the taxing Acts to stand, but told Governor Mathew to reject such a clause for the future. The Assembly of Antigua held out for a time and refused to pass a money bill without it, but came to heel in 1746.³

Though their own legislatures laid upon them no insupportable burdens, the planters had to reckon with Parliament. The cost of the war was paid largely by loans, which needed to be secured by funds of additional taxation. The Treasury natur-

¹ There were presumably some absentees who thought it their interest or their duty to return to the islands in war-time; John White, an absentee Councillor of St. Kitts, told the Board of Trade in 1755 that he should not go back unless he was obliged to do so by a war with France (White to Pownall, June 21, 1755, C.O. 152/28, BB 52).

² Fane to the Board of Trade, Nov. 26, 1744, C.O. 152/24, Y 73; Antigua Council Minutes, July 23, 1742, C.O. 9/14; compare this with the argument of the Governor and Intendant of St. Domingue, that the luxury of absentees advertised the colony and drew new settlers to it (Vaudreuil and Laporte-Lalanne to Machault, June 10, 1755, A.N. Colonies C⁹ A 96).

³ Mathew to the Board of Trade, April 15, 1743, C.O. 152/24, Y 61; Fane to the Board of Trade, Nov. 26, 1744, Y 73; Order in Council of March 7, 1744/5, C.O. 152/25, Y 133; Douglas to the Board of Trade, March 19, 1744/5, *ibid.*, Y 77; Mathew to the Board of Trade, July 6, 1745, *ibid.*, Y 139. A tax of this kind was proposed by the Assembly of Barbados but rejected by the Council (Henry Lascelles to Thomas Applewhaite, April 20, 1741, W. & G. i).

ally cast its eye upon sugar and its by-products. The West India interest was always on the alert against a new duty. It was talked of in the session of 1742-3, but Sandys, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, contented himself with taxing molasses. The West India pamphleteers said that this reduced the price of molasses from 16 shillings to 9s. 6d. the hundredweight, which was equivalent to a duty of 2s. 7d. on every hundredweight of sugar. The distiller could not raise the price upon the consumer, because the smuggler of French brandy would undersell him, and the refiner who received less for his molasses had to pay the planter less for his sugar.¹ The price of sugar did not fall much in 1743 on account of this duty, because a great deal was re-exported to the Continent that year; but the distilling of molasses seems to have been affected, for the quantity excised as low wines fell.² According to a later writer, the additional duty did not even increase the revenue.³ It continued nevertheless to be paid; the Jamaica Assembly complained later that while it might have been bearable in war-time, it weighed very heavily on the low prices of peace. That was the worst of duties raised to fund loans; they had to be borne until the loans were repaid.⁴

There was a much more serious controversy in 1744 over Henry Pelham's proposal to lay a new duty on sugar, and again in 1759 over Legge's budget. The great question was, who would pay the tax—the planter or the consumer? The Government and its supporters seem to have thought in 1744 that the consumer would do so; they argued that the price had been rising for some time without affecting the consumption, and could safely go a little farther.⁵ The planters and their advo-

¹ *Considerations relating to a New Duty on Sugar* (2nd ed.), pp. 25-6.

² The figures are:

1742	1,175,924	gallons
1743	980,494	„
1744	410,697	„
1745	543,415	„

The table (C.O. 390/3, f. 21) ends in 1745. The quantity had been over a million gallons in every year but one since 1725.

³ *Considerations relating to the laying any Additional Duty on Sugar from the British Plantations* (London, 1747), p. 22.

⁴ Address of the Council and Assembly to the King, April 14, 1749, C.O. 137/58. Rum was exempted from a new duty on spirituous liquors in 1751 (Lascelles and Maxwell to Edmund Duany, July 9, 1751, W. & G. v), but not from that of 1760 (Memorial of the Agents to Newcastle, Feb. 28, 1760, Add. MSS. 32902, f. 460).

⁵ *Parl. Hist.* xiii. 640; Lascelles and Maxwell to Thomas Applewhaite, Jan. 17, 1743/4, W. & G. ii; to William Gibbons, Jan. 17, *ibid.*

cates earnestly denied it, though it is worth noticing that when the sugar duty was talked of, some of the very merchants who refused to admit that it could possibly raise the price, warehoused their sugars in the hope that it would.¹

The planters' arguments were a little obscure. Duties, they said, had nothing to do with prices, which depended only on supply and demand. The additional duty on molasses had not raised the price but lowered it (they added, in the later controversies on this subject, that the duty of 1748 upon sugar had not prevented the fall of prices after the peace in that year).² They made out that the English market was always slightly overstocked with sugars because the colonies produced more than it could consume. They admitted that some sugar was re-exported, in fact they sometimes exaggerated the amount, in order to appeal to the zealots of the balance of trade; but they argued that the re-exportation only took place when there was an exceptional plenty in England and the prices were very low there, because the French could undersell the English at all other times.³ This was quite wrong: sugar was rather re-exported when the price abroad was particularly high because the crops of the foreign colonies had failed or been detained by war. Since the Act of 1739 the planters had a weapon which they could use against the English consumer when they were not satisfied with the price he offered—they could send their sugars directly to the south of Europe. Although they had complained of the limitations which prevented them from taking advantage of this permission, they now said that the additional duty on sugar imported into England would compel them to resort to it.⁴ Here they made a tactical mistake, for it was impossible to argue against everybody at the same time; some of their adversaries replied that they were delighted to hear this, for they welcomed anything that would increase our exports and the favourable balance of trade.⁵ The planters did not really mean to put this threat in force; indeed they could not do so for ever, for, as Beckford said in 1748, the direct exportation to Europe was only profitable in war-time when our

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Florentius Vassall, Feb. 4, 1743/4, W. & G. ii.

² *Reasons against laying any new Tax upon Sugar*, in St. Kitts Council Minutes, June 25, 1759, C.O. 241/7.

³ *Considerations relating to a new duty upon Sugar* (2nd ed.), pp. 8–10.

⁴ Letter of James Knight, 1744 (undated), Add. MSS. 22677, f. 64.

⁵ Watkins to Newcastle, Feb. 21, 1759, Add. MSS. 32888, f. 214.

control of the sea hindered the carriage of French sugars to market.¹

The planters did not think it made much difference in the end whether they or the consumer bore the burden of this tax. If the consumer paid it, the high price would reduce his consumption, and production must begin to diminish soon afterwards. The small cultivators would be driven out of the business, and emigrate to the foreign islands. Many people had already gone to Essequibo and St. Croix, where they could continue to make sugar with advantage, rather than stay in the Empire and turn their hands to other crops;² for indeed the capital, labour, and experience of a sugar-planter could not be diverted to cotton, coffee, or ginger without disastrous loss. Thus the tax would turn our own planters into foreign competitors. The defence of the islands would be weakened by this emigration, and they would become a prey to the negroes or the enemy. Only the great capitalists would remain, and even they would be forced to stint their crops. The price of sugar would be kept down abroad while it rose at home, and the English refiners would suffer by the smuggling of Dutch refined sugars into the eastern counties.³ Lastly, the planters reminded the Government that it had already killed the cultivation of indigo by a tax; they asked whether it wished to treat sugar in the same way. They repeated once more their invariable argument that it was lower duties that enabled the French producers to undersell them.⁴

This was not enough to convince. Money had to be found for the war, and if the sugar-planters did not pay it, somebody else must. Much was made of the antagonism between the landed and the planting interests. Light-headed Dodington

¹ *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 193.

² *Considerations relating to the laying any Additional Duty on Sugar from the British Plantations* (London, 1747), p. 16. The argument assumes that it was the poor who emigrated; that may have been true in the seventeenth century, but I do not believe it still was. It appears to have been rich capitalists who founded new plantations in Essequibo; indeed it is unlikely that anybody else would have been welcome there. We hear of servants, slaves, and tools imported there from Barbados, and new comers who taught the inhabitants how to make sugar—always a rich man's industry (*Storm van 's Gravesande*, ed. Sir C. Harris, Hakluyt Society, 1911, i. 211-13). In fact some of these planters continued to live in Barbados, like Gedney Clarke, who was Collector of Customs there.

³ *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 192-5 (Beckford).

⁴ *Considerations relating to a New Duty upon Sugar*, pp. 13-16; *Considerations relating to the laying any Additional Duty on Sugar from the British Plantations*, p. 8.

promised to vote against the duty in 1744 because it would ruin the planters, but admitted that they were the only people left to ruin since every other interest was undone by taxes already. Vernon acknowledged the same thing in other words.

'He is perhaps the only man in the opposition that declared to the committee that attended him, he would vote for the Sugar Bill, not but he was convinced the duty would fall upon the planter, and for that reason, because, he said, they would otherwise be for raising a new tax upon the people here, which would affect himself, and concluded that his shirt was near him but his skin was nearer.'¹

The land-tax had already been raised on account of the war; why should not the sugar-planters pay something too?

The West India pamphleteers had to meet this argument. They pointed out truly that a land-tax of four shillings in the pound did not effectively amount to more than three because the assessments for it were too low; they added that the English landowner was only taxed upon his rental while they had to pay duty on their gross income. When the planters were asked why they did not contribute to the war, they answered that they did. Not only were their freights, costs, and premiums of insurance increased, but they raised additional taxes for their defence besides paying, in all the islands but Jamaica, the 4½ per cent. duty which was supposed to be granted for the expenses of their own Government but was applied chiefly to other objects.²

Nevertheless, the sugar-planters were beginning to incur envy and dislike. The House of Commons was reported to be downright vindictive against them in 1759, and there was a strong feeling of hostility to them in certain quarters of the City.³ The rising price of their produce and the fortunes which their absentees flaunted, had created a bad impression. They could not remove it by arguing that the prices were affected by transient influences which brought them no profit, or that the absentees were few and unrepresentative, and lived beyond

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to James Bruce, Jan. 17, 1743/4, W. & G. ii; to George Hannay, Feb. 12, *ibid.*

² Antigua Assembly Minutes, Sept. 22, 1743, petition of the legislature, C.O. 9/15; *Considerations relating to the laying any Additional Duty upon Sugar from the British Plantations*, p. 13; *Considerations relating to a New Duty upon Sugar*, pp. 20-4.

³ Henry Wilmot to the St. Kitts Committee of Correspondence, March 24, 1759, in St. Kitts Council Minutes, June 25, 1759, C.O. 241/7; Watkins to Newcastle, Dec. 19, 1758, Add. MSS. 32886, f. 401; Feb. 21 and 26, 1759, vol. 32888, ff. 214, 256.

their means.¹ (Beckford went farther and argued that nobody could be expected to spend his life in the disagreeable climate of the West Indies without the inducement of a handsome fortune.)² The landed gentry had a political grievance against them, too, for they had begun to usurp the Parliamentary representation of too many boroughs.³ Beckford tried to defend his fellow planters in the House of Commons, but was interrupted by horse-laughs every time he uttered the word 'sugar'. Pitt tried to stem this tide of malice.

'He said the produce of the Sugar Colonies ought not to be put upon the foot of foreign luxury, that their produce was the labour of our own people, that they are supplied with everything from hence, that they sent home all their produce and are the support of our marine, that he did not know but the landed gentlemen seemed to consider themselves in a separate interest from the colonies, that he should ever consider the colonies as the landed interest of this Kingdom and it was a barbarism to consider them otherwise.'

These were fine sentiments, but they did not go down.⁴

The political history of the sugar taxes during these wars is worth following in some detail. The West India interest first tried to dissuade Pelham from laying one in 1743, and only had recourse to pamphleteering and canvassing against the Government when his mind appeared to be made up. It was a difficult thing to resist a tax proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the more so because the House had lately resolved to receive no petitions against money bills. A Barbadian Member of Parliament named Drax conceived the idea of effecting the same purpose by remonstrating against the existing duties as already too high; the ranting Alderman Heathcote, who would do anything to spite any Ministry, concurred with him, but the Speaker condemned this quibble.⁵ Nevertheless, the planters had everything on their side. The Opposition voted, of course, against anything the Government proposed; Pitt, already regarded as the most dangerous speaker in the House, 'desired and received a brief' against the Bill. Sandys, whom Pelham had lately superseded as Chancellor of the Exchequer,

¹ Antigua Assembly Minutes, Sept. 22, 1743, C.O. 9/15; *Considerations relating to a New Duty upon Sugar*, pp. 11, 36; *Reasons against laying any new Tax upon Sugar*, C.O. 241/7.

² *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 189.

³ Watkins to Newcastle, Feb. 21, 1759, Add. MSS. 32888, f. 214.

⁴ St. Kitts Council Minutes, June 25, 1759, C.O. 241/7.

⁵ Lascelles and Maxwell to Thomas Applewhaite, Feb. 11, 1743/4, W. & G. ii.

would not do anything to help his supplanter; Carteret was struggling with Pelham for the control of the Cabinet and was suspected of instructing his friends underhand to vote against the tax. The Prince of Wales was said to have done so too.¹

The planters struck a most fortunate bargain with the Irish and Scotch members who represented the linen interests. The object of the latter was to lay an additional tax on foreign linens, or to abolish the drawback of the duty on foreign linens exported to the colonies. The planters, as consumers in the colonies, had opposed this successfully in 1739, but now joined with the Scotch and Irish members in recommending this way of raising revenue as an alternative to the sugar tax.² Pelham got his duty through the committee but was defeated by twelve votes on the report stage of the Bill. He might perhaps have forced his measure upon the House, but he preferred to yield. He did not, however, allow the linen-manufacturers to tax the colonial consumer, but found the necessary revenue in another way. The linen interest had now served the planters' turn; some West India merchants thought it imprudent to keep up the alliance, for its success could only save the islands from the sugar duty at a heavy cost to their pocket. The Planters' Club in London thought otherwise; the sugar tax was only put off, and would sooner or later be revived unless an alternative source of revenue was kept in reserve. In fact the sugar and linen interests were still supporting each other in 1755; the legislature of Antigua then instructed its agent to resist the Hamburg linen-importers' proposal to abolish the bounties on Scotch and Irish linen.³

The planters were right in thinking that the sugar tax was only postponed. They were saved from it in 1745 by an additional duty on wines and in 1746 by one on glass and malt spirits. Pelham continued to think that sugar would bear another duty, and made up his mind in 1747 to impose one in

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Thomas Applewhaite, Jan. 17, 1743/4, W. & G. ii; to James Bruce, Jan. 17, to John Frere, Feb. 14, 1743/4, *ibid.*; Parliamentary diary of the Hon. Philip Yorke, Feb. 13 and 20, 1743/4, *Parl. Hist.* xiii. 640, 652-5.

² Samuel Martin to the Montserrat Committee of Correspondence, Feb. 24, 1743/4, Montserrat Assembly Minutes, May 26, 1744, C.O. 177/4; Lascelles and Maxwell to John Fairchild, Jan. 17, 1743/4, W. & G. ii; to George Hannay, Feb. 12 and March 12; to James Bruce, March 12; to Conrade Adams, April 20, 1744; to John Fairchild, March 2, 1744/5, *ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*; Nathaniel Newnham to Stone, Feb. 19, 1744/5, Add. MSS. 32704, f. 77; Antigua Council Minutes, Sept. 23, 1755, and April 20, 1756, C.O. 9/21.

the form of a subsidy on dry goods imported. The planters found that the country party had deserted them; they had no choice but to submit.¹

The sugar duty of 1759 nearly caused a Cabinet crisis. It was Legge's tax, and Newcastle was for it, though he had fulsomely assured Pitt that he looked upon the Sugar Colonies as a most valuable part of the possessions of the Crown.² His friends and advisers in the City strongly urged to him to support it, representing that nothing would be so popular with the landed interest. Pitt disliked it, but he would consent even less to any of Legge's other schemes. He disclaimed responsibility for it, and told the West India Agents that taxes were not in his department and he should consider them as a private Member of Parliament from his place in the House. This was a curious attitude for a Secretary of State, even in a coalition Ministry and in those days. Legge compromised on an additional 5 per cent. on certain dry goods, of which sugar was the most important. It amounted to 1s. 6d. on each hundredweight.³ In the event Pitt dared not openly resist, though he defended Beckford from the mockers. He could not deny that the Government must have money. He sulked, and contrived to quarrel with Legge over the manner while he assented ungraciously to the substance of the measure. In fact this dispute dissolved for ever the partnership of Pitt and Legge, which they had so much aired a few years earlier.⁴ The planters were powerless, for the House was so hostile to them that it would have voted any tax on sugar which Legge could have asked. The duty certainly cannot be said to have raised the price of sugar, which fell at

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Applewhaite, Bruce and Lake, Dec. 20, 1747, W. & G. iii; to Joseph Jordan, Dec. 19, *ibid.*; *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 155-95 (Henry Pelham and Beckford).

² Newcastle to Pitt, March 27, 1755, G.D. 8/51. There was a doubt whether Newcastle intended to alter the drawbacks on refined sugar; Pitt was up in arms about it, and Newcastle swore, falsely as it would appear, that he had never meant it.

³ Wilmot to St. Kitts Committee of Correspondence, March 24, 1759, St. Kitts Council Minutes, June 25, 1759, C.O. 241/7; Legge to Newcastle, Jan. 25, Add. MSS. 32887, f. 333; Newcastle's memoranda of Feb. 19 and 28, March 8, 1759, vol. 32888, ff. 173, 275, 408; Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 8, f. 287.

⁴ West's House of Commons report, March 9, 1759, Add. MSS. 32888, f. 428. (West mentions one remarkable fact: the politician Samuel Martin, though a West Indian, supported Legge, saying he believed the tax would fall on the planters but they could well afford it.) Watkins to Newcastle, March 22, 1759, vol. 32889, f. 197; Newcastle's notes of a conversation with Viry, March 24, f. 221.

the end of the year and never rose again to such a height. This tax, like the others, was permanent, and as it was levied at the artificial valuation of the Book of Rates it weighed heavier in peace than on the higher prices of war. On the other hand the price of sugar never came down to the level of the thirties, and it might be argued that it was the tax, among other things, that prevented it from doing so.

§ vii. *The Planter's Profit and Loss in War-time*

We are now able to calculate very roughly the cost of the war to the planters. The insurance rose by about 21 per cent. of the value of the homeward cargoes. Exactly how the sugars were valued for insurance, does not clearly appear, but perhaps the safest figure to take is the price of sugars in the islands; it probably represents in the long run the equivalent of the net proceeds in London. If we take Barbados as our example, let us say 21 per cent. of 30 shillings currency, which is 6s. 3d. currency. Freight rose by 4s. 6d. sterling upon an average, and English duties by 3 shillings, of which only 1s. 6d. was imposed in the war of 1744, and that at the very end. It may be uncertain who lost most by the duties in the last resort, but the importer certainly had to pay them before the sugars could be sold, so they may justly be included in this calculation. The cost of necessaries may be held to have increased 35 per cent., but it is difficult to know how to assess this article in terms of shillings per hundredweight. The most reliable West India pamphleteer reckons it at 8s. 11d. sterling in the war of 1744, but even his figures and calculations are rather doubtful.¹ It is impossible to define plantation necessaries, or to guess the value of the imports from Africa and North America to the islands—even the statistics of the imports from England rest upon purely conventional values. We do not know how much of the cost of these articles was met by the rum and molasses; estimates varied from a third to very nearly the whole. The figure of 8s. 11d. sterling looks somewhat high, from what little is known of these factors, so it would perhaps be safe to allow something for West India exaggeration and guess 8s. 11d. currency. This is an arbitrary figure, but it needs some effrontery to publish a calculation of this sort at all. The result for the War of 1744 is 15s. 2d. currency and 6 shillings sterling; translate the whole

¹ *Considerations relating to a New Duty on Sugar* (2nd ed.), p. 42.

into sterling at 35 per cent. and the amount is nearly 15s. 9d. sterling. If I am right in thinking that the prices rose from about a guinea to 38 shillings, it will appear that the planter neither gained nor lost very much by the war.¹

The price did not rise by nearly so much in the Seven Years War; but then it had not fallen back during the peace to the level of 1739. There were never more complaints from the consumer.

The other tests which can be applied produce very much the same results. The price of sugar in the islands did not vary much from war to peace. The highest prices of all are peace prices, but so are the lowest; the average seems to have been somewhere near 30 shillings in Barbados and 35 shillings in Antigua from 1748 to 1763, the period for which the statistics are fullest. This stability is a strong testimony to the efficiency of the navy if it is compared with the great fall of prices which took place at the French islands as soon as a war began.

It is almost impossible to make any sense of the rates of exchange: they did not correspond with the size of the crops or the price in London: war and peace seem to have made no ascertainable difference to them.² The Government spent more

¹ This calculation differs a little from that of the *Considerations*. The author does not include the duty, which had not yet been laid; but he underestimates the increase of the price of sugar, because he takes as his starting-point the price of 1739, which was somewhat higher than the average for the decade before the war.

² The following table will make clear the difficulties of the subject:

	<i>Antigua</i>		<i>Barbados</i>		<i>London Sugar Price s. d.</i>
	<i>Exchange Premium</i>	<i>Crop</i>	<i>Exchange Premium</i>	<i>Crop</i>	
1739	High	Large	Low	Rather small	25 8
1741			Very low	Large	30 5
1744			High	Very small	30 7
1746	Moderate	Moderate	High	Rather small	39 5
1747	Moderate	Very small			42 9
1750	High	Moderate			27 9
1751	High	Moderate	High	Rather small	30 6
1752	Very high	Rather small			38 7
1753	Low to moderate	Very large			33 0
1754	Moderate to high	Very small	High	Moderate	35 8
1757			Moderate to high	Moderate	37 1
1758	Very low	Very large	Moderate to high	Moderate	42 5
1760			Moderate	Moderate	..
1761	Moderate	Large	Moderate	Rather large	..
1762			Low to moderate	Rather large	..
1763			Moderate to high	Rather large	..

in the West Indies and drew more bills in war-time; the Dutch of St. Eustatius bought prize goods and paid for them with bills. Undoubtedly the discount tended to diminish for these reasons, but even stronger forces seem to have been driving it up.¹

The islands often complained of scarcity of money, but the legislatures made no attempt in this period to keep it in circulation by arbitrarily raising its value, until the end of the Seven Years War. Then Jamaica passed a law to increase the nominal value of Spanish dollars, and Barbados later considered following the example. The absentees and merchants in England were up in arms. Alderman Beckford, though an ostentatious lover of his native island, appeared before the Board of Trade to complain of the injury to credit, by which he meant creditors. This is not surprising, for the Beckford family had made its huge fortunes by a judicious combination of money-lending with planting. Daniel Lascelles, who had lent very large sums to the planters of Barbados, was equally indignant when he heard of the law which had been proposed there. The Board of Trade recommended the repeal of the Jamaica Act.²

Probably the conditions of exchange and currency were more affected by the demand for money in Europe than was usually recognized. An anonymous writer suggested this soon after the Peace of Paris. He accounted for the scarcity of cash in the colonies in this way among others: 'For that the want of money

A 'high' rate of exchange in this table means a high premium of exchange—45 per cent. for Barbados or 80 per cent. for Antigua; 'low' means 30 per cent. for Barbados and 50 per cent. for Antigua. I have not thought it right to make any reference to the imports into the colonies, because they were constantly rising and it would be difficult to classify them as high or low, also because the imports from England, the only ones for which we have any figures, were seldom paid for by bills: they were ordered by the planters and set against their credit balances in the hands of the factors. The prices of sugars—presumably Barbados and Leeward Island sugars—are taken from the sales of the King's sugars in London. They are not very good averages to take, but are better than none. They appear to be a little below such other market rates as I can discover; that was to be expected, since the worst sugars were usually given in payment of the 4½ per cent. tax.

¹ Thus though the Government bills for subsisting Cathcart's forces affected the Jamaica rate of exchange, and although a ring of moneyed men tried to keep it at 110, it soon recovered to the normal rate of 125 and even rose to 135 and 140. The contractors for the remittance attributed this to the cash they had sent to Jamaica in order to break the ring (*Calendar of Treasury Books, 1742-5*, p. 7), but others ascribed it to the brisk trade with the Spanish Main. (Colebrooke to Pelham, Sept. 1, 1741, Bodleian Library, North MSS. a 6, f. 126.)

² *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 1759-63*, pp. 85, 87, 90-1. Lascelles and Maxwell to T. Stevenson and sons, April 28 and Oct. 2, 1762, W. & G. ix.

in Europe in the last years of the war, drew specie from all parts of the globe, where it was to be found, and therefore must have drawn from our colonies.¹ It was not that the planters invested in English funds—there are very few records of it—but the shortage of money in Europe caused the creditors to make special efforts to draw home their debts. This would increase the demand for bills in the colonies and might even make it profitable to send gold to England.

Perhaps this will become clearer from an examination of the effect of war upon the planter's credit. It exposed his estate to some danger of invasion and therefore lessened its value. Old creditors became anxious about the security of their debts, and new correspondents refused to agree to advances. Messrs. Lascelles and Maxwell, for example, made many efforts to contract their credits on account of the war.² It is true that they used the peace as an argument to the same purpose, alleging the low price of sugars as a reason for securing themselves against the bankruptcy of the planters; the logic of creditors, like that of debtors, is versatile and can turn opposite premisses to the same conclusion. However, the sincerity of their arguments to their old debtors is proved by their reluctance to enter into engagements with new ones.³

Security was not the only consideration. The planter's chief creditor was usually his factor, with whom he first ran into debt by casual overdrafts and often ended by giving a bond or a mortgage for a loan. The high freights, insurances, and taxes of war-time obliged the factor to employ in his trade a larger capital than he would have wanted in peace; the sugars could not be sold till these had been paid, and the buyers were unusually slow in settling their accounts.⁴ Meanwhile half the planters had drawn bills on the strength of their sugars, and these had to be honoured.⁵ Besides, it might be a factor's duty to his correspondents to warehouse their sugars and wait for a better market. How could he do this if he was distressed for

¹ Add. MSS. 38373, f. 130.

² Lascelles and Maxwell to John Fairchild, Feb. 13, 1743/4, W. & G. ii; to Nicholas Rice, Sept. 6, 1744; George Maxwell to Henry Slingsby, May 4, 1745; to John Brathwaite, Nov. 1745, *ibid.*

³ Lascelles and Maxwell to Nicholas Newton, Aug. 6, 1748, W. & G. iii; to Edward Pare, Dec. 9, 1746, *ibid.*

⁴ George Maxwell to James Bruce, Feb. 5, 1747/8, and June 16, 1748, W. & G. iii.

⁵ Lascelles and Maxwell to Jacob Allin, Nov. 27, 1745, W. & G. ii.

money? When they were very hard put to it in the rebellion of 1745, Lascelles and Maxwell had to sell off their correspondents' sugars at any rate in order to save their own credit; they began with the property of those who had drawn large bills on them, but were forced to go farther and sell all the sugars consigned to them. In such an emergency, how could they be blamed?¹

The factor had the less to spare for loans when the ordinary demands of his profession increased in this way. Moreover he was himself forced to borrow in emergencies: in some degree he seems to have been a mere channel through which the credit of the London banker reached the planter.² Money was always harder to borrow in war-time; the reason which Lascelles and Maxwell usually gave was the universal desire to speculate in the public funds. They asked their debtors how anybody could expect money at 5 per cent. on a West India security when the possessors could make 10 or 20 per cent. in six months by buying and selling Government stocks? At the beginning of the Seven Years War all the money was mobilized for speculation on the war, and towards the end it was all called out again for speculation on the peace.³ Accordingly it was at the crises of English credit that the factors cried loudest for repayments—the rebellion of 1745, the great fall of the stocks in the winter of 1747–8, another financial crisis in 1753, and the chronic shortage of money at the end of the Seven Years War. It mattered very little whether the colonial legislatures tinkered with the currency, or the drawers of bills combined to raise the rate of exchange: the credit of the Sugar Colonies, and perhaps their plenty or scarcity of money too, depended most of all on the financial weather in London.

¹ Lascelles and Maxwell to Joseph Jordan, Jan. 8, 1745/6, W. & G. ii; to William Gibbons, Jan. 15, *ibid.*

² Lascelles and Maxwell to Benjamin Charnocke, Nov. 3, 1746, W. & G. iii; to Samuel Husbands, Nov. 20, 1747, *ibid.*; to Jeremiah Browne, May 20, 1751, vol. v.

³ George Maxwell to J. and A. Harvie, Aug. 21 and Nov. 8, 1755, W. & G. vii; to Richard Husbands, Feb. 5, 1757, vol. viii; to T. Stevenson and sons, April 29, 1760, vol. ix.

ENGLAND AND SPAIN IN THE WEST INDIES, 1748-61

THE period of colonial warfare which is discussed in this book began with a single combat against Spain which was complicated in 1744 by a war against France; it ended with a single combat against France, to which was added in 1762 a war against Spain. The first Spanish war of 1739 was described in the earlier chapters of this book; the description was followed by an account of the strategy and economic effect of the French wars. It is time now to say something of the second Spanish war of 1762. The West India colonies were, for the most part, more immediately concerned with the French wars and more profoundly affected by them; but the picture of England's imperial policy would not be complete without an account of her intricate dealings with France and Spain, which led up to the Family Compact and the War of 1762. For this purpose, it is necessary to turn back to the story of Anglo-Spanish relations, and to take it up at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which put an end to the War of 1739.¹

§ i. *The Treaties of 1748 and 1750*

The South Sea Company assumed that the Government would get the Assiento renewed for it at the peace; but that was by no means certain. The attitude of the Court of Spain on this subject was constant and definite. It had no intention of suffering any revival of the Assiento trade, if that could possibly be avoided; indeed it does not seem to have wanted to grant a single monopoly to the subjects of any nation.² Instead, it allowed the enthusiastic dotard Macanaz, who represented it at the conferences of Breda in 1746-7, to propose the establishment of a free port for slaves, to which the subjects of all nations might trade. This scheme, as he pointed out, would work to the advantage of England, as she was the strongest slave-trading power on the African coast.³ The Court of France, which took upon itself the direction and representation of Spanish foreign

¹ For the earlier history of these relations, see Chapters I to III.

² See the denunciations of the Assiento by Ulloa (*Restablecimiento de las Fabricas y Comercio Español* (Madrid, 1740), ii. 17, 100). His chief objection to it is the excuse and opportunity it affords for smuggling.

³ Macanaz's scheme transmitted by Sandwich, April 21, 1747, S.P. 84/425, f. 79.

policy in the conferences with England, was not anxious to snatch the Assiento for its own subjects. It had consented to go without it by the Treaty of Fontainebleau (1743), but some of its advisers hoped that England could be induced to accept a compensation for both Assiento and Annual Ship, which gave her an advantage by furnishing too many occasions for smuggling.¹

The South Sea Company on the other hand seems to have hoped at least to enjoy the Assiento for the years which were unexpired at the outbreak of the war in 1739. Indeed it went farther, and revived the arguments for a longer period; it claimed that the thirty years must be interpreted as thirty trading years, and added that the debts which the Crown of Spain owed it could not conveniently be paid except by such an extension.² If the Assiento were renewed for no more than the four years which were due according to the Spanish interpretation, it would hardly be worth the Company's while to resettle the factories and start the whole machine again. Be that as it might, the Directors thus set the English Ministry, in so far as it accepted their claims, a much more complicated problem than the mere renewal of the contract. The period must be defined, and the question of indebtedness between the Company and the Crown of Spain must be brought into consideration.³

It is not very easy, even on a small point like this, to follow the distracted and tortuous motions of the English Ministers. In 1747 Newcastle was pressing very hard to detach Spain from France, and was willing to sacrifice to that political advantage a purely commercial point like the Assiento. His colleagues were a little less ready for this, though some of them, like Bedford, were willing then and later to buy a separate peace with Spain by concessions of an even more striking nature.⁴ Newcastle had his way. He told Sandwich, the English plenipotentiary, that though he was to try to have the Assiento ques-

¹ Instructions to St. Séverin, Feb. 29, 1748, *Recueil des Instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France, Hollande*, iii. 128; A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 80, f. 111; Angleterre, 41, ff. 188, 200.

² *V. supra*, pp. 53-4.

³ Court of Directors, South Sea Company, to Keene, March 16, 1748/9, Add. MSS. 32816, ff. 258-9; Bedford to Keene, Aug. 17, 1749, S.P. 94/136, with enclosed paper of Burrell and Bristow.

⁴ I refer to the scheme for giving back Gibraltar; some account of it will be found in Sir Richard Lodge's *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, pp. 238-52, 295, 314-16.

tion left to be decided after the peace by commissioners, he might at last yield, give up the Assiento altogether (but not the private debts of the Crown of Spain to the Company), and accept Macanaz's scheme of a free port.¹ After the conferences of Breda had come to nothing (for European, not for American reasons), the attitude even of Newcastle seems to have hardened. In fact he had ceased to wish for a separate peace with Spain, because it would not end the war of France against England or of Spain against Austria.² Bedford too was perhaps less anxious for it, since he had been forced to see that it would not enable England to preserve his favourite conquest of Louisbourg. Sandwich was therefore instructed in 1748 to get the Assiento Treaty renewed.³

So he did; but that was only the beginning of the difficulty. First, what was to be the period of the renewal? By the preliminary treaty the contract was continued for the number of years during which the Company had not enjoyed it—the phrase was *non-jouissance*. This left the question between the King of Spain's and the Company's interpretations perfectly open; but the Court of Spain, if it had to yield to any renewal at all, had certainly intended to have that question closed, and in its own way. It was not Sotomayor, the Spaniard, but St. Séverin, the Frenchman, who had negotiated the preliminaries with Sandwich, and had accepted from him the fatal phrase *non-jouissance*. He turned this blunder—if indeed it was a blunder—very ingeniously to account by taking Sotomayor's part against Sandwich, and averting, at least for the period of the conferences, that detachment of Spain which England had worked hard to obtain. Sandwich and Sotomayor concerted a declaration that England and Spain would discuss an equivalent for the unexpired years of the Assiento; but as long as Spain depended on the support of France, for reducing those years from ten or fifteen to four, Sotomayor could do nothing very dangerous behind St. Séverin's back.⁴

¹ Newcastle to Sandwich, April 11, 1747, Add. MSS. 32808, f. 61.

² Tabuerniga to Carvajal, with Newcastle's emendations, March 1748, Add. MSS. 32811, f. 411. See the discussion of these questions in *An Apology for a late Resignation*, *The Resignation Discuss'd*, and *National Prejudice Opposed to the National Interest*, three pamphlets of 1748; also Lodge, *op. cit.*, chapters vi and vii.

³ Newcastle to Sandwich (very private), March 29, 1748, S.P. 84/431.

⁴ For the history of this negotiation, see S.P. 84/431 to 435 and Add. MSS. 32811 to 32814, *passim*; also Lodge, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-410.

It would be tedious to describe the delays, obstinacies, and recriminations through which this question passed to Newcastle's final surrender—especially as there was more noise than real importance in them. It was not really the Assiento so much as Newcastle's refusal to proceed without the co-operation of Austria, that caused the delays at Aix-la-Chapelle and the estrangement between him and Sandwich; though some part of both was ascribed to the smaller and less important question. Sandwich was always for yielding to Spain on this point. He argued that as he had been authorized to give up the Assiento altogether in the last resort at Breda, he might surely be permitted now to accept the renewal for four years. It was no less important and possible now than it had been then to detach Spain from France, and a direct concession to her on this small point would put her under an obligation to us instead of France.¹ Even our allies the Dutch, who were also our rivals in trade, showed no desire to support our demand for an extended Assiento. Their chief plenipotentiary plainly told Sandwich and Newcastle that we were in the wrong. Newcastle yielded at last; the four years were accepted.

According to the declaration of Sandwich and Sotomayor, the South Sea Company was not to be put in possession of its rights until the two Crowns had made some attempt at negotiating an equivalent for them. The question which the English Ministry had to face was, what were those rights, and who was to receive the equivalent?

The claims of the Company were of three kinds. First, the privileges of the Assiento and the Annual Ship. Second, the debts due from the King of Spain, which could be described as public or national in their nature, that is, caused by the diplomatic relations of England and Spain; the most important of this class were the Reprisalia, or seizures of the Company's property during hostilities between the two countries. Lastly there were the private debts of the King of Spain, for money actually advanced him by the Company acting as his banker or partner in the South Sea trade—such as the sum lent him at the beginning of the contract, or his quarter part of the capital stock which the Company advanced on his behalf.

The value of the first class in equity was very doubtful. The

¹ Sandwich to Newcastle, May 31, 1748, Add. MSS. 32812, f. 220; Sandwich to Anson, June 26 and Aug. 7, 1748, Add. MSS. 15957, ff. 69, 78.

Company's adversaries renewed their argument that the Assiento and Annual Ship damaged the trade of the nation as a whole; and the Company itself had always underrated them for purposes of its own. On its own showing it ought to be glad to get rid of those onerous privileges for nothing; the only excuse for demanding a recompense was the inconvenience and loss of revenue which they caused to the King of Spain so long as they subsisted.¹ Of course the Company did not draw these deductions, but asked cheerfully for the revival of its privileges as if for something valuable, in order to raise the price at which it would abandon them. It even exploited the unprofitableness of the Assiento proper. When it asked for a prolongation of the contract in order to repay itself out of the negro duties the debts due from the King of Spain, it was careful to point out that the Assiento itself brought in nothing but loss and that its continuation must therefore be accompanied by that of the Annual Ship.

The second class, the 'public' debts, had been the subject of much negotiation and complaint before the war broke out; in fact, as the reader will remember, it furnished the occasion of the outbreak.² The Company had demanded huge sums on account of the Reprisalia, ignoring (according to the Spaniards) the fact that a part of these sums had been paid, or the seized effects restored, to its own agents. It had added, with very little justification, such secondary charges as the maintenance of its factories during the suspensions of their activity which arose from the same cause. It now made a further claim for the effects seized in the 'third Reprisalia' of 1739. The directors piled item upon item in this account, and Newcastle was quite right to regard it as 'swollen'. Moreover, demands of this nature were incidental to the wars which had broken out between England and Spain. The English Government considered that it might lawfully give them up as an affair which properly belonged to the relations of the two Crowns, or that it might even regard them as annulled by the outbreak of war which put an end to all engagements between the two countries.³

The private debts of the King of Spain to the Company were a different matter. Although the Assiento Treaty was a public engagement between the two Crowns, some of the transactions

¹ 'The British Trade to the Spanish West Indies considered', Add. MSS. 32819, ff. 188-99.

² *V. supra*, pp. 52-5.

³ Newcastle to Keene, Feb. 12, 1749/50, Add. MSS. 32820, ff. 193-8.

which were founded upon it were exactly like any other business transactions between partners in trade or between banker and client. The Company had paid orders drawn upon it by the King of Spain, sometimes more than it was in cash for his account, and had advanced money for him, with his consent, in its own operations. These demands would have been incontestably valid if only the amounts had not been in question. But the Company, whose financial character was universally regarded as shady after the Bubble, had never produced its accounts in such a form as to convince the King of Spain that he was credited with all the real profits, or that the capital of which he was debited with a quarter was really used in trade. The Spanish Ministers hinted that if the accounts were sifted on both sides the balance would prove to be due not to the Company but to the Crown of Spain. The English Ministers believed, however, that the Company had a large and valid demand against Spain on this account,¹ and that the King could not in any negotiation sign away the private rights and properties of his subjects without their consent. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke was particularly strong on this point: the Crown could not give up the Company's rights for nothing, though it could give them up for a compensation of a hundred thousand pounds—a view which the Duke of Newcastle found rather strange.²

It was not often that Hardwicke and Newcastle disagreed for long; but there was an important question at issue here. If the Company's real claims could be ascertained, and Spain induced to admit them as valid, what form was the compensation to take? To whom was it to be paid—to the Company or to the nation? At first sight it would naturally be due to the Company; but that was not so clear to Newcastle.

He did not view the subject in a purely commercial light; still less did he regard it as one which concerned the Company alone. He said many times, in the negotiations which led up

¹ Deputy-Governor Bristow was reported to have said, disclaiming all affectation, that he believed the Company would be awarded half a million if the cause were taken into Chancery; this was certainly a great reduction from the original demand of £1,367,567 (Wall to Ensenada, Sept. 25, 1750, Add. MSS. 32823, f. 305).

² Wall to Ensenada, *ibid.*; to Carvajal, Sept. 25, f. 309; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 8/19, 1750, Add. MSS. 32722, ff. 369–70; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Sept. 15, 1750, f. 422.

to the Treaty of 1750, that the value of a satisfactory commercial agreement with Spain was chiefly political. He had already been so inept as to imagine, in the middle of the crisis of 1738, that he could tempt La Quadra to adjust the commercial and maritime disputes by hinting at the advantages of a political alliance.¹ He had been willing in 1747 (though less so the next year) to sacrifice the Assiento in order to detach Spain from France. He now wanted to complete the process of detachment, which had begun at Aix-la-Chapelle on account of some concessions into which St. Séverin forced Sotomayor. He wanted, in fact, to drive a wedge between France and her ally Spain, as the French Court was beginning to drive one between him and his ally Austria.²

He had help in the Court of Spain itself. Although the Ministers Carvajal and Ensenada had differentiated themselves by 1754 as the Anglophile and the Francophile, they were still in 1748 or even 1750 comparatively indistinguishable in their foreign policies. Both were 'national' Ministers of a national King (for Ferdinand VI, unlike Philip V, had been born a Spaniard), and their policy was: Spain for the Spaniards, and independence in foreign affairs. This independence could only be achieved by a slight relaxation of the tie which bound Spain to France. Ensenada never meant to go farther. He believed that a renewal of the conflict between England and France was inevitable, and wished to make Spain the arbiter between them—an arbiter to be handsomely paid by such bribes as the restitution of Gibraltar. In the meantime he was for contracting a neutrality of limited duration.³ Carvajal was more inclined to England; but even he told Keene, in a parable, that while he desired the friendship of England he had no intention of burning his boats with France. Keene credited him with the maxim 'To live well with England, tho' at as cheap a rate as he can'.⁴

Newcastle seldom thought anything impossible that he strongly desired. He did not mean to let Spain remain

¹ Newcastle to Keene, Jan. 26, 1738/9, S.P. 94/134; Keene to Newcastle, Feb. 23, 1739, S.P. 94/133.

² Newcastle to Keene, Oct. 26, 1749, Add. MSS. 32819, ff. 37-8; Feb. 12, 1749/50, vol. 32820, f. 193; Dec. 20, 1750, vol. 32825, f. 295; Wall to Carvajal, Feb. 5, 1750, vol. 32820, ff. 132-4.

³ Ensenada, memorandum of 1746, in A. Rodríguez Villa, *Don Cenon de Somodevilla* (Madrid, 1878), pp. 37-41; memorandum of 1751, *ibid.*, pp. 119-21.

⁴ Keene to Newcastle, March 22, 1750, Add. MSS. 32820, ff. 309-13; Aug. 13, 1750, *Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene* (ed. Lodge), p. 244.

merely neutral, but was determined to attract her, if not to an English alliance, to something not far short of it. He wanted to reconvert her to 'the old, Spanish, venerable principle, *Pace con Inguilterra, Guerra avec toute la Terra*'.¹ Indeed he did not see how Spain could, in the circumstances of the time, cease to be pro-French without becoming pro-English. Here he proved to be wrong; but the first steps to neutrality and to an English alliance were the same. They both led away from France, and thus Newcastle was helped more than he was hindered by the 'national' dispositions of the Spanish Ministers.

He wanted a commercial agreement which should symbolize the independence of Spain by the very fact that it had been negotiated without French help or intervention. It should create good relations between the English trading interest and the Spanish Government, whose mutual grievances had been such a source of war in the past. Lastly it should irritate France against the diplomatic infidelity of Spain and against the preference shown to the rival English manufactures. For these reasons Newcastle and Keene refused to be content with tacit or underhand exemptions and privileges. It was not only the privilege itself but its publicity that they desired, for the ostentation of Anglo-Spanish cordiality in the face of the world and the mortification of French diplomats.

Newcastle was therefore indifferent to the interests of the Company, so long as he was not terrified by the prospect of Parliamentary noise. At first he saw little reason to be afraid of that. The Company no longer had all the influence that so large a financial corporation might expect to have. Newcastle had been ready to sacrifice its Assiento for political considerations in 1747, and would have no objection to doing so again, but for the legal difficulties that oppressed his friend Hardwicke. Still less would he object to sacrificing it for another commercial advantage of a different kind.

What commercial advantages could we want from Spain? A direct participation in the trade of Spanish America was not to be hoped for. The trade of Spain in Europe was by no means to be neglected, especially as a great deal of it was indirectly a trade with the Spanish colonies, and according to some writers—chiefly, it is true, interested parties—the only proper or advan-

¹ Newcastle to Keene, Aug. 22, 1750, Add. MSS. 32823, f. 112. The Spanish is Newcastle's.

tageous kind of trade with them. Since the Treaty of 1667, however, we had had little to ask for our traders to Spain, who had been placed on a very favourable footing. The privileges of that treaty had been renewed and confirmed by another, negotiated in 1715 by the notorious George Bubb Dodington. Persuaded by money or despair, the Spanish Court had then been ready to grant almost anything England could ask: it promised that the English traders should never be obliged to pay higher duties than those they had paid upon the same goods in the reign of Carlos II, or those paid now by the King of Spain's own subjects or any other foreigners.

Dodington's treaty had protected the English trade until the outbreak of the war in 1739. The Spanish Government then took advantage of the absence of the English merchants, who had always joined with the French and the Dutch in defending the privileges of foreign traders at Cadiz. It raised the duties on several classes of goods and the valuations on yet more. In some cases the increase amounted to 6 or 7 per cent. (England, by the way, had likewise raised the import duties on Spanish goods during the war, although none were supposed to be imported.) Raising the valuations was probably fair enough: the money price of many kinds of goods must have altered considerably since the reign of Carlos II, but they still paid duties at the old rate. The English traders, however, would have had a clear case for exemption from these increases upon their return to Spain, if only Dodington's treaty had been renewed at Aix-la-Chapelle. By some unexplained oversight it was not. Newcastle had in the end to admit that he had forgotten to give any instructions about it, and Sandwich had been hurried into the preliminary treaty by St. Séverin, so that it slipped his memory too. At first sight the omission did not seem very important, and it might be rectified in the definitive treaty; but when it came to that point, Sotomayor would not allow a clause to be put in for confirming the Treaty of 1715 without fresh orders from his Court. Sandwich was once more in a hurry to sign, and decided not to wait a month for Madrid to declare itself on this petty point.¹

Sandwich and Newcastle ought to have foreseen the trouble which arose from their neglect, for a point once missed in the game of diplomacy with Spain was lost beyond recovery.

¹ Sandwich and Robinson to Newcastle, Sept. 25, 1748, S.P. 84/435.

Perhaps, however, they could hardly have known how great this particular difficulty was to be.

The Spanish Government was beginning to look upon commercial affairs in a new light. This change is partly to be accounted for by the publication of two books. Don Geronimo Uztaritz and Don Bernardo Ulloa were perhaps the two most popular economists of the eighteenth century in Spain. They were mercantilists of a common enough type: they lamented the passive trade of their country, and preached the importance and practicability of promoting manufactures, especially those of textiles. A great deal of their doctrine was aimed at the heavy taxation which they believed to have destroyed Spanish industry since the sixteenth century. They had some other tenets which had a more immediate bearing upon foreign policy. It was industry, rather than agriculture, that they wished to develop. Ulloa indeed said that Malaga was a more useful port than Cadiz because its trade was active; but he was not content that Spain should remain an exporter of wines and fruits only. This preoccupation with industry destroyed the foundation of a commercial accord between England and Spain. English writers used to argue that Spain ought to prefer our manufactures to those of France because we were better customers for her agricultural produce.¹ That was a true argument, but it did not avail against the industrial protectionism of Uztaritz and Ulloa.

Ulloa recommended something like a Navigation Act; England had one, and discriminated between native and Spanish shipping in spite of the commercial treaties. Ensenada took very seriously this claim of reciprocity, though Carvajal seems to have treated it as a mere debating-point.² In the protection of Spanish manufactures Carvajal was much more interested; he must have been particularly struck by Uztaritz's and Ulloa's denunciation of the Government's fiscal policy. It was indeed the opposite of everything a good mercantilist could have desired: low duties on imported manufactures and exported raw materials; high duties on imported raw materials, such as silk, and on some exported manufactures. The internal customs duties prevented the manufacturers of the rest of Spain from

¹ Josiah Tucker, *A Brief Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages which respectively attend France and Great Britain, with regard to Trade* (in Lord Overstone's *Select Collection*, 1859, p. 338).

² A. Rodríguez Villa, *op. cit.*, pp. 100, 266.

sending their goods to the colonies through the Kingdom of Seville.¹ The revenue-farmers had attracted foreign trade by granting unauthorized rebates of import dues, which had become established by custom or even by treaty. The only way to free Spain from the domination of the foreign manufacturer was to raise the duties upon him wherever he was not protected by a commercial treaty; such treaties as existed must be interpreted as restrictively as possible, and the principle of reciprocity insisted upon.²

Newcastle was unprepared for the obstinacy with which Carvajal and Ensenada held to these opinions. He hoped to pass off the difficulty by overlooking it. He affected to believe that Dodington's treaty was virtually revived at Aix-la-Chapelle, or that its renewal was unnecessary because it conferred no more rights than other treaties which were unquestionably in force. This was not quite unreasonable, considering the relation which the treaties of 1667 and 1715 were supposed to bear to each other. Besides, as Newcastle truly but vainly pointed out, the commerce with Spain in Europe had given rise to none of the difficulties which had caused the war or obstructed the peace; so that there seemed to be no excuse for deliberate innovations in this field. Keene, returning to his old post at Madrid, was told to make no fuss over the omitted treaty, and to encourage the Spaniards to believe, by appearing himself to assume, that it was to all intents and purposes in force. He did so; but he could not support his arguments against the new duties and valuations without recourse to the treaty. In one way or another it came out that the Spanish Government did not mean to consider it as renewed. Ensenada affected not to have noticed the point until Keene brought it to his attention; Carvajal acknowledged that he had always meant to drop the treaty, and had expressly told Sotomayor not to revive it.³

¹ According to Uztaritz the Kingdom of Seville was the only one which still had the right to levy duties upon such Spanish manufactures; unfortunately it was the most important one because Cadiz lay within it (*The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs*, translated by J. Kippax, (London, 1751), i. 250 bis).

² Uztaritz, op. cit.; Ulloa, *Restablecimiento de las Fabricas y Comercio Español* (Madrid, 1740). The argument is so scattered and repetitive that it is impossible to give particular references. Similar opinions were expressed in the *Nuevo Sistema de Gobierno Económico para la America*, attributed to the Minister of Finances, Joseph del Campillo y Cosío. But as Campillo died untimely in 1743 and the book was not published until 1789, his ideas cannot be said to have had much influence.

³ Keene to Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1750, S.P. 94/138. There were also Frenchmen

Ensenada made a polite attempt to swap a confirmation of it for an accidentally omitted guarantee of Don Philip's possessions in Italy, but the English Government treated that as mere mischief-making between England and her allies.¹

This was a tiresome check indeed, and no way of getting over it appeared, for Carvajal declared that the renewal of Dodington's treaty would be a new privilege from which he could not exclude the subjects of states which had most-favoured-nation clauses in their treaties with Spain.² Keene plied him with arguments in vain; the English Government made a merit in vain of its complaisance in curtailing and then abandoning Anson's project of an exploring voyage to the Falkland Islands and the South Seas. No way through the difficulty appeared until an opening came from General Wall.³

Don Ricardo Wall, a Spaniard of Irish origin, first came over in 1748 to try to arrange a peace between England and Spain without the intervention of France. He did not succeed in his mission, but he had recommended himself to Newcastle, and remained as the official representative of his Court. When the difficulty arose over the years of *non-jouissance*, he pressed the English Government to yield to Spain on that subject, in order to oblige her and to detach her from France. Newcastle declined to yield outright, but suggested that the two nations might treat of a compensation which should include not only something for the South Sea Company, but some advantage for the nation at large, to make up for the British manufactures which would have been exported in the Annual Ships.⁴ Perhaps it was this

who saw beforehand the importance of dropping the Treaty of 1715 (A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 82, ff. 116 et seqq.).

¹ The early stages of this negotiation are to be found in S.P. 94/135 and 136, *passim*, and in Newcastle's letters to Keene, Dec. 8, 1748, Add. MSS. 32815, f. 289; March 9, 1748/9, vol. 32816, f. 216; Oct. 26, 1749, vol. 32819, ff. 37-8.

² Keene to Bedford, June 26, 1749, S.P. 94/135. The possibility of exclusive privileges had also occurred to the French negotiators who had been trying to extort a commercial treaty from Spain. As the peace approached, they asked themselves whether it was worth while to obtain privileges which would probably have to be communicated to England by the most-favoured-nation clause; they had decided that it was better to wait until England should be at liberty to join in demanding favours. They were therefore outwitted by Keene, who achieved the unexpected result of privileges from which France herself was excluded (A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 80, f. 111; 82, f. 62).

³ Tabuerniga to Newcastle, May 21 and June 25, 1749, Add. MSS. 32817, ff. 27, 172; Keene to Bedford, May 21, 1749, S.P. 94/135; Bedford to Keene, April 24, *ibid*.

⁴ Newcastle to Sandwich, May 6 and 27, 1748, S.P. 84/431.

seed which brought forth Wall's proposal in 1749. Since Carvajal objected to granting the English any new privileges which would have to be communicated to other nations, and the two Governments had not yet begun seriously to discuss the equivalent for the four years' Assiento, Wall proposed to combine the two negotiations. England should 'purchase' the renewal of Dodington's treaty by giving up the claims of the South Sea Company. Carvajal would then be able to justify the exclusiveness of the privileges to be granted, by the receipt of a valuable consideration which no other nation had paid for them. It would also be an excellent way to get rid of the stale demands of the South Sea Company, which there was no prospect of settling if Keene and Carvajal had to descend into a minute examination of so many swollen and unverifiable items.¹

The two Governments took a year to come to terms. Some of the English Ministers were impressed by the legal difficulty of yielding all the Company's demands without its consent. Others were just as intimidated by the political dangers. What would the country say to a complete abandonment of the South Sea Company? Some compensation must be had, either directly or indirectly. The Cabinet in fact would rather have a sum of money paid by Spain than anything else. This met with great difficulty from Carvajal. He had been asked, he said, for special favours.² He could only justify them to the rest of the world if they were paid for; but when the payment came to be adjusted the English Government proposed that Spain should make it. Keene might point out that the suggested sum was very much smaller than the balance due to the South Sea Company, and that therefore Spain would be receiving something in return for

¹ Keene to Bedford, Sept. 28, 1749; Bedford to Keene, Oct. 26, 1749 (two letters), S.P. 94/136; Newcastle to Keene, Oct. 26, 1749, Add. MSS. 32819, ff. 37-8; Wall to Carvajal, Feb. 5, 1750, vol. 32820, ff. 132-4.

² There was a difference between Newcastle's and Bedford's attitude to this affair. While Newcastle had no great objection to giving up the Company if he could obtain some exclusive commercial privilege of another kind, Bedford took more seriously his duty to defend the Company's interests, and was less intent upon the political consequences of an exclusive concession. As he was prepared to yield less, he must ask less too; so he reasoned that we only wanted the continued enjoyment of Dodington's treaty, and did not insist upon keeping other nations out of the same benefit. Perhaps he did not quite understand that the renewal of the treaty, after the new taxes had been imposed during the war, would amount to an exclusive favour, whether the exclusiveness was expressed or no (Wall to Carvajal, Feb. 5, 1750, quoted above; Bedford to Keene, Feb. 12, 1749/50 (two letters), S.P. 94/137).

the renewal of Dodington's treaty. Carvajal denied his premisses and also dismissed them as irrelevant. Surely the rest of the world would think it too much that Spain should pay England to receive privileges at her hands?¹

For some time, therefore, the first alternative seemed unattainable; Keene never quite dropped it, but the Ministers in England thought he was wasting his time. Their second choice was to revalidate the Treaty of 1715 without saying anything at all about the South Sea Company. It would amount to giving the Company up, but it would avoid the political danger of openly doing so and the legal impropriety of abandoning the claim to the private debts of the King of Spain. This also was too little for Carvajal. His object, in making any bargain on this affair, was to guard against any demands the Company might put forward in future. It was all very well for the present English Ministers to say they would give it no help. They could not bind future Ministers; in fact, they could not bind themselves. If Sir Robert Walpole could have had his way, the Company's affairs would never have been allowed to aggravate the difficulties of 1739; but Sir Robert could control neither the Court of Directors nor the Parliamentary Opposition. What was to prevent some future Opposition from forcing a future Government, or this Government for that matter, into another crisis over the Company's demands?² Carvajal therefore refused to accept the plan of passing the Company *sub silentio*, unless King George would secretly declare that he would not support any demands it might make. This was as bad as giving up the Company outright, or worse. Nobody in the English Cabinet would hear of it, except Newcastle, who had always been more anxious than Bedford to close with Spain on any terms and was now working himself into a frenzy because nothing had been done.³

There seemed to be nothing for it but the third alternative, which was to give up openly all but the Company's private

¹ Keene to Bedford, Jan. 9 (secret) and March 22 (secret), 1750, S.P. 94/137; Wall to Carvajal, Sept. 25, 1750, Add. MSS. 32823, f. 309.

² Wall to Carvajal, Feb. 5, 1750, Add. MSS. 32820, ff. 132-4; to Ensenada, Sept. 25, 1750, vol. 32823, f. 305.

³ Newcastle to Bedford, Aug. 19, 1750, S.P. 94/138; Bedford to Keene, Aug. 30, 1750, *ibid.* (printed in *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 51-7); Henry Pelham to Newcastle, Aug. 31, 1750, Add. MSS. 32722, f. 280; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Aug. 31, 1750, f. 283. Wall taxed Newcastle with having been the first to invent the secret article (Wall to Carvajal, Oct. 9, 1750, Add. MSS. 32824, f. 78).

claims on the King of Spain. This was originally meant to be conditional on Spain's granting new and exclusive privileges which we had never enjoyed before; but Newcastle could wait no longer for a settlement (since he dared not face Parliament for a third session with nothing to show).¹ He therefore forgot or omitted this qualification, and pressed Keene to offer an almost unconditional surrender.² Fortunately Keene kept his head and his courage. While the Secretary of State was preparing at Hanover to yield almost anything rather than delay the settlement, the Minister Plenipotentiary was edging Carvajal back to the first alternative. Spain offered a small compensation to the Company, in return for which all its demands, even the private debts, were given up. Nothing was said of exclusive privileges in the treaty, but all the important benefits of 1715 were secured. The dispute over the valuations for duty was settled in our favour, and Keene slipped in a phrase which might be represented as a renunciation by Spain of all claim to Gibraltar.³

Even at the last moment the settlement came near to being embroiled. In an earlier interview with the Cabinet Wall had made the most of the exclusive advantages he was empowered to offer, and Hardwicke, like a good bargainer, had tried to belittle them by suggesting that whatever Carvajal might now think, he would find it legally impossible to refuse the same advantages to other nations. This idea had penetrated into Carvajal's head in a curious form: he offered to get over the difficulty by granting the exclusive privileges for a limited term of years only. How that would have removed any legal difficulty, is not clear; but the proposal caused the greatest consternation in England, where it appeared, and rightly as it would seem, that what Carvajal was proposing to limit was not the exclusiveness of the advantages, but the advantages themselves. These would have been perpetual, but for the unlucky omission of Dodington's treaty, and a renewal for six years only would

¹ The Opposition had already made a few complaints of the omission of Dodington's treaty, and of the delay in carrying out the terms of the Sandwich-Sotomayor declaration (*Parl. Hist.* xiv. 384 (Thomas), 581 and 670 (Egmont)).

² Newcastle to Keene, June 15, 1750, S.P. 94/137.

³ Keene to Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1750, S.P. 94/138. The concession of the valuations was not so easily extorted in practice: a paper of 1762 or 1763 complained that the valuations and therefore the duties were still higher than they ought to be (Add. MSS. 36807, f. 250).

therefore have been a very poor concession to buy with the South Sea Company's money. When the six years were up, what should we have to pay for a further lease of them? No doubt Gibraltar would have been asked: this limitation of years was first suggested to Carvajal by Ensenada, who had determined to sell Spain's friendship and goodwill to England and France for concessions of that kind, and had his eye on Gibraltar particularly. Although there were men in the English Ministry who had warmly advocated giving up Gibraltar for other solid advantages, they would not endanger the ultimate abandonment of it to repair a stupid mistake of Newcastle and Sandwich; and the limitation was rejected as inadmissible. Keene induced Carvajal to conclude without it.¹

Keene's treaty may be represented as a proof that the English Government was really more concerned for European than for American trade, or as a final victory of the Cadiz traders over the South Sea Company. I think it would be a mistake to draw such conclusions: the interest of the Government in the matter was predominantly political; not only Newcastle, but his agent Keene and, in a less degree, his colleague Bedford made this clear.

Something had still to be done to content the South Sea Company; but Henry Pelham found a happy opportunity in the conversion of the public funds. The Company claimed that its stock was not on the same footing as other Government securities, and that the interest could not be reduced. Pelham did not really accept this view, but thought a compromise on this head would be a way of compensating the Company for having to sit down with the £100,000 obtained from Spain.² The Treaty of 1750 put a formal end to the South Sea Company's trading career, which had never been so important or so profitable as the founders had hoped. All that remained of the Company was a bad reputation, a large capital lent to the Government or otherwise incorporated in the public funds, and a staff of clerks which later had the honour of having its peculiar manners preserved to immortality by Charles Lamb.

The English traders continued to supply slaves to the Spanish

¹ Keene to Newcastle, July 30, Aug. 10 and 13, Sept. 21, 1750, S.P. 94/138; Keene to Castres, Aug. 23, 1750, *Keene Correspondence*, p. 246; Newcastle to Keene, Aug. 22, 1750, Add. MSS. 32823, f. 111; Newcastle to Henry Pelham, Aug. 23, 1750, vol. 32722, f. 228; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Aug. 31, 1750, f. 283.

² Henry Pelham to Newcastle, June 1, 1750, Add. MSS. 32721, f. 13; Oct. 19, 1750, vol. 32723, f. 176.

colonies, by virtue of special licences granted to Spaniards who entered into contract or partnership with merchants of Jamaica.¹ The Havana Company offered to make a very large contract, but insisted that its business must be carried on in Spanish ships. This proviso was contrary to the Navigation Acts, so that Governor Knowles had to reject the scheme, though he and the merchants of Jamaica would dearly have liked such an alteration in the Acts as would have enabled them to trade on these terms.²

§ ii. *The 'Guarda-Costas' again*

While all this attention was paid to the comparatively unimportant affairs of the South Sea Company, what had become of the grand controversy over the right of search? It had been almost forgotten, in spite of the addresses of Parliament and George II's promise at the outbreak of the war. When Walpole was removed it had served its turn, and many of the loudest shouters for the freedom of navigation came to recognize that the question could not and need not be formally settled at all, or that their demands had been entirely unreasonable. Not all of them had the courage to admit it, as Pitt did in the House of Commons. Perhaps even he would hardly have made such a confession had he not been obliged to it by the necessities of his dreary apprenticeship in the Pelham political machine, where, 'eyeless in Gaza at the mill with slaves', he unsaid a great deal of what he had said before and was to say again.

Carteret in power had made one or two attempts to come to terms with Spain on this matter. He seems to have demanded little, and to have made even less impression on Villarias (formerly La Quadra), who continued to insist that English ships found a long way out of their course in the American seas must be subjected to search. It was not want of agreement on this point, but difficulties in the settlement of Don Philip in Italy, that put an end to any arrangement between England and Spain in Carteret's time.³ Several years after his fall, when the Governments of Europe began to make closer approaches to

¹ For details of such a contract at Cartagena, which had been enjoyed at one time by Edward Manning, see the cases of the *Isabella*, Joseph de Micolta master, H.C.A. 42/76, and *N.S. del Carmen y las Animas*, Joseph Rapalino, H.C.A. 42/83.

² This question raised great difficulty after the Peace of Paris.

³ Villarias to St. Gil, Oct. 22, 1742, Add. MSS. 32802, f. 347; Bussy to Amelot,

peace, it was still Don Philip, not the liberty of navigation, that caused all the difficulty and controversy. The English project of peace in April 1747 perfunctorily demanded that the question should be settled according to the Treaties of 1670 and 1713. Perhaps Newcastle had forgotten, or else he had never understood, that those treaties did not conclude the point.¹ Marchmont, who had taken a great part in the agitation against the right of search, might remind Chesterfield, who had done the same, that such an arrangement would hardly comply with the resolutions of 1739. Chesterfield was now Secretary of State, and could not afford such scruples. He merely advised Sandwich to 'hook in the words *No search*', if he could. It is true that he rejected Macanaz's proposal to leave these questions to commissaries once more, but he was not exacting on the substance of the dispute: he only demanded that the claims on both sides should be cancelled.²

Newcastle repeated to Sandwich the next year that our rights must be established on the foundation of the treaty of 1670; but the matter hardly seems to have been mentioned at Aix-la-Chapelle. In fact the Dutch took more interest in it than the English.³ Ensenada hoped that England would be induced to put off discussing the matter until after the peace was made, but he feared she would not consent.⁴ He reckoned without the inattention of the volatile Newcastle, who was immersed in politics of a grander and more exciting kind. Perhaps everybody concerned accepted the view laid down in St. Séverin's instructions: that no form of words could exactly reconcile the rights of England and Spain, that both sides had been right in principle and wrong in practice, and that a real settlement of the controversy was more likely to be achieved by the good relations of the two Crowns than by any promise that could be written on paper.⁵

Aug. 12, 1742, A.E. Angleterre, 415, f. 180; Tabuerniga to Harrington, Dec. 28, 1744, and Feb. 22, 1744/5, S.P. 100/59.

¹ Add. MSS. 32808, ff. 45-51.

² Marchmont's diary, Sept. 16, 1747, *Marchmont Papers*, i. 213; Chesterfield to Sandwich, April 7 and 17, 1747, *Letters of Chesterfield*, Dobrée's edition nos. 1161, 1177.

³ Newcastle to Sandwich, March 29, 1748, S.P. 84/431; Paper enclosed by Newcastle to Sandwich, July 11, 1748, *ibid.*; Sandwich to Newcastle, April 28, S.P. 84/433.

⁴ Memorial of 1746, quoted above.

⁵ *Recueil des Instructions, Hollande*, iii. 125-6. The same view is expressed in the

No mention, therefore, was made of these disputes in the treaty of peace. The Opposition made the most of this singular omission. The arguments of 1739 did duty again: the Government had recognized the claim of Spain by not insisting upon our own; besides, it had broken the King's promise.¹ The Government speakers might dispute the propriety of determining a technical and commercial question in a treaty of peace, and justify reserving it to a later discussion; the Opposition retorted that this was a singularly negligent way of treating the controversy which had been the cause of the war. Besides, months and sessions went by, and no such subsequent discussion was begun. Henry Pelham excused the Government for disregarding the resolution of both Houses, which demanded the abolition of the right of search. Such resolutions, he said, cannot affect the course of wars, therefore should not control the terms of peace; the war had not been very successful, so the peace could not be very advantageous. This was a difficult row to hoe for the man who had been conducting the war as Prime Minister for the last four years. He could only escape from it into a worse; for if he pleaded that circumstances had altered the case, and that the war, having become a continental war, had changed its objectives, he brought down upon himself the gallant Admiral Vernon and all the loud declaimers against continental politics.²

Pelham and Pitt argued better and more truly when they said that the war had been occasioned by a conflict of two rights, neither of which could be abandoned entirely, and that nothing could reconcile them but mutual forbearance, and restraint of the worst excesses of both smugglers and *Guarda-Costas*.³ Even if Spain had complied with the resolution of the two Houses, that would not have settled the controversy without some further explanation. As Pelham pointed out, every case would still have been open to dispute as to the facts—whether the ship had really been on a voyage from one English dominion to another when she was seized by the *Guarda-Costas*. Pelham may have hoped, besides, that the treaty of 1750 would eliminate the causes of jealousy and complaint in the West Indies, by instructions to Vaulgrenant, April 11, 1749 (*Recueil, Espagne*, iii. 294-5), and in A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, vol. 9, f. 104.

¹ *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 342 (Lee), 595 (Hynde Cotton).

² *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 341 (Lee), 587, 597 (Pelham), 601 (Vernon).

³ *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 686 (Pelham), 800-1 (Pitt).

making the trade through Cadiz more profitable to the English merchants.¹

A good disposition existed on both sides after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. There were still some grievances, and tempers were heated once or twice. Ensenada complained with justice that the commanders of English warships continued to convoy the smugglers, and even to trade on their own account, as they had done in the war.² The English Government did nothing, and perhaps could have done nothing effective, to stop the smuggling trade. The honest Bedford appears to have seen that an Act of Parliament ought to be passed for the purpose; but he asserted that he knew of no illicit trade which he could prevent without one.³

The English traders, on the other hand, still had to contend with a number of petty malpractices and obstructions. Neither Government showed very much desire to discuss these incidents in general terms of right.⁴ Keene carefully avoided demanding a free navigation while he was negotiating his treaty. Afterwards he promised to work at a project of arrangement which should establish the rights of both parties on a firm foundation; but he was now too old, too tired, and too ill to grasp the nettle gratuitously. Especially after the question of depredations took a new and ominous turn, he seems to have resigned his ambitions of any far-reaching scheme, and was content to live from hand to mouth for the rest of his days.⁵ The enterprising genius of Ensenada had turned for a moment in the same direction of a new and radical settlement: he once told Keene that the best thing the Spanish Government could do was to burn all the

¹ Bedford to Keene, May 11, 1749, S.P. 94/135.

² Keene to Bedford, Oct. 6, 1749, S.P. 94/136. Knowles continued to grant convoys to the Spanish colonies for some little time after the war. He complained that the English newspapers aroused the vigilance of the Spanish Government by foolishly parading the quantity of Spanish treasure which reached England from Jamaica (Knowles to Secretaries of the Admiralty, Dec. 20, 1748, Adm. 1/234). Commodore Townshend received in 1751 a severe rebuke from the Viceroy of Santa Fé for allowing the ships under his command to convoy the trade and to engage in it themselves (Villar to Townshend, May 29, 1751, *ibid.*). See also a letter of Dec. 8, 1753, on the prevalence of English trade at Havana, quoted by Duro, *Armada Española*, vi. 392.

³ Bedford to Keene, Feb. 11-17, 1751, *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 70.

⁴ Keene to Bedford, Oct. 6, 1749, S.P. 94/136; Dec. 1750 (separate), S.P. 94/138.

⁵ Keene to Castres, April 16, 1751, *Keene Correspondence*, p. 295; to Newcastle, Nov. 6, 1751, p. 314; to Castres, Aug. 2, 1753, p. 342.

laws of the Indies. Here Carvajal was on the conservative side: he could not foresee the consequences of a total reform, and thought justice and chastisement in particular cases were all that was needed. Ensenada never got farther than projecting a revision of the instructions to Spanish Governors.¹

Most of the correspondence of this period deals with minor nuisances and their redress. Some of them in fact arose, not out of depredations but out of prizes of war which had been improperly made after the time fixed for cessation of hostilities. Keene had once more to batter his way through the same difficulties that had always hindered the perfect restitution of effects seized and condemned in the Spanish colonies. The *Guarda-Costas* still plundered their prey before the formality of condemnation. They still sold the ships and cargoes, whether collusively or in good faith, at a price very much below what was claimed as the real value. They still distributed the proceeds at once without waiting for the result of an appeal or giving security to restore them in case the sentence should be reversed; if the claimants arrived with a decree of restitution from Madrid, there was little or nothing to be had.² The Governors still granted commissions to *Guarda-Costas* of insufficient fortune and reputation, and still received a share of the forfeitures, which tempted them to condemn whatever they could.³

Keene overcame these difficulties one by one. By threats of his Court's severe displeasure, or even of war, he procured in July 1752 an order for paying the value of some cargoes out of the King's revenues, so far as the captors could not be made to pay their shares.⁴ This was not an entirely effective reform, for

¹ Keene to Bedford, Dec. 1750, S.P. 94/138; Feb. 8, 1751, S.P. 94/139; to Holderness, March 21, 1752, S.P. 94/141.

² The French had found the same difficulty in getting their effects restored even with a royal order for the purpose. Larnage said of Horcasitas, Governor of Havana, that he probably would not restore a certain ship but would force the claimants to compound with him for 25 per cent., 'according to the laudable practice of the Spanish Governors, and particularly of that one' (Larnage to Maurepas, April 28, 1745, A.N. Colonies C⁹ A 66). The French Government proposed to take vigorous measures against the *Guarda-Costas* after the war—much stronger than anything the English Government allowed (Minute of Nov. 1, 1749, A.N. Marine B⁴ 62, f. 217). The authorities at St. Domingue still complained of the *Guarda-Costas* in 1755 (Vaudreuil and Laporte-Lalanne to Machault, Jan. 10, 1755, A.N. Colonies C⁹ A 96).

³ Bedford to Keene, Jan. 10 and Feb. 11, 1750/1, with enclosures, S.P. 94/139; Keene to Carvajal, June 18 and 30, 1752, with enclosures, S.P. 94/142. See also Carvajal to Keene, Dec. 21, 1753, S.P. 94/144.

⁴ His success in this object was long obstructed by the case of the *Anna Maria y*

the Governors of colonies sometimes made difficulties, by pretending they had not received the originals of the royal orders and refusing to accept authenticated copies; sometimes again they would allege, truly or falsely, that the provincial treasuries were empty. Keene persuaded Carvajal to go farther, and promise that no prizes should be distributed to the *Guarda-Costas* in future before the King's pleasure should have been signified from Madrid.¹ The question of the valuation was never settled to Keene's satisfaction. The English claimants wanted their property restored at the value expressed in the invoices or insurance policies. The Spanish Government continued in general to pay no more than the net sales in the colonies, though there were some fortunate claimants who received nearly all they asked.² As for the personnel of the *Guarda-Costas*, Carvajal could not promise to employ none but the King's ships in that work; the Royal Navy had neither men nor money for the purpose, and he doubted whether the English traders would be any safer than they were already, for the *Guarda-Costas* were supposed to give security for good behaviour. However, he accepted the suggestion that only the Governors of important provinces, in whom confidence could be placed, should be allowed to commission *Guarda-Costas*.³ Wall was to have proposed other reforms on this head, and Keene credited Arriaga, the successor of Ensenada as Secretary for the Navy, with the intention to suppress the *Guarda-Costas* altogether and have the work done by the King's ships.⁴

These matters could be debated and settled without touching any question of right or principle. There were others that could

S. Felix, in which the English Government used the same arguments to Wall that Carvajal had brought forward about the English vessels. Admiral Knowles had taken her after the time prefixed for the conclusion of hostilities, and had improperly distributed the proceeds after condemnation. The English Ministers would not order anything to be restored until an appeal had been properly lodged and heard; then they offered to apply to Parliament for the payment of the value out of the Treasury, but this application was delayed for a long time by Pelham's indecision whether Knowles should be prosecuted for his share. The money does not seem to have been finally asked and granted before 1756 (Legge to Newcastle, Feb. 2, 1755, Add. MSS. 32852, f. 335; Fox to Keene, Jan. 20, 1756, S.P. 94/151).

¹ Keene to Holderness, March 13, 1752, S.P. 94/141; June 30, July 4, 1752, S.P. 94/142; Carvajal to Keene, Aug. 16, 1752, *ibid.*

² Newcastle to Keene, July 12, 1753, S.P. 94/144; Holderness to Keene, Sept. 20, S.P. 94/145; Carvajal to Keene, Dec. 2, 1753, S.P. 94/144.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Keene to Robinson, 'most, most secret', Sept. 21, 1754, S.P. 94/147.

not; and in spite of all Keene's and Carvajal's little alleviations, the cry against depredations began to rise again in 1751. The Ministers in England insisted that something must be done—that new and very different instructions must be delivered to the *Guarda-Costas*.¹ In spite of Ensenada's reforming zeal their commissions were not changed; the anger of the English press continued to increase, and with it the alarm of the English Ministers. Newcastle and Holderness warned Keene again and again that the friendship of the two countries could not endure the strain for long; in July 1752 Newcastle prophesied that letters of reprisals would soon be asked for and could hardly be refused.²

A violent incident soon afterwards brought matters near a crisis. Admiral Knowles, the new Governor of Jamaica, was constitutionally inclined to strong measures and hard words, and had inherited from his friend Trelawny an idea that the *Guarda-Costas* could be intimidated by a little force. He caught some of them on private business at Jamaica, and had them tried and condemned to death for piracy.³ Fortunately, he had at least the good sense not to execute them without orders from home; but he aggravated his imprudence by a most offensive letter to a Spanish Governor.⁴ The Secretary of State reproached him for his silly fulmination, and at least one of the 'pirates' was promptly pardoned; but the Court of Spain was very upset by the insult—the more so, as one of the *Guarda-Costas* had carried with him, at the time of his arrest, a commission from the King of Spain which should have secured him from such treatment.⁵

This little thunderstorm cleared the air, and for some years afterwards the complaints of Spanish depredations almost ceased.⁶ The two nations had not even approached a settlement of the great controversy. Spain still thought herself

¹ Holderness to Keene, May 28, 1752, S.P. 94/141; Sept. 20, 1753, S.P. 94/145; Newcastle to Keene, July 26, 1752, S.P. 94/142; Newcastle to Wall, April 2, 1752, Add. MSS. 32825, f. 38.

² Newcastle to Keene, July 26, 1752; Holderness to Keene, Sept. 20, 1753, quoted above.

³ Trelawny to Knowles, March 6, 1750/1, C.O. 137/57; Knowles to Holderness, Nov. 18, 1752, C.O. 137/59.

⁴ Knowles to Caxigal de la Vega, Nov. 13, 1752, C.O. 137/59.

⁵ Holderness to Knowles, May 26, 1753, C.O. 137/60; Holderness to Keene, May 26, 1753, S.P. 94/143; Report of the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies, enclosed by Duras to St. Contest, Jan. 15, 1754, A.E. Espagne, 515.

⁶ Knowles to Holderness, Jan. 12, 1754, C.O. 137/59.

entitled to confiscate foreign ships found with 'contraband' goods such as silver or logwood on board. The English Ministry no longer insisted on a general renunciation of the right of search; even Newcastle admitted that 'No Search' may have been a cant word. But he and his colleagues still regarded any kind of examination of English ships on the high seas as an unjustifiable molestation, and particularly objected to the treatment of logwood and silver as contraband.¹

Such articles as silver raised no special difficulties. Logwood was a very different question; indeed, Keene said 'we justify from what these people think the greatest offence'.² At this point, even when the outcry against the depredations themselves had died away, the controversy took a new and far more dangerous form, and became a territorial question. Nothing was heard of the right of search for some years after 1754, but the dispute over logwood and the Moskito Shore more than filled its place.

§ iii. *The Logwood Settlements after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle*³

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle provided that conquests should be mutually restored. There could be no doubt that this clause applied to Rattan, which was accordingly evacuated; but the English Government declined to withdraw the settlers from Belize and Black River. It even took a new step forward, and appointed a superintendent on the Moskito Shore.⁴ Presumably, if it thought about the matter at all, it argued that the Shore and the Bay were not new conquests but old possessions, or at least establishments, dating from before the treaty of 1670. Even this does not explain why it paid this attention to the Moskito Shore and not to the more important settlement on the Bay of Honduras; perhaps that was due to the influence of Trelawny and the arguments of Hodgson, who came home to advise the Government and to obtain the superintendency. The annual produce of the Moskito Shore was so small that, according to statistics afterwards supplied by Knowles, it fell short of the expenses of the Government and fortifications; but Hodgson gave other figures, which put a different face on this

¹ Newcastle to Keene, Jan. 15, 1753, Add. MSS. 32842, f. 152.

² Keene to Castres, July 12, 1753, *Keene Correspondence*, p. 338.

³ For the earlier history of this subject *v. supra*, pp. 97-104.

⁴ Bedford to Hodgson, Oct. 5, 1749, C.O. 137/57.

question.¹ There had been a considerable trade at Black River in 1745 and 1746; but it had fallen off since then, and though Hodgson was always expecting it to revive, for one reason or another it never did so.

The usefulness of the establishment was not thought, however, to depend only on its own commerce or agriculture: it had already been invaluable as a last resort for the logwood-cutters in times of Spanish invasion, and was to prove so again.² It could be made to serve still more ambitious purposes. Trelawny had not given up his dream of disrupting the Spanish Empire; in fact he still thought it would come about one day. He was still preparing the way for annexing the isthmus of Darien and the passages to the South Seas, and still believed it could best be done by means of the Indians and Creoles. He therefore wanted to keep up an establishment which would give England a foothold in Central America, and enable her to extend her diplomacy from one tribe of Indians to another.

Trelawny wanted the Moskito Shore to retain the character of a trading-station and outpost of Indian diplomacy, not to degenerate into a plantation colony. Here no doubt he thought as Governor of Jamaica. He earnestly pressed Bedford to forbid slavery on the Shore, or to restrict it as far as possible. He drew many specious reasons from the unsuitability of such a colony for the purposes he had in view; he also argued that as the English settlements were not islands, like the older sugar colonies, the slaves would be constantly running away to the Spaniards. Here history proved him right. The slaves of the Moskito Shore had run away in a body some time before he wrote, and been subdued with difficulty by the Indians. For many years afterwards the settlers often complained against the neighbouring Spaniards for enticing their slaves, and refusing to restore them on the grounds of their conversion to Catholicism, which would be endangered by their return to heretic masters. Trelawny's real object, however, probably was to protect Jamaica from being weakened by emigration and injured by the competition of new sugar-plantations. So far as the existing settlers were concerned, he need perhaps have given himself little trouble:

¹ Knowles to Holderness, Jan. 10, 1753, C.O. 137/60; the younger Hodgson's *First Account of the Mosquito Shore*, C.O. 123/1.

² Hodgson to Under-Secretary Aldworth, April 10, 1751, C.O. 137/59; Pitts to Knowles, Aug. 1, 1754, C.O. 137/60.

very few of them had much capital, or the inclination to desert their occasional seafaring and turtling to become tillers of the soil. But new sugar colonies were generally made, in that age, by a migration of planters from the old, and Trelawny feared that the reported excellence of the land would persuade those of Jamaica to remove themselves and their slaves to Black River.¹

It was necessary to Trelawny's schemes that the Indians should be kept quiet. They had once undertaken to observe the King of England's times and occasions for war and peace rather than their own; this promise must be strictly exacted. It was indeed one of the chief articles of Hodgson's instructions. He was not to hinder the Moskitomen from defending themselves against an attack, but he was to restrain them from active hostilities against the Spanish settlements.² Trelawny intended to point out to the Spanish Governors, as often as possible, that Hodgson's presence on the Moskito Shore was not a step in encroachment, but a safeguard and advantage to the Spaniards; but for his presence, the unregulated English settlers would incite the Moskitomen to worse and more frequent outrages.³ This argument, as Trelawny's successor thought, would have been a stronger one if Hodgson himself had shown any more discretion than the other Englishmen on the Shore. However that might be, before he arrived at his post the Moskitomen had executed a great expedition against the Spaniards and their allies, and had carried off a number of Indian prisoners. Heredia, the Captain-general of Nicaragua, demanded the return of the prisoners and the withdrawal of all the arms which the English had furnished to their allies. He claimed the Moskitomen themselves as Spanish subjects, and denounced the English for inciting them to rebellion against their lawful lord. Soon afterwards he asked for the evacuation of Belize and Black River as provided for by the Treaty of 1748.⁴ Of course Trelawny could not grant this.

¹ Trelawny to Board of Trade, Oct. 7, 1748, C.O. 137/25; Trelawny to Bedford, April 8, 1749, C.O. 137/58; April 14, 1750, and private letter of the same date, C.O. 137/59.

² Trelawny, instructions to Hodgson, April 14, 1750, C.O. 137/57; May 20, 1752, C.O. 137/59.

³ Trelawny to Heredia, Oct. 16, 1750, C.O. 137/59; Trelawny to Bedford, July 17, 1751, *ibid.*

⁴ Hodgson to Aldworth, April 10, 1751, C.O. 137/59; July 11, 1751, C.O.

Heredia soon sent an envoy to make a treaty with the Moskito Indians, who received his proposals with tolerable respect.¹ He hoped also to detach them, if not perhaps the Englishmen too, by the insinuations of Spanish missionaries. He asked Hodgson's leave to send one among the Indians. Hodgson professed that he was no bigot in religion but could not answer for the safety of a Spanish priest. While he was away, however, there soon arrived a clerical emissary from the President of Guatemala. This was Father Solis, who had appeared among the English about 1745 in order to arrange an illicit trade at Black River. (Trelawny had reported at that time that most of the smuggling was in the hands of the clergy.) He now turned up again, with a curious story of disagreement among the Spanish Governors about the way to treat the English. Heredia, he told them, was for destroying their settlements, but the new Governor of Leon preferred to try gentler methods first. If they would allow him to reside among them and convert the Indians, he would arrange a trade with Guatemala for certain small articles, and the Governor would obstruct any violent measures against them.²

At this time the Spanish Governors seem to have had two policies in this affair. On the one hand they prepared an expedition to evict the English; on the other, they tried the method of peaceful penetration. In some degree this alternation of methods resulted from the conflict of different authorities; but the same Governors pursued both the one and the other.

The settlers also appear to have been in two minds. They had long been pressing Trelawny to withdraw the detachment of twenty soldiers which had been at the Shore since 1747, or else to strengthen it so that it could afford them real protection. This little force was not enough to defend them and could only get them into trouble with the Spaniards if its presence was proved.³ Trelawny and Hodgson assented to this reasoning and withdrew the men. Trelawny afterwards tried to make a

137/57; Heredia to Trelawny, June 23, 1750, and April 30, 1751, C.O. 137/59; Heredia to Hodgson, June 22, 1750, *ibid.*

¹ Ruiz to Heredia, March 7, 1751, *ibid.*

² Heredia to Hodgson, June 22, 1750; Hodgson to Heredia, Dec. 3, 1750, *ibid.*; Pitts to Trelawny, April 8, 1751, *ibid.*; Inhabitants of Moskito Shore to Trelawny, April 7, 1751, C.O. 137/57.

³ Pitts to Trelawny, July 17, 1749, C.O. 137/59; Trelawny to Bedford, Dec. 7, 1750, and July 17, 1751; Hodgson to Aldworth, April 10, 1751, *ibid.*

merit of this, by declaring that he had only done it on Heredia's promise to leave the settlements as they were, pending a reference of the whole question to the Courts of London and Madrid.¹ Pitts and the other Englishmen on the shore then asked that the cannon should follow the soldiers. Perhaps they had made up their minds to try what terms they could get from the Spanish authorities by representing themselves as defenceless stragglers without any connexion with the English Government. Some of them, especially Pitts, had an old-standing grievance, for they had established themselves at Rattan on the faith of official encouragement, and had had to withdraw at the end of the war; now they were afraid they should be abandoned again in the same way.² At any rate they did not send Solis away, and within a few months Hodgson had to complain that he had baptized the Moskito 'King' and formed a party for himself among the Indians and English. However, 'General Handyside', a Moskito notable, obliged the King to retract his conversion, and the sounder part of the Indians were for murdering Solis on the spot if Hodgson would let them. Of course he could not suffer it, but suggested as a counter-attack that an Anglican clergyman should be sent to the Shore. Trelawny had already applied for one in vain to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and the English settlers said that the Government deserved to lose the possession of the Shore for want of such precautions.³ I cannot say whether this new proposal resulted in the dispatch of anybody; but if the battle of the missionaries ever began, it was soon ended by the suppression of Solis. He seems to have been sent to Jamaica to answer the charge of stirring up rebellion among His Majesty's subjects. Once there, he was conveniently arrested for an old debt of his smuggling days, and died in prison. Hodgson was instructed to allow no more priests among the Indians.⁴

¹ Trelawny to Heredia, May 15, 1752, C.O. 137/59; Vasquez Prego to Trelawny, Nov. 25, 1752, C.O. 137/57.

² Hodgson to Aldworth, July 11, 1751, C.O. 137/57; Hodgson to Knowles, Dec. 19, 1752, C.O. 137/60.

³ Hodgson to Aldworth, July 12, 1751, C.O. 137/57. There had been one, who went by the name of 'the Irreverend Mr. Holmes'.

⁴ Trelawny to Holderness, Nov. 25, 1751, C.O. 137/59; Trelawny, instructions to Hodgson, May 20, 1752, *ibid.*; Trelawny to Heredia, May 15, 1752, *ibid.*; Hodgson to Knowles, Jan. 19, 1753, C.O. 137/60; Report of the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies, enclosed by Duras to St. Contest, Jan. 15, 1754, A.E. Espagne, 515.

Meanwhile the Spanish preparation for warlike enterprises had been pushing slowly on. Heredia complained that the equipment of the galleys was perpetually obstructed by the idleness and 'juridical diligence' of the President of Guatemala, whose love of forms and zeal for economy may have been stimulated by dissent from the violent policy. Heredia had received orders of September 1750 from Ensenada, to destroy and dispeople the English settlements. Pitts discovered this by intercepting a Spanish messenger, and spread an alarm; but Trelawny thought there was no immediate danger.¹ Next year, however, he sent back to the Shore not only the detachment he had lately withdrawn but a whole company of soldiers. His relations with the Spanish Governors had not improved. A few years earlier he had refrained from demanding a vessel taken between the Moskito Shore and Jamaica as having been interrupted in a voyage from one British dominion to another. He now claimed the Shore as absolutely for England as they for Spain; but he tried to gain time by entreating that no violence should be done until the Governments in Europe could settle the matter. This request could hardly meet with much favour, accompanied as it was by a reinforcement of the English defences; and the President of Guatemala hinted that he should be obliged to use force to dislodge the settlers.²

At this moment a new Governor arrived in Jamaica. If the plausible Trelawny had allowed matters to come so far towards a crisis, it was not likely that Admiral Knowles would keep the peace long. Knowles, however, did not think very much of the Moskito Shore. It did not even earn the expenses of its Government by its exports. Hodgson's residence and the fort were wrongly placed at Black River, some hundred miles from the strongest Moskito head-quarters near Cape Gracias à Dios. Black River, with its ninety miles of navigable stream connected with a hundred miles of Indian road, might be the best place for a trade with the Spaniards, for which reason Hodgson had chosen it; but it was too far to receive help in an emergency from the Moskitomen. Besides, they were beginning to be disaffected: they had received the Spanish overtures without

¹ Heredia to Yscar, Jan. 12, 1751, C.O. 137/59; to Ensenada, April 26, 1751; to the Viceroy of Mexico, April 30, 1751, *ibid.*; Trelawny to Bedford, July 17, 1751, *ibid.*

² Trelawny to Heredia, May 15, 1752, *ibid.*; Vasquez Prego to Trelawny, Nov. 25, 1752, C.O. 137/57.

disfavour in 1751, and three years later General Handyside actually abandoned Hodgson in his greatest necessity. Perhaps this was attributable to Hodgson's embezzlement of the Government's Indian presents. Knowles said so; and although Knowles threw his accusations about as he needed them, there is more significance in the repetition of the charge by Governor Haldane.¹

Hodgson indeed made a very good thing of his superintendency. He spent large sums of public money on heaven knew what; he wished also to engage the Government in a great commercial venture by buying negroes on its account, to hire them out afterwards to new settlers. This perhaps accounts for his antipathy to Pitts, the chief trading and negro-owning magnate upon the Shore.² Knowles thought the whole establishment on the Moskito Shore a job; so it was, and what was worse, it was not Knowles's job.

Hodgson now demanded that the ships of war should make an offensive campaign against the small Spanish *Guarda-Costas* who molested the Shore; but Knowles snubbed him. When the Moskito Indians made an expedition against the Spaniards at Carpenter's River, Knowles ordered Hodgson to send any white settlers who had engaged in it to Jamaica to be tried, and to recover and return the booty. On the other hand the temptation of affronting a Spanish Governor by a display of stern inflexibility was too much for him; he told the President of Guatemala that if the English settlements were molested he would repel force by force. This declaration received the approval of the Government in England.³

The Spanish blow fell in 1754, not on the Moskito Shore but on the logwood-cutters in the Bay of Honduras. Though that was the more important of the two settlements, there is little mention of its history in the English archives—presumably because there was no superintendent to send home reports, and the Baymen, who made their living by disregarding the Acts of Trade, did not wish to say too much about themselves.

¹ Hodgson to Aldworth, July 11, 1751, C.O. 137/59; Knowles to Holderness, Jan. 10 and March 26, 1753, C.O. 137/60; Hodgson to Reid, Aug. 3, 1754, *ibid.*; Haldane to Board of Trade, July 10, 1759, C.O. 137/30, Z 60.

² Hodgson to Aldworth, April 10, 1751, C.O. 137/59.

³ Hodgson to a friend, end of 1752, C.O. 137/57; Hodgson to Knowles, Dec. 19, 1752, C.O. 137/60; Knowles to Hodgson, Jan. 24, 1753, *ibid.*; to Vasquez Prego, March 20, 1753, *ibid.*

Diplomacy, however, had been handling the logwood question very gingerly and reluctantly. Keene, in particular, wished to have as little to do with it as possible. As he had avoided discussing the right of search while he negotiated the Treaty of 1750, he now kept logwood in the background while he adjusted the disputes over new depredations.¹ Both he and Ensenada once thought of working out a definite compromise; it is to be wished they had done it, for they might thereby have saved their countries a war.

Ensenada's scheme appears to have consisted in a licensed monopoly of the trade, jointly in English and Spanish hands; but he soon came to prefer an exclusively Spanish monopoly, and proposed to set up a company at Santander for the purpose. He believed that the Spanish merchants, having all the supplies in their hands, could raise the price upon the dyers of Europe. The English thought so too, and it was exactly what they wanted to avoid. Hardwicke believed that even an Anglo-Spanish monopoly would be objectionable. There were other people in England who thought a monopoly harmless, provided it were an English one. That was the point of the often expressed desire to oblige the logwood-cutters to conform to the Acts of Navigation, and of the younger Hodgson's suggestion that the cutting needed some regulation in order to prevent over-production and the steady fall of prices. At any rate no Englishman of any school of thought wished to be at the mercy of Spain for the supply of logwood, or to pay whatever prices the Spaniards chose to ask.² This was the great reason for the obstinate refusal of the English Government to accept any such settlement of the question. It was quite useless for the Spanish Ministers to protest that they did not wish to deprive us of logwood and that they would arrange for its sale on reasonable terms. They could not prevail against an ineradicable suspicion, and perhaps a very justifiable one, since the whole tendency of commercial policy in the Spanish Empire was towards high prices and small supplies.³

¹ Keene to Newcastle, April 19, 1751, Add. MSS. 32827, f. 197; Keene to Holderness, July 4, 1752, S.P. 94/142; June 30, 1753, 94/143.

² See a letter to the *Craftsman*, no. 605. I shall not try to enter into the justice of this reasoning. It was then a commonplace of economics that a nation which had a monopoly of an article would ask and could get any price it chose.

³ Keene to Newcastle, Aug. 27, 1751, Add. MSS. 32829, f. 163; Newcastle to Keene, Sept. 5, 1751, vol. 32830, f. 6; Keene to Newcastle, March 21, 1752,

Poor Keene was forced to bring forward the English claim to cut logwood, though he did not believe in it, and understood that it raised difficulties far greater than those which were involved in the right of search. He did his best to dissuade his Government from patronizing the logwood-cutters; and as for the Moskito Shore, he said with perfect truth that he had never heard of our right to it. He could not convince Holdernessee. Newcastle never got farther than understanding that the logwood question was a very important one, which must be settled; he could not see what difficulty there could be in making out the English title.¹ If only he and Hardwicke had entertained at this period the doubts they felt in 1760, there might have been a different story to tell; but it was not to be expected that Newcastle should question the foundation of a right before he could see a grave political danger in asserting it.² Be that as it might, the controversy about logwood could not remain dormant. Keene could not reclaim the ships confiscated for carrying 'contraband' logwood without starting this question; and even if England had made no complaint of the state of affairs, Spain was determined to put an end to it. Carvajal raised the question several times. He always denied that England had any right, and apparently hoped to get the settlements evacuated peacefully by convincing the English Government.³

While Carvajal argued, Ensenada acted. He had long inclined somewhat more to France than his rival. As the Secretary for the Indies he had the power not only to magnify the complaints of English encroachments but also to give what turn he pleased to the orders which the colonial Governors received. Exactly what he did in this affair of the logwood, and why he did it, are not very clear from the English archives. He afterwards maintained that he had given no special orders to promote

vol. 32834, f. 204; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Sept. 10, 1751, Coxe's *Pelham Administration*, ii. 410; Keene to Holdernessee, March 21, 1752, S.P. 94/141; Ensenada's justification, quoted by Rodriguez Villa, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-4.

¹ Keene to Holdernessee, June 30, 1753, S.P. 94/143; Newcastle to Keene, June 20, 1751, Add. MSS. 32828, f. 110; July 26, 1752, vol. 32839, f. 27; July 12, 1753, S.P. 94/144.

² Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 13, 1760, Add. MSS. 32911, f. 270; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Sept. 14, f. 286; but see also Newcastle's letter to Joseph Yorke, May 27, 1760, vol. 32906, f. 348.

³ Keene to Holdernessee, Jan. 17, 1752, S.P. 94/141; Carvajal to Keene, Dec. 2, 1753, S.P. 94/144; Duras to St. Contest, Jan. 15, 1754, A.E. Espagne, 515.

aggression against the English, and had King Ferdinand's full assent to what he did.¹ This can hardly be true, for the King (who was a spectator and not an accomplice of his fall) was apparently horrified at the consequences of those orders.²

The English version of the affair was as follows. The Spanish Court was in two minds whether to apply first to England for the withdrawal of the settlements, or to send orders for hostilities at once. The committee, to whom the question was referred, decided to try the amicable negotiation first; but Ensenada, apparently without the King's full knowledge or consent, ordered, in the royal name, that the English settlements should be attacked immediately.³ Keene had already sent home in 1753 an elaborate plan drawn up by one Flores da Silva for penetrating in various disguises near the English settlements and cutting off the inhabitants in their cups one Sunday or holiday. This plan, according to Keene, had been sanctioned by Ensenada; but it is no evidence against him.⁴ This expedition against Belize, duly authorized or not, was not the only charge against Ensenada; and all the charges put together were rather the pretext than the cause of his fall. His real crime was his French sympathies, and the danger that he would be too powerful after the death of Carvajal who had balanced him. His disgrace was arranged with Newcastle before Wall left London to succeed Carvajal;⁵ and the horror which was felt in England upon the discovery of his black designs was no more than an excellent piece of acting, for the discovery must have been made a long time before it was announced.

The consequences of Ensenada's orders were more than theatrical in the Bay of Honduras. A land and sea force was mustered from Havana and Guatemala. A body of soldiers penetrated unexpectedly, by a newly cut path, to the houses of some settlers at Labouring Creek, and overpowered them. After this the Baymen took to flight, leaving their huts and their cut logwood to the Spaniards. They retreated to Black River, where Hodgson himself was preparing to meet an attack. He

¹ Rodriguez Villa, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-6.

² Keene to Robinson, July 31, 1754 (most secret, nos. 1 and 2), S.P. 94/147.

³ *Ibid.*; Robinson to Albemarle, Aug. 15, 1754, Add. MSS. 32850, f. 90.

⁴ Keene to Holderness (very secret), June 30, 1753, with annexed memorandum, S.P. 94/143.

⁵ Newcastle to Albemarle, Aug. 1, 1754, Add. MSS. 32850, f. 6. Carvajal had died in the spring of 1754.

was seriously embarrassed by their presence, for when they were all assembled together it was almost impossible to victual them. They furnished him, however, with five hundred armed men, who compensated him for the disappointments he had just received: Knowles had sent him a very ill-timed order to send back the regular soldiers to Jamaica, and General Handyside, with many of the Moskito Indians, had deserted him. No further attack came. The Spaniards retired without even burning the piles of logwood properly, and within a few months the Baymen were back in their settlements without the least molestation. Knowles sent them an engineer to rebuild their forts, and a few soldiers, disguised as Baymen in frocks and trousers, to protect them.¹

There is little that is of interest in the history of the Shore or the Bay for the next few years; but Ensenada's indiscretion had unhappy consequences in diplomacy. Before anybody in Europe knew what had happened in the West Indies, the English and Spanish Governments found themselves entangled in a misunderstanding. Wall sent counter-orders to the Spanish Governors, to suspend their measures against the English settlements while the two Crowns came to an amicable agreement on the rights and wrongs of the matter.² The English Ministers expected more—indeed, they construed this very action of Wall as a promise of more. It was not enough, they said, to leave off hostilities: if the settlers had been dispossessed, they must be restored to their establishments.³

This was more than Wall could admit. He had been willing enough to use the crisis in order to get rid of Ensenada; and perhaps, as an Anglophile, he sincerely deplored so violent and provocative a method of handling a delicate matter, which might have involved Spain in a war with England for interests whose importance did not warrant it. But he no more recognized the justice of England's pretensions than Carvajal or Ensenada himself. Keene therefore had great difficulty in get-

¹ Pitts to Knowles, Aug. 1, 1754, C.O. 137/60; Hodgson to Reid, Aug. 3, 1754; Settlers of the Shore to Knowles, Sept. 5, 1754; Knowles to Robinson, Dec. 11 1754, Jan. 13, Feb. 25, July 12, 1755; Hodgson to Knowles, March 16, 1755; Hodgson to his son, May 14, 1755, *ibid.*

² Keene to Robinson, July 31, 1754 (most secret, no. 2), S.P. 94/147; Wall to Keene, Sept. 15, 1754, *ibid.*; Arriaga, orders to Governors, Jan. 5, 1755, S.P. 94/148; Wall to Newcastle, Sept. 25, 1754, Add. MSS. 32850, f. 387.

³ Keene to Robinson, Jan. 12, 1755 (secret and confidential), S.P. 94/148; Robinson to Keene (no. 1), Jan. 27, 1755, *ibid.*

ting from him satisfactory orders to the Governors. He would give back the captured ships, but to restore the settlers would be to acknowledge the validity of the English claim or at least to increase its force. Besides, who and where were these 'illustrious exiles'? If the English Ministry would undertake to collect and present them in order to their re-establishment, the next thing that would follow was a settled English government in the Bay, and this furtive intrusion would thus be regularized as an English Colony. Keene urged that we were not asking for anything new: a mere re-establishment of the *status quo ante* would commit Spain to nothing. Wall did not accept his argument, and still thought that a negotiation on such terms would be useless because England's demand would be conceded before it was discussed. However, he went so far as to instruct the President of Guatemala to restore everything to the condition in which it was before the hostilities. The English Ministry was not satisfied with these orders, and detained them nearly six months in the hope of extorting better.¹ None were needed in the end, for the Baymen had restored themselves. The whole affair became less pressing and was almost forgotten for a time while a new war between England and France drew near.

Nothing had been settled. The negotiation, if it can be called so, advanced little farther. Wall continued to insist, in one way or another, that the affair could not be discussed on equal terms unless England would withdraw the establishments in dispute. He had promised Keene that he would not force concessions from England by taking advantage of her embroilment with France. He kept his promise so well that Ensenada, emerging from disgrace in the next reign, might well have boasted that Spain would not have been paid so little for her neutrality if he had remained Minister.² Yet Wall did not wish to leave the matter for ever in suspense. His anger and impatience rose as the English logwood-cutters repaired and fortified their habitations with the connivance of the Governor of Jamaica, and the English Ministers continued to deny him the negotiation which he looked upon as the price for revoking Ensenada's orders.³

¹ Ibid.; Wall to Newcastle, March 5, 1755, Add. MSS. 32853, f. 115; Robinson to Newcastle, July 5, vol. 32856, f. 482.

² Keene to Fox, Sept. 8, 1756 (secret and separate), S.P. 94/153; Rodriguez Villa, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

³ Keene to Robinson, Sept. 22, 1755, S.P. 94/150; to Fox, Sept. 8, 1756, quoted above.

He suspected them of playing for time; and indeed that was just what they did. Trelawny had played for time when he pretended that Heredia ought to leave the settlers alone until the two Courts had come to an agreement; the English Ministers, finding that matters had righted themselves in the West Indies without intervention, seem now to have made up their minds to avoid further discussion so far as they decently could. They took what Wall gave in 1755, and eluded their part of the bargain; indeed, they often quoted Wall's letter to Keene as a kind of charter to preserve the *status quo* until further order should be taken. They even made a show of distracting Wall's attention to a settlement of French buccaneers on the isthmus of Darien, which was thought to have some official countenance from the Governor of St. Domingue. 'If we can get these thorns out of our sides', Keene wrote, 'it will not be hard to stick them into those of the French, who cover their own encroachments upon Spain by bawling against us.'¹ The English Ministers were hardly to be blamed for neglecting a minor negotiation during the war, or for avoiding explanations on a point they did not wish to yield, with a great power which might set a price on its neutrality.

Wall and Keene faintly tried to quiet the controversy in 1755

¹ Keene to Newcastle, Sept. 25, 1754, Add. MSS. 32850, f. 378; Duras to St. Contest, June 17 and July 27, 1754, A.E. Espagne 515. This settlement was not a new one. There were always a few good-for-nothing Frenchmen, who had made the regular colonies too hot to hold them. They were scattered hugger-mugger up and down the Darien coast; they had been there since the days of the buccaneers, and no doubt they led the same kind of life as the English on the Moskito Shore. They seem to have received reinforcements and encouragement from St. Domingue about 1750. Conflans, then Governor, entertained some Indian chiefs and even sent some kind of trading expedition to them. A few years later a certain Father Louis, who was wanted by the police for malversations, led a party of young gentlemen from the south side of St. Domingue to make a new French colony at Darien. The old settlers had some connexions with the Spaniards (who nevertheless suspected them), but the new seem to have aspired to establish a regular plantation with a Governor and legislature. The Spanish Government was alarmed, but without reason, for neither Machault nor the local authorities at St. Domingue wanted to support Father Louis. The Darien Indians massacred sixty French families in 1757, and renewed their friendship with Jamaica. Lieutenant-Governor Moore gave them some arms against the possible arrival of a French reinforcement (Maurepas to Conflans, July 21, 1747, A.N. Colonies B 85; Vaudreuil to Machault, Jan. 13, 1755, C^o A 99; Machault to Vaudreuil, Oct. 31, 1756, B 103; Mémoire in A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2008, ff. 82, 88; Townshend to Cleveland, Dec. 2, 1750, and Jan. 19, 1750/1, Adm. 1/234; intercepted letter of Dulac to Dutruch, April 4, 1755, C.O. 28/42; settlers to Marcillan, April 1, 1755, C.O. 137/60; Dulac to Marcillan, *ibid.*; Moore to Holderness, Aug. 31, 1757, C.O. 137/60).

by reviving something like Ensenada's scheme for furnishing logwood to the English dyers through Spanish channels. This project, for which Newcastle had called loudly, would have involved breaking the Navigation Acts by allowing the logwood to be imported into Jamaica in Spanish ships. Just before his resignation in 1756 Fox announced that the English Government would prepare a convention of its own for this purpose.¹ At this point Abreu, the Spanish Minister in London, once more demanded the complete evacuation of the Bay and the Moskito Shore, and requested, not for the last time, an answer in writing. Fox thought he ought to have distinguished between the two settlements. The King would give immediate orders about the Moskito Shore, but the old-established logwood settlements were another affair.² Pitt adopted this distinction in 1757. He would make the settlers withdraw from all encroachments made on Spanish jurisdiction since the peace of 1748—so, at least, he said, but I can find no hint of orders for the purpose. Wall, in a passion, had this answer returned to Pitt as inadmissible, and refused to listen to his excuse that Abreu had misled him into thinking this was all that was immediately wanted.

The whole affair stuck there for three years. Pitt would take no further step till Wall had explained why the answer was inadmissible; Wall would explain nothing, but threatened to leave it to time and circumstances to do him justice.³ When the Conde de Fuentes went Ambassador to England in 1760, with high hopes of clearing up all outstanding controversies, that of the logwood settlements was disagreeably renewed.

Wall still required an unconditional withdrawal of the settlers. Pitt professed a great desire to come to an amicable agreement, but could not do so if Spain precluded discussion by demanding everything—an accusation which Wall retorted, with about as much justice, on Pitt's own head. Pitt acknowledged that some of the settlements might be unjustifiable encroachments, but could not consent in any circumstances to give up the right of

¹ Keene to Robinson, Dec. 10, 1755, Add. MSS. 32861, f. 269; to Fox (secret and separate), Sept. 8, 1756, S.P. 94/153; Fox to Keene, Oct. 5, 1756, *ibid.*

² Abreu to Fox, Sept. 25, 1756, G.D. 8/92; Fox to Keene, Oct. 5, 1756.

³ Pitt to Abreu, Sept. 9, 1757, S.P. 94/156; Pitt to Keene (secret), Nov. 29, 1757; de Cosné to Pitt, Dec. 26, 1757, *ibid.*; April 24, 1758, S.P. 94/157; Pitt to Bristol, Aug. 1, 1758, S.P. 94/158, printed in Thackeray's *History of William Pitt* (London, 1827), i. 380-5.

cutting logwood. Wall took advantage of Pitt's admission and complained that England, having acknowledged the invalidity of all the settlements, still refused to evacuate any of them until she had extorted the conditions she wanted for the logwood-cutters. Each party, in fact, would negotiate, provided the negotiation should proceed on a basis which would imply an acceptance of its own position. Each party insisted on a *status quo* so favourable to itself that it would suffer nothing if the discussion never came to an end. Wall accused Pitt of trying to keep, in the continued occupation of the settlements, a pledge that England would never have to accept a final agreement which did not satisfy her. His accusation was perfectly just, but he might as fairly have taxed himself with exactly the same thing; for if the settlers were removed, Spain would be under no necessity to agree to anything except on her own terms. It is ill work criticizing in detail the interested logic of diplomacy. Each party wished to negotiate, but to accept no conditions but his own—not an uncommon fault in Ministers for Foreign Affairs.¹

A sort of negotiation was continued. It seems to have been Charles III of Spain, rather than Wall, who prevented an agreement. Wall tried to persuade him to treat without the preliminary evacuation; but Charles III was determined to expel the logwood-cutters altogether, and to furnish the English with ready-cut logwood at some European or American port.² Wall therefore had to insist once more on the total evacuation of all the encroachments. He brushed aside the distinction between the logwood settlements and the Moskito Shore with the very reasonable argument, founded on experience, that it was useless to expel or withdraw the English from one establishment on the coast if they were to have the liberty of repairing to another. However, he made a great concession, which was the basis of the agreement finally reached in the Peace of Paris. He would only ask Pitt to withdraw the soldiers and artillery and to demolish the forts; the cutters might continue their business until a final convention should be made for supplying England with logwood. Perhaps Wall only meant to place Pitt

¹ Pitt to Bristol, Sept. 26, 1760, S.P. 94/162 (Thackeray, i. 487-92); Bristol to Pitt, Jan. 14 and 28, 1761, S.P. 94/163; Wall to Bristol, Jan. 24, 1761, *ibid.*; Pitt to Bristol, July 3, 1761 (Thackeray, i. 560).

² Ossun to Choiseul, July 16, 1761, A.E. Espagne, 533.

in the wrong by this, for he was already far advanced in the adjustment of the Family Compact with France. The destruction of the military defences was something more than a concession of mere form, and would at least help Spain to enforce her own terms in the last resort by removing the settlers altogether. Pitt did not accept unconditionally; before he ordered any sort of evacuation he must know the details of Wall's scheme for supplying the logwood. Here the struggle for advantage began again. Pitt would only treat if he knew beforehand that he would approve the terms which Spain would propose. Wall would only do so if he should be placed in a position to propose any terms he chose and have them accepted.¹ Here the matter rested when the sands of patience ran out in both countries; for Wall's last offer to be content with the military evacuation of Black River alone can hardly be regarded as a serious one, since it was made after the Family Compact was signed.²

Thus the attempt to clear up the outstanding disputes between the two countries ended in failure. The contest of pride and obstinacy over the logwood settlements destroyed the hopes which Newcastle had founded upon the Treaty of 1750. That contest might have ended less violently had Europe been at peace; but it was unhappily prolonged into the Seven Years War and became one of the most important incidents in the struggle of England and France for the alliance or at least the neutrality of Spain.

¹ Pitt to Bristol, April 24, 1761, S.P. 94/163; Bristol to Pitt, May 20, 1761, *ibid.*; Aug. 6 and 31, 1761, S.P. 94/164 (the latter printed in Thackeray, i. 579-88); Wall to Bristol, Aug. 28, 1761, S.P. 94/164.

² Bristol to Pitt, Sept. 28, 1761, S.P. 94/164.

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND SPAIN, 1756-62

§ i. *The Bidding for the Spanish Alliance*

THE English and French Governments never ceased in these years to struggle for the control of Spanish policy. For a short time after 1748 the effort was relaxed a little: each party could see that too much zeal would do more harm than good with Ferdinand VI and his ministers. But when the impermanence of the settlement of Aix-la-Chapelle became more and more apparent, the rivalry of the two countries for the favour of Spain became keener than ever.

In the ten years after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the relations of England and Spain were more friendly than at any other time in the century. The Spanish Court was no longer grateful for the French intervention of 1744, and only remembered the rather high-handed way in which France had treated the interests of Spain at the Peace Congress. Sir Benjamin Keene successfully removed some of the outstanding causes of ill will, and avoided the consideration of those he could not remove. The French Ambassadors, Vaulgrenant and Duras, tried harder and harder to resist him as they watched his successes grow, and as their own Government saw less and less chance of keeping the peace with England in America. Keene held his own as long as Carvajal lived. Duras tried in 1753 to persuade Carvajal to make a close alliance between France and Spain, but he was put off with vague phrases, to the effect that Ferdinand VI would come to the rescue of France if he saw her oppressed or in great difficulties.¹ Duras believed that he made more impression on Carvajal in the last months of his life, and was almost sorry for his death though he had passed for an enemy of France; but Duras was not a very sensible man, and founded his belief on the report of stormy interviews between Keene and Carvajal which do not seem to have taken place.²

The death of Carvajal in 1754 was to have opened to his rival Ensenada a position of unquestioned authority, in which

¹ Keene to Holderness (most secret), Dec. 22, 1753, S.P. 94/144.

² Duras to St. Contest, Feb. 23, March 9 and 26, April 9, 1754, A.E. Espagne, 515.

he would have been able to provoke a war with England whenever he pleased; for though Wall was to have the department of Foreign Affairs, Ensenada would be able to regulate the volume of complaint against England, having the supervision of the Indies and internal trade from which it must arise.¹ The fall of Ensenada and the appointment of Wall to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were part of a preliminary struggle for influence at the Court of Spain, between two nations which were aware of the necessity for renewing their great contest in America. Newcastle still hoped for a defensive alliance with Spain, who had done enough to annoy France but not enough to get clear of her. This consummation of his policy could only be achieved through the fall of Ensenada.² Newcastle believed, or professed to believe, that some collusive design accounted for the coincidence of Ensenada's expedition against Honduras with the French aggressions in North America.³

After his disgrace, Wall and Alva controlled the policy of the Court, and Keene appeared stronger than ever. Wall had passed through France on his way from London to Madrid, and had a curious interview with St. Contest, the French Foreign Minister. He owned it was to be desired, in the interests of France and Spain, that a prospective aggressor should know they stood together; but he did not admit Duras's and St. Contest's minor premiss, that the relations of England and Spain were critical, and that Spain would therefore need the help of France. St. Contest had regretfully to conclude that Wall would follow the system of Carvajal; in fact he did more when he came to power, and set himself to finish for ever the misunderstandings that subsisted between England and Spain.⁴

Ensenada was gone, but the defensive alliance between England and Spain was very little nearer. However, the triumph of English diplomacy was celebrated ostentatiously by Keene's long-coveted knighthood and by a self-satisfied announcement in the King's speech of November 1754. Although the Opposition, through the mouth of Potter, congratulated the Government on its success, Beckford pointed out that the reality hardly squared with the boasted professions of Spanish friendship.

¹ Duras to St. Contest, June 17, 1754, *ibid.*

² Newcastle to Keene, Jan. 24, 1754, Add. MSS. 32848, f. 146.

³ Newcastle to Albemarle, Aug. 15, 1754, Add. MSS. 32850, f. 90.

⁴ St. Contest to Duras, May 7, 1754, A.E. Espagne, 515.

Newcastle himself felt this discrepancy. He told Wall that people would contrast our behaviour to France and Spain: we armed against the one while we complimented the other, though both alike withheld from us our due. Wall replied that he did not know what to do between the French and English: they criticized him for yielding too much, while we were not satisfied with what he yielded.¹

For many years his attitude continued to be that of the friend who wished to serve us if only we would enable him to do so by going half-way to meet him. He pointed out the difficulty of his position: a foreigner, Irish by birth, lately Ambassador in London and notoriously an intimate friend of English statesmen, he was exposed to the reproach of sacrificing Spain to England. He must therefore be at least as careful as another man to defend the essential interests of his country.² No doubt this was a profitable way of extorting concessions: a diplomat is not worth his hire if he cannot make his friends pay dearer than his enemies by such means. It does appear, however, that Wall was for a long time a real well-wisher to England, and that he would have liked to make it the glory of his Ministry that he had established a solid friendship with her. This explains very well the warmth with which he resented the outrages of the English privateers and Pitt's refusal to come to terms about Honduras. He was concerned to find that we ourselves made his policy impossible on his own terms. He would have liked to resign; and if he entered at last in cold blood upon measures against England, he only did so under the guidance of his master, when he had already given Pitt more than enough time for concessions and agreement. He kept up his air of pained benevolence to the last, even after the Family Compact was signed.³ This excellent acting casts a little doubt on his earlier sincerity, but not enough to call it seriously in question.

Instead of pursuing in detail the ups and downs of English and French influence at the Court of Spain, it is more profitable

¹ King's Speech of Nov. 14, 1754, in *Parl. Hist.* xv. 330; see the debate which follows, especially Beckford's speech, p. 350. Newcastle to Keene, Jan. 27, 1755, Add. MSS. 32852, f. 275; to Wall, Jan. 26, f. 272; Wall to Newcastle, March 5, 1755, vol. 32853, f. 115.

² Keene to Fox (private), Sept. 8, 1756, S.P. 94/153; Keene to Holderness (secret and confidential), July 21, 1757, S.P. 94/155; Holderness to Newcastle, Sept. 8, 1757, Add. MSS. 32873, f. 464; Keene to Pitt (most secret and confidential), Sept. 26, 1757, S.P. 94/156.

³ Bristol to Pitt (most secret), Aug. 31, 1759, S.P. 94/164.

to examine in general the arguments and offers which each nation put forward in order to gain its cause. France possessed one card which England could not play—the dynastic appeal. The French and Spanish diplomatic correspondence of this century is full of ‘Bourbonism’—grandiose schemes of domination in southern or western Europe, and desperate calls for help in wars and crises, all backed by references to the ties of blood and the honour of the family. Many of these expressions were hollow and interested, but they probably counted for something, especially with Charles III, who had extended the Bourbon estate to Naples. Appeals of this kind were often made to Ferdinand VI at the beginning of the Seven Years War, coupled with a reminder of Carvajal’s vague promise of 1753. His answers, however, were for the most part vague or tepid, and if he took one or two resolutions of preparing to help his cousin, they were traversed by accident or stronger influences. Duras carried his entreaties too far in the summer of 1755: he denounced the King of Spain’s Ministers to his face. Ferdinand VI was really angry, and Duras had to go. Keene had the field to himself for some time after that, but his opportunity was spoilt by the depredations of our privateers, which were Wall’s chief grievance in 1757.¹

Though England had no dynastic argument of her own, she had some influence at Court. Ferdinand’s Queen Barbara was a Portuguese princess, related to the Austrian Hapsburgs. Neither the Court nor the Minister of Portugal was so warmly in our interest as we were used to expect, and the Austrian connexion became a hindrance rather than a help to our designs after the reversal of the alliances in 1756. Nevertheless his Queen generally inclined Ferdinand VI to our side, and her death in 1758 gave us another year’s valuable time by reducing her husband to a pitiable incapacity which paralysed Spanish policy.

The game became more complicated with the accession of Charles III, the King of Naples, to the Spanish throne in 1759. Italian ambitions were called into play. He wanted to bequeath Naples and Sicily to his son, instead of giving it up to his brother Don Philip, which the treaty-makers of 1748 appear to

¹ A. Soulangue-Bodin, *La Diplomatie de Louis XV et le Pacte de Famille*, pp. 35-57; Keene to Robinson (secret), April 7, 1755, S.P. 94/148; Keene to Holdernessee (most secret), July 24 and 29, Aug. 27, 1755, S.P. 94/150.

have expected him to do on his accession to the Crown of Spain. George II was more free to oblige him in this respect than Louis XV, whose favourite daughter was married to Don Philip. The affair was entangled, however, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which provided that Don Philip should give up some of his Italian patrimony when his brother left Naples. Sardinia, who was looked upon as our ally, stood to gain by this, so the problem was quite as difficult for England as for France. Austria too was concerned, and since Maria Theresa was no longer any friend of ours, we wanted Charles III to join with Sardinia against her and sweep the board in Italy, by which method Charles III, Don Philip, and Sardinia might all have been contented without treading on each other's toes. The English Ministers, and Newcastle in particular, expected great thanks for this interesting scheme, and for their consent to the devolution of Naples upon Charles III's younger son. Newcastle relied upon this to divert Charles III's attention from his American complaints to Italy, and to stop his mouth by rendering him dependent upon us for help against Austria. Unfortunately Charles III refused to be grateful for our acquiescence in his disposition of his own property, and France removed the cause of conflict with Austria by squaring the Italian circle in such a way that everybody was satisfied. The effect of this contrivance was spoilt, however, by a ladies' quarrel over a marriage. The Archduke Joseph was intended for a daughter of Charles III, but Don Philip's wife used her influence with her father Louis XV to get the young man for her own child. The influential prejudice of Queen Maria Amalia for a neutrality between England and France was attributed, perhaps unjustly, to her resentment of this manœuvre. Her death at the end of 1760 was followed very quickly by the first steps towards the Family Compact, but whether she could have prevented it, may well be doubted.¹

The solid interests of Spain in Europe and America required more immediate sacrifices from the belligerent powers. England

¹ See the accounts of Soulange-Bodin, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-91; F. Rousseau, *Le Règne de Charles III d'Espagne*, pp. 3-7. Newcastle still believed in the summer of 1760 that Charles III was too much interested in Italy, and too dependent on us for help there, to quarrel with us for America (Newcastle to Yorke, May 29, 1760, Add. MSS. 32906, f. 350; to Kinnoull, June 6, vol. 32907, f. 21). Fuentes gave him little encouragement: 'And tho' I hung pretty much upon that string, to avoid the other, Mo^r Fuentes did not seem to enter into it' (Add. MSS. 32908, f. 36).

had kept for herself, at the Treaty of Utrecht, two morsels of the Spanish dominion in Europe. The recovery of Minorca and Gibraltar was one of the constant aims of Spanish policy. In ordinary circumstances no English Government would have consented to give them back, but the Seven Years War began with such disasters that the Ministers had to think seriously of yielding something. Minorca itself was taken by the French, who therefore had it to offer if the Spanish Court would take their part in the war. The French Ambassador suggested this once or twice. Wall had enough influence to get the offer repelled.¹ He had determined upon neutrality, and was not to be moved from it but by the conduct of England herself. When the Family Compact was made at last in 1761, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris tried to persuade Choiseul to put Spain provisionally in possession of Minorca. France was now disinclined for any bargain upon that island, because she had lost so much in the war that she must keep it to buy back some of her own colonies from England.²

The English Ministers were afraid in the first years of the war that Spain would be tempted by this offer of Minorca. They therefore brought themselves to counteract it by a sacrifice of their own. Fox was suspected of hinting to Abreu in July 1756 that we should give Spain Gibraltar if she would help us to recover Minorca. Newcastle did not like this, and Fox denied that he had ever spoken of it.³ A year later, however, the situation of England was so little better that even Pitt proposed, and Newcastle agreed, to instruct Keene to put forward this suggestion again. Perhaps we should only have suffered in our pride if our terms had been accepted: Spain was not only to get back Minorca for us, but she must also give us Oran, Ceuta, or some port on the African shore instead of Gibraltar. Pitt offered at the same time to evacuate the new logwood settlements made since the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. His language was almost that of despair: after lamenting the French victories in Lower

¹ Keene to Fox, May 31, 1756, S.P. 94/152; *Recueil des Instructions des Ambassadeurs, Espagne*, iii. 323.

² A. Bourguet, *Le Duc de Choiseul et l'alliance espagnole*, p. 210. A little later, however, Choiseul seems to have been converted to the necessity of promising Minorca to Spain (M. Danvila y Collado, *Reinado de Carlos III*, ii. 128, 137). Since France and Spain were no more successful than France alone, Minorca had to be restored to England in 1763, and Spain had to wait twenty years longer for it.

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 12, 1756, Add. MSS. 32866, f. 143.

Saxony and the danger to Cumberland's army of observation, he concluded in these words: 'The day is come, when the very inadequate benefits of the Treaty of Utrecht, that indelible reproach of the last generation, are become the necessary, but almost unattainable wish of the present; when the Empire is no more, the ports of the Netherlands betrayed, the Dutch barrier an empty sound, Minorca, and with it the Mediterranean, lost, and America itself very precarious.'¹

Hardwicke doubted the wisdom of all this. He did not think giving up Gibraltar would be any more popular than making peace without Minorca, and he believed that if Spain procured these terms for us by interceding with France, it was to France, not to us, that she would really be obliged for the recovery of Gibraltar.² Perhaps it was not settled at first among the English Ministers, as it came to be later, that Spain was to procure Minorca for us not by a peaceful intercession with France, but by taking our part in the war. That would have been an end in itself, in view of the advantages which English trade in Spain would have had over the French during such a war.

The outrages of our privateers and the delay in the logwood negotiation prejudiced Wall against us so much that he could not think of accepting the proposal. His colleagues were averse to entering the war on our side; some, like Eslava, would rather have taken part against us, and Wall's own credit was ruined by the English Government's neglect. He would not promise even to represent Keene's offer to his master; Keene thought he observed 'something of a regret, either that this proposition should come too late, or in circumstances when he would not or dared not, make use of it'. 'Are these times and circumstances', he asked Keene a few days later, 'to talk on such points as the liberties of Europe and a close union with Spain, when you have given *us* so much room to be dissatisfied with you?'³

¹ Pitt to Keene (most secret and confidential), Aug. 23, 1757, S.P. 94/155; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Aug. 9, 1757, Add. MSS. 32872, f. 492; Newcastle's memorandum of Aug. 16, vol. 32997, f. 245. Pitt appears, but not certainly, to have thought of this first.

² Hardwicke to Newcastle, Aug. 11, 1757, Add. MSS. 32873, f. 25.

³ Keene to Pitt (most secret and confidential), Sept. 26, 1757, S.P. 94/156, printed in *Chatham Correspondence*, i. 263-77. The idea of giving up Gibraltar was strongly denounced, and even the value of Spanish neutrality was questioned, by Postlethwayt (*Britain's Commercial Interest Explained and Improved* (London, 1757), ii. 490).

§ ii. *The Spanish Grievances—the Prizes and the Fishery*

What were the injuries which so estranged Wall from his friends in England, and drove him at last into war? First of all, the violations of Spanish neutrality by English warships and privateers. It would be impossible to discuss these in a satisfactory manner, without entering into the vast subject of neutral rights.¹ The English Ministry knew very well the bad consequence of offending Spain during the war with France, and tried hard to avoid it; indeed, it treated Spain with more favour or justice than it allowed to any other neutrals. But the proper pride of the Admiralty, the difficulty of controlling the privateers, the reluctance of the Government to interfere with the Prize Courts, and a kind of *raison d'état* which has always been the curse of belligerent nations—all these things prevented the best-intentioned Ministers from satisfying the claims of any neutral power. The molestation of Spanish merchant vessels, and seizures within Spanish territorial waters, continued to incense Wall to such a pitch of fury that even his old friend Keene could do nothing with him. Poor Keene can truly be said to have died of these disputes. His successor Lord Bristol was able to calm Wall, but the mischief was done. Neither Wall nor Charles III could forget the tactless inflexibility with which the navy and the courts of England asserted their very questionable doctrines of international law—the most odious possible reminder of the rights of the strong.

The second of the grievances for which Spain went to war with England arose out of the first. But for the seizures of Spanish ships in the French North America trade, the question of the Newfoundland fishery need not have arisen at this time. It was first mentioned in one of Abreu's complaints about prize cases. Some of the ships which were brought up before the English courts seem to have had Spanish passports for going to fish in Newfoundland. This errand was presumably no more than a pretext for carrying provisions to the French colonies; but the validity of the excuse was unavoidably called in question. Abreu quoted the treaties from which Spain claimed the right to take part in this fishery, and Pitt very soon joined issue by denying the whole Spanish case.²

¹ I hope to do so in a book to be published shortly.

² Abreu to Pitt, June 16, 1758, S.P. 94/157; Pitt to Bristol, Aug. 1 and 15

There was little to be said for the Spanish claim to the fishery, so far as it was founded upon the right of first discovery; but the English argument for excluding the Spaniards altogether was supported by some rather dubious sophistries. Obviously the rights had been far from clear when the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, for it begged the question by preserving to the Spaniards any privileges to which they could make good a title. Neither Government had ever meant to yield anything by this formula; England tried to entrap Spain by granting licences for Spanish voyages to Newfoundland, but it does not appear that their acceptance really prejudiced the Spanish case. The dispute had slept at any rate since the Treaty of 1721, which avoided a determination in the same way as that of Utrecht.¹ It now became a burning question, because the Ministers of England, France, and Spain were all intent upon improving their navies, and thought of the fishery as the best possible training for sailors. Pitt and Choiseul attended to this point so earnestly that their peace negotiation came to grief on it in 1761. Spain, who had so long disused the fishery, could hardly pretend that it was of the same importance to her; but the middle of the eighteenth century was a time of colonial and maritime revival, in which the fishery may have been meant to play a part.²

Neither Pitt nor any other English Minister seems to have thought seriously of yielding this point to Spain. England had already got the sole possession of Newfoundland by the Treaty of Utrecht; the French still enjoyed the fishery on the banks, besides that of the St. Lawrence which naturally belonged to the sovereignty of Canada. After the conquest of Montreal, S.P. 94/158; Pitt to Abreu, Aug. 11, *ibid.*; see Fuentes's later memorial, Sept. 9, 1760, S.P. 94/162.

¹ See the article of Miss Vera Lee Brown on this subject, in the *Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association* for 1925.

² Historians generally make the most of Charles III's interest in this question and in the revival of the Spanish navy. That seems to have begun under Ensenada and continued by Arriaga, though Charles III still found much to do when he came to the throne. Ensenada had been aware of the Spanish claims to the fishery in 1746, though he did not expect to have them recognized at once. Macanaz had tried to get them established by his peace project of 1747 (S.P. 84/425, f. 80). The Spanish Government first took up the Newfoundland question, and demanded an answer in writing, before the accession of Charles III. The mercantilist writers Uztaritz and Ulloa had complained of the loss of this fishery, though in a rather academic way (Uztaritz, *op. cit.* ii. 135-45; Ulloa, *op. cit.* ii. 42-9). Their aspirations were noticed and condemned in 1757 by Malachy Postlethwayt in *Britain's Commercial Interest Explained and Improved* (ii. 282), so the Newfoundland question was a familiar one before Abreu reopened it.

Pitt seems to have aimed at a monopoly of both these fisheries, by excluding even the French from them. The other members of the Cabinet were less ambitious to deprive France of the fishery, but even Newcastle hardly wanted to allow it to Spain, and if he would have done it, he dared not. Hardwicke thought the Spanish pretensions very thin, and Pitt never varied his absolute denial of any concession or even discussion of the point. It was 'sacred'; it was even more than the friendship of Spain was worth.¹

It was hardly one of Spain's essential interests to insist on this privilege, even if it was one of England's to deny it (which is somewhat doubtful). If the prizes and the Newfoundland fishery had been their only grievances, Charles III and Wall would hardly have had any solid reason for departing from their neutrality. The controversy over the logwood settlements was a far more important affair;² but the worst thing of all was the spirit in which the English Government treated all these questions. Two things became more and more evident after the tide had begun to turn in our favour against France. Pitt meant to sweep the board in North America and perhaps in the West Indies too. By conquering one French colony after another, he must necessarily make England the strongest power in that part of the world, and bring her face to face with Spain. Moreover, he clearly wished to avoid dealing with the Spanish claims in Newfoundland and Central America until he had finished the war with France. Spain would then have to confront him alone, and to settle her accounts with him on any terms he thought proper to impose.

§ iii. *The Balance of Power and the Family Compact*

The successive conquests of Louisbourg, Guadeloupe, and Quebec gave Spain increasing cause for anxiety. Wall expressed some private satisfaction as a friend of England, but this may have been a mere compliment.³ Charles III was without Wall's partiality to us, and was seriously impressed by the appeals of

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 15, 1760, Add. MSS. 32908, f. 308; to Mansfield, July 18, f. 353; to Hardwicke, Sept. 13, vol. 32911, f. 270; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Sept. 14, f. 286; Pitt to Bristol, Sept. 26, 1760, S.P. 94/162, and July 28, 1761, S.P. 94/163 (these two dispatches are largely printed in Thackeray's *History of William Pitt*, i. 487-90, 570-3). See also Bristol's account of his arguments with Wall, in his dispatch of Nov. 6, 1760 (most secret), S.P. 94/162, and Wall's paper of Jan. 24, 1761, S.P. 94/163.

² *V. supra*, pp. 550-5.

³ Bristol to Pitt, Nov. 12, 1759, S.P. 94/160.

the French Court to the common interests of France and Spain in America. Ossun, the French Ambassador accredited to him both at Naples and Madrid, declared that the French colonies in North America were the bulwark of the Spanish Indies against the aggressions of England. Cape Breton, Canada, and Louisiana lay successively between the English and the mines of Mexico; but those defences were falling one by one. Charles III's blood froze at the news of Quebec; Montreal was to surrender next year, and the English army would be free to proceed against New Orleans. In the same way the loss of Guadeloupe was likely to be followed by that of Martinique and perhaps St. Domingue too; what sort of neighbours would the English be to the Spaniards on Hispaniola?¹

The English Ministers did their best to repel these suspicions. While the controversy with France was still maturing, they tried to retort the charge of encroachment by pointing out that the French memorials made claims to North America which Spain would be sorry to see us admit.² Pitt assured the Neapolitan Ambassador Sanseverino in 1759 that we did not mean to attack French Hispaniola, but should only conquer the Windward Islands.³ Even this limitation did not quite satisfy Spain, who still held some sort of a claim to the Neutral Islands, upon the principle that whatever she had not formally conceded in America to a foreign nation was still hers by right. During the peace negotiation of 1761, Wall warned Choiseul not to sign away those islands to England without regard to this interest; but it was a small matter, and Spain only put it forward in order to acquire a title to some compensation in another field.⁴ In North America, Pitt made a merit of abstaining from any conquest which might give umbrage to Spain; perhaps this was the reason why Amherst never made any attack on Louisiana.⁵ The Spanish Government particularly desired that the English should have no settlement near the Gulf of Mexico, for that would bring them to the treasure route by a side-door.

¹ Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Duras had tried the effect of these arguments before the war began (Keene to Robinson, April 7, 1755 (secret), S.P. 94/148).

² Robinson to Keene (secret), March 11, 1755, *ibid.*

³ Pitt to Bristol, June 5, 1759, S.P. 94/159.

⁴ Bristol to Pitt, July 13, 1761, S.P. 94/163. Wall discussed the matter with Bristol as well (Bristol to Pitt, Aug. 10, 1761, S.P. 94/164).

⁵ Pitt to Abreu, Dec. 13, 1759, S.P. 94/160; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Oct. 19, 1760, Add. MSS. 32913, f. 210.

Besides these considerations, Choiseul and Ossun brought forward once more the doctrine of the American balance of power. This was the natural retort to the English cant upon the liberties of Europe. It took several forms. Sometimes Ossun or Sanseverino would imply that there ought to be a local balance of power in every region of the world, which it was the interest of neutrals to keep even. Something of the sort had been established in America by the Treaty of Utrecht, and it was now upset by the English conquests. When Sanseverino repeated this language in London, Pitt asked him how Charles III would like it if we were to talk about the balance of power in Italy? This shaft fell wide of the mark, because Charles III did not accept Pitt's encouragement to upset that particular equilibrium for his own advantage. Pitt further denied that the Treaty of Utrecht had meant to establish an American balance of power, and if it had done so, France as the first encroacher and aggressor was more responsible than we were for its alteration. He thought it neither very friendly nor very neutral of Charles III to say that he could not see with indifference our conquests in America. We only took, and meant to keep, what was necessary to our security and to the prevention of future wars. (This was almost an admission that we meant to upset the balance, which can hardly be said to exist when one party is permanently secure from attacks by the other.)¹ Sir James Gray, at Naples, replied to the same arguments in another way: he denied the existence of such regional balances of power, and maintained that there was only one in all the world, which France, through her preponderance in Europe, was more likely to upset than we were.² The French diplomats overcame this objection by arguing that the military balance on land was no longer important; it was commerce, wealth, and sea power that carried the day, therefore the colonial and maritime balance was the most essential of all.³

Choiseul meant to establish on these grounds a case for

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 22, 1759, Add. MSS. 32897, f. 287; Abreu to Pitt, Dec. 5, 1759, S.P. 94/160; Pitt to Abreu, Dec. 13, *ibid.*

² Gray to Pitt (extract), Sept. 27, 1759, Add. MSS. 32896, f. 132.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, Sept. 7, 1759 (*Recueil des Instructions des Ambassadeurs, Espagne*, iii. 349). See also the letter of Choiseul to Ossun quoted in Bourguet, *op. cit.*, p. 159. Duras had already held this language in 1755 (paper enclosed by Keene to Robinson, April 7, 1755, S.P. 94/148). See also *Le Politique danois*, pp. 141-3, 281-4.

Spanish mediation. At the beginning of the war, France had been no more anxious for such a thing than England, but after so many disasters she had changed her opinion. Bernis wanted a Spanish mediation in 1758, but the eclipse of Ferdinand VI's understanding made it impossible.¹ Choiseul returned to the plan next year with more hope of success. He was for dividing the separate peace with England, under the mediation of Spain, from the general congress, because he hoped to extort better terms by isolating England in a three-cornered discussion with France and Spain on those questions in which alone Spain had an interest opposite to that of England. The English Ministers seem to have guessed something of the sort.² Newcastle was not for rejecting a Spanish offer altogether, because he thought Pitt would prefer Charles III's mediation to any other, and therefore regarded it as the only way to reconcile Pitt to a peace. George II did not like it at all, and as it turned out, Newcastle must have been mistaken about the attitude of Pitt, who went to considerable shifts to avoid the intervention of Spain; he was afraid of a private peace between England and France, because once our own war was over and we had nothing more to gain, the Ministry could not easily get Parliament to continue supporting Frederick II, whom he was determined not to desert. Newcastle admitted this, but seems to have thought there could be no harm in a separate negotiation so long as it did not lead to a separate peace. That was both silly and dangerous, and Pitt was no doubt in the right to avoid the interposition of Charles III altogether.³ He put it aside, professing his readiness to accept good offices, and at the same time he tried to render it unnecessary by proposing, in concert with Prussia, a general peace congress at which everything should be treated.

Choiseul really wanted a peace; even the Spanish mediation was designed as a means to it, not as an excuse for embroiling Spain in the war. He would still have preferred to settle his affairs with England through the mediation of Spain, but he

¹ *Mémoires et Lettres du Cardinal de Bernis* (ed. Masson, 1878), ii. 44, 98, 191, 259.

² Hardwicke to Newcastle, Jan. 3, 1760, Add. MSS. 32901, f. 48.

³ Newcastle's memoranda of Aug. 27, 1759, Add. MSS. 32894, f. 477; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Aug. 30, Sept. 2 and 12, vol. 32895, ff. 32, 117, 363; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Aug. 31, f. 80; Newcastle's memoranda of Oct. 8 and 11, vol. 32896, f. 349 and 32897, f. 11; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 15 and 31, vol. 32897, ff. 88, 513; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Oct. 24, f. 351; Dec. 5, vol. 32899, f. 301; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Jan. 2, 1760, vol. 32901, f. 42.

could not afford to reject the congress. Meanwhile Charles III had met Wall, and seen for himself the unreadiness of the Spanish army and navy. Wall had not been consulted on the mediation; he had always disliked it as a step which might lead Spain into the war, and he was supported in this by Queen Maria Amalia and perhaps by Charles III's own conviction of the necessity of waiting his time. Spain therefore accepted Pitt's snub, and offered good offices instead of mediation. Choiseul still tried hard to keep her to the original plan, and Charles III finally allowed him to say that England had refused mediation. The first months of 1760 were taken up with a futile controversy over the truth of this, and perhaps Charles III was as much angry with Choiseul as with Pitt for so unpleasant an advertisement of his failure.¹

While Charles III strengthened his resources and increased his navy, the controversy between England and Spain took a more dangerous turn. The Conde de Fuentes, who had been his named Ambassador to England long ago, was at last sent to post with orders to press for satisfaction of the various injuries which Spain had suffered from the English. The discussion of those grievances, especially that of the logwood affair, had been hung up too long already, and if Spain was to take any advantage of England's war with France, her opportunity was beginning to run out. This mission of Fuentes seems to have been England's last chance of making up her differences with Spain. Presumably Charles III and Wall had determined to know where they stood, in order to decide whether Spain's own interests required her to take part in the war while France was still able to wage it. It was not only the balance of power that was the question, but the prizes, the fishery, and the logwood settlements.

Fuentes presented a batch of memorials and demanded an answer in writing. Pitt gave one in September about the prizes, but avoided saying anything definite on the other two questions, since no answer which we could bring ourselves to give was likely to satisfy Spain. Even Newcastle disputed the points of Newfoundland and the logwood; but after a closer attention

¹ See Yorke's letters to Holderness at the beginning of 1760, S.P. 84/487, also Newcastle to Yorke, Feb. 26, 1760, Add. MSS. 32902, f. 408; see also Bourguet, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-88; Rousseau, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-51; Soulange-Bodin, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-37.

to Fuentes's arguments, he began to think we were in the wrong about the latter. Kinnoull and Hardwicke, the two best informed and most judicious of his friends, agreed with him. Bute was as firm as Pitt about the fishery, but hoped we might accommodate the affair of the logwood.¹ Even Pitt himself seems to have thought we might have to yield this point, for he prepared to throw the blame of doing so upon Newcastle.

'He told me, in a very extraordinary manner, and persisted in it to the last, that, when the affair came to be decided, which he thought must be brought to an issue very soon, he (Mr. Pitt) would give no opinion. That it was the Duke of Newcastle, and My Lord Hardwicke, who must determine it.'

The reason he gave for this strange abnegation was that Newcastle had already compromised our case many years before by promising Wall that we would yield something; further:

'That he, (Mr. Pitt) was not in a situation in the administration to stand either breaking with Spain, or the giving up any right of this country—that he did not apprehend the consequences of a breach with Spain, so much as others might do; tho' he wish'd extremely to avoid it, in order to secure an alliance with that Crown, with regard to the affairs of Europe in general. He thinks, Spain will give up the point of the fishery on Newfoundland, and would propose some expedient with regard to the logwood. But whether that expedient should be accepted or not, he would not give any opinion. He said, the Duke of Newcastle is the person, who has the confidence of the King, the Duke of Newcastle has the support of the Parliament, and a power, which may enable him to stand the one or the other. That his situation was very different.'²

This may have been a momentary outburst of ill humour, or a clever threat calculated to paralyse Newcastle, or Pitt may

¹ Newcastle's memorandum of his interview with Fuentes, July 3, 1760, Add. MSS. 32908, f. 36; Kinnoull to Newcastle, July 10, 1760, f. 171; Memorandum of conversation with Viry, July 25, vol. 32909, f. 46; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 13, vol. 32911, f. 270; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Sept. 14, f. 286.

² Newcastle's memorandum of July 4, 1760, Add. MSS. 32908, ff. 80-1. I hardly know what credit to give to this sort of report. No doubt Newcastle thought he understood Pitt right, but he was himself so anxious to escape responsibility for anything unpopular, that he may have erred in thinking that others were trying to get rid of it by thrusting it on him; that is, he may have judged Pitt too much by himself. Nevertheless Hardwicke, whose judgement I would take against that of any of his contemporaries, seems to have shared Newcastle's opinion of Pitt, and I am inclined to believe, from this and many other instances, that Pitt was an exceedingly artful demagogue, who took the credit for anything popular and often—but not always—shirked the responsibility for things that would not go down.

afterwards have changed his mind. He seems to have determined to avoid giving Fuentes a definite answer. He received a most unfortunate encouragement in this fatal course from the indolence of Hardwicke, without whom Newcastle dared not face him. Hardwicke did not want to come to town, and acquiesced the more readily in Pitt's policy of delay. He argued it neither proper nor necessary to return answers at once to Fuentes's memorials.

'They can never be such, as will please the Court of Spain, neither do I think that the people of England, in their present temper, will bear it. Therefore I think it will be right to gain time, as much as possible, especially till you see the winding up of this campaign, both in Germany and America: for according to those events, it may be right to speak more or less strongly to Spain.'¹

This may have been true. It certainly was so, if the Ministers were determined to be afraid of their own supporters (which was quite unnecessary before the death of George II) or to vindicate at all costs what Pitt thought, but Newcastle and Hardwicke did not think, the just and essential interests of their country. At any rate it coincided with Pitt's own reasoning. He contented himself with declaring, in a long dispatch to Bristol, that he was ready to negotiate the logwood question, but not on the basis of Fuentes's memorial. As for the fishery, Spain must 'cease to expect, as a consideration of an union, which it is at least as much to her interest as to ours to maintain inviolate, a sacrifice which can never be made'.²

It was here that the negotiation took the wrong turning from which it never came back. Wall and Fuentes had long suspected that Pitt was only trifling with them until he should have his

¹ Hardwicke to Newcastle, Sept. 14, 1760, Add. MSS. 32911, f. 286.

² Pitt to Bristol, Sept. 26, 1760, S.P. 94/162. Pitt did not make clear his reasons for saying that Spain gained at least as much as England from their mutual friendship. He may have been thinking of the argument that England was a much better customer for Spanish produce than France, though the balance of the trade between the two countries was supposed to turn in favour of England. English pamphleteers often used this argument in order to prove that Spain must lose more by a war than England. (For example, *The Advantages and Disadvantages which will attend the Prohibition of the Merchandizes of Spain, impartially examined* (London, 1740), p. 29.) Postlethwayt complained in 1757 that the Spaniards took more French than English textiles, although England was a better customer for Spanish goods (*Great Britain's True System*, p. lxxxiv). So far as the trade statistics prove anything, the exports from England easily overbalanced the imports in every year of peace between 1730 and 1770 (see Sir C. Whitworth's figures, *State of the Trade of Great Britain*, ii. 31-2).

hands free of the French war; now they were sure of it. Ossun held the same language to Charles III.¹ Wall pressed Bristol for an answer in writing, ostensibly because he needed it to defend himself against this suggestion of Ossun; but Bristol would not even give him a copy of Pitt's dispatch. Pitt continued to withhold a written answer, on the pretext that a paper war of memorials would only irritate the Court of Spain; he was willing instead to 'negotiate' the points in dispute by word of mouth.² At the same time Wall ordered Fuentes to try once more to obtain something in writing about the logwood settlements.

'If they should confess, as they do verbally, that they ought not to keep those settlements, and that they will evacuate them upon such a condition, we always obtain, by their confession, a new pledge of our justice. Do you therefore continue to press strongly for an answer in writing, which at all events must be of use to us, in order that the King's measures may have a solid support.'³

The last sentence has an ominous look; but no danger could draw any concession from Pitt. There was a race between the exhaustion of France and the rising anger of the Court of Spain, and the English Government had some reason for hoping that France would submit before Spain was ready.

That was just what Charles III and Wall feared. Wall asked Bristol again and again whether he thought Spain could be so foolish as to pick a quarrel with England at the height of her power and triumph. In truth, however, this was his last good chance, and he knew it. Choiseul had never concealed that if Spain allowed France to be defeated in this war, he should not be able, if he wanted, to support Charles III in his quarrels with England.⁴ Spain must soon make up her mind once for all whether she was likely to procure satisfaction from England without fighting, and whether France could hold out against England long enough for her to enter the war. Grimaldi and Fuentes, at Paris and London, were already convinced at the beginning of 1761 that it would be a disaster for Spain if England and France were to make peace before she had per-

¹ Bristol to Pitt, Nov. 6 (most secret), Dec. 1, 1760, S.P. 94/162.

² Pitt to Bristol, Sept. 26 and Dec. 23, 1760, *ibid.*; Bristol to Pitt, Nov. 6 (two letters) and Dec. 22, *ibid.*

³ Wall to Fuentes, Dec. 22, 1760, intercepted, Add. MSS. 38197, f. 102.

⁴ Bristol to Pitt (most secret), Nov. 6, 1760; Choiseul to Ossun, Sept. 7, 1759, *Recueil des Instructions des Ambassadeurs, Espagne*, iii. 350.

suaded the former to yield or the latter to support her.¹ Wall must have come round to this opinion at the same time. At the beginning of January he heard from London, through Bristol and Fuentes, that Pitt had once more refused a written answer about Honduras; at the same time he procured a document which informed him clearly enough what the answer would have been, if it had been given. This was Pitt's dispatch to Bristol of September 26, which Pitt had consented to let him see. Wall was so displeased with it that he would not even show it to his master, or so he told Bristol.² However, he now knew where he stood: he was 'at length fully convinced of what he might expect from Great Britain'. He could look for no concession on the fishery, and England would insist on negotiating the logwood question before she evacuated the settlements, whereas Spain had demanded that the evacuation should take place first.

Wall saw the dispatch not long before the 14th of January; on the 19th Ossun told Choiseul that if he could make a good peace with England he ought to do so, but there was no need to accept a bad one in a hurry, because Spain would soon be ready to come to his help.³ Soon afterwards Grimaldi, the new Spanish Ambassador at Versailles, made overtures for a closer union of the two Bourbon powers. Whether he made his first proposal by order, is an unimportant question; he soon enough got his conduct approved. It was the fear of a peace between France and England that inspired Grimaldi with such a precipitate zeal for the Family Compact. Convinced that Spain could only get her grievances redressed by war, he saw that it was her advantage to throw her weight into the scale of France now, rather than fight single-handed a few months later.⁴ As he told Fuentes on March 5: 'It appears to me of the utmost importance for us, to assure ourselves of France, and engage her before she makes her peace; for afterwards, I don't know what

¹ Fuentes to Wall, Jan. 30, 1761, G.D. 8/93; Grimaldi to Fuentes, Feb. 26 and March 5, 1761, *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 92, 95; Fuentes to Grimaldi, March 10, p. 96.

² Bristol to Pitt, Jan. 14 and 19, 1761, S.P. 94/163; Fuentes to Wall, Jan. 23, 1761, Add. MSS. 32918, f. 27.

³ Bourguet, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁴ In this he seems to have differed from Wall, who repeatedly told Ossun he hoped a war could be avoided. Wall may even have welcomed the French intervention in the Anglo-Spanish dispute because it would enable Spain to yield with dignity what she could not give up to England alone (Ossun to Choiseul, June 29, 1761, A.E. Espagne, 532; July 16, vol. 533).

inclination she may have to go to war again for our sake.¹ At the same time he had to conceal from Choiseul the obvious self-interest of the scheme, and to represent it as the overflowing of Charles III's compassion for his cousin.² For this affectation of generosity Choiseul made Spain pay heavily at the Peace of Paris.

Choiseul now had two strings to his bow. He can hardly be said to have made up his mind whether he would rely more on making a peace with England or continuing the war with the help of Spain. Much would depend on the terms which could be obtained from the enemy and the ally. Choiseul was ready to make Spain pay for helping him. He can hardly be blamed for that, since she had often refused help when France needed it, and only offered it now in her own interest, when France was bled white by the war.

He seems to have given up the idea of a new Treaty of Commerce,³ convinced that France already enjoyed by prescription such rights as could hardly be improved by a new tariff.⁴ He did, however, ask Charles III to prevent neutrals from importing English manufactures during the prospective war with England. The ostensible purpose was to aggravate England's financial exhaustion by cutting off her export markets; but presumably there was the ulterior motive of enabling French counterfeits to establish themselves securely in the market under this protection.⁵ That was exactly one of the things England most feared from a war with Spain.⁶ Further, the Family

¹ Grimaldi to Fuentes, March 5, 1761, Add. MSS. 32919, f. 446.

² Fuentes to Grimaldi, March 10, 1761, vol. 32920, f. 40.

³ He had suggested it at first—see his letter to Ossun of Jan. 27, 1761, quoted by Bourguet, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

⁴ See the *mémoire* sent to Ossun with Choiseul's approval on May 5 (A.E. Espagne, 532). Ossun disagreed with Choiseul; he thought it was to Spain's advantage to resign any attempt at manufactures, for which her working population was too small, and to live by exporting raw materials to the industrious French, from whom she should receive them back as finished products (Ossun to Choiseul, with *mémoire* annexed, June 29, 1761, *ibid.*). Even the English had never asked more than this: Ensenada and the Spanish mercantilists would not have thanked Ossun for the suggestion.

⁵ Choiseul to Ossun, July 7, 1761, A.E. Espagne, 533. Such a clause was finally included in the Family Compact and was very strictly executed. The shopkeepers of Madrid ran out of English cloth and would have been glad to supply themselves with French substitutes, but the local regulations of Nîmes about sizes and standards obstructed the contract, and the help of the French Ministry had to be invoked (Ossun to Choiseul, May 27, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536).

⁶ Bristol to Egremont (separate and secret), Dec. 6, 1761, S.P. 94/164.

Compact finally included a vaguely worded clause by which each nation communicated to the subjects of the other the same rights that were enjoyed by its own natives, and no other country might claim the privilege so imparted, even by virtue of a most-favoured-nation clause. If this article had been at all precise, France would at last have gained the position of unique and exclusive commercial privilege for which she had so long striven at Madrid; but in fact it seems to have had very little importance.

Although France did not ask for many tangible advantages from the Spanish alliance—for indeed the alliance itself appeared to be advantage enough—Grimaldi and Choiseul had nevertheless a violent tug-of-war over the terms. It was Grimaldi's object to prevent France from making peace with England without procuring redress of the Spanish grievances into the bargain. For this purpose he suggested that each power should communicate to the other all its negotiations, and that neither should make peace without the consent of the other. Choiseul thought this unreasonable, especially as Grimaldi proposed to avoid if possible the entry of Spain into the war. This was asking France to pay the reckoning while Spain called the tune.¹ Choiseul (as he later said in his justification) regarded the question between peace with England and the Spanish alliance as an open one—or rather, he would prefer a peace with England if it could be had on reasonable terms; the Spanish alliance was only to guarantee him against bad ones.² His negotiation with Pitt, through the missions of Bussy and Stanley, had already begun in the middle of his more secret one with Spain, and if it succeeded, he did not mean to spoil it by drag-

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, May 26, 1761, A.E. Espagne, 532. There were other causes of disagreement. Spain wanted to limit so far as possible the contingencies against which she was to guarantee France—that is to say, she did not want to follow France into an offensive German war. Besides, she only offered at first to guarantee France the territories she should possess at the peace with England, while France was to guarantee all that Spain possessed now. That is to say, France was to undertake that Spain should lose nothing at all, while Spain would not undertake that France should lose nothing more (Choiseul to Ossun, May 26 and June 2; Ossun to Choiseul, June 22). This inequality was removed in the Family Compact, by which each power only guaranteed to the other what it should hold at the next peace.

² See Choiseul's *mémoire* printed by Soulangue-Bodin, op. cit., pp. 242-3; Choiseul's instructions to Bussy, May 23, 1761, A.E. Angleterre, 443. He continued to say so as late as July 7, when he was on the point of deciding to unite himself with Spain (Choiseul to Ossun, July 7, A.E. Espagne, 533).

ging in Spanish affairs. He therefore told Bussy to keep Fuentes quiet in London so long as there was any hope of a peace, and only to play upon his animosity if there was none.¹ At the same time, while offering to sign the Family Compact as soon as Spain pleased, he only promised to make the satisfaction of Spain's demands on England an indispensable condition of his own peace if he had not succeeded in making it within eleven months; in that case, Spain was then to declare war on England.² The only point on which Spain was to be consulted in all events was the partition of the Neutral Islands between England and France. This was reasonable, because Spain asserted some claim to them; but it might serve, if the negotiations for peace went badly, as a hook to draw Spain into the general discussion of the terms.³

It was therefore clear that if Pitt and Choiseul came to an agreement at once, Spain would be left out. The issue of Choiseul's double game turned on the intrigues within the English Ministry. As early as January 1761, Fuentes reported that England would never yield anything so long as Pitt controlled her policy, but a little pressure might hearten the peace party and bring about his fall. The Russian Ambassador in London gave Choiseul the same advice in April, and advised him not to show too much facility. Finally Choiseul himself claimed, after the event, to have discerned at a very early stage of the peace negotiation that it turned on the struggle of Pitt and Bute for ascendancy.⁴

The affair was not quite so simple as Choiseul believed. Bute wanted Pitt's power and popularity, but he was not sure whether it was yet safe to dispense with him, and he did not know how to beat him except with his own weapons.⁵ It is a

¹ Instructions to Bussy, May 23, 1761, A.E. Angleterre, 443. Unfortunately Bussy despaired at once of the peace and began to work up Fuentes too soon.

² Choiseul to Ossun, June 2, 1761, A.E. Espagne, 532.

³ In fact it did so (Choiseul to Bussy, June 19 and July 4, A.E. Angleterre, 443; see also Bussy's instructions, *ibid.*, and Choiseul to Ossun, May 26).

⁴ Fuentes to Wall, Jan. 23, 1761, Add. MSS. 32918, f. 27; Galitzin to Choiseul, April 26, 1761, A.E. Angleterre, 443; Choiseul's *mémoire* of 1765, printed by Soulange-Bodin, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-3.

⁵ Fox afterwards attributed this to Gilbert Elliot's attempt to bring Bute and Pitt together, which 'raised, or at least fomented and increas'd in L^d Bute that vain imagination of gaining equal popularity with Pitt; in order to which, his Lordship was, in such points as he thought would at all effect that, of Pitt's side in the Council, and carrying the cyphers of the Cabinet with him outvoted the sound part' (Memoir, in *Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox*, i. 51).

mistake to treat Bute as the head of the peace party during this summer of 1761. He pursued peace, it is true, but dared not make an unpopular one; for a long time, therefore, he was half an accomplice of Pitt, and the task of insisting on peace at any reasonable price fell upon Newcastle and Hardwicke, and most of all upon Bedford. In fact it was Bute as much as Pitt who suggested on June 26 the fatal decision to refuse France any fishery in America—even that of Newfoundland which she had always enjoyed. Pitt and Temple were for claiming the monopoly of the fishery. Newcastle and Bedford disliked that, but Bute persuaded the majority of the Cabinet to try once more whether France would yield it, without meaning to insist if she held firm. Though Pitt condemned this trial of Choiseul's resistance as 'puerile and illusory', he did not reject help in any form, and altered his dispatch so as to declare that we would not allow France any share of the fishery without some great and important compensation—by which he meant the almost equally unacceptable condition of demolishing Dunkirk.¹

By all accounts this was the turning-point of the negotiation. There were indeed other matters in dispute, even in the fishery itself. Choiseul wanted not only the Newfoundland fishery but that of the St. Lawrence as well, and a settlement to which the French fishermen could resort; without this, he said, the right of fishing was illusory. Bute's unfortunate suggestion only covered the first of these points; at that stage of the negotiation the Cabinet was almost unanimous in refusing the other two, which were equally indispensable in Choiseul's eyes. It would therefore be wrong to blame any one party in the Ministry for the failure to bridge the gulf between Pitt's concessions and Choiseul's demands. It is nevertheless true that if Bute and his fellow waverers had agreed in June to what they allowed in September, the peace might have been made between England and France, and the Family Compact might never have come into being.

There is plenty of evidence that the refusal of the fishery convinced Choiseul that he must ally himself with Spain and continue the war. A day or two after he heard of it, he first told Stanley, who was negotiating with him in Paris, that he

¹ Newcastle to Devonshire, June 28, 1761, Add. MSS. 32924, ff. 312-20; Pitt to Stanley, June 26, printed in Thackeray's *History of William Pitt*, i. 546.

had been offered a Spanish alliance.¹ At the same time he ordered Bussy to introduce Spain into the negotiation by declaring that France could only discuss the Neutral Islands with the consent of Spain; he warned Bussy that this was only the first move, and that the next messenger would bring him further instructions.² It is true that he still tried to convince Charles III that he would prefer a peace with England on good conditions to a prolongation of the war; but he may have meant to sharpen Charles III's desire for the Family Compact by an affectation of reserve.³

He took an irrevocable step on July 15. He had made up his mind not to yield the fishery, and if Pitt persisted in withholding it, he should only spin out the negotiation in order to gain time. He sent Bussy a memorial, which set forth the grievances of Spain and argued that the peace between England and France would only be solid if Spain was satisfied as well, because, if Spain went to war with England, France would be obliged to take her part.⁴ In this and other ways he not only revealed that he was about to enter into some engagement with Spain for that purpose, but gave Pitt the impression that he had already done so. Perhaps Choiseul had still half a hope of peace, for he would have wished Bussy to keep this memorial up his sleeve until Pitt should have answered the French ultimatum, which was sent at the same time and demanded the fishery once more. He wanted to give Pitt a last chance, and to avoid prejudicing the French case by the addition of the Spanish; for which reason he had refused to sign the offensive alliance with Spain until he should be convinced by Pitt's next answer that there was no hope of a good peace.⁵ Louis XV, however, decided that Bussy must leave it to Fuentes to judge whether to present the French and Spanish demands at once. In spite of Bussy's persuasions, Fuentes insisted upon his doing so. Bussy finally agreed to be guided by the temper in which he found Pitt; but Pitt was so violent when he began to discuss the Spanish

¹ Stanley to Pitt, postscript of July 5, Thackeray, *op. cit.* ii. 541.

² Choiseul to Bussy, July 4, A.E. Angleterre, 443.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, July 7, A.E. Espagne, 533.

⁴ Choiseul to Bussy, July 15. The memorial is translated in Thackeray, ii. 552-3. It was originally a part of the French ultimatum, but Stanley remonstrated with Choiseul and persuaded him to cut it out and to leave Bussy to discuss the Spanish affair with Pitt by word of mouth. Finally Choiseul compromised on a separate memorial (Stanley to Pitt, Aug. 6, Thackeray, ii. 585-6).

⁵ Choiseul to Ossun, July 7; Ossun to Choiseul, July 27, A.E. Espagne, 533.

grievances by word of mouth, that he decided to give him the written memorial, and the mischief was done.¹

For all the excuses of Wall, this looked uncommonly like a threat, or 'reversionary declaration of war from Spain'. It was not quite without precedent, for Spain had communicated to France, a year earlier, a copy of Fuentes's memorial to Pitt on the Newfoundland fishery. That had annoyed the English Ministers, though there was this to be said for it, that as the fishery was sure to be an object of negotiation between England and France, Spain might well remind both parties that they did not possess between them the sole claim to it.² The same pretext might be given for Choiseul's reference to Spain's claim to the Neutral Islands—on which she had just made a similar communication to France.³ This fresh memorial, however, was far more objectionable, for it clearly indicated that France and Spain meant to make common cause against England in their colonial affairs, unless she satisfied both of them at once. This came out later in some expressions of Wall, who blamed Pitt for rejecting the very handsome conditions offered by Choiseul, and judged from that how unlikely he was to yield to the reasonable demands of Spain.⁴

Pitt did not hesitate to denounce this interference of our enemy with the affairs of our ally; he returned the memorial to Bussy as inadmissible, and the conclusion of the Family Compact was brought about at once by this indignity. Bussy was forbidden to sign any peace between France and England without satisfaction for the demands of Spain as well.⁵

¹ Bussy to Choiseul, July 21 and 26. See also Stanley's letter to Pitt of Aug. 6. Bussy seems to have apologized to Newcastle for this paper (see Newcastle's memorandum of July 29, Add. MSS. 32926, f. 50) and perhaps he really thought it a mistake to present it.

² Fuentes to Pitt, Sept. 9, 1760, S.P. 94/162; Pitt's reply of Sept. 16, *ibid.*

³ Bristol to Pitt, July 13, 1761, S.P. 94/163. Choiseul does not seem to have taken the Spanish claim seriously; he finally persuaded Charles III to give it up to France.

⁴ Bristol to Egremont, Nov. 2, 1761, S.P. 94/164. Pitt had given Wall an opportunity to disavow Bussy's step, but Wall expressly took the responsibility for it (Pitt to Bristol, July 28, S.P. 94/163; Bristol to Pitt, Aug. 6 and 31, S.P. 94/164, with Wall's paper of Aug. 28).

⁵ Choiseul to Ossun, July 30, A.E. Espagne, 533; Choiseul to Bussy, Aug. 10, A.E. Angleterre, 444. Bute was no less angry than Pitt with Bussy's intervention in the Spanish dispute; indeed the violence of his expressions on this subject alarmed Frederick II, who was afraid it would needlessly embroil England with Spain (*Politische Correspondenz*, vol. xx, no. 13130).

§ iv. *The Resignation of Pitt*

Since the war between England and Spain was virtually decreed by the beginning of August 1761, there is not very much interest in the later stages of the peace negotiation. Choiseul and Pitt only tried to put each other in the wrong. Bute was converted from war to peace in the middle of August.¹ Consequently the English Ministry yielded first the Newfoundland fishery, then that of the St. Lawrence, and finally a very small settlement for the French fishermen. The dispute centred more and more on the exigencies of Austria and Prussia, whom Choiseul and Pitt were less and less willing to sacrifice as they saw less hope of satisfaction on their own national points. Choiseul retracted in July a very important concession which he had, perhaps inadvertently, made at Maria Theresa's expense in June.² Stanley seems to have understood that the fishery

¹ Bute's fluctuations in July and August are hard to follow. Bedford wrote him a long letter on July 9, to persuade him that we ought to allow France the Newfoundland fishery. Bute replied that he agreed to that, but Choiseul wanted an establishment on land for his fishermen as well—which would be objectionable because it would grow into another Louisbourg. He claimed to be as ready for peace as Bedford himself, but 'let that peace prove in some measure answerable to the conquests we have made. Can ministers answer for it to the public, if they advise the King to sit down with a barren country' (this is Canada) 'not equal in value to the Duchies of Lorraine and Barr, and yet an acquisition invidious from its vast extent, while the French have restored to them the very essence of the whole? Why not rather, out of all our rich conquests, reserve to posterity something that will bring in a clear and certain additional revenue, to enable them to pay the interest of the enormous debt we have by this most expensive war laid upon them?' (Bute to Bedford, July 12, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 32). On the same day he seems to have promised Devonshire to agree to a sort of compromise suggested by Sir William Baker (Devonshire to Newcastle, July 12, Add. MSS. 32925, f. 28). On the 21st, his under-secretary reported that Bute was 'very much disgusted' by the last French terms, and had been 'endeavouring, for the last three or four days, to spirit up the Dukes of Newcastle, Devonshire, and Bedford to something vigorous' (Jenkinson to George Grenville, July 21, *Grenville Papers*, i. 376). When the Cabinet replied sternly to those terms and resolved to reject Bussy's memorials about Spain and Austria, the same under-secretary gave Bute the credit of it (Jenkinson to Grenville, July 28, *ibid.*, p. 380). Not until August 18 did he give up his objection to the *abri* for the French settlement, and join the peace party (Devonshire to Bedford, Aug. 18, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 41; Devonshire to Newcastle, Aug. 21, Add. MSS. 32927, f. 154).

² This was the evacuation of Wesel and Cleves. Choiseul seems to have yielded it in his proposals to Stanley of June 17 (Thackeray, *op. cit.* i. 541) but he expressly refused it in those of July 15 (*ii.* 550). Stanley accounted for this inconsistency by carelessness or ignorance, but that is hardly plausible, for Choiseul had been Ambassador in Vienna and knew as well as anybody the engagements between France and Austria. Pitt regarded this 'tergiversation' as one of the decisive proofs of Choiseul's insincerity.

was the real centre of the negotiation, but prophesied that when Choiseul despaired of obtaining it, he would express a more ostentatious attachment to Austria and Spain.¹ The English Cabinet never offered it, until the Family Compact was made and it had to be refused; so Choiseul gave more prominence to the interests of his allies in order to have a nobler excuse for breaking off. Pitt at the same time accepted Frederick II's demands, and embodied them in his own, without the reservations which he might have made at the beginning of the campaign; but here he was somewhat more consistent than Choiseul, as he had never promised anything to Frederick's disadvantage.²

If the last stages of the negotiation were illusory, the dissimulation of Wall is not much more important. Fuentes at least seems to have tried to keep a door open, especially after the fall of Pitt, which gave Wall a slight return of hope.³ Perhaps if that event could have been known in Paris before Stanley came away, it might have made a difference, for Choiseul seems to have thought Pitt the great obstacle to a peace.⁴ The one place, however, where a real decision remained to be taken was the English Ministry, which was only half enlightened as to the intentions of France and Spain.⁵

In this dispute, as in the earlier one over the terms of peace with France, there were not two parties but three. Pitt had made up his mind to a war with Spain, Newcastle wanted to avoid it if he could; but between them, several members of the Cabinet wavered or regarded the question as open, and hoped to hit upon a compromise. Pitt was prepared with schemes of

¹ Stanley to Pitt, Aug. 1 and 6, Sept. 4, 1761 (Thackeray, ii. 565, 584-5, 612). Stanley had the wit to notice, in particular, that Choiseul did not introduce the Spanish question before Pitt's refusal of the fishery.

² Pitt raised his demands on Frederick's behalf in his ultimatum of Aug. 16 (Thackeray, ii. 596).

³ Wall to Fuentes, Oct. 26, 1761, Add. MSS. 32930, f. 48. Fuentes himself seems to have hoped that England, France, and Spain might yet come to terms if France would repeat her last offer (Fuentes to Grimaldi, Nov. 10, f. 394; to Wall, Dec. 18, vol. 32932, f. 230).

⁴ Newcastle's memorandum of Dec. 4, 1761, Add. MSS. 32931, f. 408.

⁵ Its deliberations have been analysed again and again; for example, by Sir J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, ii, chap. 6; R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*, iv, chaps. 10 and 11; A. von Ruville, *William Pitt, Graf von Chatham*, ii, chaps. 15 and 16; Basil Williams, *Life of William Pitt*, chaps. 17 and 18; L. B. Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, i, 339-43; D. A. Winstanley, *Personal and Party Government*, chap. 2; H. W. V. Temperley, in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, i, chap. xvii.

conquest, and converted Mansfield to them for a moment;¹ but Mansfield seems to have veered round again in the meeting of October 2, when Anson and Ligonier, the heads of the fighting services, spoke against the war as impracticable.² Pitt's plans for carrying on a Spanish war are not known; he afterwards claimed the credit of projecting the expedition to Havana, and he may have cast his eye upon Panama.³ He certainly meant to seize the Mexican *flota*, which was daily expected at Cadiz. This was the old method of putting a kind of preventive pressure on Spain. Newcastle and Hardwicke must have remembered Vernon's failure to catch the *azogues* in 1739. One of the peace party mentioned it in the meeting of September 18, and added that the length of the present war with France was a lesson against relying on a brisk decision at the beginning.⁴ Besides, the financial and economic effects of such a war must be considered. Newcastle was justly nervous about them, as he was raising the next year's supplies, and met with disquieting reservations in the City upon the contingency of a Spanish war.⁵ Not only Pitt but Bute had argued in August that a Spanish war would pay for itself in prizes⁶—a venerable fallacy which had misled English statesmen from the days of Elizabeth. On the other hand, our flourishing trade with Spain, which would be cut off by a war, was one of the things which had enabled us to maintain the struggle with France. Besides, somebody suggested that if once we broke off relations with Spain, we should find it difficult to get our favourable treaties of commerce renewed at the peace; this foresight was justified next year by the almost invincible obstinacy of Grimaldi on the subject.

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 21, 1761, Add. MSS. 32928, f. 304.

² Add. MSS. 32929, f. 20.

³ The evidence of this is only a 'supposed conversation between Mr. Pitt and a General Officer, related from memory' and quoted by Almon in his *Anecdotes of the Life of the Earl of Chatham*, 1797, i. 366.

⁴ Add. MSS. 32928, ff. 230-1.

⁵ He noticed on Oct. 8 that one of the chief underwriters of the loan 'hopes he may bring £1,000,000; but in the case of a Spanish war, he does not believe he can get any subscribers at all, at least he can't subscribe himself' (Add. MSS. 32929, f. 111). Bussy had always advised Choiseul that English credit could support many more years of French war but would break down if one with Spain were added (Bussy to Choiseul, June 11 and 19, 1761, A.E. Angleterre, 443).

⁶ Newcastle to Hardwicke, Aug. 7, 1761, Add. MSS. 32926, f. 282. Barrington pointed out later that if the prizes were insured in England, as many of them were, the captures would increase the immediate financial difficulty, because the insurance must be paid at once while the prize-money took much longer to distribute (Barrington to Newcastle, Jan. 3, 1762, Add. MSS. 32933, f. 50).

More attention was given in the Council to the moral justification of a breach. The question was: how far and in what way were France and Spain known to be committed to each other? Historians have spilt a great deal of ink on this subject. The only certain thing is that besides Bussy's ominous memorial of July, the Ministers were in possession of three documents. Grimaldi wrote to Fuentes that the Spanish Court must gain time until the *flota* reached Cadiz; that two conventions had been signed between France and Spain on August 15, but had not yet been ratified, and that France was bound by them not to make peace without settling the affairs of Spain. This letter was intercepted on September 8.¹ Wall gave Bristol on August 28 a paper which was a masterpiece of ambiguity. On the one hand he avowed Bussy's memorial about the Spanish disputes, but on the other he represented it as inoffensive to England. He defended the right of France and Spain to interfere in each other's disputes with England, and asserted that 'There is the greatest harmony between the two Courts; and who, in this age, can be surprised there should be that harmony between the Kings of Spain and France?' He owned that Louis XV had promised to defend Spain against England in case there was a rupture after the peace between England and France; and he asked whether Spain was to despise so generous an overture? But he hinted that if England had tried, or should still try, to make up her differences with France and Spain separately, she would meet with the utmost goodwill.² Finally, Stanley wrote on September 2 that he had seen the draft of a secret article between France and Spain, by which the former undertook to support the interests of the latter at the peace negotiations. That, however, was no more than appeared from Bussy's behaviour in July, and Choiseul told Stanley that he hoped to be able to disengage himself from Spain if we would agree to his final terms.³

This was all the evidence that the rest of the Cabinet had, and I am not inclined to believe that Pitt and Temple had any other.⁴ Their colleagues did not think it enough, and refused

¹ Add. MSS. 32927, f. 299.

² S.P. 94/164.

³ A copy is in Add. MSS. 32927, f. 336.

⁴ Bute later said in the House of Lords 'that when Lord Temple advised the war, they knew nothing of this treaty between France and Spain, nor that there was such a thing, but by mere rumour'. Temple's contradiction need not prove much, for he may have been thinking of Grimaldi's letter (Ilchester, *Henry Fox*,

to commit the irregularity of declaring war on the strength of it. That decision, however, can by no means be regarded as a vote for peace with Spain, and there was a serious political struggle underneath the rather pedantic dispute over the evidence.

Pitt himself rested the case for war on wider arguments than the proofs of the Family Compact. He had never been a friend of Spain: from his first days in Parliament to his last, he was too easily fired by patriotic rant against the whole House of Bourbon. He kept this feeling in check as late as 1759, in order to avoid provoking what he called 'a half-enlightened, irritable, but too necessary Court'. The necessity, however, was passing away. Pitt understood what Newcastle never believed, that we were now a match for Spain as well as France; and soon after Bussy's intervention in the Spanish dispute, he began to think of seizing the *flota*.¹ He relied less and less on proofs of a written agreement between the Bourbon powers, or of Spain's resolution to declare war, and more on the inconvenience of suffering Spanish neutrality at all. 'Spain', he said at his last Cabinet meeting, 'is now carrying on the worst species of war she can for France—covers her trade, lends her money, and abets her in negociation. This puts you actually in war with the whole House of Bourbon.' He held this language later to Hardwicke, and again in the House of Commons.² In fact, Pitt seems to have been resolved on a war with Spain, whatever reasons he might choose to give for it. Perhaps he repented of his compliance with the concessions to France, and determined to find an excuse for resigning rather than stay in the Ministry to be responsible for measures which he did not approve. He almost said as much in the meeting of September 21, and the impression is confirmed by his needlessly dictatorial behaviour in October.³

First Lord Holland, ii. 162). Pitt said in the meeting of October 2 that 'the papers he had in his bag fix'd an eternal stain on the Crown of England, if proper measures were not taken upon it'; but Newcastle understood him to mean Bristol's dispatch and Wall's paper of Aug. 28 (Add. MSS. 32929, f. 22). Newcastle might not understand right; but if Pitt had more than that in the bag, why not show it? In Dutens's *Mémoires d'un voyageur qui se repose* (London, 1806), i. 152, there is a very vague story about a secret dispatch of Squillace, Spanish Minister of Finance, which Dutens got hold of at Turin and sent to Pitt. This dispatch, if it existed, was not mentioned at any of the Cabinet meetings.

¹ Newcastle's letter of Aug. 7, quoted above.

² Minute of Oct. 2, 1761, Add. MSS. 32929, f. 22; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Oct. 13, f. 228; West's report of the House of Commons, Dec. 11, vol. 32932, f. 141.

³ Newcastle heard on Sept. 13 that Pitt thought of resigning; that was before

His enemies put a more sinister interpretation upon his resignation. They thought he had begun to see that the war could not be carried on in his way, nor the peace made on the terms he had taught the country to expect; he therefore determined 'by going out upon a spirited pretence, to turn the attention and dissatisfaction on those, who, at a ruinous expense, are to carry on his wild measures'.¹ Without wishing to pay Pitt too high a compliment, I do not think we can hope for much light on his motives from two cynical, calculating self-seekers like Fox and Dodington. At the same time it can hardly be denied that Pitt did contrive to have the best of both worlds: his reputation suffered far less from the events of 1762 than those of Bute, Newcastle, and Fox himself. Newcastle, unlike Bute, never exactly accused Pitt of resigning on purpose to avoid responsibility for the peace; but he and Hardwicke had seen long ago that Pitt would find it very hard to save his face when he came to treat with France.

'Your Grace says that you begin to be of my opinion about Mr. P.'s disposition as to peace. I never said that he might not wish it; but I have said, & do think that he hardly knows how to set about it. He sees that, in order to obtain peace, so much of our acquisitions must be given up, and the populace, who have been blown up to such an extravagant degree, and of whom he is unwilling to quit his hold, will be so much disappointed, that he is ready to start at the approaches to it.'²

These considerations might account for Pitt's difficulty in the negotiation with France; but why should he force himself out of office just when peace was indefinitely postponed? Perhaps it is best to accept the reason which Pitt himself gave; it was a just and constitutional one. The next step in the Spanish affair, whatever it might be, must involve orders to Lord Bristol. They must be signed by Pitt, for Spain was in his department, and he must therefore be responsible for them.³ If he did not

the Spanish business came before the Cabinet (Newcastle to Bedford, Sept. 13, vol. 32928, f. 131).

¹ Melcombe to Bute, Oct. 8, 1761, printed in Adolphus's *History of England from the Accession of George III*, i. 549. See Fox's memoir in *Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox*, i. 46, 57.

² Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 10, 1760, Add. MSS. 32904, f. 303.

³ Apparently he suggested on Sept. 21 that Bute, the other Secretary of State, should send Bristol the orders he could not bring himself to sign (Newcastle's memorandum of Sept. 21, 1761, vol. 32928, f. 299). The same reason which induced him to resign was an excellent one for accepting his resignation; as Bute

choose to accept this responsibility, he was quite right to resign. Finally, one thing more must be remembered. Pitt went out of his mind a few years later, and the undue violence of his decision in October 1761 may perhaps be accounted for by the approaches of insanity.

The motives of Pitt's adversaries were various. The extreme pacifist Bedford regarded Pitt as a danger to his country and might fairly be glad to see him go. Newcastle's attitude, though vague and scared, was equally logical. He had always lamented the difficulties which Pitt had cast in the way of the peace negotiation; had always been for lowering our terms to France, and continued after Pitt's fall to resist the measures which led to a breach with Spain. Newcastle cannot in any sense be said to have betrayed Pitt on this occasion. He might be mistaken as to the chance of avoiding a war with Spain; indeed he had nothing to propose but leaving well alone and forbearing to press Wall for explanations where only disagreeable ones were to be expected. He admitted that the Family Compact might contain some articles which would be offensive to us and, if known, would make it harder to settle our differences with Spain. That, in his opinion, was a reason against demanding to know what they were. If we could, after all, come to an agreement with Spain, we need never know them, and we might detach her from France without war.¹ This argument had two weaknesses. Newcastle could not or durst not propose any plan of settlement which should at the same time maintain our honour and satisfy Spain. Moreover, the facts were against him: Spain was actually bound to declare war on us before May 1, 1762. That, however, was more than Newcastle or anybody else knew. Besides, Choiseul was already treating with England before May 1, so that Newcastle had some justification for thinking that if we had kept quiet, swallowed our pride, and asked no questions for a few months, we need never have gone to war at all.²

said, there was no doing business with a man who would not execute the resolutions of the Council when he did not concur in them (Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 21, f. 305).

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 20 and 21, Add. MSS. 32929, ff. 406, 421; his observations on Egremont's dispatch, Oct. 26, vol. 32930, f. 57.

² Hardwicke did not agree. He did not repent of resisting Pitt's desire for an immediate war in October, but he believed later that the real point was not the Family Compact but the logwood settlements. Nothing would have satisfied Spain but their evacuation, especially after she had fortified herself by a close connexion with France; but no English Minister would have dared to give orders for the

Mansfield and Hardwicke were judges. Perhaps they were really affected by the considerations of evidence and diplomatic propriety which the Council discussed before Pitt's resignation; but what was Bute's game? He had supported Pitt in standing out for high terms against France, and now he neither wished nor expected to renew the negotiation at once. He disliked the war, but he dared not put his name to a bad peace. A few days after Pitt's resignation, Bute wrote that 'the change of a minister cannot, at present, make any remarkable change in measures'.¹ He was thinking of the French negotiation, but what he said was equally true of the Spanish.

At the meeting of September 18, the Council resolved against recalling Bristol at once and declaring war; but at a private meeting next day, four of Pitt's opponents 'were unanimously of opinion, that before any hostilities should be committed, a notification should be given to the Court of Spain tantamount to a declaration of War, and Lord Bristol recall'd'. The difference then was one of punctilio, especially as this was so near to what Pitt and Temple had proposed to the King the day before.² Pitt's adversaries only proposed to allow a somewhat fuller trial of Wall's intentions. Bristol was to refuse peremptorily to discuss the prizes and Newfoundland; but he might offer to evacuate the logwood settlements, if Charles III would promise that the logwood-cutting should go on until further arrangements were made. This was almost exactly what Pitt had already offered, and Charles III was resolved not to grant. Bristol was to ask whether Charles III was under any engagements to take part with France; and if the answer was unsatisfactory, he was to treat it as a declaration of war and come away. This course offered very little prospect of avoiding war; Newcastle objected to it, but the others answered that the conduct of Spain was very offensive, and that if she would not take hold of this very slight 'handle to get off', then 'we should give Mr. Pitt such a handle against us, as might have very bad consequences, if we did not take such a refusal, as a declaration of war on their part'.³ Newcastle acquiesced, but Hardwicke got the resolution

purpose without the assurances which Wall had refused to Pitt (Hardwicke to Newcastle, Dec. 25, 1761, Add. MSS. 32932, f. 349).

¹ Bute to Melcombe, Oct. 8, 1761, Adolphus, *op. cit.*, p. 549.

² The original Minute of Sept. 19 is in Add. MSS. 32928, f. 248, the amended version on f. 233; Pitt's and Temple's paper on f. 225.

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 20, 1761, Add. MSS. 32928, f. 261.

toned down.¹ It was not executed for some weeks, because the situation was altered by more reassuring letters from Stanley and Bristol, and then the resignation of Pitt caused a new delay.

This delay could not be prolonged for ever: on the one side Wall was clamouring for a written answer to his last paper about the logwood, and on the other Bute and his new colleague Egremont soon determined to 'out-war Mr. Pitt'. Newcastle did his best to dissuade them from asking for an explanation of Spain's intentions, but he might have spared himself the trouble. At first the news from Lord Bristol was so comfortable that Egremont was induced to express his demand in the softest and least peremptory terms. Unfortunately this mild dispatch crossed a most alarming one from Bristol. Too true, perhaps, to the policy of Pitt, he had hammered at Wall in order to find out the terms of the Family Compact. Wall completely changed his tone, burst out into violent denunciations, and accused us of aiming at the conquest of all the French and Spanish colonies in the West Indies. 'He would himself be the man to advise the King of Spain, since his dominions were to be overwhelmed, at least to have them seized with arms in his subjects' hands, and not to continue the passive victim he had hitherto appeared to be in the eyes of the world.' Worse still, he put Bristol off without any information. He only admitted that there had been some renewal of the Family Compacts between France and Spain. Bristol did not know how to account for this sudden change, except by the safe arrival of the *flota*, which made it unnecessary to wear the mask any longer.²

Even Newcastle doubted the necessity of war no more. Bristol received the peremptory orders which the peace party had avoided in September, and left the Court of Spain after Wall's equally peremptory refusal to reveal the treaty with France.

The behaviour of Bute and his party needs some explanation. Bute had already begun to think of the Spanish and the German wars as alternatives, but it can hardly be believed that he resisted Pitt's Spanish war in order to force him out, then took it up in order to render the German war impossible and force out Newcastle.³ That was the effect of his policy in the

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 20, 1761, Add. MSS. 32928, f. 264.

² Bristol to Egremont, Nov. 2, 1761, S.P. 94/164.

³ He said on Sept. 26 that 'If we have a war with Spain, we must give up the

end. He first got rid of the war Minister and carried on the war, then got rid of the peace Minister and proceeded to make the peace. Since Bute probably meant from the beginning to drive out Pitt and Newcastle sooner or later, there is a temptation to suspect him of a very subtle design; but that mediocre Scotch amateur was incapable of anything so clever, and it is far more likely that he blundered into the position he desired.

As soon as Pitt's retirement became possible, Bute probably began to ask himself what was the point on which it would be most to his advantage that it should take place. Newcastle did the same;¹ but neither of them was glad of the resignation when it came. Bute wrote to Dodington, whom he can hardly have hoped to deceive, 'Whatever private uneasiness I might have in the late administration, I am very far from thinking it favourable in the present minute to the King's affairs.' He gave a convincing reason for his embarrassment. For the moment, he was afraid of having to carry on Pitt's war without Pitt's help; afraid of being answerable 'for the miscarriage of another's system, that he himself could not have prevented'.² That is to say, he probably shared at that time the opinion that Pitt had forced his resignation because he knew he could not perform the impossible.

Why did Bute rush into the Spanish war? Once more, because he was afraid—not of the consequences but of Pitt's popularity. Egremont thought his safety was concerned in sending a strong dispatch to Spain; and Newcastle justly said of the whole set of them that 'They breath war as much as Mr. Pitt did: But from this principle, for fear of Mr. Pitt's popularity, which *they* would endeavour to gain but will never obtain it'.³ Henry Fox and the Spanish Ambassador took the German war; it is impossible to carry on both; and then Mr. Pitt will quit for that' (Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 26, Add. MSS. 32928, f. 363).

¹ Newcastle calculated that if Pitt was to resign, he had better do so over his refusal to continue the negotiation with France, because he was more obviously in the wrong there, and Newcastle would have more advantage over him (Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 23, vol. 32928, f. 303). The King was more candid: in the register of Bute's correspondence (Add. MSS. 36796, f. 256) there is a reference to an undated letter of George III to Bute: 'Desires to get rid of Mr. Pitt but must select a favourable opportunity for so doing.'

² Bute to Melcombe, Oct. 8, 1761, Adolphus, op. cit., pp. 548-9; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 20, 1761, Add. MSS. 32928, f. 260.

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 23, vol. 32929, f. 472, and Hardwicke's reply, f. 470.

same view.¹ Bute's anxiety was quite natural. He did not yet know whether Pitt meant to make trouble; he and Egremont were new to politics, desperately anxious to make good reputations, and without the *sangfroid* of experience—they were still talking to Nivernois of scaffolds and impeachments a year later. Bute, moreover, held in his hands the most precious treasure of all, and was determined not to spill it—the popularity and credit of the young King, which it was his life's purpose to establish.

§ v. *The Spanish War and the Conquest of Havana*

The Spanish war of 1762 revived the hopes and projects which had obsessed the English public twenty-three years ago.² Privateering received a new lease of life.³ The Government once more prepared to conquer Havana; but the execution of the design left nothing to be desired this time. The English fighting-machine was in full working order, and the experience of the earlier failure seems to have taught the Admiralty what to avoid. There was none of the delay, cross-purposes, and uncertainty which did so much harm to Cathcart's expedition in 1740. The choice of objective was not left to the commanders: even the route and rendezvous were worked out beforehand.⁴ The Government thought this enterprise so important that it commanded Rodney to give up the siege of Martinique in case he should not have succeeded already, in order to hold his forces in readiness for the grand expedition under Pocock and Albemarle.⁵

Nevertheless the whole plan came near to being ruined. It might be thought that this time, at least, there would be no fear of a French intervention, for France was already an enemy, and a beaten one; yet there was a French force in the West Indies, and it had an unexpected chance of destroying the English expedition. The Comte de Blénac had been sent out to relieve Martinique. He was to have sailed in November 1761,

¹ Fuentes to Grimaldi, Nov. 10, 1761, vol. 32930, f. 394; Fox's memoir in *Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox*, i. 56.

² *V. supra*, pp. 65-97.

³ The number of new commissions taken out, which had diminished greatly since the Privateers' Bill of 1759, suddenly rose again upon the expectation of Spanish treasure. However, part of this number is accounted for by the privateers already in existence; for a commission against France did not warrant captures upon the Spaniards, and a new one had to be taken out against France and Spain.

⁴ Secret instructions to Pocock, Feb. 18, 1762, Adm. 2/1332, pp. 25-33.

⁵ Orders to Rodney, Feb. 5, 1762, Adm. 2/1332, p. 17.

but was held up in Brest till January by the winds and the English blockade which prevented his storeships from reaching him in time.¹ When he arrived at Martinique he found it lost, so he sailed away to St. Domingue. There he was to co-operate with the colonists and the Spaniards in the conquest of Jamaica.

The authorities at Jamaica had already discovered from intercepted letters that the French were preparing to invade the island. Commodore Forrest wanted to take out his whole force and intercept the enemy's fleet before it arrived at St. Domingue. He was in good time, for Blénac had hardly started from Brest; and he judged rightly that the Brest and Rochefort squadrons would not be able to get out of port together, but would have to come to the West Indies separately. (In fact only one detachment ever reached the West Indies, because d'Aubigny could not break out of Rochefort at all; but if the whole of Choiseul's scheme had been executed, two squadrons, neither of them larger than Forrest's own, would have arrived at St. Domingue one after the other.) Forrest's plan was therefore to lie off Cap François, where they were most likely to arrive, and cut them off one by one. It was the best thing he could have done; but unhappily he thought himself obliged to defer to the Governor and Council of Jamaica, who believed that the safety of the island could only be assured by mooring the capital ships in Kingston Harbour and sending out the frigates for news. So Forrest lost the chance of catching Blénac and destroying almost the last sizable French squadron at sea. Twice more he wanted to go out—when he heard of Blénac's arrival at St. Domingue, and when Rodney sent word from the Leeward Islands that he was coming down with reinforcements which Forrest was to meet at Cape Tiburon. Both times the block-headed cowardice of the Governor and Council balked him.²

Meanwhile Rodney, with his large fleet to windward, was so alarmed for the safety of Jamaica that he sent down a great part of his force under Sir James Douglas to protect it. Now

¹ Choiseul to Blénac, Oct. 19, 24, 26, and 31, Nov. 7, Dec. 12, 1762, A.N. Marine B² 368, ff. 137, 140, 144, 150, 159, 203.

² Forrest to Anson, Jan. 28, 1762, Adm. 1/1788; to Cleveland, Jan. 28, Feb. 25, and April 14, *ibid.*; Jamaica Council Minutes, Jan. 24 and March 16, 1762, C.O. 140/42; Admiralty Minutes, May 1, 1762, Adm. 3/70. The mystery is, why Forrest was so stupid as to think himself bound to obey the Governor and Council. Perhaps it was because he had only just succeeded to the command by Holmes's death, and had no time to make himself familiar with his instructions.

Pocock was to have picked up most of Rodney's ships in the Windward Islands and gone down towards Cuba in force; but when he reached Martinique he found nothing there, for the ineffable Rodney had sent away the few ships of the line he had left to cruise for prizes on the Spanish main.¹ Therefore, if the French and Spaniards had joined, they would have been superior to Pocock until he met with the Jamaica squadron commanded by Douglas.

Blénac in fact was in the same position as d'Antin in 1740: with the help of the Spaniards at Havana, he ought to have cut off the force from England before it could unite with the force on the spot. But the parallel between Blénac and d'Antin fortunately went farther. Both were irresolute, and neither could get the Spaniards to join him.² This time the Spaniards at Havana may not have been in fault, for none of the five *avisos* sent out to warn them had ever arrived.³

Perhaps Blénac ought to have taken the initiative, but he was kept in harbour by trifling accidents and duties, and finally by the report that St. Domingue itself was to be invaded. In short, he was so weak and useless that Douglas at Jamaica was able to divide his squadron again and blockade him in Cap François; so the concentration of the English force, which could easily have been upset, took place without danger.

Blénac still had a chance to do some good. In the middle of June he received from Havana pressing entreaties for help; but his troops were beginning to fall sick, the colonists of St. Domingue were still afraid of an English invasion, and it was difficult to see how his squadron would ever be able to reach Havana while Pocock was lying before it. The next thing proposed was an attack on Jamaica. That island was left very bare of ships and soldiers, but Blénac's forces were reduced so low by accident and sickness that the French commanders could not promise themselves a decisive victory, and therefore preferred to attempt nothing. They then thought of sending some troops to Santiago de Cuba, and as much farther towards

¹ Pocock to Cleveland, May 26, 1762, Adm. 1/237; Rodney to Cleveland, March 24 and 26, May 27 and 31, 1762, Adm. 1/307.

² Private instructions to Blénac, Oct. 12, 1761, A.N. Marine B² 368; project of a letter to be sent to Blénac, Feb. 10, B⁴ 104; Blénac to Choiseul, March 28 and May 18, *ibid.*; Minutes of a Council of War, *ibid.*

³ Choiseul to Ossun, July 13, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536; Ossun to Choiseul, July 26, *ibid.*; Prado to Bory, April 6, A.N. Colonies C⁹ A 111.

Havana as the squadron would safely carry them. Governor de Bory seems to have thought that something ought to be done, but the other commanders made all the difficulties they could out of the vagueness of the Spanish requests and the uncertainty of the situation. Finally the Intendant finished the controversy by announcing that he could not find enough victuals to enable the troops or the squadron to make an expedition which would probably require a long journey and much waiting.¹

The English forces were thus suffered to reduce Havana undisturbed, without paying for their serious mistakes of strategy. A third of the Spanish navy was destroyed, a great sum of prize-money was distributed, some English merchants rushed slaves into the market and found great difficulty in recovering payment for them;² and the Earl of Albemarle, not content with the vast share of plunder which had fallen to him and his family, got himself into a series of lawsuits by exacting illegal duties from the English importers who flocked to the market.³ The conquest made a great public impression and affected the negotiations for peace.

Walpole's Ministry had meant to combine the conquest of Havana with a 'side-show' at Manila. That had to be given up then, but the intention was fulfilled in 1762. There was a difference in the execution: the earlier expedition was to have gone round Cape Horn, but Draper started from the East Indies. Greater secrecy could be observed, and Draper was not, like Anson, dogged by a Spanish Admiral. The conquest of Manila was not known when the peace was made, therefore it could not enter into the terms. It may only have been meant to procure a compensation from Spain in some other part of the world; but the Government certainly would have liked to

¹ Bory to Choiseul, June 13 and 15, July 17, Aug. 22, and Sept. 2, 1762, A.N. Colonies C^o A 111; Bory's speech to a Council of War, Aug. 16, *ibid.*; Blénac's justification, A.N. Marine B⁴ 104, ff. 185 et seqq.

² Lascelles and Maxwell to Gedney Clarke, Jan. 31, March 5, and May 20, 1763, W. & G. ix; Lascelles and Daling to William Harvie, March 13, 1766, W. & G. x.

³ See the opinion of the Law Officers, Norton and de Grey, to the Treasury, May 14, 1764, Add. MSS. 36223, f. 424. They held that, according to the capitulation, Albemarle might impose Spanish duties on conquered Spanish subjects, but not on His Majesty's native-born subjects who imported goods into the conquered territory. This seems to differ from the practice of Governor Dalrymple in Guadeloupe (*v. supra*, p. 192).

keep Mindanao, nor does Sir Julian Corbett appear to be right in saying that it never thought of keeping Manila too.¹

The Spanish war enabled Choiseul to revive his plans for invading England or Ireland, or both. He wanted to make a feint against Ireland in the summer and to conquer Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight in the autumn; but the King of Spain could not spare troops for the first, and it is doubtful if Choiseul could ever have undertaken the second, even though it did not demand a large naval force.²

The one new thing in the war of 1762 was the attack on Portugal. It seems to have been Wall who first suggested that Portugal should be given the option of closing her ports to English shipping or submitting to an invasion.³ It was a good plan. If Portugal complied, the Bourbon powers had the beginnings of a 'continental system' in southern Europe, and in particular they deprived England of the Brazil trade, which was to her almost what the Cadiz trade was to France.⁴ Her exports must fall, and her financial stability might be threatened by cutting off the imports of gold which she drew chiefly from this source. The English navy and privateers had used the port of Lisbon and found it in some ways more convenient than Gibraltar. If Portugal resisted this attempt to detach her from her English alliance, Charles III had no doubt of his ability to conquer her. Once in his power, she would serve as a hostage for all sorts of concessions. England would be forced to buy her

¹ The instructions to Steevens recite that the East India Company thought Mindanao a good thing to keep at the peace, but both Manila and Mindanao were to be handed over to the Company if taken, and both were to be disposed of by the King at the peace (Adm. 2/1332, p. 13). It is true that we only mentioned Manila in the negotiation in order to frighten Spain into agreeing to our terms quickly; but we could not tell then whether we had taken it.

² Choiseul to Ossun, April 5, May 4 and 29, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536; Ossun to Choiseul, Aug. 2, vol. 537.

³ Choiseul congratulated Wall on the idea, which he described as 'luminous' (Choiseul to Ossun, July 2, 1761, A.E. Espagne, 533).

⁴ Choiseul also intended an expedition against Brazil itself, which might have the same effect upon the trade and revenues of England that an attack on the Spanish West Indies had upon France—to dry up the sources of our wealth. At the beginning of 1762 he seems to have meant to send a small force against the northern provinces of Brazil ('Plan de campagne par mer pour l'année 1762', in A.N. Marine B⁴ 104). In the autumn he projected a much larger and more important conquest. Beaussier's squadron was to attack both Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. The instructions were dated as late as Oct. 19 and 20, 1762—a fortnight before the preliminaries of peace were signed. They breathe an extraordinary spirit of desperate resolution. Beaussier's expedition was to be a kind of 'death ride' of the remnants of the French navy (A.N. Marine B⁴ 105, ff. 38 et seq.).

back by restoring her conquests to France, and, if the war went well enough, by giving up Gibraltar to Spain.¹ In fact the Portuguese war was to Spain what the German war was to France—a means of distracting England's energy from her other enterprises, of holding her to ransom and cancelling the effect of her conquests in America.

This plan rested on some miscalculations. In the first place, England did not allow her attention to be diverted from Havana. Newcastle, it seems, would rather have sent the fleet to Lisbon, but nobody listened to him.² The Portuguese war did in fact have a very important effect on the attitude of the English Government to the German war; but it seems to have been rather an excuse than a reason for abandoning the Continent. Besides, after all, Prince Ferdinand's army continued to fight in Germany with a good deal of success in 1762. Furthermore, there was some doubt whether England would have been ready to sacrifice much at the peace for Portugal's sake. Nivernois found in September that many Englishmen, rather than sacrifice Cuba for Portugal, would leave the latter, for the time, in the possession of Spain, while the English forces went on from one conquest to another in Spanish America; then they could repurchase Portugal by giving up these further acquisitions and keep Cuba as pure gain.³ It is to the credit of Bute that he did not reason upon such principles; but the Spanish army had to evacuate Portugal without any compensation.

Charles III overrated his own strength and prospects. The Family Compact was to improve the terms for France and procure satisfaction to Spain, because Lisbon was sure to fall and Havana was impregnable. In fact Havana was conquered and Lisbon was never in serious danger from the inept Spanish commander. This reversal of all expectations is the reason why Spain suddenly capitulated on every point in dispute at the end of October 1762, and why the Bourbon alliance was so disastrous to her and so little advantageous to France.

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, April 19 and 26, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536.

² Newcastle's memorandum of Feb. 11, Add. MSS. 32934, f. 275.

³ Viry to Solar, July 12, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536; Nivernois to Comte de Choiseul, Sept. 15, A.E. Angleterre, 447; Choiseul to Ossun (private), Oct. 9, A.E. Espagne, 537.

§ vi. *The Peace of Paris*

Choiseul renewed the negotiation of peace surprisingly soon after his failure to come to terms with Pitt, and prepared to put an end to the new war into which he had dragged Spain, almost as soon as it was begun. He felt that he was incurring some just criticism by this haste, and defended himself by saying that Charles III had always meant the Spanish intervention to be the instrument of a better peace for France; if that peace should offer itself quickly, Spain had no reason to complain.¹ Historians have generally attributed the change to the fall of Pitt. No doubt that had something to do with it, for hints and invitations began to be exchanged soon afterwards, before any event had altered the situation of France for the worse. But above all it was the diplomatic changes in eastern Europe that rendered the peace so much easier to make in 1762. On the one hand Bute, having quarrelled with Frederick II, was more eager for a separate peace with France and less inclined to insist on safeguards for the interests of Prussia; on the other, Choiseul's ally Maria Theresa was thoroughly frightened by the defection of Russia, and ready for peace at last—so ready that Choiseul was afraid she would make it without him.

Choiseul's sincerity to Spain is doubtful. He began the conversations in secret, and only revealed them to her when he was sure that England would offer enough; even then he contrived, with Egremont's collusion, to conceal from her the fact that he had already been treating for over two months.² He insisted, however, from the first, that Spain alone of all his allies must be consulted sooner or later, and he afterwards declared with ostentation that France could make no peace without her.³ The English Ministry was in two minds whether to accept the solidarity of France and Spain, or to try to treat with them separately. Newcastle was impressed by Choiseul's declaration that France could do nothing without Spain, but Bute and Egremont would not at first recognize the Bourbon Family Compact by consenting to approach one power through the

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, May 17 and June 13, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536; Aug. 17 and 27, vol. 537.

² Choiseul's *mémoire* to Grimaldi, inclosed in his letter to Ossun, April 17, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536; Choiseul to Ossun, May 12, *ibid.*; Solar to Viry, May 12, Add. MSS. 32938, f. 175.

³ Solar to Viry (most secret), Feb. 1, 1762, vol. 32934, f. 125; Choiseul to Solar, April 15, vol. 32937, f. 112; May 10, vol. 32938, f. 133.

other; they changed their minds several times and agreed at last to a half-measure which only maintained the technical distinction of the two negotiations.¹ This was in March; by July it was England who insisted on making peace with her two enemies together. The change is to be accounted for by the discussions over the Louisiana boundary.

The more Choiseul was sure of satisfactory conditions in his peace with England, the harder he pressed Charles III to conclude even at the cost of some sacrifices. First the reason was his increasing consternation at the effects of Peter III's accession in Russia; then, though Peter III was deposed, the French army in Germany was in a desperate situation. A little later, he urged Spain to sign the peace before Havana should fall, and last of all, when that news arrived, he declared that France and Spain together were no match for the English navy. No doubt the reasons he gave reflected a succession of very real alarms, but it is impossible not to see in his dispatches to Ossun a great deal of exaggeration and special pleading, and to suspect that he made up his mind to peace, let the arguments for it be what they might.²

There is no need to discuss here the terms between England and France, except where they affected Spain. On one very important matter they did so, and perhaps it was the turning-point of the whole negotiation. This was the Mississippi boundary. Choiseul had agreed to buy back Martinique by yielding to England all the French territory in North America east of the Mississippi.³ As a compromise between England and France, it was a statesmanlike piece of work. But it was a matter which did not concern England and France alone. Such an extension of English territory would isolate Florida and bring the English to the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Here the North

¹ Newcastle's memorandum of March 10, 1762, Add. MSS. 32999, f. 423; of April 1, vol. 33000, f. 3; Newcastle to Hardwicke, March 11, vol. 32935, f. 312; Egremont's draft letter to Viry, March 21, vol. 32936, f. 1; Newcastle to Hardwicke, March 31, f. 234; Egremont to Choiseul, April 8, f. 418.

² The most important documents in this series of lamentations are Choiseul's letters to Ossun of April 17, May 12, 16, and 17, June 13, July 13 and 19, all in A.E. Espagne, 536; those of Aug. 17, Oct. 3 and 20, vol. 537. Choiseul really did not believe that Havana would fall, and was extremely disconcerted when he heard the news; see his letter to Nivernois, Oct. 3, in Nivernois's *Œuvres posthumes*, vol. ii, pt. iii, pp. 62-3.

³ For the details of this compromise, and of the terms of the Peace of Paris so far as they affected England and France in the West Indies, see Chapter V, pp. 225-6.

American question became a West Indian one, and the French question a Spanish one. While Spain had been neutral, the war-makers had not dared to order an expedition against Louisiana for fear of offending her; she was now an enemy, and the peace-makers had no reason for sparing her feelings.

As soon as Charles III found out what was in the wind, he began to make objections. He did not want the English to have a new advanced post for smuggling and for intercepting the Mexican *flota*. Wall explained to Ossun that so long as the English had no lawful excuse for sailing in the Gulf, they could properly be seized there as interlopers (an argument which shows how little Spain had departed from her old doctrine of 'suspected latitudes'). If England had a colony on its shores, the *Guarda-Costas* could not exercise their profession with the same safety or excuse.¹ Ossun replied that the English were often found in the Gulf of Mexico already, and that if any possession could enable them to intercept the *flota* it was the Bahama Islands, which belonged to them and had never been used for the purpose. Charles III would still have preferred a boundary which would have kept them away from the Gulf, and proposed that all the land between Florida and New Orleans should be neutral Indian territory.²

The English Government was not blind to this side of the question. It might pretend that the Mississippi valley would be of no manner of use, and that its only object was the establishment of an ideal frontier;³ but its words were belied by the vehemence with which it insisted at first upon New Orleans, the capital of Louisiana, which happened to lie on the eastern bank of the river. Choiseul affected to believe that England only claimed New Orleans by a geographical oversight. He proposed another boundary farther east, which ran from the Mississippi down the Iberville river through two lakes into the Gulf. It can hardly have been a geographical oversight which prompted the violent resistance of Granville, Egremont, and George Grenville to this change.⁴ Bute overcame them, and the Iberville boundary was accepted; but the whole English

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, July 12, A.E. Espagne, 536; Aug. 2, vol. 537.

² Ossun to Choiseul, Aug. 2 and Sept. 27, vol. 537.

³ Observations accompanying the English project of July 10, A.E. Angleterre, 446.

⁴ Cabinet meeting of June 21, Add. MSS. 34713, f. 106. We still insisted on New Orleans in our project of July 10 and only gave it up on July 31 (Egremont to Choiseul, July 31, A.E. Angleterre, 446; Viry to Solar, Aug. 1, *ibid.*).

Government continued to demand not only the Mississippi boundary, with this small alteration, but the right to navigate the river as well. If the Iberville and the Lakes proved to furnish a satisfactory channel for large ships between the Gulf and the river, we would be content with that at a pinch; but if there was any doubt on that point, we were to enjoy the right of sailing down the Mississippi to the very mouth, even though both the banks at New Orleans were under French sovereignty.¹ When the news of Havana came and the enemy's negotiators were at our mercy, we exacted the entire navigation of the Mississippi without even this condition.

This question embarrassed Choiseul more than any other, and he entangled himself in lies over it. Grimaldi made a fuss as soon as he heard of it in June. Choiseul contented him by altering the article, and assuring him that it could give Spain no cause for alarm because there was no good harbour in that part of the world except New Orleans, which he did not mean to let England have.² At the same time he told Ossun that he would not let the peace come to grief for this. He promised England that she should have both the boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi down to the Iberville—and thence presumably through the lakes into the sea. This concession was made in a secret article which could not be shown at present.³ On the very same day Choiseul told Grimaldi that the English were to have no access to the sea.⁴ He seems to have distinguished the navigation of the river from that of the Gulf of Mexico into which the river ran. France could lawfully allow England to share in the former, but could not transfer any right to the latter without the consent of Spain. In fact Choiseul does not appear to have seen his way through this difficulty even as late as the beginning of September, when the English and French plenipotentiaries were exchanged.⁵

It seems to me that the duplicity of Choiseul on this point

¹ Cabinet meeting of July 26, Add. MSS. 34713, f. 110; Egremont to Viry, July 31, A.E. Angleterre, 446; Instructions to Bedford, Sept. 4, S.P. 78/253; Egremont to Bedford, Sept. 7; Bedford to Egremont, Sept. 12, *ibid.*

² Choiseul to Ossun, June 29, A.E. Espagne, 536.

³ Choiseul to Ossun (private), June 30, *ibid.*; Comte de Choiseul to Solar, July 21; to Viry, July 21, with the secret articles, A.E. Angleterre, 446.

⁴ Choiseul to Ossun, July 21, A.E. Espagne, 536.

⁵ *Mémoire instructif* for Nivernois, A.E. Angleterre, 447, f. 30. It is plain from this document that Choiseul meant to try once more whether he could somehow escape from the concession which he had made to England in the secret article.

may have something to do with the mysterious Cabinet crisis of July, when even the ultra-pacifist Bedford¹ refused to make peace with France unless Spain acceded at the same time. The ostensible reason for this refusal was that if the war against Spain was continued after the peace with France, English and French troops would have to face each other as auxiliaries in Portugal. That would certainly be an awkward situation, and at the time it seemed to be a likely one, for Grimaldi had presented on behalf of Spain a set of articles which were unacceptable in almost every detail.² But the Ministry had been willing enough in March to divide the Bourbon powers; why should it object to doing so in July, unless it was afraid that Choiseul had made a proposal which might at worst involve England and Spain in endless disputes over which he would stand as arbiter, and was at best only valid if he would guarantee Spain's acquiescence in it? Choiseul must be made to buy the concessions we made him, by obliging Spain to consent to those which he made us; otherwise we might have to pay for them twice over, first to France and then to Spain.

In fact, though Choiseul obtained from Charles III a promise to set about peace-making in earnest, the danger to the Mississippi navigation was not over. The French plenipotentiary Nivernois was convinced, as soon as he arrived in England, that it was the most difficult point of all. Bute lived in fear that this article, which he had invented and looked upon as his 'shield against Parliament', might be open to new discussion and retraction; if he allowed it, the patriotic Opposition in his own Cabinet would denounce him as the betrayer of his country.³

Bedford went to Paris as plenipotentiary at the same time that Nivernois came to London;⁴ when he arrived he found

¹ It is worth noticing that Bedford was much more exacting in the Spanish than in the French affair: at one point he raised objections to a concession which even Egremont did not object to making (Bedford's minute of July 19, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 89).

² Bute to Egremont, July 26, Add. MSS. 36797, f. 7; Egremont to Comte de Choiseul, July 31, A.E. Angleterre, 446; Viry to Solar, Aug. 1, *ibid.*; Fox's memoir in *Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox*, i. 69; Egremont to Bedford, Sept. 7, 1762, S. P. 78/253.

³ Nivernois to Comte de Choiseul, Sept. 15 and 16, A.E. Angleterre, 447 (the latter is printed in Nivernois's *Œuvres posthumes* (1807), vol. ii, pt. iii, p. 9); Egremont to Bedford, Sept. 16, S.P. 78/253; Bute to Bedford, Sept. 28, Add. MSS. 36797, f. 12.

⁴ At the beginning of September 1762.

that the news of Choiseul's secret arrangement had not yet been broken to Grimaldi. This was bad enough; but Bedford would have been much angrier if he had known that Choiseul then proceeded to console Charles III by explaining that he had only granted England the right to sail *down* the river. That could not have hurt Spain, for the Mississippi valley produced no contraband goods, nor would it be easy to introduce them from Europe into its upper waters. It was only the ships that sailed *up* the river that could bring any merchandise fit for smuggling into Mexico.¹ Charles III naturally wanted to have this stipulated in so many words, and once more suggested a proviso that England should have no port in the Gulf of Mexico.² It is doubtful if Choiseul would have put this forward, as he was already pledged to England; besides, in the last resort he did not care what Charles III thought of the matter. Louisiana, he said, was the property of France, and he would not let Spain dictate to him how he should dispose of it—a curious argument from the man who had persuaded Charles III into the Family Compact by telling him that the French possessions in North America were the bulwark of the Spanish West Indies.³ But however Choiseul may have meant to equivocate, the time for double dealing had gone by when the conquest of Havana was known, and Grimaldi was made to yield the point without any reservation. Choiseul made amends at the last. He felt himself obliged to give Spain some consolation for her losses at the treaty, and he chose Louisiana as the sacrifice. He may have had many good reasons for his choice. He did not think much of the colony, and when so much was lost in North America it was hardly worth keeping by itself. So far as Spain found this present worth accepting at all, it was because it would enable her to keep a closer watch on the approaches of England to her treasure-colonies.

The immediate terms between England and Spain had still to be settled. The three old disputes of the prizes, the fishery,

¹ Bedford to Egremont, Sept. 13 and 19, S.P. 78/253 (the latter is partly printed in *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 101-13); Choiseul to Ossun, Sept. 20, A.E. Espagne, 537. It appears that Bedford proposed a clause for safeguarding Spain against smuggling in the Gulf of Mexico, but it was unacceptable because it applied equally to English and French subjects trading to the Mississippi (Comte de Choiseul to Nivernois, Sept. 19, 1762, A.E. Angleterre, 447).

² Ossun to Choiseul, Sept. 29, A.E. Espagne, 539.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, Sept. 20, *ibid.*; Comte de Choiseul to Nivernois, Sept. 20, A.E. Angleterre, 447.

and the logwood gave the least trouble of all. The prizes had to be left to the English courts. There was no practicable alternative. Spain might stipulate that the treaties and the law of nations should be applied, but that meant as much or as little as the Court of Prize Appeals chose to allow. Charles III did not insist on the express recognition of the Spanish fishery: he was content to perpetuate the ambiguity of that affair by a simple confirmation of the Treaty of Utrecht. England would have accepted this, if the conquest of Havana had not given her the power to impose her own conditions. Grimaldi was obliged at last to renounce the fishery altogether.¹

The affair of the logwood settlements promised to be more difficult. Charles III meant at first to exclude the English altogether from the mainland of Central America, in order to prevent them from stirring up the Moskito Indians to rebellion. For this reason he demanded their unconditional removal. He was ready to make an agreement to supply a quantity of cut logwood in some Spanish port; but he did not want to make even this concession a condition of the evacuation.² The English Ministers did not intend to sacrifice the right to cut logwood; they recurred therefore to a suggestion which Wall had dropped in 1761. The settlements should be disavowed, but the King of Spain should promise not to disturb the logwood-cutters, pending a further agreement.³ This provisional toleration would probably have lasted for ever, or at least until England gained her point by negotiation. Charles III held out at first, but yielded in September. Before the terms could be adjusted the news from Havana encouraged England to press for something more. Egremont would have liked to demand the sovereignty of part of Yucatan as a compensation for restoring Havana. This plan would have given a concrete fulfilment to the long-standing ambition for an English foothold in Central America, and it is most unlikely that Spain would have yielded it. Bute obliged Egremont to propose more harmless alternatives, but

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, June 12 and July 12, A.E. Espagne, 536; Grimaldi's proposals of July 20, *ibid.*; Viry to Solar, May 22, with annexed note, A.E. Angleterre, 446; separate instructions to Bedford, Sept. 4, S.P. 78/253; Bedford to Egremont, Sept. 19, *ibid.*; English project of Oct. 26, articles 15 and 17, *ibid.*

² Ossun to Choiseul, April 26, May 31, and June 12, A.E. Espagne, 536. Choiseul approved of Charles III's attitude at first (Choiseul to Ossun, June 29, *ibid.*).

³ Egremont to Comte de Choiseul, July 10, with English proposals, *ibid.*; separate instructions to Bedford, Sept. 4, S.P. 78/253.

he could not resist the temptation to screw up the terms of the logwood clause a little higher.¹ Instead of evacuating the settlements, England would only destroy the forts; the King of Spain must promise to tolerate the logwood-cutters indefinitely without any hint of a further agreement to be made, and he must even guarantee the huts and property of the cutters. Grimaldi had to yield all this, and the settlements in Honduras received a precarious and indefinite recognition—precarious because they could have no military protection against Spain, and indefinite because neither their boundaries nor their rights were ascertained. In no other part of the world was the Peace of Paris less conclusive: the Governments and colonists of both countries bickered continually about their rights for the next twenty years.²

The English Ministry was surprised to find that the three old disputes were not all. The war had automatically put an end to all treaties of commerce between the two nations, and Spain meant to take the opportunity of revising her commercial system. No nation's privileges cost the Spanish treasury more than those of England, or did more to prevent the growth of native industry in Spain. The doctrines of Uztaritz and Ulloa were beginning to have their effect, and the Marqués de Squillace, who controlled the Spanish treasury, was determined to make at least three reforms. English shipping was to be subjected to closer search for smuggled goods; the exemption of the *Pié del Fardo*, which amounted to 40 per cent. of the duties, was to be abolished; and reciprocity was to be claimed for Spanish shipping. English ships were allowed to import goods from any European countries into Spain, so it seemed quite fair that Spaniards should have the same privilege in England; but this last demand was quite impracticable, for it required the repeal of the English Act of Navigation.³

In order to procure these alterations, Grimaldi was instructed to renew the old treaties for six months or a year at most, and

¹ Nivernois to Comte de Choiseul, Oct. 12, A.E. Angleterre, 447; Bedford's note of Aug. 23, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 96; English project of Oct. 26, article 16, S.P. 78/253.

² See the account of these disputes in Miss Vera Lee Brown's article in the *Hispanic American Historical Review*, v, no. 3, pp. 351-68; also the *Archives of British Honduras*, ed. Sir John Burdon, vols. i-iii (London, 1931-5). The logwood settlement was not recognized as a British colony until 1862 (iii. 247). The British claim to some authority on the Moskito Shore was not finally renounced before the Bulwer-Clayton Treaty of 1850.

³ Ossun to Choiseul, April 26 and June 12, A.E. Espagne, 536.

to stipulate that a new one should be made within that time. The English Ministry would not hear of this, and insisted on the unconditional renewal; a fresh treaty might indeed be negotiated, but that was not to be a condition of the peace.¹ Choiseul had to deal with the old dilemma. If English merchants were badly treated, French merchants gained relatively; but the rights of France were badly defined, and she could not wish the curtailment of English privileges to develop into a general attack on all foreign trade in the interest of Spanish industry. Besides, since France was to be treated as the most favoured nation, anything which England gained would accrue to her, and it might be worth her while to let England fight her battles. Choiseul seems to have been sure of only one thing: he hoped Spain would avoid renewing Keene's Treaty of 1750—it was a symbol of England's influence and gave her merchants exclusive privileges.² Some of the English Ministers returned this attention. They suspected that France had obtained some special rights in the Family Compact, and wanted to defeat it by stipulating that all treaties of commerce should be renewed, notwithstanding any engagements which Spain had undertaken to the contrary. Bedford was able in the end to get this put into the preliminaries; for Choiseul, after proposing in vain a very ambiguous compromise, had to force Grimaldi to accept Bedford's terms on this point as well as the others, when the news from Havana gave England the power to dictate.³

The conquest of Havana very nearly upset the negotiation. Everybody in England counted on success, and even the prospect of it cruelly embarrassed the peace party. That was the reason why Bute hoped the peace would be made before the news came. Pitt would have delayed the negotiation until it should come, in order to have an excuse for raising his terms.⁴ Bute was too anxious for peace to do such a thing. He knew that nobody in England would consent to give Havana back for nothing. For himself, he would have been content with obliging Spain to show greater facility on the points already

¹ Bedford to Egremont, Sept. 19, with enclosures D, G, and I, S.P. 78/253.

² Choiseul to Ossun, May 24 and 29, A.E. Espagne, 536.

³ Bedford's note of a conversation with Mansfield, Sept. 4, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 98; Bedford to Egremont, Sept. 19, S.P. 78/253; article 24 of the preliminaries.

⁴ He was suspected of delaying the negotiation in May 1761 until we should have conquered Belle Isle.

in dispute, but his colleagues were sure to insist on some new acquisition of territory. Egremont had always warned Choiseul to expect such a demand, but Bute seriously doubted whether Spain could ever be induced to satisfy it, and was afraid that if the case should arise the peace would be wrecked.¹

At the end of September the news was expected hourly. The mulish George Grenville, who had held out against every concession to everybody throughout the summer, announced that he should ask for a compensation for Havana before it was known to be taken, and thus started Bute's second Cabinet crisis.² Bute was in even greater difficulties a few hours later, when the victory was known. Egremont had lately worked hand in hand with Grenville, and affected a certain patriotic intransigence which was meant to commend him to the Opposition. He now began to flatter himself that he could throw Bute over and stand at the head of a national party.³ He and Grenville had already insisted that Bedford should submit his terms to the Cabinet before he signed them, in order to keep a check on his immoderate inclination to peace.⁴ They now joined with Granville, Mansfield, and the Chancellor to ask an impossibly high price for restoring Havana to Spain: we must have Porto Rico and Florida, besides forcing Spain to yield on all the points already in dispute. Worse still, Grenville now demanded that the preliminary treaty should be laid before Parliament before it was signed. He can only have meant to lead the resistance to concession as Secretary of State.⁵

¹ Egremont to Viry, May 1, 1762, A.E. Angleterre, 446; Viry to Solar, July 12, A.E. Espagne, 536; Bedford's note of a conversation with Bute, Aug. 23, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 96. Bedford was instructed to exact a good compensation for Havana if it was taken before the peace was signed. For this reason he tried to get the peace signed first, or at any rate he used this threat as a lever to accelerate the consent of Spain (Comte de Choiseul to Nivernois, Sept. 14, 1762, A.E. Angleterre, 447).

² Fox to Cumberland, Sept. 29, printed in Albemarle's *Rockingham*, i. 128-32.

³ Nivernois to the Comte de Choiseul, Sept. 25, Oct. 4 and 7, 1762, A.E. Angleterre, 447. Nivernois believed it was the peace, rather than Bute, that stood in danger after the fall of Havana; Bute could at least meet Parliament with a success in hand, and Nivernois thought this made him less anxious to conclude peace before the session began.

⁴ Egremont to Bedford, Sept. 7 and 19, S.P. 78/253; Bute to Bedford, Sept. 28, Add. MSS. 36797, f. 11; Rigby to Bedford, Sept. 29, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 125. Choiseul saw this point quite as clearly as Egremont, and therefore wanted the English Ministry to leave Bedford's hands free.

⁵ Bute to Bedford, Oct. 14, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 137; Grenville's memorandum in *Grenville Papers*, i. 483.

Parliamentary discussion of the peace before it was signed was just what Bute had always meant to avoid, because he was sure that the only way of getting Parliament to agree to it was to present it ready-made. His reasons for believing this are not very clear. No doubt there was a danger that the Opposition, perhaps secretly abetted by Grenville, would carry through the House of Commons some violent and extravagant resolution as to the terms, which could hardly be resisted and would tie the negotiators' hands. Moreover, Bute, whose somewhat rigid mind could only defend a carefully prepared position, seems to have wanted to know where he stood before Parliament met in order that he might take the lead, whether for war or for peace, in the King's speech from the throne. It is barely possible that Bute's anxiety to make peace before the Session began was affected for the purpose of hurrying Choiseul into signing quickly. If this was so, it becomes easier to see why he made difficulties, or allowed them to be made, when Nivernois asked him to have the opening of Parliament postponed. The Comte de Choiseul appears to have taken this view when he said: 'The English profit not only by their superiority and their advantages, but also by their own divisions, their internal difficulties and their constitution, to impose hard conditions upon us.'¹

Bute had deprived himself of his natural allies against Grenville, when he had acquiesced in the resignation of Newcastle in May. Newcastle had stood for peace at any price, and he might have been expected to come to Bute's help now; in fact Bute had made advances to him for that purpose, and Bedford strongly desired his return to the Ministry. But Newcastle had changed for the worse since he left office. He had an avowed and legitimate grievance against Bute's German policy, and his personal dislike of Bute was natural enough; but that was not all. Newcastle had been in politics for forty years, and he had an itch for it. He could not sit still, and rather than do nothing he had drifted into the situation of leader of the Opposition—an unconstitutional one by his own doctrine. He had even begun to object to the peace. His reasons might be superficially valid, for it was true that since his retirement Bute had made

¹ 'Memoire pour servir d'instructions au Sr Duc de Nivernois', A.E. Angleterre, 447; Nivernois to Comte de Choiseul, Sept. 15 and 24, *ibid.* (Nivernois, *Œuvres posthumes*, vol. ii, pt. iii, pp. 40-1); Comte de Choiseul to Nivernois, Oct. 31, *ibid.*; Egremont to Bedford, Sept. 16 and Oct. 30, S.P. 78/253; Bute to Bedford, Oct. 24, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 138.

some new concessions; but if Newcastle had still been Prime Minister he would have been the loudest for making them.¹

Bute could not turn to Pitt; if anybody could have got his support in this controversy it would have been Egremont and George Grenville. Bedford had some influence, but he was in Paris. There was nobody but Fox who could save Bute. Historians have denounced this alliance without reason. No doubt Fox was glad to come back to the Cabinet, and wanted a peerage; but it is evident, unless he lied in his memoirs and his letters, that he sincerely agreed with Bute and Bedford about the peace.² Also he believed that the only alternative to Bute was Pitt, whom he had hated so long that he sincerely thought him a danger to his country. Unless somebody stepped in to save Bute, a great popular party, headed by Pitt, Egremont, and George Grenville, might obtain such a monopoly of power as to enslave the King for life.³ Fox's greatest strength as a politician was his connexion with the Duke of Cumberland, who was now at the bottom of Newcastle's opposition. If the admission of Fox to the Ministry could buy off Cumberland, Newcastle might be reduced to silence.⁴ Fox proposed to Cumberland the office of mediator between all the parties which really wanted a peace; but Cumberland was too far gone in faction to listen, and the only result of Fox's adhesion to Bute was to break his old friendship with his patron.

Even without Cumberland, Fox had his value. All Bute needed was somebody who could stand up to Pitt in the House of Commons, for Pitt was the only sincere opponent of the peace, and therefore the only one likely to make an impression. Fox was the man for this uncomfortable but not dangerous position. George Grenville had to be degraded from the leadership

¹ This accounts for the persecution of his friends, and especially the dismissal of Devonshire. The King wanted Devonshire to share the responsibility of a peace which he had always approved in his heart. Devonshire might naturally dislike the task of protecting Bute against the criticism of his own party, but George III had quite as much right to dismiss a servant whom he suspected of factious treason to his conscience (Bute to Granby, Nov. 5, Add. MSS. 36797, f. 20). For the whole of Newcastle's conduct in the summer and autumn of 1762, see Professor Namier's brilliantly entertaining account in *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, i. 380-468.

² See his memoir in *Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox*.

³ Fox to Cumberland, Sept. 29, in Albemarle's *Rockingham*, i. 131; see Nivernois's account of Bute's situation in his letter to the Comte de Choiseul, Oct. 9, A.E. Angleterre, 447.

⁴ Nivernois to the Comte de Choiseul, Oct. 13, A.E. Angleterre, 447.

of the House of Commons, but still imprisoned in the Cabinet, for if he was a free man, he would carry a considerable strength to the Opposition, and his tongue would be loosened to reveal many details of the negotiation which Bute did not wish to make public. The admission of Fox was therefore accompanied by an exchange of offices between Grenville and Halifax.¹ Bute was in smooth water again, as Fox had prophesied.

The reunited Ministry offered to restore Havana on condition that Spain gave way on all the other questions and surrendered Florida or Porto Rico.² The crisis was now transferred to France, where Choiseul had to procure the acquiescence of Spain in these hard terms. The war could not go on, for what was left of the Spanish navy must be sent out to protect the West Indies, and the invasion of England was out of the question. France must not make a separate peace: she could only force or bribe Spain to make sacrifices. Yet that was exactly what Choiseul did not wish to have the air of doing, for so disastrous a beginning could not recommend the Family Compact to patriotic Spaniards, and the parallel with the treaty of 1748, which France made to some degree at Spain's expense, was becoming unpleasantly close.³ The greatest danger was that Spain would refuse to admit the disaster. Choiseul was very alarmed by the heroic posture in which Charles III and Wall received the news: they would fight on till all the West Indies were lost, rather than yield an inch of land to England in negotiation. Choiseul deprecated these violent resolutions: he really believed that Mexico might be conquered next year, and foresaw that French trade would lose twenty million livres by the loss of the market to the English.

After a few days' reflection Charles III gave way to necessity,

¹ The question arises, why had Grenville to be degraded from the Secretaryship of State as well as the lead in the House of Commons? I think the reason may be, that as Secretary for the Northern Department he could still have obstructed the peace by insisting on such safeguards for Frederick II's interests as France might not be willing to grant (see Nivernois's letter to the Comte de Choiseul, Sept. 20, A.E. Angleterre, 447). Perhaps, however, the explanation was simpler: when a Secretary of State was in the House, it would be almost irregular for the Paymaster-General to take the lead.

² Bute was so anxious to save time in the negotiation, that he had the French Ministry informed privately of these terms, through Viry and Nivernois, a fortnight before Bedford received his official instructions upon the subject (Nivernois to the Comte de Choiseul, Oct. 11, 1762, A.E. Angleterre, 447, f. 279; *Œuvres posthumes*, vol. ii, pt. iii, pp. 73-8).

³ Choiseul to Ossun, Oct. 3 and 9, A.E. Espagne, 537.

and authorized Louis XV to sign the English terms if it could not be avoided.¹ Choiseul not only used this permission, but took advantage of it to extract a few paltry concessions for France at the last minute: Bedford had to bribe him to smooth the Spanish affairs by giving up, for example, the inspection of the French fishing settlement in the St. Lawrence.² Florida came into the possession of England; Bute's honour was satisfied and his skin was safe.

He cared for little else; Fox thought him calm, but he and Bedford had talked of nothing but scaffolds and impeachments until Choiseul was tired to death.³ This way of talking might be partly cant and partly even bluff; but there seems to be no doubt that their personal reputation, even their personal safety, was the ruling consideration in the minds of the English peace-makers. Bute at least was reduced to a pitiable state of nerves and glad to get out of the war on any terms which his countrymen would not condemn. He and his colleagues were, after all, pure politicians, to whom popularity and prestige were the realities; this is equally true of those who held out and of those who yielded. Newcastle would have acted in no other spirit, and Egremont with his care for his reputation was no more a realist than Bute with his fears for his safety. Although it was a mercantilist age, Pitt was the only man in the first rank of politics who dealt in terms of economic or strategic value, and considered colonial acquisitions as something more than so many debating-points for or against the Ministry. That is why, in spite of its exaggerations and inconsistencies, Pitt's is the only opposition to the Peace of Paris that can be justified or pardoned, and why Pitt remains, for all his insincerity and demagoguery, the one living figure among a generation of shadows.

When the Preliminaries of Peace came to be debated in the House of Commons, Bute's fears and the noisy confidence of the Opposition were made to look equally ridiculous. Fox prophesied in his memoir (perhaps after the event) that Bute would get a majority, with the help of the Tories and the Scotch, after a few angry debates. 'So many of the leaders on

¹ Choiseul to Ossun (private), Oct. 9; Ossun to Choiseul, Oct. 10 and 22; Choiseul to Ossun, Oct. 20 and Nov. 3, *ibid.*

² Bedford to Egremont, Nov. 3, S.P. 78/254.

³ Nivernois to Comte de Choiseul, Sept. 15 and 16, A.E. Angleterre, 447 (the latter is printed in Nivernois's *Œuvres posthumes*, vol. ii, pt. iii, p. 18); Choiseul to Ossun, Sept. 20, A.E. Espagne, 537.

the other side are in their hearts for peace, have declared so, and the comparison between this and that which even Mr. Pitt offer'd his consent to last year is so obvious, that they will be embarrass'd to let out all their fury against it. I mean all but Mr. Pitt, who like his mob is never embarrass'd by any degree of shame.¹ It came to pass as he said. After a long and bad speech by Pitt in the Commons,² and a half-hearted one by Hardwicke in the Lords, the Opposition collapsed and the terms were approved by large majorities. There is no need to have recourse to the myth of proscription or bribery in order to explain the acquiescence of Parliament in a settlement which secured the original objects of the war and satisfied the reasonable ambitions of all Englishmen but those who lived by war or war-mongering.

The Peace of Paris was by no means the end of the long conflict of England, France, and Spain; but it concluded a stage in that conflict which differed from those which went before it. This is the period of the single-handed but successful English aggression. We fought without receiving, and almost without expecting, the help of the Dutch, or of any other sea-power. The French pamphleteers might well alter, in the middle of the Seven Years War, the terminology of their cant effusions, so as to denounce 'the Maritime Power' instead of 'the Maritime Powers'.³ It is true that we were helped on land by Maria Theresa and then by Frederick the Great; but in each case the continental fighting was no part of our original plan, and we began the struggle in the expectation of a purely naval war against France and Spain. Even when the war became general, our allies did not so much join in an attack as repel a counter-

¹ *Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox*, i. 77.

² If the speech given under his name in the Parliamentary History represents him truly, Pitt said some things he had no right to say. It was all very well to denounce the Government for making peace without crushing France and reducing her to a second-class power. That was Pitt's considered opinion, though we may agree with Bedford that he demanded the impossible. But it was factious to run down North America and to exalt the value of Martinique and Guadeloupe by comparison, because Pitt was the man who had always insisted that the security of North America was the first object of the war, and the conquest of the West Indies a thing of second-rate importance (*Parl. Hist.* xv. 1263-7). In this respect alone Bute had the advantage of Pitt, for he had obtained much better terms than Pitt had been willing to accept—as a result, it is true, of the success of Pitt's conquest of Martinique.

³ This change is made, for example, from the first to the second editions of *Le Politique Danois*.

attack upon a flank which in the opinion of many representative Englishmen was not really exposed.

Not only had we no allies at sea, but we were equal there to the united force of our two nearest rivals. This conclusion which was hinted in 1747 was apparently proved in 1762, when the Bourbon Family Compact broke down. The proof was not quite so decisive as could be wished, because history might have been written differently if Spain had entered the Seven Years War when it began, instead of waiting till the French navy was destroyed; but Spain was probably still weaker in 1756 than in 1762, so the final result, if the war had lasted long enough, is not likely to have been very different.

The failure of the Family Compact was a great disappointment to Choiseul. As he explained to Ossun in 1764, Spain was so useless an ally that

‘the first care of France, if another war should arise between her and England, must be to prevent Spain from having anything to do with it, in spite of the stipulations of the Family Compact; on the other hand, if Spain should start the war first, we should be obliged by sentiment and policy to take her part, without which I think she would lose America in two years.’

Spain, in fact, was a liability in war. Choiseul regarded this as a reason why she should consent to be an asset in peace by granting favours to French commerce.¹


This was not always Choiseul’s language. While he was pressing Charles III to make peace, he held out hopes of renewing the struggle. He spoke of peace as a rest, or a truce, necessary for the reform and repair of the French and Spanish fighting machines. Pitt called the peace a ten years’ armed truce; Choiseul only expected it to endure for five.²

Historians have often remarked that England gained too little or too much at the Peace of Paris. In this they only echo Pitt, who was justified by events within his own lifetime. As a criticism of the details of the peace, this seems to be a little severe. It is not the loss of territory, but the loss of the war itself that creates the desire for revenge; and in spite of Choiseul’s cant about a ‘solid’ peace, it is hard to believe that further concessions would have diverted him or his successors from preparing for another war. Yet in a more general way, Pitt was

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, Dec. 16, 1764, *Recueil des Instructions des Ambassadeurs, Espagne*, iii. 354.

² Choiseul to Ossun, Oct. 9, A.E. Espagne, 537.

right. France and Spain were neither appeased nor crushed. Perhaps they could not be appeased; that was what Pitt seems to have thought, for all his arguments pointed to the conclusion that the Bourbon powers must be crushed. France and Spain were not yet second-rate powers, and they had not to wait very long for a chance to turn the tables on England.



APPENDIX I

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1739-63

I. *War of 1739-48*

- 1739 Jan. Convention of El Pardo.
 June. Declaration of reprisals against Spain.
 Oct. Vice-Admiral Vernon arrives at Jamaica.
 Declaration of war against Spain.
 Nov. Vernon reduces Portobello.
- 1740 Mar. Vernon reduces Chagre.
 Aug. D'Antin and Laroche-Alart sail for the West Indies.
 Oct. Ogle and Cathcart sail for the West Indies.
 Dec. They arrive at Jamaica.
- 1741 Mar.-Apr. Vernon attempts Cartagena.
 July-Oct. He attempts to conquer the east end of Cuba.
- 1742 Mar. He attempts an overland expedition against Panama.
 Oct. Vernon sails for England.
- 1743 Feb.-Apr. Knowles attempts La Guayra and Porto Cabello.
- 1744 Mar. Declaration of war against France.
- 1745 Mar. Caylus arrives at Martinique.
 Sept. Townsend arrives at Barbados.
 Nov. Engagement between Mitchell and Macnémara off St. Domingue.
- 1746 Aug. Engagement between Mitchell and Conflans off St. Domingue.
- 1747 Mar. Engagement between Dent and Dubois de la Motte off St. Domingue.
 June. Fox intercepts Dubois de la Motte's homeward convoy.
 Oct. Hawke intercepts L'Étanduère and the outward convoy.
- 1748 Mar. Knowles takes St. Louis and attempts Santiago de Cuba.
 Preliminaries of peace signed between England and France.
 Oct. Knowles fights Reggio between Vera Cruz and Havana.
 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

II. *Seven Years War*

- 1756 May. Declaration of war against France.
 Périer de Salvert at St. Domingue; alarm at Jamaica.
- 1757 Feb. Beauffremont at St. Domingue; more alarms at Jamaica.
 Oct. Engagement between Forrest and Kersaint off St. Domingue.
 Nov.-Mar. 1758. Osborn prevents La Clue from going out to the West Indies.
- 1759 Jan. Moore and Hopson attack Martinique without success.
 Feb.-Apr. They reduce Guadeloupe.
 Mar. Bompar arrives at Martinique but fails to relieve Guadeloupe.
- 1761 May. Peace missions of Bussy and Stanley.
 June. Capture of Dominica.
 Aug. Family Compact signed between France and Spain.
 Sept. Withdrawal of Bussy and Stanley.

- 1761 Oct. Resignation of Pitt.
 1762 Jan. Declaration of war against Spain.
 Rodney conquers Martinique.
 Feb.-Mar. He reduces the Neutral Islands.
 Mar. Blénac arrives at St. Domingue; alarm at Jamaica.
 Apr. Pocock and Albemarle arrive in the West Indies.
 June. They reach Havana.
 Aug. They take it.
 Sept. Peace missions of Bedford and Nivernois.
 The news of Havana arrives.
 Nov. Preliminaries of peace signed at Paris.

APPENDIX II

ENGLAND

Secretaries of State

Northern Department

- 1739 William Stanhope, Lord Harrington.
 1742 John, Lord Carteret.
 1744 William Stanhope, Earl of Harrington.
 1746 Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield.
 1748 Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle.
 1754 Robert D'Arcy, Earl of Holderness.
 1761 John Stuart, Earl of Bute.
 1762 (June). George Grenville.
 (Oct.). George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax.

Southern Department

- 1739 Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle.
 1748 John Russell, Duke of Bedford.
 1751 Robert D'Arcy, Earl of Holderness.
 1754 Sir Thomas Robinson.
 1755 Henry Fox.
 1756 William Pitt.
 1757 (Apr.). Robert D'Arcy, Earl of Holderness.
 (July). William Pitt.
 1761 Charles Wyndham, Earl of Egremont.

Governors of Jamaica

- 1739 Edward Trelawny.
 1752 Rear-Adm. Charles Knowles.
 1756 Henry Moore, *Lieut.-Governor*.
 1759 (Apr.). Brig.-Gen. George Haldane.
 (Aug.). Henry Moore, *Lieut.-Governor*.
 1762 William Henry Lyttelton.

Governors of Barbados

- 1739 James Dottin, *President*.¹
 (Dec.). Hon. Robert Byng.
 1740 (Oct.). James Dottin, *President*.
 1742 Sir Thomas Robinson, Bt.
 1747 Hon. Henry Grenville.
 1754 Ralph Weekes, *President*.
 1756 Charles Pinfold, LL.D.

Governors of the Leeward Islands

- 1739 William Mathew.
 1752 George Thomas.

Ambassadors, &c., at Versailles

- 1739 James, Earl Waldegrave.
 1740 (Oct.). Rev. Anthony Thompson, *Chargé d'Affaires*.
 1749 (Feb.). Hon. Joseph Yorke, *Chargé d'Affaires*.
 (July). William Anne Keppel, Earl of Albemarle.
 1761 Hans Stanley (special mission).
 1762 John Russell, Duke of Bedford.

Ambassadors, &c., at Madrid

- 1739 Benjamin Keene.
 1749 Benjamin Keene.
 1757 Ruvigny de Cosné, *Chargé d'Affaires*.
 1758 George Hervey, Earl of Bristol.

Ambassadors, &c., at The Hague

- 1739 Rt. Hon. Horatio Walpole.
 (Oct.). Robert Trevor.
 1745 (Feb.). Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield, and Robert Trevor.
 (May). Robert Trevor.
 1746 John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich.
 1749 Robert D'Arcy, Earl of Holderness.
 1751 Hon. Joseph Yorke.
 1758 (Feb.). Daniel Delaval, *Chargé d'Affaires*.
 (June). Hon. Joseph Yorke.

First Lords of the Admiralty

- 1739 Sir Charles Wager.
 1742 Daniel Finch, Earl of Winchelsea.
 1744 John Russell, Duke of Bedford.
 1748 John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich.

¹ Senior Councillor acting as Commander-in-Chief.

First Lords of the Admiralty (cont.)

- 1751 George, Lord Anson.
 1756 Richard Grenville-Temple, Earl Temple.
 1757 (Apr.). Daniel Finch, Earl of Winchelsea.
 (July). George, Lord Anson.
 1762 (June). George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax.
 (Oct.). George Grenville.

Secretaries of the Admiralty

- 1739 Josiah Burchett.
 1742 Thomas Corbett.
 1745 Thomas Corbett and John Cleveland.
 1751 John Cleveland.

Commanders-in-Chief, Jamaica Station

- 1739 Commodore Charles Brown.
 (Oct.). Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon.
 1742 Vice-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle.
 1744 Vice-Admiral Thomas Davers.
 1746 Cornelius Mitchell, *Acting Commodore*.
 1747 Digby Dent, *Acting Commodore*.
 1748 Rear-Admiral Charles Knowles.
 1749 Commodore George Townshend.
 1752 Commodore Thomas Cotes.
 1755 Rear-Admiral George Townshend.
 1757 Vice-Admiral Thomas Cotes.
 1760 Rear-Admiral Charles Holmes.
 1761 (Dec.). Arthur Forrest, *Acting Commodore*.
 1762 (Apr.). Commodore Sir James Douglas.
 (July). Rear-Admiral Hon. Augustus Keppel.

Commanders-in-Chief, Leeward Islands Station

- 1743 (winter). Commodore Peter Warren.
 1744 (summer). Commodore Charles Knowles.
 (winter). Commodore Peter Warren.
 1745 (Mar.). Commodore Charles Knowles.
 (May). Commodore Hon. Fitzroy Henry Lee.
 (Sept.). Vice-Admiral Isaac Townsend.
 1746 (Mar.). Commodore Hon. Fitzroy Henry Lee.
 1747 (Apr.). Commodore Hon. Edward Legge.
 (Nov.). George Pocock, *Acting Commodore*.
 1748 Rear-Admiral Henry Osborn.
 1749 Commodore Francis Holburne.
 1752 Commodore Thomas Pye.
 1755 Commodore Thomas Frankland.
 1757 Commodore John Moore.
 1760 Commodore Sir James Douglas.
 1761 Rear-Admiral George Brydges Rodney.

FRANCE

Ministers of Marine

- 1739 Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Comte de Maurepas.
 1749 Antoine-Louis Rouillé.
 1754 Jean-Baptiste Machault.
 1757 François-Marie Peirenc de Moras.
 1758 (June). Claude-Louis, Marquis de Massiac.
 (Nov.). Nicolas-René Berryer.
 1761 Étienne-François, Duc de Choiseul.

Governors of St. Domingue

- 1739 Marquis de Larnage.
 1746 De Chastenoye, *Acting Governor*.
 1748 Comte de Conflans.
 1751 Comte Dubois de la Motte.
 1754 Marquis de Vaudreuil, *Acting Governor*.
 1756 Bart.
 1761 De Bory.

Intendants of St. Domingue

- 1739 Maillart.
 1751 Laporte-Lalanne.
 1758 (Dec.) Lambert.
 (Dec.) Élias, *Acting Intendant*.
 1760 (Mar.) Peyrac, *Acting Intendant*.
 (Dec.) De Clugny.

Governors of the Windward Islands

- 1739 Marquis de Champigny.
 1745 Marquis de Caylus.
 1750 (Apr.) Hurault de Ligny, *Acting Governor*.
 (Oct.) De Bompar.
 1757 Marquis de Beauharnois.
 1761 Le Vassor de la Touche.

Intendants of the Windward Islands

- 1739 La Croix.
 1744 Ranché.
 1749 Hurson.
 1755 De Givry.
 1759 Le Mercier de la Rivière.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs

- 1739 Denis Amelot de Chaillou.
 1744 Louis-René de Voyer, Marquis d'Argenson.
 1747 Louis-Philogène Brûlart, Marquis de Puysieux.
 1751 Barberie de St. Contest.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs (cont.)

- 1754 Antoine-Louis Rouillé.
 1757 François-Joachim de Pierre de Bernis.
 1758 Étienne-François, Duc de Choiseul.
 1762 César-Gabriel, Comte de Choiseul.

Ambassadors, &c., in London

- 1739 Comte de Cambis.
 1740 (Feb.) De Vismes, *Chargé d'Affaires*.
 (Apr.) De Bussy.
 1749 (Jan.) Durand.
 (July.) Marquis de Mirepoix.
 1761 De Bussy (special mission).
 1762 Duc de Nivernois.

Ambassadors, &c., in Madrid

- 1738 Comte de Vaulgrenant.
 1738 (Oct.) Comte de La Marck.
 1741 Vauréal, Bishop of Rennes.
 1748 Comte de Vaulgrenant.
 1752 Duc de Duras.
 1755 Frischmann, *Chargé d'Affaires*.
 1757 Marquis d'Aubeterre.
 1759 Marquis d'Ossun.

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