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WAR AND TRADE IN THE WEST INDIES

1739–1763

BY

RICHARD PARES
Fellow of All Souls College

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WAR AND TRADE
IN THE
WEST INDIES
1739–1763

TO

THE VERY REVEREND

A. T. P. WILLIAMS

AND

C. G. STONE

TWO GREAT TEACHERS

OF HISTORY

PREFACE

THE reader will not find here a story told straightforward from beginning to end. No more, on the other hand, will he find an analysis carried out, subject by subject, without regard to sequence of time. In order to see a thing from all round, the historian has to combine different methods. Sometimes he has to describe a political, an economic, or a strategic system as a going concern, which can be viewed almost logically as a complex of ground and consequence; at other times he must relate the course of a campaign or a negotiation as a story complete in itself. In order to give a just idea of a great movement of history, such as a war or a succession of wars, he has to treat not only of diplomacy, but of law and party politics; not only of strategy, but of economics, the structure of society, and party politics again. He has therefore to vary the method. Some of these things, such as diplomacy, can hardly be rendered except by narrative; for other parts, such as law and economic history, narrative would be quite inappropriate. Movement therefore must alternate with standing still: sometimes the story goes forward, sometimes it comes to a stop at some point from which the surroundings can be surveyed at length.

This combination makes difficult reading. Where the difficulty is in the nature of the thing to be attempted, there is no need to apologize for it; only where the fault is of my clumsy contrivance, I have to ask the reader to excuse it. Perhaps he will get some help through the labyrinth if he constantly consults the tables of the principal events and dramatis personae which I have given in the Appendixes.

I have tried to describe two great colonial wars, in so far as they arose out of disputes in the West Indies and affected the way of living in the sugar colonies. I have tried to explain what the colonists expected from those wars, what part they took in fighting them, what demands they made upon the armed forces and the diplomacy of their mother countries. I have discussed at some length the economic effect of colonial wars upon plantation colonies in one of the great ages of imperialism. I have tried to show how much and how little patriotism meant to the colonists. Above all, I have tried to discover the policy of which those wars were the instruments,

and to show how the relations of those great powers were determined by their ambitions in America, especially in the great diplomatic crises of 1739–41 and 1761–2, upon which I have spent what the reader may at first sight think a disproportionate time.

He may also be surprised at finding so large a book written about the West Indies. I answer, first that it is by no means all about the West Indies, and secondly that in the age of which I have written, nearly everybody still considered the West Indies to be the most important and valuable part of our empire. The scale of things has changed, and it is difficult now to conceive how those neglected and unprosperous islands, many of them hardly bigger than the Isle of Wight, could ever have loomed so large in the eyes of governments and peoples. Yet so it was; therefore to ignore the West Indies is to get a lop-sided and unhistorical view of the mercantilist empire of the eighteenth century.

Further, the reader may think it strange that a book about war should contain so few accounts of battles or even campaigns. Here again the answer is simple. There were very few battles or expeditions in colonial waters during the two wars which I have described. There was, on the other hand, a very interesting and important routine of blockade and trade defence, and it played a far more serious part in the war than battles or expeditions. Naval war in those days was a branch of business, not only for the colonists who claimed the protection of the navy, but for the strategists who planned the operations and most of all for the sailors who carried them out. However, I must acknowledge that even where there were conquests or engagements to describe, I have very seldom given a narrative of them. That is because I have been more interested in war as a social institution, as a system for satisfying certain ambitions or securing certain rights, than as a fine art. The reader who is interested in campaigns and encounters will do better to consult Admiral Richmond's excellent *History of the Navy in the War of 1739–48*, and Sir Julian Corbett's somewhat less valuable *England in the Seven Years' War*.

This book has other faults for which I offer an unqualified apology. It is impossible to give a satisfactory account of war or diplomacy between two nations, without consulting the records of both general staffs and both foreign offices. I have

tried to do this for England and France, but my courage failed before the vast archives of Spain. Of the making of books there must be somewhere an end. One day a more conscientious historian will have to rewrite some of these chapters from the records of Simancas and Seville. I can only plead, and it is a bad excuse, that this book, imperfect though long, is a by-product or excrescence from an original project of a history of the British West Indies.

I have many debts of gratitude to pay. First of all, I owe my thanks to the Warden and Fellows of my College, who have enabled me to write this book, by electing me to a Research Fellowship, and have more lately, with an excess of generosity, helped me to bear the cost of publishing it. After them, to the officials of the Public Record Office and the British Museum for their patience. Next, to the librarians of many historical societies and other learned institutions in the United States. I should like especially to thank those of the Library of Congress, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the New York Public Library, the John Carter Brown Library, and the Essex Institute at Salem; I name these not so much because their kindness exceeded that of others, but because I have made most frequent use of it. I am also very grateful to several private owners of manuscripts; most of all to Lord Chewton, who allowed me to use some papers of the first Earl Waldegrave, and to Messrs. Wilkinson & Gaviller, who let me spend several months in their office over the papers of their firm. This unique series of merchants' letter-books is the richest and best single source of information for the history of business that I have ever seen, and I cannot enough thank the owners for such generosity as I wish were commoner in the business world. I must also thank Miss Jean Garlick for permission to use these papers, of which she hopes to publish a selection shortly.

Last and most of all, I wish to thank two friends who have helped me most generously with their advice. I cannot express how much I have profited by the kindness, patience, learning, and wisdom of Professor G. N. Clark and Professor L. B. Namier. The only recompense I can offer them is, that if they ever read this book again they will see how much it owes to them.

R. P.

OXFORD, *June 1936.*

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ABBREVIATIONS

Add. MSS.	Additional Manuscripts, British Museum.
Adm.	Admiralty Records, Public Record Office.
A.E.	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (Correspondance Politique).
A.E. Mém. et Doc.	Do. (Mémoires et Documents).
A. N.	Archives Nationales, Paris.
A.P.C. Col.	*Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series*, ed. Grant & Munro.
Arch. Gir.	Archives de la Gironde, Bordeaux.
C.J.	*Commons Journals.*
C.O.	Colonial Office Records, Public Record Office.
C.S.P. Col.	*Calendar of State Papers, Colonial.*
C.S.P. Dom.	*Calendar of State Papers, Domestic.*
G.D.	Gifts and Deposits, Public Record Office.
H.C.A.	High Court of Admiralty Records, Public Record Office.
H.M.C.	*Historical Manuscripts Commission.*
H.S.P.	Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
M.H.S.	Massachusetts Historical Society.
N.Y. Col. Doc.	*New York Colonial Documents.*
N.Y.H.S.	New York Historical Society.
N.Y.P.L.	New York Public Library.
Parl. Hist.	Cobbett's *Parliamentary History.*
R.I. Col. Rec.	*Rhode Island Colonial Records*, ed. J. R. Bartlett.
R.I.H.S.	Rhode Island Historical Society.
S.P.	State Papers, Public Record Office.
T.	Treasury Papers, *ibid.*
W. & G.	Letter-books of Messrs. Wilkinson & Gaviller, 14 Great Tower Street.

These are described by Miss L. M. Penson in *The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies* (London, 1924), pp. 300–1; but since some volumes exist which Miss Penson does not appear to have seen, my numbering of the volumes is different.

Vol. I.	March 1739/40–Feb. 1741/2.
Vol. II.	Sept. 1743–Jan. 1745/6.
Vol. III.	Feb. 1745/6–Aug. 1748.
Vol. IV.	Aug. 1748–Aug. 1750.
Vol. V.	Aug. 1750–Aug. 1752.
Vol. VI.	Aug. 1752–May 1754.
Vol. VII.	May 1754–July 1756.
Vol. VIII.	July 1756–Nov. 1759.
Vol. IX.	Nov. 1759–June 1763.
Vol. X.	April 1765–Aug. 1768.
Vol. A.	Letters of Henry Lascelles, Nov. 1751–Sept. 1753.

I

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1739

§ i. *The Beginnings of the Struggle for Spanish America*

SPAIN was the sick man of America at the end of the seventeenth century. Critics have sometimes been tempted to ascribe the decrepitude of the Spanish Empire to some moral or social blemish of the Spaniards themselves, or the revenge of God and Nature for the wholesale destruction of the aboriginal Indians. This is to do less than justice to the Spaniards both of Europe and America. The greatest fault of Spanish imperialism was attempting too much. Its claims vastly exceeded its performance. Her enemies never gave Spain a fair chance to show how she could have settled and organized the whole continent of America; but had they left her alone, she was too constantly preoccupied with European wars to give herself a fair chance.

There were hundreds of miles of coastline and millions of acres inland, where Spanish occupation was a mere pretence. Perhaps the most striking example is to be found by the side of the most important highway of Central America. The whole treasure of the South Seas was supposed to pass every year from Panama to Portobello; yet within a few miles of the road the Darien Indians were still unsubdued and even hostile to the Spanish power after two centuries of empire. The Lesser Antilles, the first seats of English and French colonization in the West Indies, were nothing more than a row of Spanish names upon the map, although the outward-bound galleons had to sail through them and take in wood and water there. The coast of North America between St. Augustine and the Bay of Fundy was not even complimented with a row of Spanish names.

This pre-emption of a continent defeated its own purpose in a violent manner. The other nations of Europe could do nothing lawful in America; they therefore did very much that was lawless. They did not merely want to jump the Spaniards' claim to land. Instead of building up colonies of their own, they fastened at first like parasites upon the Spanish Empire and bled it white. For peoples whose resources in men and especially in money were small, it was easier, no doubt, to fit

out a plundering expedition against the galleons than to find the capital for beginning a plantation. There was also a political motive for attacking Spain in this way. Charles V and Philip II used the treasure of the Indies to pay their troops in Italy, and to pursue their ambition of dominating Europe. Their enemies naturally believed that the best way to defend Europe was to attack the West Indies. This doctrine was perhaps less true than it looked; but it suited large and active classes of people, and it died hard. Above all, it was not land but money that the English, French, and Dutch first came to the West Indies to take. They might have pardoned Spain for the fictitious pre-emption of a continent in which they had very little interest; but they could not pardon her the real occupation, which almost amounted to a monopoly, of the mines of gold and silver.

Whatever the reasons and justifications of this nearly universal obsession with gold and silver, for the Spaniards and their rivals in America it was the prime motive of imperialism. The rich plantations of tobacco, sugar, and indigo were only a second best. Not until the Dutch had proved by their example that a nation could live and prosper without any command of the precious metals at first hand, did some economists come to their senses on this subject. Even they preceded public opinion by nearly a hundred years. The cramped and hard-living seaports of western Europe were haunted by dreams of gold to be had for the taking. There soon grew up a legend that the Spanish Empire was made of gold and silver. In the still mysterious back-country between Brazil and British Guiana, Sir Walter Ralegh believed that there lived a Golden Man. This invincible belief in the abundance of precious metals must have cost many a Spanish colonist his life or his limbs in the days of the buccaneers, who tortured their prisoners in order to make them reveal hoards which for the most part never existed.

Gradually it became clear that there were more ways than one to get possession of the wealth of America. The crude method of plunder could not succeed for ever. Though their system of trade defence was always unwieldy, the Spaniards got the habit of protecting the chief thoroughfares of their commerce, and the galleons were not often taken entire after the reorganization of Pero Menendez. Yet the slipshod Spanish Empire—more slipshod after every exhausting effort in Europe

and America—offered to the outsider opportunities of making money in other ways. Illicit trade with the colonists was very likely more profitable than privateering. For this illicit trade the Spanish Government itself was much to blame.

Before the reign of Philip II, Spain had possessed some industries which might have been developed. If she could have supplied her own colonies with manufactures, the competition of England, France, and Holland for the Spanish-American market would have been less necessary. This development, however, had been checked. The Spanish economists of the eighteenth century hardly recognized any other reason for this but excessive taxation. The foreign ambitions of Charles V and Philip II did indeed call for vast revenues, which were raised in such a way as to do the most possible harm to Spanish industry; but the economists did not take enough account of other things, such as the effect of American gold and silver upon the level of prices in Spain. Whatever the cause, Spain was only the channel through which the manufactures of the rest of Europe passed to her colonies. The Spanish Government made even this almost impossible by contracting the volume of trade.

The commerce of the Indies was confined to a few thousand tons of shipping which was meant to sail, from Seville or Cadiz, at regular intervals. One small fleet known as the 'galleons' was convoyed to Cartagena, and another known as the *flota* to Vera Cruz in Mexico. The supercargoes did their business at the fairs of Portobello and Jalapa; the two convoys then assembled at Havana with their cargoes of bullion, cochineal, and cocoa, and came home to Spain together. Single registerships (so called from their registered cargoes) sailed to the smaller markets which could not be supplied from the fairs; there were also *azogues*, which carried out quicksilver for the silver-refineries of Mexico and brought home valuable cargoes. All this shipping together made up a very few thousand tons; the regulations of the fairs further hampered the trade, for the merchants of the colonies were forbidden to ship goods for their own account on the galleons and flotas, and the supercargoes from Spain were equally restrained from warehousing their goods in the colonies and selling them at leisure. Both the ships and goods in this trade were to be the property of Spanish subjects.

It was partly for the sake of the revenue that the trade of the Indies was regimented. The Crown expected a great deal of the duties, which it often increased in spite of its promises. The attacks of foreign privateers also made some sort of convoy necessary, and restricted the frequency of sailings. These limitations were less serious than they might have been, because most of the exports were luxuries whose bulk was small in proportion to their value, and the chief imports were gold and silver. That, however, may be an effect rather than a palliation of the system. The Spanish minister Campillo attributed it to the method of laying the duties according to the measurement of the goods, which made it most profitable to ship merchandise whose value bore the highest possible proportion to the space taken up.[1] Whether the Spanish Government shared the wish of the merchants that prices should be high in America, is not so obvious. At any rate, whatever its motives, by damming up the trade between America and Europe it created an excellent fishpond for the foreign interlopers. As Campillo wrote: 'With such high duties and such restrictive freights, and other notable hindrances, it may be said that we have shut the door of the Indies upon the manufactures of Spain, and invited all the other nations to supply those goods to the Spanish dominions, since every port in fourteen thousand leagues of coast is open to them, and those provinces must be supplied from somewhere.'[2] The smugglers had all the advantage, for they escaped the crushing duties; and the interruption of the galleons left the market for longer and longer intervals without goods, which only the smugglers could supply. This interruption is said to have begun in the War of the Spanish Succession; the colonists then acquired a taste for smuggled goods which injured the success of the galleons after the war.

Cause and effect moved in a vicious circle. The fewer galleons sailed and the seldomer, the greater were the interlopers' opportunities and profits. Perhaps the wholesale merchants of Lima and Mexico would as soon have dealt with the regular fleets as with the smugglers; but they could not wait, and if some of them began to supply themselves from the smugglers the rest had to follow suit for fear of being undersold. The more

[1] Joseph Campillo y Cosio, *Nuevo Sistema de Gobierno Económico para la América* (Madrid, 1789), p. 19. It is not quite certain that Campillo was really the author of this book.

[2] Campillo y Cosio, op. cit., p. 20.

the markets were stocked with smuggled goods, the less inducement there was to ship on the galleons; they became smaller and rarer, in spite of the repeated edicts which enjoined regularity. There was an interval of seven years in the 1730's, and when the galleons sailed at last in 1737 the tonnage was less than ever before. Yet when they appeared at Cartagena, they found the market glutted; the merchants of Peru were so accustomed to buy smuggled goods, that they had neither inclination to buy of the galleons nor money to pay for their purchases.[1]

A little more freedom of trade would have taken most of the profit out of smuggling, for the excess of demand over supply was largely artificial. The Creole nobles were luxurious, but they were only a small part of the population; it does not appear, from the relations of travellers, that the poor devils of Indians can have had much purchasing-power. The interlopers themselves often found that the trade was overdone, and even when the French made their way into the fresh markets of the Pacific, in the War of the Spanish Succession, they quickly learnt that a very little competition among themselves lowered their profits, although they were helped by some years' virtual suspension of lawful traffic between Cadiz and America.[2]

The Spanish West Indies had for the trader as well as the pirate all the charm of the remote and fabulous. The legend of the great American market superseded the legend of the Golden Man, or rather grew up by its side. There was some conflict between these legends, or between the people who believed in them. It was not impossible to combine plundering the Spaniards and trading with them; but it was not very easy.

[1] Geronimo de Uztaritz, tr. J. Kippax, *The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs* (London, 1751), i. 156, 209–13; Bernardo Ulloa, *Restablecimiento de las Fábricas y Comercio Español* (Madrid, 1740), ii. 98–168. Ulloa was the father of the traveller and sailor, Antonio Ulloa, who may have informed him of the state of affairs in South America; but Antonio had not returned to Europe when his father's book was published. See also Campillo y Cosio, op. cit., p. 159 *bis*.

[2] E. W. Dahlgren, *Les Relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'Océan Pacifique*, i. 384–6. In 1715 the thirty French ships then in the South Seas had so glutted the markets that the St. Malo merchants themselves suggested that no more permissions to sail should be issued (Dahlgren, *L'Expédition de Martinet et la fin du commerce français dans la Mer du Sud*, p. 30). (See also Frezier, *A Voyage to the South-Sea*, English translation, 1717, p. 201.) The writer of an anonymous paper of 1715 (A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2008, f. 68) says that Brittany cloth, which used to be 8 or 9 reals the varre, is now reduced to 2½ or 3. Fifteen ships, he says, would do more good in the South Sea trade and bring home more money than forty do at present.

At first sight it looks as if the combination was frequent, but the truth is that trade disguised itself as plunder, or at least pretended to use force, for the better justification of the Spanish Governors who did not want to prevent it. Perhaps real violence was sometimes used or threatened, in order to overcome the scruples of the authorities; the inhabitants very seldom had any, for they could not ask for a better opportunity to satisfy their wants and to dispose of produce that had not paid duties or silver that had not received the royal stamp. As the Governors commonly excused themselves by the necessity of averting violence, it is difficult to distinguish the instances where it was really intended, from those in which the threat was at most a piece of expiatory ritual.[1]

Sometimes trade and plunder were alternatives, for each of which an expedition was equally ready. This happened especially in places where the disposition of the colonists to trade was unknown; the English, Dutch, or French adventurer might resolve to deal with the inhabitants if they would trade, and plunder them if they would not. Perhaps the early voyages of John Hawkins were made with this indefinite purpose.[2] A hundred years later, when the South Seas were almost as little known in England and France as the Caribbean had been in Hawkins's time, some of the earliest schemes of French voyages round Cape Horn showed the same uncertainty.[3]

Nevertheless, in spite of some exceptions, the antagonism between piracy and trading was obvious and insurmountable. It is seen very clearly in the politics of Jamaica; two factions grew up there in the 1670's, the buccaneering party of Morgan and the party led by Lynch, which preferred to promote the trade with the Spaniards.[4] They represented two conflicting

[1] The Spanish Ambassador St. Gil complained of the piracies of the people of Curaçao upon the coasts of his master's colonies; the States-General replied in their resolution of Oct. 14, 1739, that what was described as piracy was only trade in disguise. They went on to argue that just as smuggling can disguise itself as robbery, so on the other hand robbery can be committed on pretence of smuggling: and they accused the Spanish colonists of tempting the people of Curaçao to come and trade with them, in the deliberate intention of having them robbed by the *Guarda-Costas*.

[2] Dr. Williamson has ascribed to Hawkins a more definite and elaborate design. His argument is most ingenious: but possibly he has made more sense of Hawkins's voyage than Hawkins could have made of it for himself when he set out (J. A. Williamson, *Sir John Hawkins* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 92 et seqq., 166 et seqq.).

[3] Dahlgren, *Les Relations commerciales et maritimes, &c.*, pp. 113–14.

[4] I use the term *buccaneering* because it is the commonest one in English, though

tendencies in the policy of the English Government, which hesitated at that time between bringing Spain to heel by means of the buccaneers, and trying to procure, with the consent of the Spanish Court if possible, a greater freedom of trade with the Spanish colonies. At one time Morgan's party had the upper hand, both at home and in Jamaica; but the Government tried afterwards to call off the buccaneers.[1] The tradition of plunder died hard, and the same conflict reappeared in the War of the Spanish Succession. Once more the Government supported the traders, whom it considered more profitable to the nation than the privateers.

French policy experienced the same hesitations and changes as our own. For France, however, and consequently for the rest of Europe, the Spanish question took a new turn at the end of the seventeenth century, and the stakes became higher than ever. It was a question of nothing less than the partition of the Spanish Empire or its appropriation by France alone. This was the dispute over the Spanish Succession, about which so many treaties were made and broken, so many battles were fought. The policy of Louis XIV was entirely changed. He had lately been the enemy, waiting to tear away provinces and conquer privileges by force; he now represented the heir, and became eager to keep the estate together and set it on its feet by a programme of reform and efficiency. Yet he was not disinterested. France meant to turn the tutelage of Spain to good account. Louis XIV pressed various schemes upon his grandson Philip V of Spain. Some were only reorganizations of the commerce between Cadiz and the colonies; France would only profit by them indirectly as the principal foreign trader to Cadiz. Others suggested a more active part for French efficiency: the galleons were to be convoyed by French ships, and the squadrons stationed in the colonies were to be put under French control. This would ostensibly have checked the illicit trade of the English and Dutch, but it would also have favoured that of the French. Other proposals again would have given an open monopoly of the colonial trade to a Franco-Spanish company—a leonine partnership in which the direction, the capital, and

M. Vignols was quite right to insist that we misapply the term to what ought to be called *filibustering*.

[1] An elaborate account of these politics is to be found in an unpublished thesis of Miss Margaret Hunter on the career of Sir Henry Morgan.

the profit would be predominantly French. Whatever benefits the French might derive from these reorganizations, they meant to keep to themselves. Michel-Jean Amelot, going Ambassador to Madrid in 1705, was instructed not to sign a treaty of commerce, as that would create public advantages which France might have to share after the peace with England and Holland. At the same time he was to discourage Frenchmen, so far as he could, from participating in the manufactures of Spain, as their development would interfere with the sale of French merchandise in the Spanish market.[1]

Besides trying to get special privileges from the Spanish Government, France took the law into her own hands. Since 1682 she had permitted and encouraged a smuggling trade from her colonies in America to those of Spain. She now connived at a bolder novelty—the voyages of French adventurers round Cape Horn to the markets of Chile and Peru. There is no need to describe the shiftings and cross-currents of French policy. Sometimes the interests of Nantes and St. Malo were sacrificed, or kept in the background, in order to please the Spanish Government or stifle the outcry against foreigners in Spain; but more often the merchants' influence and the needs of the treasury overcame the political scruples of Pontchartrain, and the trade was winked at or openly allowed. At any rate, eighty-eight ships left France for the South Seas during the War of the Spanish Succession; the affair made a great noise in Spain and among the enemies of France.[2]

The alteration in the policy of Louis XIV had required a reaction in that of his rivals. As long as France had been the enemy of Spain, England could pose as a friend. France now aimed at the control of Spain, though it was destined to be much slighter, in matters of commerce, than the enemies of both countries chose to think. There were three courses which England and Holland could take. They could persuade France to a partition of the Spanish Empire, in which they should reserve for themselves, or for some candidate of their own, the American colonies in which they were interested. Louis XIV consented to make such treaties, but broke them in 1700 by

[1] Dahlgren, *Les Relations commerciales et maritimes, &c.*, pp. 330–1.

[2] This subject is discussed at great length by Dahlgren, op. cit., vol. i.

accepting for his grandson the whole inheritance of Carlos II. His enemies must then resist him by force, and oppose the Austrian King of Spain to the French King. This was their policy in Europe and America during the War of the Spanish Succession; they sent armies to Spain, and tried to provoke a sympathetic revolution in the Spanish colonies by playing upon the jealousy which the Creoles were supposed to feel against the French.[1] They could obtain for themselves, from their own candidate, such a special position as France would have liked to get from Philip V. In fact England secretly stipulated in the Treaty of Barcelona (1707) for very great privileges in trade, at the expense not only of the French but of her own allies the Dutch.

When it became clear that Philip V could not be turned out of Spain and Louis XIV could not be made to expel him, England decided to make the best of a bad business. She would accept the French King of Spain but nullify the effects of French influence upon the trade of Spanish America. It was no longer possible to insist upon the absolute exclusion of France from all direct or indirect trade with the Spanish colonies (the Dutch had been inclined to demand this in the peace negotiations of 1709). France could, however, be induced to forgo all special privileges in Spain. Intelligent negotiators like Mesnager had long seen that this would be a necessary condition of peace. At first a mere paper renunciation was not held to be enough guarantee against collusion between the French and Spanish Bourbons. French 'perfidy' was then as much an article of faith in England as English perfidy has ever been in France. England and Holland held out for a 'real security' for their commerce—we shall meet the phrase again. They meant by 'security' the possession of some towns in Spanish America. No doubt this would have injured the Spanish Empire. These towns would have been, at the least, advanced posts for illicit trade. England already had such posts in Jamaica and Barbados, Holland in Curaçao and St. Eustatius; but strongholds suitably placed on the mainland would have made smuggling easier still. In case of war they might be still more useful as starting-points for expeditions of conquest. France and Spain naturally resisted such a concession; and though Philip V unwillingly consented to make it, Mesnager was able to

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, nos. 33, 554, 735, 793.

divert the English from it by offering favours of another kind.[1]

Several Governments had long coveted the privilege of supplying the Spanish colonies with slaves. The Spaniards were forced to depend on foreigners, because they had no slave-trading settlements of their own. Spain had directed her efforts towards America and turned her back on tropical Africa. Portugal was the first great power on the West African coast, and in the years when the Portuguese Empire was incorporated in that of Spain, the Spanish Government commanded its own sources of supply. After the Portuguese had recovered their independence but lost their pre-eminence on the Slave Coasts, both the authorized and the illicit trade in negroes to the Spanish dominions were keenly competed for. Adventurers of several nations obtained *Assientos*, or contracts for furnishing the Spanish colonies with slaves; but it is doubtful if many of them made a profit. They were burdened with heavy duties and hampered by the high standards of quality which their contracts stipulated. Meanwhile, interlopers smuggled in cheap and inferior negroes, such as the colonists could afford not only to buy but to pay for. Yet the Assiento trade was an attractive prize, for it gave an opportunity of selling merchandise as well as negroes, and it was for this purpose that the nations competed to obtain it.[2]

One of the first effects of the accession of Philip V was the transference of the Assiento from the Portuguese to the French. England extorted from the Archduke Charles a promise of a contract which closely imitated the French Assiento. The Tory Ministry, which must have some advantages in trade to show for the fruit of its negotiation, now claimed the same concession from Philip V; and when Mesnager made difficulties over the 'real securities', Secretary St. John proposed to drop that demand if Spain would grant, by way of compensation, an Assiento for thirty years instead of ten. This was agreed to, and England was thus the only party to the war which obtained by it any special privilege in Spanish American trade beyond what was common to all nations. She afterwards got it increased in a very significant way. France had agreed in the provisional

[1] These subjects are treated in great detail by Legrelle, *La Diplomatie française et la Succession d'Espagne*, vol. iv (Ghent, 1892).

[2] G. Scelle, *La Traite négrière aux Indes de Castille* (Paris, 1906), ii. 107, 118.

negotiations of 1711 that England alone should have a reduction of 15 per cent. in the duties upon manufactures imported into Cadiz. It soon became obvious that England could not decently keep this privilege to herself at the peace treaty; she must at least impart it to her ally Holland. She therefore commuted it for another advantage which should be peculiar to herself—the right of sending a ship of 500 tons every year to the fair at Portobello.[1]

Everybody could see that the Assiento and the Annual Ship would lead to smuggling. Some clauses of the treaty were almost useless except as a pretext for it. The tonnage of the Annual Ship could be exceeded, and the hold filled up again and again by tenders which brought it 'refreshments'.[2] The Assientists might also send small vessels from time to time with 'necessaries' of various kinds for their factors and negroes in the Spanish ports. They had the right to hold land on the River Plate for the purpose of disembarking and refreshing their negroes; since Buenos Aires was in itself an unimportant market for slaves, this provision was meant to enable them to smuggle goods overland into Chile and Peru. Other privileges were copied from former Assientos, but these three were now invented for the first time, probably by Manuel Manasses Gilligan.

This adventurer had been deeply concerned, as a naturalized Dane, in smuggling to the Spanish colonies during the War of the Succession; his ship had been condemned as prize, and he had narrowly escaped prosecution for high treason by the Law Officers of Barbados. Carrying his case to London, he got the Vice-Admiralty sentence reversed, and returned to Barbados with strong support from the Government to organize a trade in slaves with the Spanish coasts. He turned up once more in 1712 as our chief commercial negotiator at the Court of Madrid, where the important finishing touches were being put to the Assiento treaty. This was the man who possibly conceived and at any rate procured the privilege of the Annual Ship; and if there were any doubt of the tendency of the treaty to encourage smuggling, it would be removed by the antecedents of its negotiator.[3]

[1] Scelle, op. cit., ii. 485–581.

[2] Juan and Ulloa, *Relación Histórica del Viage a la América Meridional* (Madrid, 1768), i. 142.

[3] *C.S.P. Col. 1702–3*, nos. 572, 661, 1065, &c.; *1704–5*, nos. 108, 203, &c.; *1706–8*, nos. 53, 777; *1708–9*, nos. 126 (i), 134, 180 (iv); Scelle, op. cit., ii. 528–9, 553–60.

As if this were not enough, the South Sea Company (to whom Queen Anne had assigned the Assiento) tried to obtain by a treaty in 1716 a further facility for clandestine introduction of goods into the Spanish colonies. It argued with some justification that one could not calculate exactly how much merchandise would be needed to buy a cargo of slaves on the coast of Africa, and that for this and other reasons the slave-ships might have to cross the Atlantic with some unsold goods. It therefore asked permission to bring these goods into the Spanish ports. It offered to warehouse them, but, Spanish officials being what they were, that was not a very real restriction on their sale. The King of Spain therefore refused to allow it except in Buenos Aires; he insisted that the Company's ships bound to the Caribbean ports should stop on their way in the English colonies and unload this superfluous merchandise.

Excepting these special advantages, the Treaties which England made with France and Spain at Utrecht professed to establish equality for all nations in the Spanish trade and to restore the state of affairs which had existed in the reign of Carlos II. Louis XIV promised in his treaty with England 'that he would not, for the interest of his subjects, hereafter endeavour to obtain, or accept of any other usage of navigation and trade to Spain and the Spanish Indies, than what was practised there in the reign of the late King Charles II of Spain, or than what should likewise be fully given and granted at the same time to other nations and people concerned in the trade'. England did not enter into the same undertaking with France. Philip V likewise promised 'that no licence, nor any permission at all, should at any time be given either to the French, or to any nation whatever, in any name or under any pretence, directly or indirectly, to sail to, traffic in, or introduce goods, merchandises, or any things whatsoever, into the dominions subject to the Crown of Spain in America'—except the Assiento for introducing negroes, which was at present granted to England, but might be transferred to another nation after the expiry of the contract. The King of Spain also promised that he would never alienate any part of his American dominions to France or any other nation; in return for this, Queen Anne guaranteed to him all the Spanish dominions in the West Indies as they had stood in the reign of Carlos II.

France consented to prohibit direct trade from her ports to

the South Seas. This prohibition was not always wholeheartedly enforced and still less loyally observed. Dahlgren gives the names of sixty-two French ships which departed for the South Seas between 1713 and 1724.[1] It was not until Spain sent out an expedition—officered by Frenchmen—that the back of the trade was broken. The French Government had perhaps some excuse for connivance, for nothing whatever was done to stop the smuggling trade of the English and Dutch colonies.[2]

Thus the settlement of Utrecht was supposed to have established an equilibrium or 'balance of power' in America. It confirmed the doctrine that the much-agitated question of Spanish colonial trade was best resolved by leaving the King of Spain in possession of his empire. The trade was not thrown open to foreigners in principle; certainly they might not sail directly to Spanish America, and even the projects of reform were dropped, by which the galleons and flotas were to be abolished or the subjects of foreign nations to be allowed to ship their goods in their own names. Everything had still to pass under Spanish names—no great grievance, because the Spanish merchants who lent them had the reputation of complete honesty. This trade was nominally equal for all nations, but its security depended much on administrative connivance and Court influence. France might, therefore, expect to have the largest share of it, because a French king governed Spain. It might be foreseen that France would become the champion of the Cadiz trade while England would turn the patronage of smuggling into an important article of national policy.

This did not happen at once in the complicated and chaotic diplomacy which followed the Peace of Utrecht. Commonplace prophecies were falsified by the growth of an *entente* between England and France; Spain was ruled by an Italian queen, not a French king. But Europe began in the later 1730's to recover from the age of adventurers, of unnecessary hostilities and wild or improvised alliances, and to settle down once more to colonial rivalries. Then the American equilibrium of Utrecht was once more appealed to and called in question.

[1] Dahlgren, *Voyages français à destination de la Mer du Sud, 1695–1749* (Paris, 1907).
[2] *C.S.P. Col. 1714–15*, nos. 76 (i), 129 (ii).

§ ii. *The* Guarda-Costas, *the South Sea Company, and the Private Smugglers*

The treaties of Utrecht were hardly signed when complaints of Spanish 'depredations' began to come in from the West Indies. The first is dated from Bermuda, in January 1714; a Spanish coast-guard ship, or *Guarda-Costa*, had seized some English vessels for carrying goods reputed to be the produce of the Spanish colonies.[1] Examples were soon multiplied, and the volume of controversy and protest grew very quickly.[2] Lord Archibald Hamilton, Governor of Jamaica, was induced, chiefly, it seems, by his private advantage, to allow reprisals. This gave colour to the Spanish counter-complaints of English piracies; in the interest therefore of the friendship of the two nations (and because he was suspected of Jacobitism) he was recalled in 1716.[3] Even the critics of his policy of retaliation continued to complain of the Spanish captures, which soon began to poison the relations of England and Spain. It would be wearisome to follow this disagreeable subject through twenty years of agitations in the English press, strong resolutions passed or frustrated in the House of Commons, stiff diplomatic dispatches and references to commissaries. It can hardly be said that this petty plundering of colonial shipping was a principal cause of the two ruptures of diplomatic relations between England and Spain, in 1718 and 1727; but it produced in the West Indies a situation which subjected trade to some of the nuisances and expenses of war, and sometimes came near to causing more serious hostilities. English warships had to cruise in the Windward Passage for the protection of trade, and even to convoy the merchant fleets clear of the islands, just as in time of war.[4] The Spaniards went so far, on one or two occasions, as to descend upon shipping at anchor in the harbours of Jamaica, and often molested the coasting trade of the island.[5]

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1712–14*, no. 544.

[2] See this list of 47 seizures given for the years 1713–21, in *The State of the Island of Jamaica, Chiefly in Relation to its Commerce* (London, 1725), p. 49.

[3] *C.S.P. Col. 1716–17*, nos. 158, 203; *1717–18*, no. 350.

[4] Commodore St. Lo to Secretary Burchett, June 24, 1728, Adm. 1/230; petition of the Kingston merchants to Rear-Admiral Stewart, May 28, 1730, Adm. 1/231; Commodore Dent to Burchett, Dec. 10, 1735, June 27, 1737, Adm. 1/1695; Commodore Brown to Burchett, May 8 and July 8, 1738, Adm. 1/232.

[5] St. Lo to Burchett, Aug. 25, 1728, Adm. 1/230. *C.S.P. Col. 1717–18*, no. 65 (i–iii); *1720–1*, no. 213.

Neither the naval commanders on the Jamaica station nor the Lords of the Admiralty could put up with this without trying to stop it; the former often solicited, and the latter sometimes gave, orders to supplement the defence of trade by active measures against the pirates. Such orders were given, for example, in 1723, 1728, 1730, and 1736. They hardly agreed with the more peaceful instructions which the Secretary of State sent to the colonial governors.[1]

On one occasion the English navy came near taking a step further. Some privateers of Porto Rico having seized the *Mary*, of Liverpool, in a particularly scandalous manner, the Admiralty instructed Rear-Admiral Stewart in 1730 to make reprisals on Spanish merchant shipping if he could not get her restored any other way. He tried in vain to get satisfaction from the Governor of Porto Rico, and was, therefore, preparing to execute this part of his orders, when he received a petition from the South Sea Company's agents, imploring him to do nothing of the kind. They pointed out that the Company's Annual Ship was then at Portobello for the fair, and would certainly be seized as soon as it was known that Stewart had laid violent hands on any Spanish traders. Besides this, the Governors of the Spanish colonies might all proceed to sequestrate the Company's property and embargo its trade wherever it had any. This would amount to an interruption of the Assiento and injure the English slave-traders. They added that the Spaniards would almost certainly issue similar orders against English shipping. Experience, they justly said, had taught them how hard it was to recover anything that the Spanish authorities had once seized. They therefore asked Stewart to confine himself to authorizing his ships to cruise against the Spanish *Guarda-Costas*. Stewart very prudently took the hint, and was approved by the Government; but he involved himself in one of those controversies with the merchants which hardly any Admiral on the Jamaica station succeeded in avoiding. It snowed petitions and counter-petitions, of which the purport matters very little. The adversaries of the Company declared that the situation of English shipping in those waters could not be worse than it was, for any orders that the Spanish governors might give in consequence of Stewart's action. But their chief motive was pro-

[1] For example, Newcastle's circular of Jan. 22, 1729/30, C.O. 324/36, pp. 171–192.

bably hatred of the South Sea Company, a feeling which was very prevalent among merchants at Jamaica.[1]

This time, then, the interest of the South Sea Company had saved the situation in the West Indies from developing into what would have amounted to a war. Meanwhile the depredations in general had been referred to English and Spanish commissaries appointed under the Treaty of Seville. These sat a long time, settled some cases, and left many others unsettled for want of such proofs and papers as would satisfy the Spaniards. But for a debate in the House of Commons, and an occasional article in the Opposition newspapers, the question dropped into oblivion.[2] The seizures still continued; according to figures given in the *Gentleman's Magazine*,[3] there were ten in 1731, one in 1732, six in 1733, one in 1734, nine in 1735, none at all in 1736; then, in 1737, there were eleven, and the whole controversy burst suddenly into flame.

Before considering the causes of this sharp renewal of the crisis, or the principles of the diplomatic argument which followed, it would be well to ask, who made these depredations, and on whom?

For more than a century before the Peace of Utrecht, the Spanish Empire had been victimized by marauders of three different nations, who had destroyed a great deal of its legitimate coasting trade. That trade must once have been considerable, because of the economic diversity of the Spanish lands in America; perhaps it was increased by the restrictions on transatlantic shipping which caused the colonies to become, except for luxuries and a few Spanish products, a self-sufficing system. When lawful trade is annihilated, it is not surprising if the seafaring population takes to piracy—an argument which the English used in their turn when they attributed the development of piracy among their own sailors to the Spanish depredations.[4] Robbers and adventurers create their own kind among the populations they attack. Therefore it is likely that the out-

[1] Pratter and Rigby to Stewart, March 4, 1730/1, Adm. 1/231; Stewart to Burchett, March 8, 1730/1; the merchants to Stewart, Sept. 24 and 27, 1731, ibid. The Admiralty's instruction is printed by R. G. Marsden, *Law and Custom of the Sea*, ii. 273.

[2] *C.J.*, Feb. 16 and 26, March 4 and 16, 1730/1, vol. xxi, pp. 631, 648–9, 660, 675.

[3] March 1738, vol. viii, p. 163.

[4] *The State of the Island of Jamaica, Chiefly in Relation to its Commerce* (London, 1725), p. 8; Charles Johnson, *A General History of the Pirates*, Introduction.

rages of the *Guarda-Costas* resulted partly from those of the buccaneers. Indeed, Governor Trelawny of Jamaica maintained that their commissions were still, in 1751, based on an order which the Queen Regent of Spain had issued in 1674, expressly for the suppression of the buccaneers; he sent home a copy of such a commission, to prove his point.[1]

If this was true, it goes some way to explain the violences which the *Guarda-Costas* permitted themselves; and even if it was not true, they could hardly be expected to abandon the habits and livelihood of fifty or a hundred years, the first instant after peace was concluded. The buccaneers themselves, after all, were no more able than the *Guarda-Costas* to convert themselves into law-abiding citizens at the word of order from Ryswick or Utrecht. It is generally admitted that unemployment among privateers caused the almost world-wide outbreaks of piracy after King William's War and the War of the Spanish Succession. Moreover, after the Peace of Utrecht the seamen of England and Spain in America were asked to forget, not merely the tradition of two long wars, but that of a century of skirmishing and marauding. Indeed, the remarkable thing is, not that they should have continued for a time the hostilities and pillage to which they had been accustomed, but that they should finally have been put down at all.

The English and French Governments contrived to suppress their own pirates. It was perhaps the first time in the history of the modern world that such a thing had happened, and is to be attributed to the exceptional length of the peace and the unusual whole-heartedness of the governments, who no longer wished to foresee any possible use for buccaneers. The Spanish Government was less able or less willing to restrain the *Guarda-Costas*. Less able, for the revival of Spain was slow under Philip V, and the effective control of colonial Governors was, if possible, even slighter in the Spanish Empire than in any other. There may have been some truth in the charge which the English made against these Governors—that they had sometimes an interest in the *Guarda-Costas* and shared their takings; also that the *Guarda-Costas*, being unpaid and private individuals, had to rely upon their prizes for their subsistence and profits, and were forced to seize unjustly where they could not find

[1] Trelawny to Holdernesse, Dec. 1, 1751, C.O. 137/59. Marsden prints the commission of a *Guarda-Costa*, op. cit. ii. 270.

anything to seize rightfully.[1] Certainly, as the Spanish Government afterwards admitted, there were some Governors who were not fit to be trusted with the power of issuing such commissions.[2]

Moreover, the Court of Spain had no desire to suppress the *Guarda-Costas* altogether, for it had work for them to do. Since the Treaty of Utrecht was meant to restore the old system of trade to Spanish America, interlopers must be put down, and a system of supervision was as necessary and legitimate as ever. In spite of the prohibition, the smuggling did not stop. England and Holland, whose illicit traders were old-established, continued to be the worst offenders.

Perhaps the South Sea Company was the greatest smuggler of all, carrying on an unlawful trade under cover of the lawful. The directors and agents soon got a bad reputation, but I do not know exactly why; for the declared profits of the Annual Ship were seldom large, and sometimes there were none at all. However, the declared profits of the Company might have very little to do with the private profits of the directors. The Company sometimes dismissed its agents for illicit trade; but that may have been as much a matter of self-defence as a proof of its sincerity to the Crown of Spain.[3]

The *Guarda-Costas* could do little against the Company, for it was able to penetrate, under lawful colours, inside the lines of the prohibitive system. They could do more against the private traders. Neither the Treaty of Utrecht nor the South Sea Company had succeeded in putting down this trade. The Assiento Treaty, which established a monopoly of the introduction of slaves, contained provisions for inducing the Assientists to defend it against the interlopers; they were to profit by the forfeitures of negroes introduced by such unauthorized traders. These clauses, and the obvious intention of the Company to supersede the private traders, caused very bad feeling between it and them, which developed into a political controversy; the Whig writers backed the private traders of Jamaica against the

[1] Trelawny to Holdernesse, Dec. 1, 1751, quoted above.

[2] Carvajal to Keene, Dec. 2, 1753, S.P. 94/144.

[3] Such resolutions are reported in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, i. 539, ii. 773, iii. 213; Add. MSS. 25504, f. 225. See D. Templeman, *The Secret History of the Late Directors of the South Sea Company* (London, 1735), a malicious but not very convincing piece of work. The same can be said of *The Particulars of the Enquiry into Mr. Benjamin Wooley's Conduct* (London, 1735).

Company, to which the Tories had handed over the Assiento as a monopoly.[1]

The private traders were said to have made a large profit to the nation, while the Company made nothing by the Assiento and little by the Annual Ship. The Company was thought to have convicted itself of losing by the Assiento, for it had obtained the Annual Ship from the King of Spain as a compensation for the unprofitableness of the contract for slaves.[2] Besides, it was argued that the Company, which was obliged to pay heavy duties to the King of Spain, could not make such a profit as the private traders, who took care to pay none, though they were liable to lose something by seizures and had often to purchase the connivance of the Spanish officers. The unprofitableness of the Company's commercial enterprises is shown by the fact that in 1734 the Spanish Ambassador persuaded it to ask the King for permission to commute its trading privileges.[3] It was also argued that the Company, having expensive establishments and large stocks in the Spanish colonies, had given hostages to the King of Spain which precluded the Government, or at least caused it to shrink, from taking proper measures to protect English shipping against depredations.[4] I have quoted an instance in which this happened; there were others in which it did not, and the Company had a long controversy with the King of Spain over the restitution of its effects which had been seized in 1718 and 1727 by way of reprisal for English hostilities.

The sugar-planters of Jamaica also disliked the Company. They thought it raised the price of slaves upon them by exporting so many to the Spaniards. Certainly the prices continued to rise in this period, but it would be wrong to attribute that to the Assiento contract. While the Assiento had been in Genoese and Portuguese hands, Jamaica had already supplied many of the slaves. Besides, the private traders were partly responsible for the rise, as the Jamaica Assembly recognized when it tried to burden with duties all re-export of slaves from the island.[5]

[1] *The British Merchant*, nos. 95, 98.

[2] *The Assiento Contract Considered* (London, 1714), pp. 6, 38; *Some Observations on the Assiento Trade* (London, 1728), *passim*.

[3] Petition of the Company to George II, July 4, 1734, Add. MSS. 25561, ff. 22–3, *Gentleman's Magazine*, ii. 824, v. 162, 273–4; Add. MSS. 25544, ff. 105–110; 25545, ff. 36, 41–2.

[4] Newcastle to Sandwich, April 11, 1747, Add. MSS. 32808, f. 62.

[5] *C.S.P. Col. 1716–17*, nos. 67 (i), 83, 85; *1717–18, passim*.

The colonists had another grievance against the Company which was perhaps better justified. They complained that it exported all the best slaves and left them only the refuse. The Company was in fact obliged by its contract to furnish negroes of a certain standard; this was a very great handicap, for the private traders continued to export the cheap inferior negroes and spoilt the market for the better and higher-priced article.[1] Three classes of negroes were said to be imported into Jamaica: the best sort, which the Company re-exported; the second, kept for the planters; and the worst, re-exported with very little profit by the private traders.

There were other arguments against the Company. It was alleged that the Annual Ship caused a net decrease of English manufactures exported, and therefore a net loss to the nation, however profitable it might be to the directors or even to the Company itself. The Cadiz merchants, uncertain what English goods the Company would export to America, were afraid of ordering so much of them as they would have done if they had had the trade to themselves and could have regulated the supply. The Annual Ships were also said to spoil the markets for such English merchandise as the Cadiz traders still sent to America; for as the smuggled goods came cheaper, they could be sold at a price which the supercargoes of the galleons could not afford to take. The decline of our trade to Cadiz was said to be greater than the whole turnover of the Company, to which it was attributed.[2] This was not fair to the Company. In fact our exports to Spain did not diminish; and if they had, the private traders of Jamaica would have been at least as much responsible for the decrease as the Company. In later days, when the Company was out of the question, this issue was joined.

The Company was also accused of shipping luxuries of foreign manufacture rather than English merchandise which was bulkier and less profitable; so that as much as two-fifths of its annual cargo consisted of re-exports. In fact, when the King of Spain took it into his head to confine the loading of the

[1] South Sea Company to James Pym, Dec. 12, 1723, in Miss Elizabeth Donnan's *Documents illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America* (Washington, 1931), ii. 307–8; Merewether to Burrell, Sept. 6, 1736, pp. 459–60.

[2] Malachy Postlethwayt's *Universal Dictionary of Commerce*, s.v. South Sea Company; *The British Trade to the Spanish West Indies considered*, Add. MSS. 32819, ff. 188–99; A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, 41, f. 191.

Annual Ship to English manufactures, the Company was extremely disconcerted.[1] Lastly, the enemies of the Company pointed out that it had never justified its title by a single voyage of trade or settlement to the South Seas. 'It was, for many years, like the dog in the manger, it neither traded itself nor would suffer those who would have done so in the like branch.'[2] This also was unjust. A Company founded in a war against Spain, to trade to her Pacific colonies without the consent of her Government, could neither expect nor be expected to combine such a trade with a monopoly conferred by that Government.

Although the private traders of Jamaica complained that the Company had destroyed them, they continued to exist. In fact they made their bargain with the Company. It soon discovered that there was little profit in the slave trade—at least with some of the smaller markets[3]—and licensed the traders to supply them in its stead, as the Treaty empowered it to do.[4] This cannot have been very advantageous to the traders, who had to pay the Company's profit as well as the King of Spain's duties. Probably most of them preferred to trade without a licence and take their chance of seizure.

The slave trade was only one article, and not the most important. English goods in general appear to have been smuggled briskly from Jamaica to all parts of the Caribbean.[5] No doubt the Company had an advantage in competition with the private traders; smuggling in port was probably safer than hovering on the coasts. The private traders, however, were not ruined by this handicap. They often received the protection

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, v. 273, 497; Add. MSS. 25545, ff. 42–3, 44–6.

[2] *The British Merchant*, no. 98, quoted by Postlethwayt, loc. cit.

[3] An article of the Treaty obliged the Assientists to supply the windward coasts of Caracas and Santa Marta with slaves at a maximum price of 300 pieces of eight.

[4] Some controversies in the Company about the licensing are reported in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, vi. 422; Add. MSS. 25545, ff. 35, 38, 39; 25506, f. 75, &c.

[5] Descriptions of this trade are not very common. The most celebrated is that of Captain Nathaniel Uring. The trader, accompanied by an interpreter who was usually something of a secret agent, appeared at some harbour just outside Cartagena or Portobello and sent in letters to the Spanish merchants. They came off to him in canoes and did business on board. The merchants of Panama came to Portobello disguised as poor peasants, with their money hidden in jars of meal, and returned through the woods with little packs of merchandise on their backs. (*The Voyages and Travels of Captain Nathaniel Uring* (reprint of 1928), p. 114. This description was abridged by Postlethwayt, s.v. Antilles, and lifted entire without acknowledgements by the author of *An Account of the European Settlements in America.*) See also Add. MSS. 32964, f. 65.

of the English men-of-war, who convoyed the interlopers upon their business, and were not always above taking a hand in the slave trade for themselves.[1] Indeed the navy had a special opportunity for it, since the Admiralty often sent out warships to the West Indies by way of the west coast of Africa, where the officers took in slaves on their own account. George II promised in 1732 that he would put an end to this improper behaviour, but it does not seem to have stopped.[2] The French Government was equally aggrieved, and entertained a controversy upon this subject with the English Ministry, about the time that the Anglo-Spanish crisis was at its height.[3]

§ iii. *The Depredations and their Redress*

These were the people with whom the *Guarda-Costas* had to deal. It would have been impossible to keep up a purely preventive system of defence against smuggling along the whole shore of the Caribbean Sea. The centres of population were too far apart for that. There were some spots where smugglers were sure to be found at almost any time of the year; such as Baru, near Cartagena, and the Garote off Portobello. In general, however, the *Guarda-Costas* would have attempted the impossible if they had confined themselves to looking into all the places along the coasts where they might find interlopers. Moreover, they would have annoyed their fellow countrymen too much if they had intercepted the much-wanted European goods on the way to market. They did no such immediate and direct harm by confiscating the payment after it had been made. For these reasons, their method was punishment rather than prevention. They ranged at large, often at some distance from the coasts, and examined every English ship they met. If she was carrying anything which they chose to regard as Spanish produce, they concluded at once that she had been trading unlawfully, and carried her off for condemnation. Whether this procedure was conformable to the treaties, or founded upon a fair criterion of the English trader's guilt, was one of the points that most envenomed the diplomatic controversy, and proved hardest to settle.

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1717–18*, nos. 566, 681 (iii).

[2] Add. MSS. 38373, ff. 130–1. A copy of Keene's and Patiño's declaration of 1732 is printed by Marsden, *Law and Custom*, ii. 281.

[3] P. Vaucher, in *Mélanges offerts à M. Bémont* (1913), pp. 611 et seqq.

If the *Guarda-Costas* had contented themselves with the repression of smuggling, no matter by what means, the War of 1739 might never have happened. They preyed, however, upon the lawful as well as the illicit commerce of the English colonies, especially upon that of Jamaica.

The prevailing trade-wind in the Antilles is easterly. The commonest course of ships bound from England to Jamaica was to get into the right latitude before they reached any of the West India islands, and then run down with the wind; this course took them near—but not very near—the southern coasts of Porto Rico and Spanish S. Domingo.[1] There they might possibly be snapped up by the Porto Rico privateers, and accused of hovering on the coast for illicit purposes. This, however, was not so great a risk as that which must be run on the way home. Ships from Kingston had two choices—they could go through the Windward Passage between Cuba and French St. Domingue, or take the 'Gulf Passage' round the west end of Cuba, past Havana, and through the Gulf of Florida. Either way they must pass very near some Spanish coast; for the Windward Passage is not very wide, and in order to avoid getting into the Bight of Leogane, between the two western prongs of St. Domingue, they had to keep on the Cuban side of the strait—besides, the land winds were said to be more useful there. Doing this, they must pass the privateering port of Santiago de Cuba. If they went through the Gulf, they had to coast along three-quarters of Cuba, keeping particularly close to the western point of it at Cape Antonio in order to avoid a contrary current which often runs from the Gulf of Mexico into the Caribbean.

It might seem that the Gulf course was the less natural, and that nobody would take it except for the excuse to smuggle near Havana. In fact, however, it was very often the most convenient if not the only possible one. The winds and currents on the south side of Jamaica were sometimes so strong that the homeward ships were a week or more rounding the eastern point of the island; after that, they had still to make against head winds through the Windward Passage, which lies nearer east than north from Jamaica. If they took the Gulf route, the winds favoured them until they had rounded the west end of Cuba, and then, although there were often calms off Havana, they

[1] In future the French colony in the western half of Hispaniola will be referred to as St. Domingue, the Spanish colony to the east of it as S. Domingo.

got another favourable wind and current to carry them eastward through the Florida Channel. This route was therefore proper and natural, but they might nevertheless meet a *Guarda-Costa* off Havana, who would very likely interrupt their navigation upon the pretext that they were about some illicit trade. It was in this course that several of the ships were taken in 1737, whose seizures renewed the agitation and disputes on this subject, and led to the war.

The trade of the other sugar colonies was not in so much danger, but even their ships went home through the islands for some distance, and might meet a Porto Rico privateer. Perhaps the shipping of North America ran more risk than any other, for it both came and went through the Windward Passage to Jamaica, or past Porto Rico to the other islands.

The *Guarda-Costas* judged these lawful traders by the same standards they used for the smugglers: that is, the places where they were found and the nature of their cargoes. By these tests the former were hardly more likely to be acquitted than the latter, because they often carried home the articles which the Spaniards chose to regard as proofs of illicit trade—cocoa, logwood, and money.

It was generally the lawful traders who complained loudest of these seizures; though a smuggler, who had a fair chance of concealing his real profession, might induce the Government to take up his case. At least one of these interlopers who had been selling slaves on the coast of Cuba posed as a lawful trader on his way from Jamaica to London through the Gulf of Florida.[1] Keene, our Minister at Madrid, admitted that the English Government sometimes intervened in favour of very dubious claims,[2] and Montijo, who had been Ambassador in London and was President of the Council of the Indies during the crisis, asserted that the English Government was often deceived by the clamour of disguised smugglers.[3]

Diplomatic representations were made, from time to time, to the Court of Madrid on such cases as seemed to deserve them. The Spanish Ministers generally answered that the Governors had not yet sent home copies of the legal proceedings: and however peremptory Keene might be in demanding immediate

[1] Geraldino to St. Gil, Jan. 20, 1739, S.P. 107/23.
[2] Keene to Newcastle (private and confidential), Dec. 13, 1737, S.P. 94/128.
[3] Keene to Newcastle, Nov. 18, 1737, S.P. 94/128.

justice, they would reply, with some reason, that they could not be expected to decide the case without hearing both sides.[1] In his heart Keene admitted this; the more so as the English complaints were only too often ill founded. When Newcastle sent him a great batch of petitions and protests in the autumn of 1737, Keene complained to a friend:

'Then my God what proofs! At most they can only be regarded as foundations for complaints, but not for decisions for restitution, must there not be an *audi et alteram partem*? Are the oaths of fellows that forswear themselves at every custom-house in every port they come to, to be taken without any further enquiry or examination, what should we say to a bawling Spaniard who had made a derelict of his ship at Jamaica, & afterwards swore blood and murder against the English before the Mayor of Bilbao? Should we give him his ship without knowing what the Gov^{r} of Jamaica has to say for his proceedings? Yet this is the case. I know not how M^{r} Sharpe could give such papers, I mean some of them, to the Council, I blush I am sure when I give them to this Court, yet it is in virtue of such performances that I am to get justice.'[2]

Sometimes the Spanish Ministers would point out that the English captain had not appealed, and must, therefore, be considered as acquiescing in the justice of the sentence; Keene had then to prove, if he could, that this was no fault of the captain's, who had been hindered by want of money or an abuse of the Governor's authority. But in fact the captains too often gave up all attempts to defend their vessels in the Spanish courts. They despaired of a favourable result, wanted to save the expense, and chose to rely on the good offices of the British Government, which would generally believe their story even if it was false, rather than on the justice of the Spanish courts, which would not believe it even if it was true.[3]

But supposing the captain had appealed—or supposing the English Government succeeded, as it sometimes did, in shoving in an appeal from above by its influence at Madrid—even then there were great difficulties. Keene reported that the Council of the Indies made it a rule never to allow new facts to be brought in evidence upon the appeal; anything therefore that was suppressed in the record of the inferior court would remain suppressed for ever. This was serious, because the Spanish

[1] Keene to Newcastle, Jan. 27, 1738, S.P. 94/130.
[2] Keene to Waldegrave, Dec. 13, 1737, Waldegrave MSS.
[3] Keene to Newcastle (private and confidential), Dec. 13, 1737, S.P. 94/128.

Governors were interested in obtaining a conviction by their share of the forfeitures. Profiting by the real reluctance of the English captains to defend their ships at law, or by their ignorance of what was going on, or at a last resort by their involuntary confinement, the Governors used to appoint a lawyer to make a sham defence for the Englishmen. (Indeed, there were other lawyers who were too much afraid of the Governor's wrath to undertake a real and wholehearted defence of their clients' interests.[1]) They cooked up a trial in which no evidence was admitted which would clear the ships or their cargoes.[2] Keene had no proof of this but the affidavits of the Englishmen concerned; and in any case the Spanish Ministers denied his major premiss, that the Council of the Indies refused to admit new evidence at appeals.[3] Indeed, when he put enough pressure on them, they procured reversals of sentences which seem to prove the truth of what they said.

The trouble did not stop there; indeed it only began. The Council of the Indies might order the ship and cargo to be restored, and give the claimants a *cedula*, or royal letter, for that purpose. The restitution could only be made at the place of condemnation; to which, therefore, the claimants had to make an expensive voyage. They often paid themselves very well for this; such a golden opportunity of going on lawful business to the Spanish ports did not happen every day, and the ship which carried out the injured claimant often took a valuable assortment of trade goods. The Spanish Ministers asserted that the claimants of the *Woolball* returned three times on such an errand to Campeachy, after they had been told, on their first visit, that the proper place to apply was Mexico.[4] When the claimant appeared, in good or bad faith, with the royal *cedula*, at the place of condemnation, he might find other compensations, but if his real object was the recovery of his property, he was often disappointed.

Sometimes the Governor would say the *cedula* had been obtained (as it often may have been) on false pretences, and

[1] Edward Manning to Drake and Long, Feb. 21, 1753, S.P. 94/145.

[2] Draft letter of Keene to La Quadra, sent by Newcastle to Keene, March 17/28, 1737/8, S.P. 94/132. For the interest of the Governors in the forfeitures, see Carvajal's note to Keene, Dec. 2, 1753, S.P. 94/144.

[3] La Quadra to Keene, May 26, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

[4] Ibid. The men-of-war were concerned in this, for they carried the claimants on these repeated journeys to Campeachy.

write home a protest, pending the answer to which nothing was done.[1]

The original ship and cargo had nearly always been sold; in view of the time it took to send the proceedings home, have them reconsidered by the Council of the Indies, and bring the *cedula* out, that was the best thing that could happen, especially if the cargo was at all perishable. The sale very seldom produced anything near what the English claimed as the first value of the cargo. A Spanish provincial capital was often a poor place where money was far from abounding; and while the cargoes of outward-bound ships might meet with a good sale because they consisted of goods which were badly wanted, those of the homeward-bound, which were more often taken, fetched much less than they would have done if they had reached their real destination. Besides, if the capture was unjust and the condemnation irregular—which may be assumed in the cases where the Spanish Court ordered restoration—the sale might well be collusive, at artificially low prices; and so no doubt it often was. For this reason many claimants refused to accept *cedulas* to colonial Governors, and preferred to resort once more to their own Government for a better and more immediate satisfaction.[2]

Even if the sales should be in every other respect satisfactory, there remained a further difficulty in recovering. The proceeds had been distributed, generally without any security to restore them in case the sentence should be reversed; for indeed the appeal was by no means always entered on the spot. They could not be recovered without prosecuting the captors or their securities individually. If the courts lent themselves to obstruct such prosecutions, the proceedings were interminable; and even if the courts expedited the business, the result was often useless, for the *Guarda-Costas* and their securities alike proved insolvent.[3] These shameful disappointments only admit of one extenuation —which is, that the conditions were nearly as bad in the English colonies; this the neutrals found to their cost in wartime.

The claimants insisted, with the support of their Government, that as the *Guarda-Costas* were, after all, doing the King

[1] La Quadra to Keene, Feb. 21, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

[2] Jenkins to King Charles II, Oct. 8, 1675, Wynne's *Life of Sir Leoline Jenkins*, ii. 779; Newcastle to Keene and Castres, May 8, 1739, S.P. 94/134.

[3] Ibid.; Wager to Keene, Sept. 30, 1730, *Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene* (ed. Lodge), p. 4.

of Spain's business though not in his pay, he ought to make himself responsible for restoring what they had unjustly taken. Philip V did in 1732 make a declaration which England believed, and Spain denied, to have this effect,[1] but it remained to all intents and purposes unexecuted. Even in the more propitious reign of Ferdinand VI, when England and Spain were trying hard to be on good terms, this promise, though better observed, had little effect. The King of Spain did not choose to pay at home; the treasures of the offending colony were drawn upon for the purpose. That colony would often have, or appear to have, no money in its chests; or else the fiscal of the exchequer on the spot would show his zeal for the royal revenue by the invention of chicaning difficulties.[2] For many reasons, therefore, the claimants and the English Government came to believe that the only acceptable form of restitution was payment out of the royal exchequer at Madrid; which, in a number of instances, they finally succeeded in getting. This was the origin of the famous sum of £95,000 which Spain was to pay to England according to the Convention of El Pardo; whose non-payment was the proximate cause of the war.

This, then, was the situation in which the Anglo-Spanish crisis arose. The Spanish Government had hoped to stop the mouth of England with some lawful share of her colonial trade. She had not succeeded, and the smuggling continued, the authorized traders taking part in it with the others. She could only stop it by the *Guarda-Costas*, who got out of hand and molested the traffic of England with her own colonies. This was the foundation of the diplomatic dispute which must now be examined.[3]

[1] Marsden, *Law and Custom*, ii. 280; La Quadra to Keene, May 26, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

[2] Pedro de Estrada to Drake and Long, April 18, 1755, S.P. 94/148.

[3] This controversy has already been treated by Paul Vaucher, *Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury* (Paris, 1924); A. Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la Cour de France*, vol. iv; H. W. Temperley, in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, III. iii. Professor Vaucher's account of the matter is especially to be recommended.

II

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

§ i. *The legal argument; the Treaties of 1667 and 1670*

In the autumn of 1737 the West India merchants complained to George II of the revival of Spanish depredations. The Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, ordered Benjamin Keene to make strong protests at Madrid, and to ground his demand for restitution on the treaties existing between England and Spain.[1]

There were two treaties which might be held to apply to this matter—those of 1667 and 1670. The former seems to have been drawn up with a view to sparing the feelings of both Governments about the concessions which obviously must be made in America. The least that England could openly accept, Spain could not openly grant. The question of trade between the two countries was dealt with very gingerly. The subjects of each state might trade 'where they were accustomed to trade'—that meant, in the European but not in the American dominions of the contracting parties. The only article which expressly mentioned the Indies was the eighth; it put England on the same footing on which the Dutch stood by the Treaty of Münster. That is to say, Spain was not to interrupt the trade between England and her colonies, and vice versa. The English were only to enjoy this privilege on condition of undertaking, like the Dutch, to prevent their subjects from trading to the Spanish colonies.

The Treaty of 1667 was meant to serve also as a treaty of commerce, and for that reason included a number of provisions, in the mode of those times, for defining neutral rights. The manner of search was prescribed; nothing but the ship's papers were to be examined, and that without any show of force. A list of contraband was drawn up. It is reasonably certain that the Spanish Government did not mean these articles about search and contraband to apply to the English trade except in so far as the English might be neutrals when Spain was engaged in war. In fact it is doubtful if any article of the Treaty of 1667 applied to America, except the eighth. Seventy years after-

[1] Newcastle to Keene, Nov. 4, 1737, S.P. 94/129 (two letters, with numbers of papers enclosed).

wards, it was the 'right of search' which was the chief subject of discussion, and both sides frequently applied the term 'contraband' to the goods which English smugglers exported from the Spanish colonies contrary to the laws of Spain. This was an entirely unsuitable use of the term, but it sufficed to lead the Duke of Newcastle into a very silly mistake.

The Treaty of 1670 was known as the 'American Treaty' and there was no doubt of its applicability; but in at least one article it was drawn up with a face-saving vagueness which was perhaps necessary in order that it should be signed at all, but left a door open for future trouble. It confirmed the 1667 treaty in so far as it did not supersede it. It forbade English subjects to trade with the Spanish colonies (and vice versa), unless such trade was authorized by somebody with a proper warrant from the King of Spain for doing so; but it allowed certain help and refreshments to be given to the ships of either nation driven by storm or pursuit of enemies into the ports of the other nation's colonies. Nothing whatever was said of the legitimacy of the methods by which Spain repressed the English trade to her colonies. This omission was serious enough, but it was made worse by article 15, which tried to combine two incompatible pretensions by leaving them entirely vague. The first part of this article says that 'This present treaty shall in no way derogate from any pre-eminence, right or seigniory which either the one or the other allies have in the seas, straits, and fresh waters of America, and they shall have and retain the same in as full and ample a manner, as of right they ought to belong to them'. This is an allusion to the claim of Spain that all America, land and sea, belonged of right to her except in so far as she should allow privileges to other nations by way of exception; but at the same time there was nothing in the article to show that England admitted that claim. The latter part of the article makes the same compromise the other way round: 'it is always to be understood that the freedom of navigation ought by no manner of means to be interrupted, when there is nothing committed contrary to the true sense and meaning of these articles'. That is to say, Spain showed she knew that England claimed some unspecified right of navigation in some unspecified part of the American seas, without committing herself to recognizing its validity. Keene later said very justly of this treaty that 'it consists of reciprocal proposi-

tions made between an English and a Spanish Minister, corrective of each other, without bringing the point to so precise a conclusion as might effectually, and at all times, and in all dispositions of the two Crowns towards one another, prevent the evil it was intended to remove'.[1]

The immediate success of this treaty was the result of its other clauses; Spain profited by the suppression of the buccaneers, so far as England could suppress them, and recognized in return the English occupation of Jamaica. It was a long time before the rest of the treaty did any harm. The Government of Carlos II was dependent on England for help against France, particularly for the preservation of its sovereignty in Flanders. As for the Indies trade, it was in such a chaos that the smuggling from Jamaica was not much noticed or resented at first. Philip V had no special motive of goodwill to England. He no longer possessed Flanders; he was anxious, and increasingly able, to put the colonial system of Spain in order. Then it was that the discussions arising out of the Treaty of 1670 showed how much trouble the judicious ambiguity of one generation can bring upon the next.

The West India merchants who were heard before the Council in 1737 demanded that the behaviour of the *Guarda-Costas* should be governed by the Treaty of 1667.[2] This would have prevented them from making many real discoveries, because it only allowed them to inspect the ship's papers, and gave them no right to look into the contents of the cargo. It would not have protected the smugglers altogether, for it appears from the Jamaica shipping registers that many of them were foolish enough to clear openly for the Spanish colonies, which must presumably have been expressed in the papers they carried. But it would have conferred even upon smugglers a further advantage. If the *Guarda-Costas*' attitude to the question of 'contraband' were to be governed by the provisions of this treaty, they would only confiscate the contraband goods themselves, leaving the ship and the rest of the cargo to go free; whereas their actual practice was to confiscate everything, if they found any one contraband article on board. In fact several English claimants complained that their vessels and

[1] Keene to Holdernesse, June 30, 1753, S.P. 94/143.

[2] 'Short state of the several seizures, &c.' transmitted by Newcastle to Keene, Nov. 4, 1737, S.P. 94/129.

cargoes had been entirely lost for the sake of one piece of log-wood or braziletto found in the hold—a story suspect by its repetition and improbable in itself, for what master of a ship would be such a fool as to carry about with him a single incriminating article?[1]

The merchants' insistence on the Treaty of 1667 was probably what misled Newcastle (who never really understood a legal or a commercial question in his life) to insist on it in his turn. Keene replied at once that the Treaty of 1667 had nothing to do with the West Indies; the clauses about contraband and search were meant to enable Spain to stop certain kinds of trade with her enemies, while the object of the *Guarda-Costas* was to stop all kinds of trade with her subjects. The two things had nothing in common, and it would not be to our advantage to confuse them, for while the Treaty of 1670 forbade the trade of British subjects with the Spanish West Indies, it did not establish any kind of search; whereas if we admitted the right to examine the papers according to the Treaty of 1667, we were allowing the Spaniards something which they could not claim by that of 1670. The latter treaty, if it justified any search at all, could only cover that which the *Guarda-Costas* exercised by Spanish laws within what were indisputably Spanish waters.[2]

This might be true, but Keene was too logical. There was no persuading the Court of Madrid to accept his reasoning against any kind of search; and we should certainly have been the gainers if we had induced Spain to accept, in lieu of anything worse, the almost harmless inspection provided for in 1667.[3] When we came to grips with the subject, we were forced to make larger concessions than this; and Keene himself later proposed a scheme somewhat like that of 1667, but that it gave the *Guarda-Costas* much greater rights in certain cases. Meanwhile Newcastle's blunder—for a blunder it was—gave the Spanish Minister, La Quadra, an opportunity to elude for a time a real discussion of the subject, and to score a logical victory, by proving that the Treaty of 1667 was beside the point.[4] Newcastle, forewarned by Keene's objections, was reluctant to own

[1] e.g. Capt. Way of the *Loyal Charles*, Capt. Vaughan of the *Sarah*.
[2] Keene to Newcastle (private and confidential), Dec. 13, 1737, S.P. 94/128.
[3] Stone's observations on Keene's letter of Dec. 13, 1737, S.P. 94/128.
[4] La Quadra to Keene, Feb. 21 and May 26, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

the mistake. Sir Robert Walpole and his brother were apparently anxious to do so, and to make a fresh start on the ground of the Treaty of 1670; but Newcastle, supported by Hardwicke, insisted at least on building a bridge from the old position to the new, in a passage of transitional nonsense.[1]

The original argument of the Spanish Government assumed that foreigners could have no lawful trade to the Spanish West Indies. Such trade was forbidden by the Treaty of Münster, whose provisions, in this respect, were applied to England by the Treaty of 1667. It was forbidden again in that of 1670; and in the settlement at Utrecht the powers of Europe had agreed that the trade of Spanish America should be restored to the footing of the reign of Carlos II, when foreigners did not ordinarily receive any general legal permission to engage in it. Admittedly the treaties did not prescribe how Spain was to put down unlawful trade—for the Spanish Ministers denied the relevance of the Treaty of 1667; but though that of 1670 had only condemned navigation and trading in Spanish ports, it was reasonably to be interpreted as including the *conatus proximus*, the sailing to and from Spanish ports on such unlawful business.[2] Even if there had been some omission in the treaties, it remained true that smuggling was forbidden. It was to be assumed that the smugglers were to be suppressed by the laws of Spain; and the only question was, what were the places to which Spanish jurisdiction extended?

The Spanish Ministers were quite clear in their own minds that it covered all the seas of the West Indies. The claim of Spain to be the rightful mistress of all America had never been explicitly abandoned, and La Quadra meant to revive and enforce it as far as he could. Keene described him and his colleagues as

'three or four mean stubborn people of little minds and limited understandings, but full of the romantic ideas they have found in old memorials and speculative authors who have treated of the immense grandeur of the Spanish monarchy, people who have vanity enough to think themselves reserved by Providence to rectify and reform the abuses of past ministers and ages'.[3]

[1] Horace Walpole to Trevor, March 7/18 and 14/25, 1737/8, *H.M.C. XIVth Report*, App. IX, pp. 13, 14; Newcastle to Keene, March 17, o.s. 1737/8, enclosing letter to be written by Keene to La Quadra, S.P. 94/132. Stone's observations quoted above. [2] Keene to Newcastle, May 7, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

[3] Keene to Newcastle (most private), April 24, 1739, S.P. 94/133.

They could not deny that Spain had been forced to yield territorial and other rights in America to England, France, and Holland: for instance, she had undertaken to respect the principle of freedom of navigation in America, by the Treaty of 1670. But these privileges were only conveyed by grants from Spain; they were only exceptional derogations from her sovereignty in the Indies. Whatever she had not expressly yielded, was still hers by right; and even the concessions she had made, were to be judged in the light of her own laws.[1]

La Quadra kept this immense claim in the background as long as he could; no doubt he rightly feared that it would offend other nations besides those with which he was immediately in controversy. It had to come out sooner or later, for Spain could hardly give any other reason why she should exercise a right of stopping and searching foreign ships all over the West Indies without the express warrant of treaties for doing so. She had promised the English freedom of navigation in America, and meant to observe that promise; but they could not claim anything beyond the true sense of her promise, of which she was to be the judge. If the claim which they founded on that promise should come into conflict with her prior and indefeasible right to protect her colonial monopoly against smugglers, it must give way. Spain did not claim to interrupt the trade of English ships sailing between England and the colonies; this, she held, was the true sense of that 'liberty of navigation' which she had granted in 1670. There were recognized routes for such voyages, though they had never been defined in any treaty between the two nations. Traders who deviated from them without any necessity were held to have convicted themselves of meaning to traffic unlawfully in the Spanish dominions. This was presumably the point of the expression 'suspected latitudes', and of the exception which La Quadra made against vessels which 'voluntarily forsook their course'.[2] Spain was to judge what the latitudes were, in which English ships were justly open to suspicion; she was also to judge what was the 'course' from which they had deviated. The English Government resisted these definitions of guilt. It was thought neither safe nor honourable to let Spain mark out our sailing-routes for us in the open seas; and while the conception of 'suspected lati-

[1] Keene to Newcastle, May 7, 1738; La Quadra to Keene, May 26, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

[2] La Quadra to Keene, Feb. 21, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

tudes' made possible an agreement which would establish a right to pass by certain Spanish coasts, all English shipping in America was in danger from it, so long as no such agreement existed.

As to the way in which this fundamental right was to be exercised, Spain was more accommodating. The Government had lately upheld seizures of foreign ships in 'suspected latitudes', and ships which contained any goods which could only have come from the Spanish dominions. What those 'suspected latitudes' were, I do not know that it ever defined; but it ordered the restitution of one or two vessels, such as the *Woolball*, which were proved to have been seized elsewhere. No general rule was laid down as to the ships which, though taken where they ought not to have been searched, were afterwards found to contain 'contraband' goods. Were they to be condemned as having been guilty of illicit trade, or restored as unlawfully arrested? Here again the example of the *Woolball* seemed to show that they would be restored.[1] The question of ships in this case was one about which the English Ministers themselves were uncertain; even Newcastle doubted if he should be justified in claiming them.[2]

Early in the summer of 1738, Keene thought he saw indications that the Spanish Ministers would abandon their positions and take up another which would bring them much nearer to that of Walpole. They never gave it him in writing, but he believed he might say that they would adopt a new method of search and a new criterion of guilt. The *Guarda-Costas* should examine the papers of English ships, which were to express their ports of departure and destination. If their presence in the place where they were stopped was compatible with their pursuing, in good faith, the voyage described in their papers, they should be released without further examination; if not, they should be searched, as before, for 'contraband' goods, and condemned if they carried any.[3]

Keene was disappointed in the expectation that La Quadra would propose this; but he continued to believe that it was what Montijo, the President of the Council of the Indies, really desired, and that Montijo's opinion in such a matter was of more

[1] Report of the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies, forwarded by Keene to Newcastle, May 7, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

[2] *Parl. Hist.* x. 770.

[3] Keene to Newcastle, May 7, 1738, S.P. 94/130.

weight than La Quadra's.[1] The execution even of this project would have needed a great deal of goodwill and adjustment. It would still have left much to the discretion of the Spanish Governors and *Guarda-Costas*. It would have left even more—too much, in fact—to the honesty of English customs officials; and it would probably have been incomplete without some definition of the 'suspected latitudes'. Further, it must have been supplemented by some strong action on the part of the English Government against the smugglers and the commanders of warships who favoured and protected their trade. But the project had this great advantage, that the lawful traders would be subject to an inspection of papers only, so long as they kept in their recognized courses; and so the original demand of the West India merchants would have been satisfied. At any rate it was something on which to build projects of accommodating the dispute; and this is what Keene and his masters proceeded to do.

Soon after this suggestion was made, the controversy took another turn, and little more was heard of the Spanish attitude to the question of search and free navigation until the meetings of the plenipotentiaries in the summer of 1739. By that time the hope of averting war had been lost or thrown away, and the exasperated stubbornness of the Spanish Ministers expressed itself in an open revival of the old claim to universal sovereignty in America. They explained the Treaty of 1670 in such a way 'that the navigation which the British nation can pretend to in the American seas, is to be such as shall not diminish or lessen the pre-eminences, rights, and dominions, which in those parts belong to his Majesty. . . . Neither the pre-eminences, rights, and dominions above mentioned, can remain whole and entire to his Majesty, as long as the ships or privateers authorized by him, shall not be permitted to detain, examine, and search the vessels that navigate in the American seas, and without such formalities as these, it can never be verified whether in those seas anything be done or committed against the genuine sense of the said article.'[2]

[1] Keene to Newcastle (most private), Aug. 2, 1738, S.P. 94/131. It does not appear why the Spanish Ministers did not give Keene these proposals in writing, which it seems they once meant to do. Lord Waldegrave, the English Ambassador in Paris, suggested that it was 'from an opinion that they may get off upon easier terms than they at first expected', which might or might not be due to hopes of support from the Court of France. (Waldegrave to Keene, June 10, N.S., 1738, Waldegrave MSS.).

[2] Keene and Castres to Newcastle, July 13, 1739, S.P. 94/133. The claim was

They condemned as a derogation from these principles the English claim to be exempted from search. This language would not have been used if Spain had still hoped for a settlement of the dispute; but it may, for all that, express the real thoughts and wishes of the Spanish Court.

The dispute between England and Spain was about a rule and an exception. Spain asserted that the Spanish sovereignty of the Indies was the rule and the English right of navigation was the exception; England retorted that the natural freedom of navigation was the rule, and the Spanish right to prevent smugglers was a derogation from it, which could only be lawful within the ordinary territorial limits of the Spanish dominions—for we allowed Spain no extraordinary sovereignty in America or anywhere else. The English Government never claimed or desired any right of smuggling in the Spanish Empire; even the Opposition, in their saner moods, acquiesced in the condemnation of real smugglers and were always careful to put the hardships of the lawful Jamaica traders in the forefront of the agitation. Where, however, the rule and the exception conflicted, they argued that the rule was to prevail. It was unfortunate, they said, that the King of Spain should find it so difficult to put down smuggling within his own territories. But he was not entitled, for that, to step outside his own sovereignty and exercise preventive measures in the open seas which were common to all; still less was he to molest our fair traders.[1] A right of search on the high seas could only come into being by virtue of treaties; nothing of the sort was known to the fundamental law of nations. If we started from the Spanish principle that smuggling must be prevented, and carried it to all its necessary conclusions, nothing would be left of the lawful trade of England with her colonies. When the Opposition orators were heated, they went farther, and even hinted a criticism of the Treaty of 1670, for giving up our right to trade to the Spanish dominions.[2]

This was not the opinion of responsible people. Still less was it the opinion of the Ministers, who may have known that smug-

repeated, even more imprudently, before an international public, in the King of Spain's *Raisons justificatives* (Rousset, *Recueil*, XIII. ii. 179).

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 683 (Pulteney), 748 (Carteret): *A Review of all that hath pass'd between the Courts of Great Britain and Spain* (London, 1739), pp. 36–8.

[2] *Parl. Hist.* x. 1222 (Bathurst): *A View of the Political Transactions of Great Britain since the Convention was approved of by Parliament* (London, 1739), pp. 25–8.

gling must continue with impunity if their demands were satisfied, but never were so silly as to say so. Indeed, both Walpole and Newcastle saw the necessity of giving Spain at least a promise to repress it by all means that were constitutionally in the Government's power.[1] Newcastle once went so far as to say that we were morally obliged to do so by the Treaty of 1670.[2] It is doubtful if such a prohibition would have been effective. The Ministers would hardly have dared to ask Parliament for an Act; the most they seem to have offered, in their projects of treaties, is a proclamation, and a promise to cashier any commanders of warships who should protect the traders or engage for themselves in the trade.[3] They made it perfectly clear, however, that they would never agree to any measure which would infringe the absolute liberty of the fair traders.[4]

Therefore they could not acquiesce in the Spanish doctrine about 'suspected latitudes' and voluntary alterations of course. They were not so unreasonable as to deny that there were some places where English traders could have no lawful business, if Spain would in her turn concede that there were some places in which English ships were not necessarily suspect of smuggling. There were several ways of settling this question. One was to establish a distance all round the Spanish coasts, outside which no search might be made. Something of the kind seems to have been nominally observed by the *Guarda-Costas* under an order of 1732;[5] but it was too rigid, and would have to be qualified by a declaration that it was not to be applied on the lawful routes of English trade. Another expedient was to except by name the Windward Passage and the Gulf of Florida from the places where English shipping was to be suspected and examined.[6] This scheme, which was approved by a well-informed French writer,[7] would have raised difficulties. It would have involved the abandonment of the whole island of Cuba to English smuggling, and would not really have protected the Spanish monopoly in the mainland, because Cuba would have been a door

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 1292, 1312.

[2] Newcastle to Hardwicke, 'Fryday noon', Add. MSS. 35406, f. 53.

[3] Article 3 of the first draft treaty, article 2 of the second.

[4] Newcastle to Keene and Castres, Nov. 13, 1738, S.P. 94/132.

[5] Report of the Fiscal of the Indies, quoted above, p. 35.

[6] Draft instructions to Keene and Castres, Nov. 13, 1738, S.P. 94/132.

[7] Silhouette to Amelot, Dec. 24, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, vol. 405, f. 360; March 12, 1740, vol. 407, f. 181; A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, vol. 9, f. 111; vol. 41, f. 200.

through which English goods would have reached the whole empire.

Yet another expedient was the proposal of Montijo.[1] The English Ministry did not dislike it, but could not accept it alone. For Newcastle, the chief point was *No Search on the High Seas*, because it made most noise. The investigation of the ship's papers, to see if she was really on her declared voyage, might be quite harmless to the innocent if it were properly conducted; still it was a search, and the Spaniards apparently proposed to practise it on the high seas. That would not satisfy the bellowing patriots in the House of Commons. Newcastle therefore combined all the schemes together, in order to make assurance treble sure: Montijo's scheme, the exception by name of the Windward Passage and the Gulf of Florida, and his own favourite project of establishing a reasonable distance round the Spanish coasts, within which English shipping should not go. Outside this distance, there was to be no search at all; within it, the papers only were to be searched for evidence as to the voyage, as Montijo had suggested.[2] Even if some discrepancy appeared between the declared and the actual voyage, that was not to suffice alone to condemn the ship and cargo. Legal proof of smuggling or intention to smuggle must be produced; and even so, only that part of the cargo which was brought for or from the Spanish dominions should be confiscated. The English plenipotentiaries did not criticize this; it does not signify what La Quadra would have said to it, because the great question of search and free navigation had hardly been discussed between the plenipotentiaries before the war broke out.

The English Ministers objected not only to the practice of search, but also to the Spanish doctrine of 'contraband'. That doctrine touched the national honour. Spain claimed, amongst other things, a right to interrupt the trade between one part of the British dominions and another. The *Guarda-Costas* not only searched, on the high seas, vessels that were actually coming away from the Spanish colonies; they extended their inquisitions to 'contraband' goods which had been safely landed at Jamaica and reshipped for England or North America. Once a Spanish product, always a Spanish product; there was a *vitium reale*, a taint in the thing itself, which rendered it liable

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 35.

[2] Draft instructions to Keene and Castres, Nov. 13, 1738, S.P. 94/132.

to confiscation, no matter where it was found, after how many voyages and changes of ownership.[1] There was no knowing how far this would go, as it was left entirely in the discretion of the Spaniards. If they seized Spanish coin in the Florida Passage to-day, they might seize it in the Channel to-morrow: if they seized cocoa on the ground that some of it was grown in the Spanish colonies, one day they might seize sugar for the same reason. Of course these fears were exaggerated, but Spain was nevertheless asserting a new and objectionable principle; she had in fact discovered, though not in the sphere of neutral rights, the doctrine of continuous voyage; and *mutatis mutandis*, some of the English arguments of 1739 became the Dutch arguments of 1759.[2]

The 'contraband' goods might have come into the possession of Englishmen in many lawful ways. Perhaps through the Assiento. It was all very well in 1670 to seize goods of Spanish origin as evidences of illicit trade; but since 1670 we had the Assiento Treaty and the Annual Ship.[3] The South Sea Company had its agents at Jamaica; most of its ships came straight home without touching there, but they did not all do so, and some of them may have disembarked goods in the island. Certainly this tap leaked; the Company no doubt exported more than it ought, and besides, there was a danger that all the Spanish products in Jamaica would be legitimated because some of them had entered into circulation through a lawful channel. Perhaps the Government might have adopted a suggestion of Keene's, that produce which really had been acquired by the Company should be protected by a certificate of its factors.[4] The certificates would undoubtedly have been sold to all and sundry, but the question would at least have received a nominal solution. Besides the lawful exports of the Company, there was some Spanish produce whose presence in the English colonies could be accounted for in another way. The Spanish Governors, on pretexts of scarcity of provisions, sometimes allowed their subjects to send ships to the English colonies to buy necessaries, and to export merchandise to pay for them. The impropriety of this practice, if there was any, lay at the door of the Spaniards

[1] *A State of the Rise and Progress of our Disputes with Spain* (London, 1739), pp. 5–6.
[2] *Parl. Hist.* x. 650.
[3] Keene to Newcastle, Feb. 3, 1738, S.P. 94/130.
[4] Keene to Newcastle (private and confidential), Dec. 13, 1737, S.P. 94/128.

themselves; and it was hard if the Spanish authorities should pursue with their vengeance the Englishmen at Jamaica who bought the goods so exported.

There was another reason why the criterion of 'contraband' goods could not be admitted. Some of them were said to be produced in the English as well as the Spanish colonies. Cocoa had once been grown in Jamaica, but the trees had died for want of expert care; yet a little was still grown here and there in the English dominions. This too was a very small tap which would let out a great deal.

More serious, because of its implications, was the question of dyewoods. Captain Kinslagh of the *Prince William* was convicted of illicit trade in 1737 on account of some braziletto wood in his cargo.[1] He said it was the growth of New Providence, in the Bahamas; but Spain had never admitted the English right to settle the Bahamas, and regarded them as Spanish possessions. Logwood created a yet more important difficulty. Some logwood grew, and still grows, in Jamaica; it was sometimes exploited commercially, especially by those who were clearing new plantations. Most, however, of what was imported into England came from the Spanish provinces of Honduras and Campeachy. The use of logwood in dyeing dark colours made it an article of great necessity to the woollen-manufacturers of Europe. It was a tree which grew in swampy ground near the creeks on both sides of Cape Catoche. The Spaniards of S. Francisco de Campeche cut and sold it in the seventeenth century. The English seem to have come to the trade from buccaneering: first they plundered the logwood ships, then they seized upon the piles of wood which lay ready cut near the creeks. Finally they settled down to cut it for themselves, especially after the serious attempts of the English Government to suppress buccaneering forced them to change their career. It was a life of hard work, up to the knees in swamp half the time, and heavy burdens to carry; but it was beguiled by drinking-bouts and native women, and recommended itself to those who had been accustomed to live outside the pale of law and order.[2]

Exactly when the logwood-raiding turned into logwood settlements cannot easily be ascertained. The Board of Trade

[1] Newcastle to Keene, Nov. 4, 1737, S.P. 94/129, with enclosures.

[2] William Dampier, *Voyages* (ed. 1699), vol. ii, part ii, *passim*.

afterwards made the most of the evidence that the process had taken place before 1667, or at any rate before 1670.[1] This point was held to be important, for the Treaty of 1670 recognized the *status quo* of the dominions of each party. Certainly the Spanish Government never meant to legitimate the logwood-cutting settlements; could it be held to have done so by mistake? They had no established government of any kind and were in no sense regular dominions of the Crown of England. Besides, it was doubtful if their sites could be regarded as having been left vacant by the Spaniards. Sir William Godolphin, Ambassador at Madrid, had been applied to for his advice in 1672; he answered that the province of Campeachy was as much occupied by the Spaniards as most of their other American possessions, and that the Spaniards 'may as justly pretend to make use of our rivers, mountains, and other commons, for not being inhabited or owned by individual proprietors, as we can to enjoy the benefit of these woods'.[2]

After this, the Spanish authorities continued to eject the logwood-cutters as best they could, and the English Government to protest from time to time. The English claim was further strengthened by the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of Commerce in 1713, which confirmed the Treaty of 1670 'without any prejudice however to any liberty or power which the subjects of Great Britain enjoyed before, either through right, sufferance or indulgence'. The Spaniards denied that there ever had been such indulgence and sufferance, and pointed to the number of times they had turned the logwood-cutters out, without any complaint made by the English Government. A demand of the Spanish Ambassador for the withdrawal of the English settlers from the Laguna de Terminos produced in 1717 a long and celebrated report on the subject by the Board of Trade.[3] Its reasoning is far from conclusive, though it was accepted as Gospel truth by most Englishmen.[4] Besides, whatever title it might establish for the logwood-cutters of Campeachy, it was open in 1739 to one insurmountable objection: since it had been written, the logwood-cutters had been finally ejected from Campeachy, and those who still pursued that calling lived at a

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1717–18*, no. 104 (i). [2] *H.M.C. Xth Report*, App. I, pp. 200–1.

[3] *C.S.P. Col. 1717–18*, no. 104 (i).

[4] Keene did not accept it (Keene to Under-Secretary Couraud, June 9, 1739, S.P. 94/133). See also Fuentes to Pitt, Sept. 9, 1760, G.D. 8/93; Bristol to Pitt (most secret), Nov. 6, 1760, S.P. 94/162.

much more recent settlement, hundreds of miles away, on the bay of Honduras. It was not even, as Wager supposed, 'in the same province of Yucatan', and the right to it could not be defended on the same grounds.[1]

This was a dangerous subject to touch upon, because it revived a controversy that had only been quieted in 1670 after nearly a hundred years of war—the question of effective occupation. Apart from the sophistry of claiming a right under the Treaty of 1670, the only solid justification the English had to offer for their logwood settlements was that they occupied the country and the Spaniards did not. Spain had allowed the doctrine of effective occupation to be applied once, when she recognized Charles II's title to his American dominions in 1670; but she had not assented to it in general. She still believed that no settlement in America was lawful which she had not expressly licensed; therefore to claim the cargoes of logwood in English ships as the produce of English dominions was to advance from questioning her rights at sea to questioning her rights on land. It was for this reason that Wall afterwards said of those cases that the justification was worse than the offence. When the depredations, the South Sea Company, and all other sources of irritation had died away, logwood still remained to play a considerable part among the causes of the Anglo-Spanish war of 1762.

§ ii. *Newcastle and the Opposition; the Reprisals of 1738*

The argument between England and Spain was interrupted almost as soon as it was begun. The question of search and free navigation was complicated by disputes upon several other subjects; and even if the English Ministers had been able to keep the Spanish Court to the main point, they were not masters in their own house.

The two nations were drifting towards war in the spring of 1738. The agitation of the West India merchants made a great noise. Moreover, a new element was introduced into the situation. The English Opposition had seen a chance of making party capital out of the dispute, and was pressing the Government for strong measures which would lead to war.

The Earl of Marchmont lamented, at the end of the Parlia-

[1] Wager's observations on the draft treaty, Nov. 8, 1738, Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS.

mentary session of 1737–8, that he had not succeeded in persuading the Opposition leaders to take up this question early enough in the season; 'it was answered, that must arise from the merchants themselves: and from them at last it did arise, but too late'.[1] The Ministry therefore encountered little trouble in Parliament until the session was some way advanced. Perhaps Pulteney and Wyndham wanted to be sure that there was something in the agitation before they associated themselves with it openly. They had already begun a spate of articles in the press; and one of them had, intentionally or not, taken a step which perhaps did more to bring on a war than anything that any of them could say in public.

Newcastle heard in October 1737 that 'a certain Person'—presumably somebody in Opposition—had talked of making a particular attack on him for the conduct of the Government about the Spanish depredations.[2] Certainly Newcastle must have felt that the record of past achievements in this field was not imposing. Complaints had been made, and had sometimes been answered civilly. Commissaries had been appointed on both sides to adjust these cases; but there remained a number of English claims unsatisfied, and small appearance that the abuses would cease in future. It was all very well for Hardwicke to reassure Newcastle that if the truth were known he would be as well able to justify himself as anybody; he must have been thrown into great agitation at this prospect of being personally singled out for criticism.

Newcastle was above all a political coward. He was terrified of public opinion—whatever that may have been in the eighteenth century. Anything that could talk big and call itself a tribune of the people could make him quiver with anxiety. His fear of Pitt may be excused; for who was not afraid of that great actor?—but he even stooped to be afraid of Alderman Beckford, who was never more than Pitt's Sancho Panza. He could not live without unqualified approbation, and one dissentient voice was enough to disturb his peace of mind. Yet with his colleagues, who had no popular influence to terrify him, he was very far from compliant. In spite of the nervous agitation into which the least difficulty threw him, he had a boundless appetite for business; he loved the merit of arranging

[1] *Marchmont Papers* (London, 1831), ii. 100.

[2] Hardwicke to Newcastle, Oct. 12, 1737, Add. MSS. 32690, f. 394.

everything, and the praise of arranging it well. Though he seldom knew exactly what he wanted, he wanted it so strongly as to go almost any lengths to obtain it. It was not conscious treachery or desire for power that made him part with so many political allies and edge so many colleagues out of the nest; it was a firm conviction that his own policy, however nebulous, was right and necessary. Walpole, Carteret, Chesterfield, Bedford—it is an imposing list. Several of them were discarded for trying to do exactly what Newcastle himself did soon after their extrusion.

It was for this kind of reason that he was universally suspected of dishonesty. Admittedly he broke promises—that was because, in the fullness of his heart or as a line of least resistance, he had had the misfortune to promise the same thing to too many people. It is true that few men succeeded in remaining his friends and allies for long; but he was not, like Pitt, deliberately and artificially dishonest. His was the spontaneous dishonesty of weakness. He was a mercurial, always at the top or at the bottom of his spirits; he lived entirely in the present. He saw life neither steadily nor whole; but whatever he did see, struck him with an overwhelming force of conviction. While he believed a thing, he believed it strongly; and perhaps it was hardly his fault that he could not foresee the difficulties which would cause him to rebound so lightly from one doctrine or friendship to another. Besides, he was easily flurried and lost his head. He was then more determined than anybody that something must be done, and knew less than most what it ought to be. He would then recommend with equal earnestness almost all the possible expedients, and later events would enable him to proclaim with perfect sincerity that he had always been in favour of the course which finally seemed the most eligible. He never understood more than the politics of any subject, and was fascinated by the personal side even of politics. He has been charged with having no interest in life but jobbery; but that is not quite fair to him. True enough, his name is not associated with any great acts of legislation. He passed no Reform Acts, relieved no distress by wise laws; but domestic legislation was not then thought to be the chief business of Government. Ministers were generally preoccupied in the conduct of war and foreign affairs, and Newcastle was no exception. He lived for foreign politics, as the enormous correspondence

testifies which he so futilely devoted to them. With long experience, he never formed anything like a general principle; the only two prepossessions in his mind which approached such a thing were a horror of Tories and a partiality for the House of Austria, in spite of everything that her intractable monarchs could do. He had picked these up in the heat of his youth and always looked upon them as the 'good old system'; but even from them he was brought to allow deviations, though with a wry face. Nothing but inexhaustible vitality could have enabled him to live forty years of so tormenting and haphazard a political career, and to prevail with such surprising and continued success against men of better capacity.

With such a light-weight, so sensitive to popular disapproval, in charge of the negotiations with Spain, the Opposition's policy became at least as important as that of the Government. Even before the Opposition had declared itself, Newcastle had already quarrelled with Walpole for his tameness to Spain; but the subject of that disagreement seems to have been something else.[1] It would be a trivial pedantry to ascribe all Newcastle's ill-judged zeal in the affair of the depredations to his apprehensions of the 'certain person', though Hardwicke's letter was followed remarkably soon by Newcastle's first sharp dispatch to Keene. Certainly he had other and more public motives, such as the petition of the West India merchants; but I think it remains true that his impatient bellicosity was very greatly due to his fear of criticism, not to say impeachment, and his desire to play a part worthy of a strong Foreign Minister.

The Ministry took a violent step towards war at the beginning of March 1738. The King offered to issue letters of reprisal for the English merchants to do themselves justice against Spain. This was a form of private war which had almost passed out of use. It was designed to satisfy the grievances of an individual against a foreign power, without incurring an open international conflict. If an English merchant was wronged, for example, by the King of Spain or his subjects, and could not get justice from the Spanish courts, he was entitled to apply for the interposition of his own sovereign. The King of England would then make a formal complaint to the Court of Spain, and demand a review of the sentence, or whatever form of satisfaction was most appropriate. If justice was still denied, the

[1] Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 16, 1737, Add. MSS. 32690, f. 299.

King of England might, after a due period, grant the injured parties letters of reprisal. This would entitle them to fit out a private vessel of war and take the property of Spanish subjects on the high seas, until they had recovered their loss, which they were generally obliged to prove beforehand in the English courts. It was a chaotic and dangerous way of doing business, though perhaps it was no worse than the modern trade embargo. It had been very common in former times, and the conditions of its use were often defined by treaty, as by those of 1630 and 1667 between England and Spain.[1]

Newcastle justified the letters of reprisal by the treaties;[2] but the practice had always been inconvenient and was becoming obsolete. Even though the sovereign who resorted to it usually took care to make his subjects prove their loss in his courts, he could not always make sure of the facts before he thus cut short the controversy and refused to hear the other party's version. He might claim to be as good a judge of the facts as any other; but if this claim was admitted and acted upon, there would be two courts of justice for every dispute where the parties were of different nations.[3] Besides, in those days reprisals could hardly fail to bring on a war, which they had once been designed to avoid. Diplomacy was assuming more and more of the responsibility for private international relations; the English Government in particular, which was more amenable than others to a sort of public opinion, would find it hard to distin-

[1] There was a case very much in point a few years after the second of these treaties was made; a certain Captain Cook was wronged at Havana, but got a sentence in his favour from the Court of Spain. He was to have it executed at Havana, which he looked upon as a hardship, for he believed that satisfaction would be delayed or eluded there. He seems to have petitioned Charles II for letters of reprisal, in order to save himself a fool's errand to the West Indies. Sir Leoline Jenkins advised the King that reprisals could not properly be granted without a denial of justice, which could not be presumed until Captain Cook had obeyed the Queen of Spain's *cedula*. (Wynne's *Life of Jenkins*, ii. 778.) Marsden prints many letters of reprisal in his *Law and Custom*. The earliest is dated in 1295 (i. 39).

[2] Newcastle to Geraldino, April 28, 1738, *Law and Custom*, ii. 284.

[3] The author of *Britain's Mistakes in the Commencement and Conduct of the Present War* (London, 1740) admits that Spain has the right to confiscate smugglers but denies that she is the sole judge of the facts: 'it is behaving like a little pettifogging Norfolk attorney, to allow the Court of Spain, or any Court in the World, to contest the fact with us'. This aphorism, which represents the opinion of the whole Opposition, illustrates the impracticability of the whole system of reprisals. How could peace be preserved if everybody acted upon this principle? The question asked itself again in the controversy between England and Prussia over the Silesia Loan.

guish for long between reprisals and war. Lastly, reprisals were probably impracticable in the eighteenth century. They had been common when the royal warships were few and small, but a privateer could no longer affront the navy of even a second-rate maritime power, unless he was sure that his own navy supported him. Privateering was therefore common enough in war, but too dangerous in peace.

Moreover, Newcastle's reprisals were not true reprisals at all, for they were offered not only to the merchants whose grievances were unredressed in Spain, but to all who chose to take them. This was war without a declaration and without a Royal Navy. There were precedents for it: the line which divided reprisals from privateering pure and simple had become obscure in the seventeenth century. Reprisals had been allowed without proof of loss in 1628. General letters of reprisal had been issued against Holland in 1664 and against France in 1689; they differed little from privateers' commissions.[1] Nevertheless, the letters of reprisal were much ridiculed in 1738.

The Government was trying to shirk its responsibility; perhaps this was due to a difference and a compromise within the Ministry, but more likely it is to be attributed to the cowardice of Newcastle and his faction, for his colleague and enemy Horace Walpole described it as 'that wild notion of leaving the people of England and the Queen of Spain to worry one another'.[2] The merchants would not let the Government leave them to fight their own battles like that; they required it to do the work for them with the King's ships of war, arguing no doubt, as Carteret did the next year, that 'Royal navies are kept by the merchants, and must protect the merchants'.[3] Nobody took out letters of reprisal; it would have been a great risk unless the Government was committed to war. The Opposition tried to stimulate applications by introducing a Bill, copied from the Prize Act of 1708, for giving the entire property of the prizes to the captors, and guaranteeing to adventurers, who should fit out expeditions of conquest against the Spanish territories, the perpetual possession of whatever they might take. Sir Robert Walpole resisted this malicious proposal, which

[1] Marsden, *Law and Custom*, i. 407; ii. 48, 123, 408.

[2] Walpole to Trevor, Oct. 24, o.s., 1738, *H.M.C. XIVth Report*, App. IX, p. 24. 'Horace Walpole' always means, in this chapter and the next two, the Ambassador to The Hague, and brother of Sir Robert Walpole, not the letter-writer and art-critic who was Sir Robert's son.

[3] *Parl. Hist.* x. 1409.

would have destroyed his chance of settling the dispute with Spain. He pointed out that in 1708, when such an Act was first passed, we were already at war with France and Spain; we were now at peace with both, but should not long remain so if we took such a measure.[1] The Bill was defeated and the letters of reprisal remained unapplied for; the peace was for the moment saved.[2]

Newcastle must have been getting ready for war at the beginning of June 1738, for he had the English merchants in Spain warned to withdraw their effects from the country. A few days afterwards a sudden light broke; and though the negotiations which now began led to war in the end, their first appearance was very favourable to peace. At this time the Court of Spain must have sincerely desired a settlement or at least a delay. If it had been really warlike it would never have stomached the proclamation of reprisals, which La Quadra treated with surprising equanimity.

The Spanish Government yielded nothing on paper; but it was about this time that Montijo suggested a more tolerable

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 831–2.

[2] The Government repeated the letters of reprisal as a prelude to war in 1739, and that time the merchants, with greater confidence in its intentions, applied for them. The Seven Years War began in much the same way, but the institution of reprisals was still further distorted from its original form. The injury for which the reprisals were granted was in no sense a private wrong; it was the French aggression in North America. This was not quite without precedent, for the Law Officers, of whom Hardwicke was one, had reported in 1727 that in attacking Gibraltar the King of Spain had committed acts of war which would justify George II in committing any kind of reprisals or hostilities without a declaration (Marsden, *Law and Custom*, ii. 265). Yet there was another irregularity in the reprisals of 1755; they were only exercised by the Royal navy. (See the debates on this subject, *Parl. Hist.* xv. 544–615.) Choiseul tried to persuade Pitt in 1761 to allow compensation for the French ships taken in this way before the declaration of war; but Pitt would not agree to it. He argued that they were taken by way of reprisals for the encroachments in Canada. Choiseul replied reasonably enough, that if France had committed unlawful hostilities in time of peace, the right remedy for that was the war itself. Pitt stuck to his point that it was the aggression and not the war which gave the right to reprisals. Choiseul admitted this, but tried a new line of argument: it was not always easy to determine who was the aggressor, and the peace treaties protected private people from the bad consequences of this uncertainty by exempting enemy ships from seizures in port at the outbreak of a war. *A fortiori* ships should be allowed to pass free on the high seas. It would not do. Pitt insisted, and Choiseul gave up the point. (Instructions to Bussy, May 23, 1761, A.E. Angleterre, 443; Bussy to Choiseul, June 19, ibid.; French memorial of July 13, translated in Thackeray's *History of William Pitt*, ii. 550; English answer of July 25, ii. 559; French ultimatum of Aug. 5, ii. 568; Choiseul to Solar, May 1762, A.E. Angleterre, 446.)

method of exercising the right of search. This outline of a project does not seem to have satisfied the English Ministry. Keene and his friend Waldegrave were very disappointed; but the negotiations went on.[1] Geraldino, the Spanish Minister in London, had already got into conversations with an agent of Walpole about a plan for satisfying with a payment of money all just claims on account of depredations. It is not very clear why the Spanish Government allowed him to propose this. It seems to have thought that the English Ministers were more concerned to stop the mouths of the injured merchants than to settle the controversy for the future.[2] This was certainly not true of Walpole, who must have foreseen a clamour against the sale of our national rights for a sum of money.[3] However, the two objects were not really incompatible.

The draft convention which resulted from these conversations provided that Spain should pay the sum of £95,000 as a compensation for the depredations, and that the two Governments should appoint plenipotentiaries to discuss and settle within a few months the questions at issue in America. The terms of reference caused some difficulty. Walpole insisted on mentioning expressly the free navigation in the West Indies. La Quadra imagined that this would prejudice the question beforehand by establishing the existence of such a right; therefore he wanted some general phrase which should promise the settlement of all the pretensions between the two Crowns. This would have started interminable disputes, and would probably have brought up the Spanish claims to Gibraltar, the Newfoundland fishery, &c.[4] A form of words was found, which made it reasonably clear that only the respective pretensions of the two Crowns arising out of their treaties with each other were to be the subject of discussion.

These pretensions were of various kinds. England was most anxious to discuss the right of search, but it was not uppermost in the mind of Spain. Besides the controversy over the navigation, we had a question of boundaries to settle. Since 1670, when the two nations recognized the territorial *status quo*, the colony of Georgia had arisen on the undefined frontiers of

[1] Waldegrave to Keene, June 10 and 17, N.S., 1738, Waldegrave MSS. For Montijo's project, *vide supra*, pp. 35, 39.

[2] Stert to Horace Walpole, June 5, 1738, S.P. 94/131.

[3] Newcastle to Hardwicke, Aug. 25, 1738, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 39.

[4] Keene to Newcastle, Oct. 13, 1738, S.P. 94/131.

Carolina and Florida. It had caused a great deal of trouble; Newcastle and Geraldino had long been disputing whether, and in what sense, if the limits of these colonies were to be referred to commissioners, the English should evacuate Georgia during their sittings.[1] Newcastle did not know what the rights and wrongs of the question were; but he knew the politics of it—the Government could not afford to surrender Georgia.[2] The question was complicated by the annual grants of money which Parliament made for the support of the colony. The Treasury might be held to incur a responsibility towards the Spaniards.

Walpole seems to have been in two minds whether to give up Georgia to Spain—reports conflicted and varied from day to day on this head. His strongest desire was to have the affair kept out of politics, in order to avoid swelling the complaints and agitation, and to enable his own supporters among the colony's Trustees, of whom many were members of Parliament, to vote with the Government. The Trustees were equally anxious to escape from an unpleasant choice: if they allowed political capital to be made out of Georgia, they got no money from the Ministry, and if they did not, they offended the Opposition, which might come into power at any moment. With a little adroitness on both sides, this difficulty was overcome; the Trustees got their money and made little trouble.[3] Newcastle made Geraldino waive the demand for preliminary evacuation, but Spain got this matter included in the plenipotentiaries' terms of reference. The Convention was signed at last in January 1739, at the palace of El Pardo.

The English Ministers would not have been so eager to make a special reference to the liberty of navigation in this preliminary agreement, if they could have foreseen how it would be taken by the Opposition. When the Convention was published, everybody cried out that by consenting to discuss our rights we had sacrificed them. Great play was made with the word 'regulate' which was found in the text. If the plenipotentiaries 'regulated' the right of search, they must end by establishing it in some form or other; if they 'regulated' the

[1] Keene to Newcastle, March 17, 1738, S.P. 94/130; Newcastle to Keene, April 12, 1738, S.P. 94/132; Geraldino to Newcastle, March 27, 1738, S.P. 100/59.

[2] Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 25, 1738, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 49.

[3] *H.M.C. Egmont MSS., Diary*, iii. 2–51, *passim; Colonial Records of Georgia*, ed. Candler, i. 336, 340–4.

freedom of navigation they could only diminish it.[1] Our Ministry should have asserted our rights without allowing any debate upon what, in the opinion of the Opposition, admitted of none.[2] The Government replied quite truly that no orders had been given for sacrificing anything of our lawful claims. In fact Newcastle's instructions were only too likely to embarrass the plenipotentiaries by their peremptory insistence on the abandonment of the right of search. He believed, or at least he said, that England really had the right to insist on her own interpretation of the freedom of navigation, by the terms of the Convention itself.[3] Horace Walpole pointed to the payment of compensation and argued that it implied a recognition that wrong had been done in the past, which amounted to a tacit undertaking not to repeat the offence in the future. This was unconvincing logic, for, as Pitt said, Spain only admitted in this way the existence of excesses in the past—nothing as to the legal rights of the case.[4] Moreover, this small mess of pottage for which we had sold our birthright, when would it be paid?

§ iii. *The South Sea Company and the Convention of El Pardo*

The famous £95,000 was never paid at all; the negotiations broke down, and war became unavoidable. How did this come about? At first sight the explanation is to be found in the method by which the money was to be paid; but there were deeper causes, arising from the propaganda of a factious Opposition, the temper and ambitions of the commercial classes, and a fundamental incompatibility between the economic policies of England and Spain.

The figure of £95,000 resulted from a compromise. The English negotiator originally proposed a much larger sum, but the Spanish Government took advantage of some inconsistencies and indiscreet concessions to have it reduced. Perhaps the King of Spain would never have promised so much if he had thought he should have to pay it in cash; but somebody in London had suggested a method for making that unnecessary.

Since the beginning of its Assiento, the South Sea Company

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 1263 (Sanderson): *A Review of all that hath pass'd between the Courts of Great Britain and Spain* (London, 1739), p. 36.

[2] Cambis to Amelot, March 12, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 404, f. 164.

[3] Newcastle to Keene and Castres, March 20, 1738/9, S.P. 94/134.

[4] *Parl. Hist.* x. 1253, 1282.

had had various financial relations with the King of Spain. It had lent him a sum at the outset. He had become a partner with a quarter interest in its trading operations; and as he did not choose to subscribe his share, the Company advanced it for him and charged him interest. A quarter of the profit on the Assiento trade and Annual Ships was due to him. Not much appeared to be payable on this head, for there seldom were any profits. The only Annual Ship whose accounts were examined on his behalf was proved to have made a very large profit. The Company would not let him inspect the accounts of any others, perhaps because it wished to defraud him of his share, by dressing up a gain as a loss.

The Company was also to pay him duties on the negroes it imported. Besides these, there were claims of an unforeseen nature. In 1726 the valuation of the dollar was altered, and a sum became due, or was at least claimed by the Spanish Court, on that account. Against this, the Company had some very large demands on the King of Spain. It argued that, as he was to have shared in the profits if there had been any, so he ought to bear his part of the loss. In the negro trade the declared loss amounted to £222,000 besides much larger deficits on the Annual Ship. It also charged him, rightly or wrongly, with a quarter of what it declared to be its running expenses; and on all these debts, which remained unpaid for many years, it demanded a very high rate of interest. In 1718 and 1727, when hostilities broke out between England and Spain, the effects of the Company in the Spanish dominions were seized by way of reprisals. Philip V had afterwards agreed to compensate the Company, but the accounts had never been settled to the entire satisfaction of both parties; still less had they been paid.[1] It had been agreed that if the reprisals were not paid for in any other way—and it was very unlikely that they would be—the King of Spain might allow the Company to recover the sum out of the negro duties which should be payable to him in future years. The Assiento had only been granted for thirty years from 1713—later altered to 1714—and was therefore likely to expire in 1744. The negro duties would not suffice to pay the Company's exaggerated demands within that time, especially as they had also been appropriated to the repayment of other debts due to it from the King of Spain.

[1] Add. MSS. 33032, ff. 256–7.

There was another dispute over the period of the contract's validity. The Assiento had been granted for thirty years; but there had been several interruptions in the exercise of the trade, and in particular there had only been seven Annual Ships, instead of twenty-four or twenty-five. The difficulties which had prevented the sailing of the rest had partly been chargeable to the Company itself; but that the directors overlooked. They started the doctrine that thirty years meant thirty trading years. They also claimed that as the negro duties would not have paid off their debt by 1744, the contract should be prolonged until the payment by this method should be complete. They refused to accept the settlement offered by the King of Spain except on these terms.[1] This enthusiasm for continuing the trade was surprising so soon after the Company had very nearly surrendered its trading privileges altogether.[2] Nor was it likely to be rewarded with success. Newcastle might think the claim 'plausible'; but the King of Spain did not wish to renew the contract. As for the huge demands of the Company, he meant to see the accounts produced in proper form. He particularly suspected the Company of grossly overrating its trading capital in order to increase the quarter share due from him, and concealing the real proceeds of the Annual Ships in order to charge him with a loss.[3]

All this while the negro duties, for which the Company was to be accountable every five years, were piling up. The directors were induced to admit that the Company had in its hands £68,000 which was due to the King of Spain in one way or another.[4] It was this sum which Geraldino proposed to have transferred to the English Government in order to pay part of the £95,000. The Ministry consented, but the Company at once made difficulties. The shareholders thought it unreasonable that they should pay what they owed to the King of Spain without receiving what he owed them. He ought at least to give good security for it by agreeing to extend the Assiento.[5] However, he refused to do any of this until the Company

[1] Add. MSS. 25561, ff. 75–6.

[2] *Vide supra*, p. 19.

[3] Add. MSS. 32819, ff. 147–51. This is a document of 1749, but it is probably a repetition of earlier ones.

[4] Burrell to Newcastle, Aug. 9, 1738, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 43.

[5] South Sea Company, Minutes of the General Court, Add. MSS. 25545, f. 81; Newcastle to Keene, Aug. 21, 1738, S.P. 94/132; March 20, 1738/9, S.P. 94/134 (this last letter was not sent).

accepted his terms, and produced accounts in a regular form.[1]

He might still, according to the Convention, pay the £95,000 in cash; but he was so angry with the Company that, if he had to do so, he meant to suspend the Assiento altogether. At first he insisted on annexing this condition to the signature of the Convention itself. The English Ministry would not have that; but Keene could not prevent him from declaring this purpose at the same time as he signed the Convention. Keene took a great risk by accepting a Convention accompanied with such an encumbrance. Newcastle had warned him against doing so, but he argued that the Assiento was to all intents and purposes suspended already by the dispute between the Crown of Spain and the Company; he had always foreseen that he should never get the *cedulas* for the Annual Ships of 1738 and 1739 until that dispute was accommodated. Though the Government approved of his action, it was a long time before the public forgave the too Spanish 'Don Benjamin'.

This was sure to be a serious matter, for the Assiento affairs were no mere private dealings between the King of Spain and some English merchants; they were founded on a public treaty signed between King Philip and Queen Anne. All that the Ministry could do was to suppress the declaration as long as possible, and hope the Court of Spain would change its mind.

The last chance of this vanished in April 1739. Nearly a year before, the Government had sent out Rear-Admiral Haddock to reinforce the Mediterranean squadron. Keene, who knew the Spanish Court, had seen no harm in this, and had even thought a show of force would do good. It does not seem, however, to have done much to placate or impose upon the Queen of Spain.[2] When the likelihood of peace improved, the Government decided to reduce Haddock's squadron; but on March 21, 1739, Newcastle sent him counter-orders to keep all his ships with him. The English Ministers gave out to their friends that this was only a gesture to please the mob;[3] but when he heard it La Quadra looked very grave. He would not accept the vague and unsubstantial comfort which Newcastle ordered Keene to administer, and told Keene that he was no

[1] Keene to Newcastle, Sept. 8 and 29, S.P. 94/131.
[2] Keene to Newcastle, Feb. 23, 1738, S.P. 94/130; June 23, Aug. 29, S.P. 94/131.
[3] Cambis to Amelot, April 2, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 404, f. 215.

longer sure of his ability to keep the peace between the two Crowns.[1] Soon afterwards the Spanish plenipotentiaries declared by order that as long as Haddock remained off the coasts of Spain they should grant no 'graces or facilities'[2]—in other words, that there was no hope of accommodating the disputes over Georgia and the right of search. In June the meaning of this threat was further particularized. Spain did not even carry out her design of paying the £95,000 and suspending the Assiento; she would not pay at all.

§ iv. *The Responsibility for the War*

Ministers are only responsible for the proximate causes of wars; they can seldom control anything more. What was the proximate cause of this war? Much has been made of Newcastle's counter-orders to Haddock. Certainly La Quadra's temper changed for the worse and the Spanish plenipotentiaries became more obstinate, soon after this measure was known in Spain. The English Ministers were wrong when they ascribed this change to the hope of support from France.[3] Spain was fortified by the marriage of Don Philip with Louis XV's daughter, but she had been refused the political alliance which she desired.[4] Yet supposing the counter-orders to Haddock had all the effect which Professor Temperley has ascribed to them, Philip V's declaration of January had already raised an obstruction to the good relations of England and Spain, which must have caused a war very soon unless Philip V himself had removed it.

One of the most remarkable things in the whole affair, which shows the majority of the English Ministers to have been really anxious for a settlement, is their readiness to accept the Convention in spite of La Quadra's declaration. Newcastle and Hardwicke may have expected and even hoped that the Spanish threat would be carried out, nor was there any love lost between the Government and the Company, which would be the chief loser in such a case; but that does not take away all the merit of an attitude which shows a real disposition to peace.

[1] Villarias (La Quadra) to Keene, April 20, 1739, S.P. 94/133; Keene to Newcastle (apart), April 24, ibid.

[2] Keene and Castres to Newcastle, May 18, 1739, S.P. 94/133.

[3] Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 26, 1739, Add. MSS. 32692, f. 52.

[4] A. Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la Cour de France*, iv. 525.

As for the dispute over the right of search itself, the proposals of England were not, for the most part, unreasonable. With good will, a real settlement could have been achieved along the lines of Newcastle's draft treaty. It would have been clogged, however, by other articles less acceptable. Newcastle instructed the plenipotentiaries on no account to give up the right to cut logwood;[1] this prohibition was certain to prejudice the main question of the right of navigation, because he insisted that logwood in the cargo was not to be a ground of condemning any English ship. Furthermore, the Spaniards would probably have attached a strong demand upon Georgia to any concession they might have made about the right of search.

There were then at least three questions—the Assiento, the logwood-cutters, and Georgia—on which no compromise was in sight when the war broke out. Newcastle wrote that Keene, after his return to England, had

'fortified Sir R. in his opinion, that Spain would have performed the Convention, had they not seen they must break afterwards in the future treaty; that Spain wished peace. Whoever doubted it, if they could have it on their own terms? and if we were to break on the future treaty, it is better to break now, for their non-performance of the Convention.'[2]

Disputes can always be compromised if they are yielded; no doubt the English could have had peace if they had been ready to give up every point. Walpole indeed was credited with the wish to do so, and certainly he was very disappointed when the war broke out in spite of all he had done. Yet he always proclaimed his dissent from the Spanish doctrine of search, and only differed from the Opposition in hoping to get the right renounced tacitly, instead of wishing to use force for its own sake.[3] It is not certain what he would have yielded in the last resort. His opinion about the logwood is not known; on Georgia, if the tittle-tattle picked up by Egmont is to be relied upon, he made up his mind to be firm. When Spain refused to pay the

[1] Silhouette, a competent observer, believed that the logwood question would be the hardest to settle. (Silhouette to Amelot, March 12, N.S., 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 407, f. 186.)

[2] Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 20, 1739, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 137. Keene himself expressed very much the same opinion in a letter of August 17, N.S., to Lord Waldegrave (Waldegrave MSS.). He did not think any good would come of reopening the conferences, even if the money were paid.

[3] *Parl. Hist.* x. 662.

£95,000, even he admitted that it would have been even more embarrassing if she had paid it and suspended the Assiento Contract.[1]

Newcastle was for war nearly all the time. There was always too much of what Walpole called *invita Minerva* in his dispatches —a sharpness of tone which did not accord with the reasonable attitudes he was sometimes obliged to take. Yet he had his variations. He declined at first to draw up the Convention, and Horace Walpole (who was perhaps over-sensitive on this subject) afterwards accused him of trying to discredit it by a malicious phrase in the declaration of war.[2] Nevertheless he set his hand to the draft treaty, which made important concessions. In the same breath as he declared that he could not concede the right of search, he proposed almost accidentally an expedient which would have settled the controversy by doing so.[3] Yet he thought we had a title to cut logwood, and told Hardwicke that 'however the right may be, it will now be pretty difficult to give up Georgia'. He was often impatient to press our demands or unwilling to moderate them; by February or March 1739 he seems to have been convinced that even the supporters of the Ministry would hardly vote for a policy of peace, and that 'we must yield to the times, so far as is consistent at least with our own point'.[4] When the war became unavoidable, he expressed his eagerness and relief; he did not wait for La Quadra's open refusal to pay the £95,000, but acted at once upon his omission to do it.

Very few of their contemporaries accused the Ministers of wanting war; indeed their crime was rather that they did not want it, but brought it upon themselves by their too obvious desire to avoid it. Not only the Opposition but some French critics thought that the fault lay at the door of an inept diplomacy. It was the want of dignity and firmness, not the want of goodwill, which was held responsible for the final crisis. When George II first offered the general letters of reprisal in March 1738, Spain immediately appealed to France for help; yet some critics argued, like Admiral Warren, that if the Government had always been prompt to grant particular letters of reprisals to

[1] Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 2, 1739, Add. MSS. 32692, f. 64.

[2] Hardwicke to Newcastle, Aug. 17, 1738, Add. MSS. 32691, f. 301; Horace Walpole to Hardwicke, Oct. 14, 1739, vol. 35586, f. 202.

[3] Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 25, 1738, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 50.

[4] Newcastle to Hardwicke, 'Saturday morning', Add. MSS. 35406, f. 111.

the sufferers from depredations, it need never have proceeded to the general measure, because Spain would have been intimidated into a real redress of grievances.[1] That was possibly true, but the Dutch of Curaçao did not succeed in stopping the seizures by this kind of retaliation. Keene can hardly be accused of cringing to La Quadra, or Newcastle to Geraldino. Keene in fact recommended a show of force, and the hint was taken. With what result? The decision to leave Haddock's ships at Gibraltar undoubtedly exasperated the Court of Spain. Perhaps this firmness came too late. Keene himself thought it ill timed.

'You will see', he wrote to Waldegrave, 'what a fine disposition this Court is in, on the news of our fleet's staying in the Mediterranean. I see the necessity of it with respect to our home affairs, but with regard to Spain I must own, that we shall only vex, not intimidate. We have gone too great lengths towards peace, to pretend we have still a mind to make war.'[2]

It is easy to criticize, but much harder to point out the exact temperament of patience with vigour which would have brought the insufferable Queen of Spain to submission without driving her to frenzy.

It is not enough to follow the progress of negotiations or pry into Ministers' minds—especially in this instance, because it was not the Government but the Opposition that made the war; and even they, being politicians, were only exploiting a much wider discontent. Perhaps the war was so necessary that the historian can absolve not only the Ministers but, what is much harder, the Opposition from blame. A country like England, which was beginning to be industrialized, and a colonial system like that of Spain could hardly coexist without conflict. Great profits, high prices, slow returns, and small consumption could not fail to result from the Spanish colonial monopoly, and these accorded very little with the pushing and expansive genius of English trade. Perhaps the English did not believe in free trade; they passed rigid laws against exporting wool, discouraged colonial manufactures, and restrained colonial commerce by Acts of Trade and Navigation. Nevertheless they could afford to see the mote in their neighbour's eye, for their own economic system was at least more progressive than that of

[1] *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 617 (Warren); A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, vol. 9, f. 105.

[2] Keene to Waldegrave, April 23, N.S., 1739, Waldegrave MSS.

Spain. The success of the English interlopers in Spanish America was accounted for by their readiness to take smaller profits than the regular traders—a thing they could well afford to do, since they did not pay the regular duties. Add to this the admirable situation of Jamaica as a smugglers' head-quarters, and the inaction of a Government which dared not suppress these unlawful exports and had no sufficient diplomatic motives for doing so; there was plenty of material for a conflict, provided each party adhered to its principles with only a little of that righteous obstinacy which inexperience of war inspires in statesmen and journalists.

Why had this agitation suddenly boiled up out of nowhere, over a practice which had continued for many years and affected smugglers rather than fair traders?[1] Did the merchants of England recklessly expose the whole volume of their foreign trade to remedy the misdoings of a few paltry privateers off the coasts of Cuba? There was some controversy over the nature of the propaganda for the Spanish war. Walpole maintained that the Opposition and the mob were entirely responsible for it; Argyll replied that it was a respectable middle-class movement supported by the merchants in general.[2] This dispute was carried into the City of London, always the home of faction and demagogy from the days of Pym to those of Alderman Wood. The supporters of the Ministry tried to turn the tables on the West India merchants who petitioned Parliament, by proving that they were not merchants and had nothing to do with the West Indies; but according to the Opposition newspapers this was only achieved by such means as describing a wholesale tobacco merchant as a tobacconist and a wholesale importer of spirits as a brandyman.[3] An Alderman who had voted for the Convention was overwhelmingly defeated at the election for Lord Mayor in 1739, despite his seniority, and the controversy raged for some years after the war broke out, until it turned itself into a constitutional struggle between the Aldermen and the Common Council.

If the merchants were really stirred by the legend of Jenkins'

[1] Silhouette asked himself this question, and answered, perhaps with too much faith in the importance of argument, that the agitation only rose to a great height when Carteret put the English case upon a strong foundation (Silhouette to Amelot, Dec. 24, N.S., 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 360).

[2] *Parl. Hist.* x. 1142–3.

[3] *Gentleman's Magazine,* ix. 158.

Ear, why were they so?[1] Many of them would have profited by the suppression of the smugglers, and could only lose their trade by a war. Walpole tried to point this moral by stirring up the merchants who traded to Spain, to send in a counter-petition. He did not succeed; and he would have made very little impression if he had. Many years afterwards an anonymous writer remarked that 'this branch of trade by Old Spain to America, has ever been neglected by our ministers and ever will, as it lies among a set of people who can't be clamorous, vizt Roman Catholics and Jews'.[2] In general, our American trade was thought to be the most valuable trade we had; the statistics may not warrant the belief, but it was overwhelmingly strong. However that might be, the Opposition was quite right to argue that abandoning our American shipping to interruptions and insults was not the best way to procure security for our shipping in other quarters of the world.

However highly this branch of commerce might be rated, does it account for the behaviour of the merchants in general? Perhaps, as Professor Vaucher suggests, they were feeling the pinch of a trade depression, which heightened their desire for new markets.[3] The statistics of exports, for what they are worth, hardly seem to suggest this: the quantity was as great in the years 1735–8 as it had ever been. It is more difficult to be sure of the prices and profits, because the valuations which are given, for example, in Sir Charles Whitworth's tables, were founded on calculations which had not changed since 1722. Moreover, though the quantity had not diminished, it was increasing very little; it had been almost stationary for more than ten years. Complaints abounded that English commerce and industry were declining, or not advancing fast enough. Particularly they were not advancing so fast as the French. Economists and politicians were more obsessed than ever by the fear of French competition. France was thought to have re-

[1] Jenkins was a captain who declared that the *Guarda-Costas* had boarded his ship and cut off his ear; the Opposition took up his case very strongly. Perhaps if they had looked under his wig they would have found both his celebrated ears on his head; Alderman Beckford said so, and he might very well know. The War of 1739 is sometimes called the War of Jenkins' Ear.

[2] Add. MSS. 38373, f. 131.

[3] P. Vaucher, *Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury*, pp. 296–302. Professor Vaucher apparently founds his opinion upon a graph in Mantoux's *Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (English translation, 1928, p. 104). Mantoux's references do not really justify his graph, for they are to incomplete statistics.

covered faster than England from the wars of Louis XIV, and the pacific policy of Cardinal Fleury was known to be aimed at extending French commerce and manufactures. The competition of French merchandise in the Spanish market was thought particularly grievous. In a frenzy of apprehension and jealousy, the English pamphleteers excited their countrymen to strike a blow which would kill this bugbear stone-dead, and restore their own trade to an unshakable pre-eminence.

Some curious opinions were held as to the policy of waging war for the sake of trade. 'A rising trade may be ruined by a war; a sinking trade has a chance to revive by it.' That was the doctrine of *Common Sense*,[1] and more respectable writers endorsed it. Since the trade of our greatest rival had risen and ours had sunk, the moral hardly needed pointing. A silly and badly written pamphlet of 1745 expresses this doctrine of economic Chauvinism better than anything else. After a description of the various trades which we were in danger of losing to the French (of which the Spanish trade is one), the author comes to this conclusion:

'Since this, we say, is the real case between us, at present, however odd this position may sound in the ears of inconsiderate persons, we will venture to affirm, it is more the true interest of these Kingdoms in general, and even the merchants themselves (those who traded to Spain and the South-Seas excepted), that we should continue in a state of war with them (France and Spain), so that war is carried on only by sea, than in a state of peace. Nay, we will go yet further, and make no scruple to assert, whilst the Crowns of France, Spain and the two Sicilies continue united, as they are at present; our commerce, in general, will flourish more under a vigorous and well-managed naval war, than under any peace, which should allow an open intercourse with those two nations.'

He goes on to give his reasons, of which the most important is, that

'by such a war, we should not only distress our natural enemy to the last degree, but by ruining their commerce, and destroying their colonies, which they could hardly prevent, whilst we are so much their superiors by sea, we should in a great measure retrieve our own, and make them flourish again as formerly'.[2]

The measures he recommends for this purpose are mostly

[1] *Common Sense*, April 22, 1738.

[2] *The Present Ruinous Land-War proved to be a H——r War* (London, 1745), pp. 21–3.

destructive, such as a descent upon the French sugar-colonies for demolishing their plantations and carrying off their slaves.

Even those who passed for economists in those days made the same cynical calculations, prophesying that

'what trade they lose, we shall get, for by harassing their coasts, their merchantmen could not, without great risk, get out or in; the Turkey, East-India, fishing and sugar-trades would be rendered impracticable to them, and the bulk of them would fall into our hands again'.[1]

In fact the Yorkshire manufacturers preferred war to peace because they made a better living. The Archbishop of York told Newcastle in 1748 that the clothiers of Wakefield did not share the general joy for the peace, because their trade improved by war; Lord Kinnoull reported in 1759 that the trade of Yorkshire was so brisk that he feared the manufacturers would be disposed to carp at the peace. Contemporaries attributed this fact, perhaps wrongly, to the land campaigns of the French army, which withdrew men from the industries of France.[2] If this was true, war stimulated English trade as long as it lasted, but it could not last for ever.

Postlethwayt, a hack writer on commercial subjects, wished to discover so thorough a method of ruining our enemies that no national or political advantages would enable them to recover their ground at a peace. He wished

'so to distress the commerce and navigation of our ever restless enemy, as to disable them in future times from maintaining that lucrative competition with us in trade, they have too long done. . . . As the affairs of our trade and finances are at present circumstanced, a peace is far more dangerous than a war, for upon the continuance of a peace our trade must be ruined and undone, if that continues to be loaded with our tax-incumbrances, which we have seen . . . put it out of our power to support that commercial competition against France and others, that alone can save the nation.'[3]

Before Postlethwayt's eyes wars and taxes moved in a vicious circle; wars called for taxes and taxes necessitated more wars.

[1] (? W. Richardson), *An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of the Foreign Trade* (in Lord Overstone's *Select Collection* of tracts), p. 281.

[2] Archbishop Hutton to Newcastle, May 28, 1748, Add. MSS. 32715, f. 126; Kinnoull to Newcastle, July 28, 1759, vol. 32893, f. 331; *Parl. Hist.* xiii. 128 (Carteret), 316 (Bathurst); xiv. 582 (Egmont); Silhouette to Amelot, Nov. 26, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 287.

[3] *Great Britain's True System* (London, 1757), p. 270.

It remained for Dean Tucker, that most rational economist, to put his finger on the fallacy.[1]

The markets of Spanish America had long been eagerly competed for, and France was our strongest rival there. Many good patriots looked forward to the day when we should once again extend our trade in that part of the world, at the expense of the French, by a return to the policy of force which had been outlawed since 1713. This accounts for the curious fact that the probability of a war with France as well as Spain inspired enthusiasm rather than doubt or fear; from the language of some pamphleteers and orators, one might almost think it was France, not Spain, that was the real enemy from the beginning.

The eagerness of the merchants for new markets will appear better from the schemes which were freely put forward after the outbreak of war, for increasing our trade by conquests in America. In that moment of excitement and liberation, perhaps the veil was torn from ambitions which prudence had hitherto kept in the dark; perhaps the plans of campaign will show the real motives of the war.

[1] *The Case of Going to War for the Sake of Procuring, Enlarging or Securing of Trade* (London, 1763).

III

THE STRATEGY OF THE SPANISH WAR

§ i. *English Imperialism and the Liberation of Spanish America*

THE war with Spain was to be fought in the West Indies. The only person in England who seriously doubted or disputed it was the Prime Minister; and as he was an unwilling prisoner in the hands of his colleagues, poor Walpole's opinion was not to have much weight in the plan or conduct of the war. He was usually obliged to content himself with irritated acquiescence and protests which he was driven to withdraw, in order that something at least might be done, even on principles which he condemned.[1]

There were many reasons for this popular insistence on the American war. A wish, perhaps, to make the punishment fit the crime—Hardwicke more pompously called it 'vindictive justice'. It was in the West Indies that the *Guarda-Costas* had committed the offences which had provoked the war; in the West Indies, therefore, Spain should receive the punishment of her injurious obstinacy. There, too, Spain was most vulnerable. A long experience had shown that little was to be expected from attacks upon her coasts and seaports in Europe, and that, on the other hand, even her greatest strongholds in America could be reduced by quite small expeditions. Drake had taken St. Domingo city, the first capital of Spanish America. Pointis had taken Cartagena, and Henry Morgan, with a horde of buccaneers, had marched overland and sacked Panama. These exploits had been done in other days. The Spain of Philip V was not the Spain of Carlos II; but the English politicians and journalists do not seem to have understood that, and most of them believed that the Spanish Empire was still an effete, chaotic, defenceless affair that would collapse at a touch.

An American war with Spain was therefore just and easy; it was in fact the only kind of war that could be waged against her, the only kind that would bring her to her knees quickly. It may have been begun for the suppression of the right of

[1] There are descriptions of painful scenes in Council, in Hervey's minutes of April 28, May 6 and 22, 1740 (*Memoirs*, ed. Sedgwick, iii. 927–39), and in Newcastle's letter to Hardwicke, Oct. 1, 1740, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 237.

search; but no sooner had it broken out than the loud-mouthed patriots made up their minds that a mere confirmation of the rights which we had gone to war to defend, would not be enough. Artful Pulteney was even afraid that we might succeed too quickly and too easily in reducing Spain to submission; for that reason he disliked the Government's plan to send a powerful fleet against Ferrol. 'To ravage the coasts of Spain (supposing we could do it) seems to be with a desire only of forcing the Spaniards into a peace, before we have secured such advantages as we may reasonably hope for in another place.' That other place was of course the West Indies; and even there, he would rather conquer a colony which we could keep, than a strong place whose loss would merely disorganize the Spanish system of defences. 'Should it be to Carthagena first, even that action (great as it might be) would be a disappointment of our hopes; it might be a very sensible mischief to Spain, but what we immediately want is, advantage to ourselves.'[1] Carteret, intemperate drinker and still more intemperate talker, said to the Swedish Minister one night after dinner, 'What is the good of taking ships? We shall take from Spain some countries in America, and we shall keep them in spite of the whole world.'[2]

The Opposition leaders were suspected of saying this kind of thing in public in order to arouse extravagant hopes which they knew the Government could not satisfy. They were capable of such strategy, and had indeed employed it over the Convention. But if there is any truth in wine, Carteret meant what he said to Wasenberg, so far as he ever meant what he said at all; and besides, there is excellent reason for thinking him sincere in this. He was angling for a place—the chief place, for preference—in a 'National Government'. For some time he had been in some sort of collusion with Newcastle;[3] and now he disgusted his companions in Opposition by preaching the duty to avoid all factious obstruction which would disable the nation from carrying on the war efficiently.[4]

[1] Pulteney to Vernon, Aug. 17, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor* (London, 1747), pp. 23–4.

[2] Wasenberg to Gyllenborg, Nov. 13, 1739, S.P. 107/34. See also Carteret's speeches in *Parl. Hist.* xi. 17, 723, 835, and Cambis's letter to Amelot, Nov. 26, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 274.

[3] Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 14, 1738, Add. MSS. 32691, f. 117. It is probable, but not certain, that the 'noble Lord' referred to in this letter is Carteret.

[4] Carteret to Marchmont, Aug. 15, 1739, *Marchmont Papers*, ii. 135–6.

While some of them ostentatiously rewarded the Government for doing their own will, others contrived to tie its hands and render peace impossible. At Wyndham's instigation, both Houses of Parliament addressed the King, asking him not to make peace until Spain would renounce the right of searching English ships in their voyages to and from the English dominions.[1] Pulteney revived, this time with success, the clause in the Act of 1708, which guaranteed to the fitters-out of expeditions the possession of whatever territories they might take from the enemy. In vain had Walpole protested that if any conquests were made, this proviso might make peace unattainable, and Bladen argued that it was contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht; in vain the South Sea Company trumped up its Charter of Queen Anne which gave it a monopoly of all Spanish America from the Orinoco to the Behring Strait.[2] Nobody now minded the Company; and one of the greatest grievances against it had always been, that it never made any effort to take advantage of its privileges. The clause passed, and aroused the greatest expectations.[3] It remained without sequel, a mere piece of bravado. Several projects of private expeditions, especially in the Pacific, were much talked of for a time; a silly scheme for the discovery of a non-existent passage to the South Seas was renewed, which had been rejected by the Admiralty some years before, and taken up in Russia of all places, until the war offered a new hope of its acceptance in England. It came to nothing, and the last heard of it is a strenuous effort of its promoter to foist it on the French.[4] I have found only two positive applications to the Government for commissions under this clause. Fotherby, Trahern, and Cole demanded one in June 1741; but there is no evidence to show where they designed their voyage or what became of it. The Royal African Com-

[1] *Parl. Hist.* xi. 213–45. Wyndham first wanted to make this renunciation a preliminary to any negotiation, but altered his proposal when Walpole denounced it for putting the cart before the horse (Silhouette to Amelot, Dec. 7, N.S., 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 321). George II assented, but in the event the promise was neither performed by the King nor claimed by the Parliament.

[2] *C. J.*, Dec. 10, 1739, xxiii. 402; South Sea Company, Minutes of the Court of Directors, Dec. 7, 1739, Add. MSS. 25510, f. 59.

[3] *Parl. Hist.* xi. 603 (address of Speaker Onslow to the King, April 29, 1740), xii. 310 (Pulteney). Pulteney had tried to get this clause, with the whole of the Act of 1708, re-enacted in 1738; see Chap. II, p. 48.

[4] Bussy to Amelot, March 31, 1741, A.E. Angleterre, 411, f. 286; June 2, 1741, vol. 412, f. 126. There are further references to it in vol. 417, ff. 197, 216, and 304.

pany also asked for such a power, which was refused, because the proposed undertaking would contravene the Act against stock-jobbing.[1]

In all this, the Opposition leaders only obeyed the public voice. The press was full of pamphlets, leading articles, and anonymous letters, which all echoed, in one form or another, the cry of 'Take and Hold'. It was a sudden and noisy explosion of imperialism, a good example of the greedy turbulence which foreign observers attributed to the English nation.[2] Some writers tried to justify our ambitions of new markets and territories, by connecting them with our rights of free navigation. They revived the argument of Queen Anne's reign, when England had demanded the 'cautionary towns' in Spanish America. There could be no guarantee, they said, for our freedom from the right of search, unless we had in our hands securities for the good conduct of the *Guarda-Costas*. Hence the cry of 'Real Security', which had a great popularity as a complement, or justification, of 'Take and Hold'. When the news of Portobello had arrived to inflame the national cupidity afresh, the French *Chargé* wrote to his Court: 'The phrase "real security" has become a sort of national cry; it is on everybody's lips, from the Peer of the Realm to the cobbler; and everybody understands by it, taking and keeping some Spanish colony.'[3]

Very few people, outside the circle of those who were responsible for directing expeditions, doubted our ability to execute any fantastic scheme we pleased to conceive. Some, however—most of them supporters of the Ministry—doubted whether all things possible were things expedient. They had to reckon with foreign governments, who might dislike to see the 'equilibrium' of Utrecht upset by the substitution of England for Spain as the ruler of Central America. This fear of foreign jealousies had some slight influence on the choice of objectives.

The settlement of Utrecht, which left the Spanish dominions in America undivided in the hands of Spain, had once been considered equally fair to all the trading nations.[4] In spite of the precautions against a collusive French monopoly within

[1] C.O. 5/5, p. 169; *A.P.C. Col.* iii. 698, 723–4.

[2] See the chapter on this agitation in G. B. Hertz, *British Imperialism in the XVIIIth Century* (Manchester, 1908).

[3] De Vismes to Amelot, April 7, 1740, S.P. 107/41; see also Norris's diary, March 17, 1739/40, Add. MSS. 28132, f. 159.

[4] See Chap. I, p. 13.

the Spanish Empire, many Englishmen had come to believe, perhaps very unreasonably, that as long as Spanish America remained, on whatever terms, under the dominion of the House of Bourbon, France would have an unfair advantage. On the other hand, some of them recognized that impartial foreigners would dislike a conquest of those countries by the English even more than a virtual French domination under the Spanish flag. What remedy was there then? To acquiesce in Spanish rule was to hand over the richest part of the continent to French trade; to claim the Spanish colonies for ourselves was perhaps to incur the hostility of all Europe. There was only one course left—to promote an American Revolution within the Spanish Empire. This was much more likely to buy off diplomatic difficulties than the scheme of 'cautionary towns', for however strong might be the arguments for regarding such towns only in the light of securities, there can be no doubt that they would have been considered as something more. The plan had other advantages. Nobody could well conceive how we should hold down Spanish America by force. England could not spare the men; and though the conquered country itself might find the money, it would be a pity to seize Mexico or Peru for the pleasure of spending a great part of their revenue (as the King of Spain himself did) upon garrisons.[1]

The difficulties of this policy were underrated. Scraps of travellers' hearsay were collected and retailed, to prove the existence of discontent, especially in the Pacific colonies. There were three things, on one or other of which every projector of revolution relied. All the Spaniards of America, except the officials, were supposed to groan under misgovernment, arbitrary taxation, and the crippling system of trade monopoly. In particular, the English naturally flattered themselves that the French origin of the King of Spain rendered him unpopular. Of the Spaniards, the parties of Creoles and Chapetones[2] were supposed to dislike each other, and the Creoles, who were the

[1] Unsigned paper dated June 6, 1741, Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS.

[2] Creoles were the Spaniards born in the colonies, Chapetones those who had emigrated there from Spain. The term Creole does *not* indicate any sort of racial mixture; on the contrary, a Creole was by strict definition a pure white Spaniard who was not born in Europe. The English extended this term to negroes, animals, and plants: a Creole negro was one born in the colonies as opposed to an African negro, one imported from Africa; Creole rice was a kind of rice supposed to be found growing wild in the colonies.

great majority, to be ready to discard their Spanish allegiance in order to satisfy this passion. Writers generally gave, as reasons for this state of affairs, the dislike of the colonist for the official (many of the Chapetones were officials), and the competition of the native colonial merchant with the more efficient trader who came out from Europe to get rich quick.[1]

Lastly, the English counted on the hatred of the Indians for the Spaniards in general. The Indians to the south of Chile were believed to be independent, very powerful, and always at war, or ready for a war, with the Spanish colonists.[2] Less was expected of the Indians of Peru and Mexico, but in the imperfectly subdued lands of Central America there were tribes which had the reputation of having never submitted to the Spanish rule. Such were the Darien and Samblas Indians of the Isthmus, the Moskito Indians of Nicaragua with their tributaries, and other Indians inland towards Guatemala, who were perhaps too liberally bestowed by amateur strategists and geographers upon the unoccupied spaces of the map. These Indians were all supposed to be impatiently awaiting their deliverance from Spain at the hands of the other powers of Europe. As an anonymous giver of unasked advice wrote of the Darien Indians, 'millions of miserable people would bless their Deliverers, and their hearts and their mines would be open to us'.[3]

The advantages which the people of the Spanish colonies would gain by accepting independence or an English government could be put before them in a proclamation. What was to be offered? Upon certain points there was universal agreement. The civil liberties, estates, and religion of the Spaniards must be safeguarded. As for religion, whatever dregs of anti-Popish sentiment remained in England, whatever penal laws in Ireland, publicists and politicians had at least seen the necessity of offering complete religious toleration to the inhabitants of conquered colonies. It was especially important in a country like Spanish America where priests counted for so much. In fact the author of one memorial suspected that clerical human nature was not very different in England and Mexico, and suggested that bare toleration was not enough; the priests should

[1] Frezier, *A Voyage to the South Sea*, English translation, 1717, p. 250.

[2] Ibid., p. 268; Shelvocke, *A Voyage Round the World* (reprint of 1928), pp. 63–4; Harris, *Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca* (1764 ed.), i. 182.

[3] Add. MSS. 32694, f. 88. See also *C.S.P. Col. 1720–1*, nos. 47, 327.

be won over by promises of preferment.[1] The clearest orders were always given on this point of toleration, and were obeyed with naïve tact. Anson with ostentatious decency exempted only the two churches from the fire of Payta, and Knowles left the garrison chapel standing among the ruins of the demolished fortress of St. Louis.[2]

The liberties and properties of the colonists were to be not only preserved but enhanced in value. Political liberties they had none, but these were now to be offered by the generous hand of England. In what form, was the question.

Some writers thought that the Spanish Americans could ask nothing better than to share the rights of Englishmen.[3] They did not intend to promote an American Revolution but wished, if possible, to annex the Spanish colonies with the consent of their inhabitants. It was enough, they thought, to offer all the privileges of English subjects. This, however, would not have answered the purpose of diverting foreign jealousy; others therefore took the more imaginative course of suggesting that the colonies, if they could be induced to revolt, should set up governments of their own. What form of government, was a question on which little could be said with certainty. The Creoles were ambitious. There were nobles, descendants of well-beloved Viceroys. Some indeed were said to aspire to crowns. There was no counting on this, and the wisest course was to leave the colonists to make their own institutions, offering them a defensive alliance and an army and fleet sufficient for their protection. This was especially easy to promise in the Pacific colonies, for the Spanish fleets had hardly ever dared to pass Cape Horn, before Pizarro followed Anson in 1741; and the difficulty of transporting an effective army from Spain to Peru, or from one part of the Spanish dominions to another, over seas dominated by English squadrons, would have dismayed the Spanish Government.

If a considerable force of English ships and troops should succeed in reaching the shores of the Pacific, the invitation could as easily be coupled with a threat; for it would be plain that

[1] 'Project for attacking La Vera Cruz and Mexico, 1740, no. 1', Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS.

[2] R. Walter, *A Voyage Round the World* (4th ed.), p. 277; Chastenoye to Maurepas, April, 8, 1748, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 72.

[3] One projector even proposed the establishment of a Mayor and Aldermen at Portobello (J. Morris to Wager, May 1742, Vernon-Wager MSS.).

even if the colonists desired to continue their allegiance to the King of Spain, he could do nothing to help them. This perhaps would be the clinching argument; were they so blind as to reject a peaceable offer, the Creoles might yet be bombarded into liberty. If this fear would not avail with them, there was another menace in store. They were not the only people who could be appealed to, and if they did not take the chance of freeing themselves from the Spaniards their slaves, or at any rate their Indian enemies, might be tempted to rise against them. Even the Indians could offer a market for English manufactures which was worth gaining, and valuable returns too, especially if they had concealed many of their best mines from the Spaniards, as some English writers believed. Thus most of the schemes for liberation in Spanish America coupled vaguely as alternatives, or even as different parts of the same policy, incitement of the Creoles against the Government, and of the Indians, mestizos, and negroes against the Creoles.[1] As long as they were clearly conceived as alternatives, there was no harm in this; but they were obviously incompatible, and the muddled instructions to combine them, which the Government finally gave, could only have created confusion if they had been executed at all.

The future of trade with the revolted colonies was a more important and more difficult question, the suggestions more various. To the smugglers of Jamaica, or the English merchants in general, the independence of the Spanish colonies would be most valuable if we, and nobody else, should trade with the states we had set up. There might be objections to this from third parties, and from interested classes in Spanish America itself. The prospect that the grateful and dependent governments of the new world would barter with their protectors trade privileges for recognition and defence, might have alarmed the rest of the world as much in 1740 as it did in 1823; and the powers of Europe might have been driven to advocating a very different Monroe Doctrine before the birth of President Monroe. Some writers assumed that we could risk that; but at least one believed that though it might seem a 'romantic' thing to conquer and free the Spanish colonies in order that the whole world might be at liberty to trade with them, we should

[1] Wager to Vernon, Aug. 20 and Oct. 29, 1741, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 51, 57.

be doing ourselves no harm by doing so. Our natural and acquired advantages, the situation of our colonies as bases for trade, and the cheapness of our manufactures, would give us a sufficient advantage against other nations in a commerce that was open to all. This anonymous projector of expeditions thus recognized that the policy of the Open Door is useful, or at least not injurious, to the nation which has most to send through the door.[1] Other writers assumed that we should make with the new states treaties of commerce which would be very much to our advantage; and this was the hope of the English Government.

Apparently the merchants of the Spanish colonies were also to be conciliated. Several anonymous advisers of the Government—especially those who thought of the Spanish colonies as put under some sort of English protectorate or dominion—recommended that we should keep up the galleons and *flotas*, and strictly prevent the unlicensed trade of Jamaica—a curious consequence, seeing how the war had been begun. These trading fleets would presumably sail from England and with English manufactures. So far, this is only another form of the claim for an exclusive trade; but it was plainly meant as a concession also to somebody in Spanish America. Presumably it would appeal to the great merchants, who bought regularly from the galleons and disliked the peddling, hand-to-mouth methods by which the interlopers supplied the small merchants and consumers without the help of a wholesale middleman. The galleon system must be reformed of its abuses; the irregularity, delays, vexations, and above all the high and arbitrary duties must be abolished. From this kind of improvement buyers and sellers would benefit alike (as the French thought, when they in the season of their power tried to make the Government of Philip V take up such reforms). It was important, however, that no change should be made in the system itself without the consent of the parties concerned in it, and England must promise to prevent illicit importations in the future. One writer made an interesting suggestion. The Spaniards forbade the growth of wine and oil in the colonies, in order to favour the agriculture of Spain. This prohibition could easily be removed by an English or free Anglophile Government. England would lose nothing, since she was not

[1] Paper of June 6, 1741, already quoted, Vernon-Wager MSS.

a grower of these articles; and the money that went to Europe to buy them, would stay at home, create new purchasing-power among the Indians, who would become growers of wine and oil, and so increase the demand for clothing of English manufacture. A retrenchment of the export of money which was sent to Spain for the purpose of buying official positions would have the same result.[1]

Nobody need take too seriously the schemes of anonymous memorialists; the eighteenth century abounded with them above all others. There are better witnesses to call. Edward Trelawny, Governor of Jamaica for fifteen years, did something in a small way to influence the policy of his superiors on Central American questions. He was not, like the author of the 'romantic' scheme, an advocate for complete national disinterestedness. Indeed, there was one place at least where he would like to see a new colony annexed to the British Crown; but he advocated the promotion of every kind of revolt against Spanish rule, especially among the Indians. By playing upon the discontent of the Creoles and Indians, he hoped to dismember the Spanish Empire:

'if we do not entirely destroy it in these parts, and lay a foundation for a most extensive and beneficial trade with the inhabitants in spite of France and Spain which will render his Majesty's reign as glorious as I wish it. It is a received notion I know that it is better that the Spaniards who are reckoned so indolent should have the possession of the West Indies, than any other Prince in Europe, and I believe it would be a right notion if they were not so greatly influenced by France, and so much of late inveterate to us; but be that how it will, surely it would be better for Europe in general that no European Prince whatsoever had the entire possession so as to exclude the others from trading with so great and rich a part of the world, but that it should be in the hands of the natives, who would naturally break into so many independent governments, no one of which could arrogate to itself the commerce of the whole. . . . I would not desire to exclude the Dutch (or even French when they behave well) from trading anywhere in the West Indies unless with our own settlements, so I think they would have no reason to complain, but would rather receive a benefit by this disposition while in alliance

[1] 'Project for attacking La Vera Cruz and Mexico, 1741, no. 1'; 'The same, no. 2'; undated paper entitled 'Proposal', all in the Vernon-Wager MSS. Some of these recommendations, especially the suggestion about the wine and oil, are extraordinarily like those of Don Bernardo Ulloa, *Restablecimiento de las Fábricas y Comercio Español*, ii. 237–60.

with us; tho' we should have, as we ought, I think, the greatest benefit by possessing the most advantageous places for commerce as Panama.'[1]

The Ministry itself was impressed by the arguments for encouraging Spanish-American separatism—in what degree, may be seen by the instructions of Cathcart, Anson, and Knowles. Cathcart was to command the main expedition to the West Indies in 1740; he had a powerful force, and he was to satisfy a strong expectation of conquest. The places against which he was to make his attempts were within easy reach of English colonies, therefore if they were taken they could probably be held. For all these reasons it was not to be expected that he should confer political independence upon the conquered peoples. The proclamation which he was to distribute, offered to all inhabitants of the Spanish colonies who should without committing any hostilities place themselves under His Majesty's protection:

'that they shall be received, protected, and maintained in their lands, houses, possessions and other properties . . . in the same manner as if they were His own natural subjects. They shall possess and enjoy the full and free exercise of their religion in the same manner and form which they do at present. They shall be freed from the increased imposts, *alcavalas*, duties, prohibitions and other oppressions, under which they at present suffer, from the nature and form of the government established in the Spanish Indies; and, in particular, the Indians shall be exempted from those royal tributes and services to which they have been subject. They shall have the privilege and right of trading directly to Great Britain and to all the British colonies in America, and finally, in all cases and in all respects they shall be attended to, assisted, favoured, and treated as the natural born subjects of Great Britain.'[2]

The policy of this proclamation (which was inexplicably divulged and made an embarrassing noise in the neutral press) was plainly not liberation but annexation by consent.

Anson's expedition to the Pacific was a more doubtful adventure. He had a much smaller force, and was going to a country about which hardly anybody in England knew anything certain. Therefore his instructions had to allow a great deal of latitude, and to be calculated on the assumption that his own

[1] Trelawny to Newcastle, Jan. 15, 1740/1, C.O. 137/57.
[2] C.O. 5/12, no. 71.

strength would hardly suffice for great conquests without some co-operation with the natives.

'As it has been represented unto Us,' they ran, 'that the number of native Indians on the coast of Chili, greatly exceeds that of the Spaniards, and that there is reason to believe, that the said Indians may not be averse to join with you against the Spaniards, in order to recover their freedom, you are to endeavour to cultivate a good understanding with such Indians, as shall be willing to join and assist you in any attempt, that you may think proper to make against the Spaniards, that are established there. . . . And whereas there is some reason to believe, from private intelligence, that the Spaniards in the Kingdom of Peru, and especially in that part of it, which is near Lima, have long had an inclination to revolt from the King of Spain, (on account of the great oppressions and tyrannies exercised by the Spanish Viceroys and Governors), in favour of some considerable person amongst themselves, you are, if you should find, that there is any foundation for these reports, by all possible means, to encourage, and assist such a design, in the best manner, you shall be able; and in case of any revolution, or revolt from the obedience of the King of Spain, either amongst the Spaniards, or the Indians, in these parts, and of any new government being erected by them, you are to insist on the most advantageous conditions for the commerce of our subjects, to be carried on with such government, so to be erected: for which purpose you shall make provisional agreements, subject to our future approbation and confirmation.'[1]

A proclamation was also drafted for Anson—apparently by Sir Charles Wager. It began by an ignorant invective against the French influence at the Court of Spain and the French trade to the Pacific colonies during Queen Anne's war (the first of which did not exist, and the second had by no means displeased the consumers in the colonies, however much it might impoverish the middlemen). Anson was then to declare that he had orders to support the Spanish colonists if they wished to set up a new form of government, and to treat them as enemies if they did not. He was to remind them that the King of Spain could do little to protect them against him; and to offer them a political alliance, the free exercise of their religion, a naval force for their defence (they were to pay a 'reasonable contribution' for its upkeep), a garrison, and lastly that

'We will supply you with all sorts of merchandise as you shall require from time to time without your being subject to impositions,

[1] S.P. 42/88.

fateagues and dangers in going to celebrate the Fairs of Panama, Portobello and Cartaxena.'[1]

Finally, the Government showed, by its instructions for Knowles's expedition to La Guayra in 1743, that it had not entirely renounced the hope of encouraging separatism. It thought it had a special reason to expect a response from the people of Caracas; the Guipuzcoa Company monopolized their trade, and its extortionate profits were believed to have excited great discontent. Knowles was therefore to inform himself of the disposition of the Creoles, and, if he found encouragement, to publish a declaration

'setting forth, that it is not the design of the English nation to make a conquest of their country, or to meddle with their property, religion, and liberty, but only to free them from the tyranny and oppression of the Guypuscoa Company, and to open a free and equal trade with them of their mutual commodities, without any exorbitant duties, charge, or imposition whatsoever'.

If this succeeded, he was to conclude a 'provisional agreement' —presumably, like that which Anson was ordered to make, of a commercial nature.[2] As Knowles's expedition was, like Anson's, a small one to an out-of-the-way destination, it was naturally prepared upon the same assumptions and with the same purpose.

§ ii. *The Sugar Interest and the Policy of Conquests*

This premature attempt at an American Revolution was not the main policy of the Ministers for their great expedition. There it was only conquests that would please. Over-estimating their chances of success, they imagined that almost everything was in their power; but the wide choice was only likely to embarrass a Government so constituted that it was certain to disagree wherever any choice was possible. The Ministers gibbered with indecision, and changed their minds over and over again, even before the Spanish fleets made a motion or the possibility of a French intervention set them a really difficult problem.[3]

There were three purposes for which new acquisitions of

[1] Add. MSS. 19030, f. 470. This proclamation is obviously founded on the 'Proposal' in the Vernon-Wager MSS., quoted on p. 74.

[2] Adm. 2/59, pp. 62–3.

[3] See Newcastle's letter to Wager, July 29, 1739, Vernon-Wager MSS.—a good example of his habit of suggesting everything and deciding nothing.

territory might be desired: trade, colonization, and protection. The last had very little importance; hardly any conquests of a purely strategic value were suggested. The nearest thing, perhaps, was the proposal to take Porto Rico because it could be used for intercepting the Spanish trade outward bound.[1] The people of Jamaica would also have been glad of the capture of Santiago de Cuba, as a place which commanded their homeward trade through the Windward Passage.[2] Both these places were notorious nests of *Guarda-Costas*, which was an additional reason for at least destroying them.

Even these proposals had another side; and the main issue was between trade and colonization. Of course they were not incompatible. For example, the conquest of Cuba with Havana would eminently serve both purposes. Yet there was a real conflict or at least a distinction between those who wanted more lands for plantation and settlement, and those who wanted outposts for carrying on trade with the Spanish dominions—outposts which they generally wished to strengthen and maintain with a colony of some kind.[3]

The ablest spokesman of the former class was William Wood, who held a post in the Customs Office; though connected with Jamaica, he does not appear to have been a sugar-planter, but had often represented before the Government the interests of the London and Bristol merchants trading to the West Indies. The arguments against a new sugar colony, and for a new smuggling settlement, are best put by Martin Bladen and James Knight. Both were connected with sugar-planting. Bladen received, for some reason, an annuity from the legislature of Nevis, and took an important part in promoting the interests of the West Indies.[4] He was a man of some influence, being a member of Parliament and of the Board of Trade; he was

[1] John Hart to Lord Townshend, May 8, 1729, copy in Add. MSS. 32694, ff. 37–8.

[2] Trelawny to Wager, Aug. 8, 1739, Vernon-Wager MSS.

[3] Some people hoped we should acquire some gold- and silver-mines in America. Others doubted whether such possessions would not have the same effect upon our national economy that they were thought to have had upon that of Spain. Gold-mines were believed to have destroyed the industry of Spain and converted its trade from an active into a passive one; none of the pamphleteers was economist enough to explain how (*French Influence upon English Counsels Demonstrated* (London, 1740), p. 13; *Britain's Mistakes in the Commencement and Conduct of the Present War* (London, 1740), supplement; see also Ulloa, op. cit., vol. i, introduction).

[4] See the Revenue Acts of Nevis, C.O. 185/4.

among the first and oftenest consulted by the Ministers and their committees, in the preparation of their plans for war, and he helped to draw up the instructions for Cathcart's expedition. Knight had been among the hotheads for reprisals against Spain in the time of Admiral Stewart, and was later one of the chief managers of the evidence against the 'depredations' at the bar of the House of Commons.[1]

Any new colonies of settlement or exploitation which we were likely to acquire in the West Indies would almost certainly become sugar colonies sooner or later. This would affect the prosperity of the sugar-planting interest, which had a certain influence in Parliament and with the Ministers. The attitude of this interest to the war is worth examining.

The English sugar colonies had suffered a depression since the Peace of Utrecht. In their early years they had prospered admirably, reduced the price of sugar to the English consumer, furnished the nation with an important article of re-export, and brought in large profits to the planters. The world's demand for their produce had been so great that the Government had to invent an elaborate system of precautions to stop it from being smuggled out of the Empire and finding its way straight to foreign markets. That prosperity was gone. The extension of sugar cultivation in the colonies of other powers had lowered the European price, and the English planters could not produce their sugar so cheaply as the French and Dutch.[2] Moreover, the increased consumption of sugar in Great Britain had begun to outstrip the somewhat slower increase of production in the British West Indies—not for want of land, for there was room in Jamaica alone for many more plantations.

For both these reasons the re-export trade had fallen off, and very few people seriously hoped to recover it. Few even of those who did, meant to achieve it by cutting costs of production—always excepting taxes, which they declared to be much higher in England than elsewhere. In the last ten years the West Indians had attended chiefly to maintaining a high price in the closed home market. For this purpose they had lately

[1] Report of proceedings in Parliament, March 1/12, 1738/9, A.E. Angleterre, 404, f. 161.

[2] It would take a long time to discuss the causes, and they are not necessary to this argument. I hope, therefore, that I may take it for granted here, and reserve it for a full examination in the book which I mean to write on the history of the English sugar colonies.

taken some very astute measures. In the first place, the Molasses Act of 1733 was meant to compel the North Americans to buy more rum and molasses from the English sugar colonies. Now rum and molasses are by-products of sugar, and by the methods used in the eighteenth century their quantity could be somewhat increased by making less sugar. If more rum and molasses were to be sold, without a corresponding extension of sugar cultivation, the quantity of sugar in the English market must be reduced, and probably the price must rise. This was said, and perhaps with some reason, to be one of the purposes of the Molasses Act.[1] It was much more certainly and avowedly the object of the Act of Parliament obtained by the West India interest in 1739, which permitted the direct export of sugar from the West Indies to certain markets in southern Europe.[2] There were some sugar-planters like Alderman Beckford who undoubtedly looked upon this liberty as a means, to be held in reserve, of browbeating the sugar-buyers at home into giving a high price. Had the Act not been encumbered by restrictions which made it almost useless, it might have been more used for this purpose.[3] Even without it, the downward tendency of

[1] *A True State of the Case between the British Northern Colonies and the Sugar Islands in America* (London, 1732), pp. 31–2; *The Consequences of the Bill now depending in favour of the Sugar Colonies* (n.d. ?1732). This imputation is denied without very much logic, by the author of *Proposals offered for the Sugar Planter's Redress, and for the Revival of the British Sugar Commerce* (London, 1733); but when the controversy had died down, an apparently knowledgeable contributor to the *Barbados Gazette* gave away the case by warning the planters against overseers who made more rum at the expense of making less sugar (*Caribbeana*, 1741, ii. 242–5). Yet it was possible, up to a point, to make more rum without reducing the output of sugar, by the method of distilling it weaker. This seems to have been done in Barbados after the Molasses Act (Paterson to Wood, July 5, 1751, Bodleian Library, North MSS. a 6, f. 174). The Boston *Weekly Rehearsal* of Sept. 18, 1732, reported from London, by way of Barbados, that the price of sugar was lower than ever; this was attributed to the failure of the Molasses Bill in that year, 'for we are assured the sugar merchants had housed vast quantities of sugars, which they expected would fetch a great price, upon the passing said bill'. That may be propaganda or uninformed comment.

[2] *The Sugar Trade with the Incumbrances thereon laid open by a Barbados Planter* (by John Ashley), MS. copy in C.O. 28/40; Ashley's second memorial, 1737, C.O. 28/25, Aa 62; William Perrin, *The Present State of the British and French Sugar Colonies, and our own Northern Colonies, Considered* (London, 1740), p. 17. Since Ashley was the chief agitator for the direct exportation, and Perrin one of the secretaries of the Planters' Club in London, their admissions are important.

[3] Beckford to Knight, June 18, 1743, Add. MSS. 12431, f. 125; *Parl. Hist.* xiv. 193–4 (Beckford). Henry Lascelles did not think very highly of the direct exportation, and reported with some pleasure that those who tried it did not find their account in it (Henry Lascelles to Thomas Applewhaite, Sept. 4, 1741, W. & G., vol. i; Lascelles and Maxwell to Samuel Husbands, Sept. 14, 1744, W. & G., vol. ii).

sugar prices in the English market was, for whatever reason, checked permanently in 1739.[1]

It would be impossible to keep up the price in the home market if the number of producers and the area of production were to be vastly increased. There was another thing to be considered. It was already becoming clear that the equilibrium of the northern and tropical colonies within the Empire was upset. As long as the West India islands could consume all the provisions and lumber of the Northern Colonies, the economic ambitions of the latter were more or less satisfied, and the internal balance of the Empire was maintained. After the Treaty of Utrecht, when the productive power of the Northern Colonies began to outgrow the consuming capacity of the English sugar islands, there were only two ways of preserving that balance—either to countenance the export of North American provisions to the foreign West Indies, or to acquire new West India territories.

The West Indian interest opposed both these remedies. It wished to confine the produce of North America to the markets of our own islands; thus it would assure itself of a cheap because over-abundant supply of fish, lumber, and provisions, and prevent its rivals in the French West Indies (who could not get enough provisions from their own northern colonies, and had to rely on the more expensive and infrequent supplies from France) from producing sugar to the same advantage, by raising

Lascelles disliked Ashley and was a sugar-factor; the promoters of the direct exportation had always reckoned with the hostility of the factors, who would lose their commissions on the sugars which went straight abroad.

[1] See the petition of the London sugar-refineries, March 20, 1753, which accuses the planters of artificially holding up the price by restricting production, because they gain more by a small crop than by a large one. The planters tried to repel the charge by pointing out the difficulty of getting the islands to co-operate for this purpose—as if the Planters' Club or the later West Indian Committee had never existed. They would have done better to deny the charge directly, for there is no evidence of a deliberate stint of sugar-production—the planters were far too greedy and individualist for that. Many of them had patented far more lands, especially in Jamaica, than they could possibly use; but we need not suppose this was calculated to keep down production. The refiners demanded some measures for extending cultivation in Jamaica, but according to Almon their real intention was to get permission to import foreign sugars (*C. J.* xxvi. 703; *Almon's Debates and Proceedings of the British House of Commons, 1751–60* (London, 1770), p. 55; Lascelles and Maxwell to Jonathan Blenman, March 14, 1753, W. & G. vi.; to Gedney Clarke, March 16). Lascelles and Maxwell were really afraid that Jamaica would produce too much for the English market (see their letter to John Frere, Sept. 4, 1756, W. & G. viii).

the price of their necessaries of life. This had been the ostensible, and to a great extent the real, purpose of the Molasses Act. It was designed, by levying very high duties on goods imported from the foreign sugar colonies, to make it impossible to export any provisions or lumber to them—for the French planters would not wish, and their own government would not allow them, to pay for foreign produce in cash.

The West India interest was now, at the outbreak of the war with Spain, trying to prevent the other solution of the difficulty, by discountenancing the acquisition of new West India territories, which might restore for a time the balance of the tropical and temperate colonies. If neither of these remedies could be used, the Northern Colonies must either manufacture much more for themselves than they had yet done, or send their corn to the markets of Europe, and compete with English agriculture. Wood pointed this out, speaking of the conquest of Cuba which was then being attempted by our forces.

'A very large additional employment will be given not only to the traders and manufacturers of this Kingdom but to the inhabitants of the British Northern Colonies, particularly to the inhabitants of New England, New York and Pensilvania, and prevent them from hurting their Mother-Country in many branches of traffic so soon as they will otherwise be able to do by a century at least.'[1]

He might well feel that he had scored a point here, for manufactures in the colonies were one of the greatest bugbears of English economists.

Some people in the Northern Colonies themselves shared his opinion. George Clarke, Lieutenant-Governor of New York, twice used this argument with the Assembly for giving a liberal encouragement to the volunteers who went on the West Indian expedition. 'By such acquisitions', he said, 'a door will be opened for a large consumption of provisions (the staple of this province) whereby the farmer, as well as the merchant, may be greatly enriched', and he later spoke of the possibility of obtaining such a territory in Cuba 'as may give large and numerous settlements to such a colony of people as may, in time, take off more of the provisions of these northern provinces than all the other islands in the West Indies'.[2]

West India conquests were expected to appeal to the North

[1] Wood to Newcastle, Sept. 10, 1741, Add. MSS. 32698, f. 26.
[2] Speeches of June 30, 1740, and Sept. 17, 1741, C.O. 5/1094.

Americans, not only as a market for provisions, but also as a field for emigration. The West India planters dreaded the very name of emigration from their own islands, for it was likely to deprive them of the few remnants of small planters and working-class white men who were believed to be their chief military security against the French and the negroes. Since losses by emigration could not be repaired, the planters were all the more anxious to prevent it. As James Knight puts it, the advantages attending the conquest of Havana

'will not compensate the damages our Sugar Islands will sustain thereby, as they will in such case be deserted and become an easy prey to the negroes, if not to the French and Spaniards, for if the midling and inferior sort of people remove, as undoubtedly they will even from Jamaica, the rich planters who are not many in number will not be able of themselves to maintain the possession'.[1]

It is curious that the great planters should have raised this complaint at a time when some of them were emigrating with their negroes to the Dutch settlements of Essequibo; but there was all the difference in the world between extending the area of sugar cultivation inside the Empire and participating in the profits of a sugar colony outside it.[2]

These considerations help to explain the traditional hostility of the English sugar-planters to colonial expansion in the tropics. They feared that sugar cultivation would be extended, the military population dispersed, and the prices of their necessaries of life raised by an increased demand. This attitude, which can be traced even in the late seventeenth century, is perfectly visible in the advice given to the Government by Knight and Bladen. Knight, for the reasons quoted above, recommended that Havana should be destroyed, rather than retained; Bladen, giving his arguments against attempting to conquer Porto Rico, said, 'We have more land already than we can people, more sugar and tobacco than we can dispose of to

[1] Knight to Newcastle, Dec. 3, 1739, Add. MSS. 22677, f. 32. Knight used every possible argument against the permanent acquisition of Havana. The French and Dutch would resent it; the situation was less central for 'interception' of Spanish trade and enterprises against Spanish colonies than that of Jamaica, which he assumed would be ruined by the competition of the new colony.

[2] Robinson to Townsend, Sept. 14, 1745, C.O. 28/47, ff. 47–8; *Storm van 's Gravesande*, i. 204, 211–13 (Hakluyt Society, 1911). Governor Grenville spoke of the practice as uncommon a few years later (Grenville to Board of Trade, Oct. 20, 1752, C.O. 28/30).

advantage.'[1] Knight thought it necessary that in the settlement he proposed to make at Darien, the colonists should be restrained from raising sugar, tobacco, ginger, and coffee, 'to prevent giving any umbrage or discouragement to our other Colonies in S. America'.[2]

Wood tried to answer such restrictive views.

'It is conceived', he said, 'Great Britain can never have too many settlements in America, provided such settlements produce commodities vendible in Europe, and not interfering with the product and manufactures of this Kingdom, and which must necessarily find employment for our navigation and at the same time give Great Britain an opportunity not only of supplying its own people cheaper, but also of becoming rivals at all foreign markets to the French in all West India commoditys, which is only to be brought about by selling cheaper than the French, and this selling cheaper is only to be effected by an increase of such commoditys in or from the British plantations in America.'[3]

This aggressive policy involved cheap production and low prices, which did not commend themselves to the conservative British planters.

The sugar interest did not put a simple veto on all plans of conquest in the West Indies. It used its influence in favour of schemes which were not likely to result in the acquisition of a new plantation colony. In fact it supported the various proposals of attacks upon places whose possession would make an opening for British trade in the forbidden regions of Spanish America.[4] This was natural, for Jamaica, the chief sugar island, was also the head-quarters of the illicit trade.[5] Whatever com-

[1] Bladen to Harrington, June 12, 1739, Add. MSS. 32694, f. 21.

[2] Knight to ? Newcastle, Nov. 20, 1739, Add. MSS. 22677, f. 25. *Vide infra*, pp. 193–4, 199–200, for further applications of this policy.

[3] Wood to Newcastle, Sept. 10, 1741, Add. MSS. 32698, f. 26.

[4] See a letter of Bussy to Amelot, Dec. 26, 1740 (A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 403), in which he gives an account of the attempt of the Jamaica merchants to dissuade Vernon from conquering Santiago de Cuba, where a rival sugar colony could be established, by diverting his attention to Panama. The report has at least this foundation, that both Bladen and Knight, the two strongest anti-expansionists among the Government's advisers, tried hard to commit it to a settlement at Panama. Governor Trelawny, in his dissenting minute of May 26, 1741, objected to the expedition against Santiago de Cuba, and laid it down that 'no Possessions but such as may be useful in commerce are for our benefit' (Council of War, May 26, 1741, S.P. 42/90, f. 174).

[5] The planters of Jamaica identified themselves with the smuggling merchants to a remarkable degree. Their lawful navigation had been molested by the Spaniards on account of the offences of the interlopers; but they bore it for the sake of the

petition the Jamaica smugglers had had to endure from the South Sea Company and the London merchants trading through Cadiz, was destroyed by the war which suspended the operations of the two last; and the interest of the Jamaica traders became, for the time being, the only national interest, where trade with Spanish America was concerned.

§ iii. *The Plans of the English Government: Havana, Cartagena, Santiago, Panama*

There are other things, besides the advice of interested parties, to be taken into account in planning a naval expedition. Ministers are called upon to determine, not only what is to be desired, but what can be done; and in this light, the advice of Admirals is at least as valuable as that of planters and merchants.

The first question to be resolved was the size of the expedition and the importance of the object. Until the available strength was determined, there was no saying whether success in a given attempt was possible. Upon this subject there were two opinions, or at least two tendencies of opinion. Newcastle and his friends were for complying with the popular cry, which demanded a great expedition in the West Indies with as many ships and soldiers as possible. They waged the war as politicians; the success they most desired was in Parliament. Walpole on the other hand was much more interested in defending the security of Great Britain and Ireland, and much more afraid of attempts upon it. He was, therefore, on the side of caution, and Newcastle on that of extravagance, in the allotment of our strength to the West Indies; and whenever there was a question of the forces to be sent there on any new emergency, Newcastle was nearly always for more, Walpole for less.[1] Newcastle in fact was for the biggest possible expedition, and the biggest possible success.

'All His Grace's politics', said Hervey, 'were founded on short maxims of policy, gleaned in private conferences in the House of

illicit trade, and turned their resentment against the Spaniards, not against the interlopers who were as much the cause of it. The resident merchants seem to have been a much stronger and more influential class than those of other islands; in fact, Jamaica was still almost as much a trading colony as a plantation.

[1] There were times when Walpole seemed to be converted, but he soon returned to his attitude of reluctance (Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 19 and Aug. 15, 1741, Add. MSS. 35407, ff. 31, 68).

Lords, during the Session, from Lord Carteret, who had over and over again told him, *Look to America, my Lord; Europe will take care of itself. Support Vernon, and you will want no support here.*'[1]

Sir John Norris, Admiral of the Fleet, was often consulted by the Ministry at this time. He did not quite agree with Newcastle or Walpole. He wisely suggested that we ought above all to keep blockading squadrons off the chief Spanish ports.[2] This was only common sense; for whatever we were to do in the West Indies, could be much better done if there were no Spanish squadrons there to oppose it. It was not the same thing to let them get out and then send more ships after them to reinforce our own commanders. That was the way to waste time, give the enemy a start, and cause uncertainty and division of our own strength; moreover a moderate English squadron in the West Indies could venture and achieve more in the presence of a very small Spanish squadron than a large English fleet could do in the presence of a moderate Spanish one. Nobody seems to have seen the point of Norris's argument, except perhaps Lord Hervey, to whose opinion only Sir Robert Walpole would be likely to attend.[3] First of all Cadiz was watched and Ferrol not; two Spanish squadrons were allowed to join at the latter port, in such strength that the Admiralty could not spare enough ships to blockade them while the grand fleet was getting ready; and at last, just when the grand fleet was on the point of sailing to deal with it, a large force under Torres got out of Ferrol and went off to the West Indies.

There were three ways of carrying on the war: large expeditions directed to important objects; smaller expeditions directed to secondary objects; and no expeditions at all. Admiral Vernon, the commander in the West Indies since the autumn of 1739, disliked all combined expeditions of land and sea forces. He always discountenanced schemes for landings and colonies as expensive and unnecessary. Sea-power alone, he thought, would do all that could and need be done in the Caribbean; it would destroy the Spanish commerce, interrupt the return of the treasure to Spain, and protect the English smugglers with the Spanish colonies while hampering the trade of their rivals.[4]

[1] Hervey, note of Cabinet proceedings, May 22, 1740, *Memoirs*, iii. 940.
[2] Norris's diary, Nov. 26 and Dec. 14, 1739, Add. MSS. 28132, ff. 86, 99.
[3] Hervey, *Memoirs*, iii. 940; *Parl. Hist.* x. 1191, xi. 833.
[4] Vernon to Newcastle, Oct. 31, 1739, S.P. 42/85, f. 55.

Vernon in fact was for a purely naval war; perhaps for the reasons he gave, perhaps because such a war would be conducted by an Admiral alone (for he was one of the vainest of men and the most ambitious of glory).

Vernon's advice was little echoed or attended to; other admirals had their doubts, but none of them approached such a radical scepticism. Such arguments were, with Newcastle, beside the point. There must be an expedition, for political reasons, therefore an expedition must be practicable.[1] Besides, long before Vernon's advice came to hand, the Ministry had been thinking in terms of expeditions. The first plans to be made, after sending Vernon out to reinforce the West India station, were for small expeditions to Manila and the Pacific. Sir Charles Wager, the First Lord of the Admiralty, appears to have been interested in a small scheme for starting a revolt in Guatemala. This kind of thing might be good strategy or common sense, but it was not grand enough. Politics demanded something larger, and the Admirals had to produce it.[2] At the end of 1739 it was decided that the small expeditions would take away too much from the strength of the great ones. The squadron destined for Manila was therefore suppressed, and only Anson's expedition to Peru and Panama was left. For the same reason Wager's project against Guatemala was laid on the shelf, and he could not get the Ministry to recommend it to Vernon, even after the greater enterprise had come to grief at Cartagena.[3]

There was, then, to be a great expedition to the West Indies under Lord Cathcart; but what was to be its objective?[4] The obvious point for a great attack was Havana. It was reputed the strongest place in the Spanish West Indies; it was the rendezvous of the *flotas* and galleons, and commanded their homeward route. If we possessed it, we could intercept or delay the return of the treasure to Spain, and thereby put such pressure on the Court of Madrid that the war must be brought to a

[1] When Cathcart changed his mind about the practicability of Havana, Newcastle was furious and had him sharply silenced by the Lords Justices (Newcastle to Hardwicke, Aug. 28, 1740, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 229).

[2] Norris's diary, Oct. 16 and 23, Dec. 5, 1739, Add. MSS. 28132, ff. 52, 59, 87.

[3] Wager to Vernon, June 21, Aug. 20, Oct. 29, 1741, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 45, 51, 57.

[4] See the full and excellent account of these discussions in Admiral Sir H. W. Richmond's *The Navy in the War of 1739–48* (Cambridge, 1920), vol. i, chap. ii.

sudden and striking end. This was a simple calculation, and it was probably a wrong one, for Spain was much better able than anybody expected, to bear the very considerable delay and diminution of the homeward treasure which we were able to effect without the conquest of Havana; in fact, Philip V had already given proof of this in the War of the Spanish Succession.[1] Be that as it might, Newcastle always preferred an attack on Havana to anything else that could be suggested.

The objections to it were two. Wager was persuaded by one Tassell, who had lately lived there as the South Sea Company's agent, that it was very strongly fortified and defended, and could not be taken by less than 10,000 soldiers.[2] This was more than could be spared, and the Ministry therefore decided in October to be content with something less ambitious. In November Newcastle brought up Havana again in a new form: why not make up the number of men with recruits from North America? Our Northern Colonies abounded with men who, properly used, were a great asset in any American war we might wage; for some people were already beginning to suspect, what proved true in the Canadian campaigns of the next war, that colonists made the best soldiers for colonial fighting. They could be attracted to the expedition by hopes of plunder and land. From soldiers they would turn settlers, and thus solve the problem how to people our new acquisitions without draining our older sugar colonies of men.[3] At first this proposal was thought to make no difference to the practicability of the scheme, but the Ministers later decided to raise troops in North America; indeed, Norris told Walpole that if they did not, the Opposition would make a cry of it. They even formed exaggerated expectations of the number of men that could be got from this source. Bladen had to explain 'that most or all the people in those parts had their employments to live and very few that wanted business',[4] and that 3,000 troops was the largest number that could be raised. In the event, the enthusiasm for

[1] The miserable end of Admiral Hosier at the Bastimientos in 1727 was a warning against merely trying to delay the sailing of the galleons (*The Grand Question, whether War or no War with Spain, Impartially Considered* (London, 1739), p. 18).

[2] Tassell to Wager, Oct. 24, 1739, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Tassell to Newcastle, Oct. 29, 1739, Add. MSS. 32694, f. 49; Wager's note on the same, f. 51; Norris's diary, Sept. 29 and Oct. 16, 1739, Add. MSS. 28132, ff. 47, 53–4.

[3] Norris's diary, Oct. 29, Nov. 22, Dec. 5 and 17, 1739, Add. MSS. 28132, ff. 68, 82, 87, 105.

[4] Norris's diary, Dec. 17 and 31, 1739, Add. MSS. 28132, ff. 105, 112.

the expedition was so great that the Government afterwards believed it could have raised more. 'There is a vast spirit by all accounts', Trelawny wrote, 'in those of the Northern Colonies who in their imagination have swallowed up all Cuba; 'tis true, they are undisciplined, but they will be supported by double the number of disciplined troops that L[d] Cathcart brings.'[1]

The second objection to Havana was its situation. It was a long way to leeward of the chief English and French colonies; and the easterly trade wind was so strong in those seas that no naval commander liked getting to leeward if he thought he should have any occasion to come up to windward again. This would make little difference, if there were too few Spanish warships in the West Indies to take advantage of the Jamaica squadron's absence. As more ships went out from Spain to join those already in the Caribbean, and as the arrival of a French fleet in the West Indies became more and more likely, disquiet for the safety of Jamaica had more influence in determining the movements of our West India expedition. If there were French or Spanish fleets to windward of it when it started from Jamaica, a long leeward journey into the Gulf of Mexico would leave the island at their mercy. This made an impression not only on the Governor and people of Jamaica, but on Wager, who knew the facts because he had commanded a West India squadron in the War of the Spanish Succession. It strengthened his dislike of the Havana scheme, and his preference for the less serious undertaking—as it then seemed—of an attack on Cartagena.[2] Another thing to consider was, that Havana was difficult of access from December to March—the best part of the campaigning season—because of the strong north winds which made it hard for ships to ride off the coasts.

Vernon shared Wager's preference; he was already stationed at Jamaica and must have heard what the island politicians had to say. Perhaps he had another reason. The voyage of the last galleons which started before the war had been unusually slow;

[1] Trelawny to Wager, Aug. 29, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Newcastle to Vernon, Sept. 12, 1740, Add. MSS. 32695, f. 51. Wager thought that the Americans would be especially suitable for such an irregular campaign as the excursion into Guatemala. It appears, though not clearly, that this was because he thought them less likely than regular soldiers to alienate the Indians by violating their women (Wager to Vernon, June 21, 1741, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, p. 46).

[2] Trelawny to Wager, Aug. 29, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Beckford to Knight, Oct. 11, 1740, Add. MSS. 12431, f. 116; Norris's diary, Oct. 29, 1739, Add. MSS. 28132, f. 68; Wager to Newcastle, June 3, 1740, C.O. 5/41.

though they had sailed in 1737, they were still in Cartagena harbour and had not yet held the fair at Portobello. However, they had done some business, according to the custom, in Cartagena, and had already received some money in return. They were, therefore, with this money and the remainder of their unsold cargoes, the richest prize that could be made in the West Indies. Whatever his faults of judgement, Vernon had a reputation for disinterestedness, but he would hardly have been human if these facts had no influence over his opinion. Besides, it was an important and honourable feat to catch the galleons, and it was an essential service to the trade of Jamaica. If their cargoes were destroyed, the smugglers would be left without competition; delaying the galleons in the harbour by a blockade until the goods rotted was very useful, but destroying them would be better still. It was to the smugglers' interest that some accident should happen to the galleons at Cartagena, before their cargoes came to market, rather than at Havana, when they were only carrying the returns, and had already spoilt the trade.[1] Vernon's preference for Cartagena can have had nothing to do with the presence of Torres and his ships of war in that harbour; for he had already conceived it before Torres came out to the West Indies at all, and he knew, before he finally sailed to attack Cartagena, that Torres had gone to Havana, where the French fleets might have joined him. In fact, if he had aimed at the destruction of the Spanish warships, he would presumably have made for Havana, not for Cartagena.

Newcastle put Havana back on the map by a characteristic compromise: the Government was to make no determination, but to leave it to the Council of War on the spot to say what was practicable. Having gained this point, he then tried, by a still more characteristic piece of dishonesty, to prejudge the decision of the Council of War, by causing it to be delayed until the expedition should arrive off Havana—from which place it was impossible to do anything except attack Havana or Vera Cruz. Wager detected and denounced this; it was given up, but the irrepressible Newcastle contrived to have the last word by sending Cathcart a private letter with his instructions, earnestly recommending him to try Havana if it was at all possible.[2] The

[1] Trelawny to Wager, Aug. 29, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Vernon to Newcastle, June 4, 1740, S.P. 43/93.

[2] Wager to Newcastle, June 3, 1740, C.O. 5/41; Newcastle to Cathcart, Aug. 14, 1740, Add. MSS. 32694, f. 472.

Opposition gave the same orders to Vernon; Pulteney told him that nothing but the conquest of Cuba would satisfy the appetite of the public.[1] Even after the first failure of 1741, Newcastle believed that a reinforcement of 3,000 men might enable Vernon to attack Havana or at least make another attempt on Cartagena.[2]

When the great expedition arrived in the West Indies and joined Admiral Vernon, the commanders made up their minds to attack Cartagena. This enterprise failed entirely.

There is no need here to describe the calamity or to distribute the blame between Vernon and Wentworth.[3] Admiral Richmond has done all that very well.[4] It may no doubt be true that Vernon was 'a silly, noisy Admiral', and that Wentworth lacked moral courage; but probably their faults and dissensions did not affect the result so much as has been thought. If it comes to that, there was equal discord behind the walls of Cartagena between the Viceroy Eslava and the General of the galleons.[5] Too much attention has been paid to the quarrel of Vernon and Wentworth. There are two reasons for this: in the first place, it has been too readily assumed that Cartagena was so weak that only some fault of our commanders could account for our bad success. In fact the place had been strongly fortified since Pointis took it in 1697, and it was a much harder nut to crack than the English supposed.[6] The second reason why the controversy was so envenomed (and why Wentworth always had the worst of it), was the unpopularity of the army. Old-fashioned Whigs and Tories had always railed against a 'standing army', and the Opposition could not forbear exploiting the cry. They affected to believe that the army existed, not to fight (for Walpole always avoided wars if he could), but to create comfortable places for the Minister's creatures. The soldiers were therefore under a cloud, and the fashionable rant was the wooden walls of old England, long before Wentworth's incompetence confirmed the legend. Lastly, it was sickness that put the finishing touch to failure at Cartagena, and that was no more Wentworth's fault than Vernon's. Vernon had been

[1] Pulteney to Vernon, Aug. 17, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 23–4.
[2] Memorandum of June 22, 1741, Add. MSS. 32993, f. 154.
[3] Cathcart died on the voyage out, and was succeeded by Wentworth.
[4] Op. cit., vol. i, chap. vi.
[5] Larnage to Maurepas, March 21, 1741, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 55.
[6] Larnage to Maurepas, Dec. 5, 1740, A.N. Colonies C^9 A. 53.

in the West Indies before, and knew that the most important maxim of West India strategy was to begin operations at once, before the soldiers could fall victims to the climate and the rum.[1] It was to avoid delay and 'Captain Punch' that he had proposed at first to meet his reinforcement under Ogle and Cathcart at Cape Donna Maria instead of letting it come into harbour at Jamaica.[2] The miscarriage of a letter brought this scheme to nothing, and once in Port Royal, Ogle's fleet could not be got out in a hurry. Then Vernon spent time in looking for the French fleet instead of sailing straight to Cartagena; the decision was justifiable, but it gave the climate plenty of time to work upon the troops.[3] It is true, however, that if Wentworth had taken Cartagena at a rush, the soldiers would have had the satisfaction of dying of fever after victory, as they did at Havana in 1762, instead of dying frustrated outside the walls.

Vernon's and Wentworth's second choice after Cartagena was Santiago de Cuba. The south and east of Cuba were so little populated, and so far from Havana, that they might have made a permanent establishment there; it was no more than the French had done on the west end of Hispaniola. The people of Jamaica, especially those of the north side, would be glad to have the pirates of Santiago suppressed, so that their ships might pass safely through the Windward Passage. The planters would not be equally pleased to see a rival sugar colony growing up next door; but the planters were not always attended to, and if the east end of Cuba was not conquered and colonized by the English, it was because the commanders mismanaged the attempt, not because the sugar interest was holding the Government by the coat-tails. Newcastle expressly ordered Vernon to have it garrisoned and settled if he could take it.[4]

The North Americans were to have been glad of this conquest, for they were to have settled it. They were disappointed of their hopes; they should have remembered the two com-

[1] After the failure at Cartagena, Ogle was of the same opinion (Ogle to Knight, June 18, 1741, and Feb. 13, 1741/2, Add. MSS. 12431, ff. 112, 114).

[2] Cathcart to Vernon, June 22, 1740; Vernon to Cathcart, Dec. 26, 1741, S.P. 42/90, f. 12; Wager to Vernon, June 10, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, p. 13.

[3] Already on Jan. 20 Wentworth reported that at least 1,400 of the soldiers were sick, of whom 500 seriously so (see his letter to Newcastle, C.O. 5/42).

[4] Newcastle to Vernon, Oct. 15 and 31, 1741, Add. MSS. 32698, ff. 138, 240. Knowles tried to capture Santiago in the spring of 1748. If he had taken it, he would have kept it, but only 'in hopes it may produce some good terms upon the conclusion of a peace' (Knowles to Newcastle, March 13, 1747/8, C.O. 137/58).

panies of Massachusetts volunteers, who arrived at Jamaica in 1703 to find no quarters or allowances, and to be enrolled, in spite of their express wish and the entreaties of their Governor, into the crews of Admiral Whetstone's ships.[1] The volunteers of 1740 were not much better treated; Newcastle heard many complaints that they had been drafted into the ships in exactly the same way.[2] They might well be furious, for nobody disliked the service of the King's ships more, or went farther out of the way to avoid the press-gang, than the North Americans. They got no plunder, for there was none; no land, for none was conquered, and if any had been, Wentworth strangely obstructed the proclamation which was to have offered it to them. He alleged that most of them were unsuitable for colonization and had not the necessary means; and if Vernon is to be trusted (which perhaps he is not), the officers of the regular army grumbled at having to fight battles in order to conquer land for North Americans.[3] The unbounded expectations of the use of North Americans in West Indian warfare were disappointed, and the idea of such a service was unpopular for some years in the Northern Colonies;[4] yet volunteers were found in 1762 for a very similar enterprise against Havana.

When both Cartagena and Santiago had resisted them, Vernon and Wentworth condescended to take some advice from the people of Jamaica, and to reduce their pride to one of the smaller but more practicable enterprises in which that island was interested.

There was one expedition which was always more popular in Jamaica than any other that could be proposed.[5] This was an overland attack upon Panama, to be followed by a settlement upon the isthmus. Such a settlement was designed as an advanced post for illicit trade into the Pacific, and for the acquisition of gold-mines, or at least gold, in the neighbouring province of Veragua.[6] In fact it was the first proposal which the

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1702*, no. 1131; *1702–3*, nos. 30, 319, 322, 694, 764.

[2] Newcastle to Vernon, Aug. 28, 1741, Add. MSS. 32697, f. 482; Oct. 15, vol. 32698, f. 138.

[3] Wentworth to Newcastle, Dec. 20, 1741, C.O. 5/42; Vernon to Newcastle, Nov. 11, 1741, *Original Papers relating to the Expedition to the Island of Cuba* (London, 1744).

[4] Vaudreuil to Maurepas, Feb. 22, 1748, A.N. Colonies C⁹ A. 74.

[5] Not only in Jamaica; Bussy reported that a large company was projected for this purpose in London (Bussy to Amelot, June 2, N.S., 1741, A.E. Angleterre, 412, f. 112).

[6] Bladen to Harrington, June 12 and 18, 1739, Add. MSS. 32694, ff. 21, 25;

Government considered in this war. Bladen had urged it very strongly, and Lord Harrington favoured it; but Wager and Norris reported that it would need at least 2,000 soldiers and a large squadron. At first it was a project for attacking Panama from both sides of the isthmus, but then the Admirals made up their minds that no settlement could be made on the Pacific shore. The march overland from the Atlantic, which Wager and Norris thought more practicable, was soon forgotten for greater enterprises.[1]

The scheme had a long history, for the Isthmus of Panama was the short and narrow channel by which the produce of the Pacific colonies had passed to Spain for the last two centuries. The temptation to seize it was obvious to anybody with the slightest sense of strategy. There Drake had intercepted the treasure; Morgan's buccaneers had taken Panama in 1671. Near by were the mines of Veragua and St. Mary's, to which the privateers had made an expedition in 1702. The travellers Dampier and Wafer had reported favourably of the Indians, who had also shown friendship to the Scotch settlers at Darien in 1698.[2] The Governor of Jamaica had entered into relations with them in Queen Anne's reign. It was assumed that they still hated the Spaniards mortally, and would furnish valuable military help to an English army against Panama or the gold-mines; and finally, that they would be ready to sell some of their land for a small consideration, and for the sake of the colonists' protection against the Spaniards.[3]

It is very questionable how far these assumptions were justified. Vernon thought them out of date. In his opinion the

Knight to Newcastle, Nov. 20 and Dec. 3, ff. 9, 16; Trelawny to Wager, Aug. 29, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Trelawny to Newcastle, Jan. 15, 1740/1, May 27, 1741, C.O. 137/57; Beckford to Knight, Feb. 10, 1741/2, Add. MSS. 12431, f. 118.

[1] Norris's diary, Sept. 17 and 29, Oct. 16, 1739, Add. MSS. 28132, ff. 31, 47, 51.

[2] G. P. Insh, *The Company of Scotland* (London, 1932), pp. 129–35, 186–90. See Wafer's *New Voyage and Description of the Isthmus of America*, republished by the Hakluyt Society, 1934; also *C.S.P. Col. 1702–3*, no. 22.

[3] 'But as this tract of land is still in the possession of the aborigines who were never conquered by nor submitted to the Spaniards, . . . it will be necessary to have their consent and approbation, which I am persuaded may be easily obtained. . . . The Scotch met no difficulty in it. This will be acting agreeable to the law of nations, the principles of Christianity, and the constant maxims of the British nation, whose possessions are founded on reason and justice, and not chimerical grants, butchery of millions of innocent people, and other unjustifiable means.' (Knight to ? Newcastle, Nov. 20, 1739, Add. MSS. 22677, f. 27; see also Add. MSS. 32694, ff. 83–8.)

Darien project was unnecessary, for it would procure no advantages in trade that we did not possess already by our command of the sea. He thought it impossible too. Since the failure of the Scotch colony, the Spanish authorities had perceived the folly of estranging tribes placed in so important a situation, and had conciliated them.[1] This pacification of the Indians probably had something to do with the bad behaviour of the English 'marooners'—the dregs of the pirates, who abused the Indian women. Unscrupulous sailors enticed Indians on board ship, under pretence of trade, and then carried them off and sold them as slaves in Jamaica. This came to the ears of Wager, who remembered a project of a settlement at Darien from the days when he was Commodore at Jamaica. He was very upset, and wrote to Vernon and Trelawny to have these practices stopped and punished. The warning was not needed, for nobody set a higher value on Indian friendship than Trelawny, who had already persuaded the Jamaica Assembly to make a law against the enslavement of Indians.[2] He was the warmest partisan of the Darien scheme, but he had to admit that the Indians had made their peace with the Spaniards; however, this only made him insist with the more vehemence on the necessity of taking Panama in order to encourage them to join our side again.[3] But taking Panama in order to make an impression upon the Indians was a very different calculation from taking it with their help.

No doubt the Panama scheme was conceived with a vague and free imagination, helped out by confusions between the Indian tribes and anachronisms as to their attitude; but something had been done on the Isthmus more than once before, and Vernon might at least have given it a fair trial. Most of the witnesses agree that he did not. It was important to arrive quickly and safely at Portobello, and, before making any open appearance there, to have landed a force behind the town and seized the pass which led to Panama. Instead, he beat farther to windward than he need, so that the rainy season had time to set in and the soldiers to fall sick. He then sailed into the harbour 'with all the pageantry of a Spithead expedition',

[1] Vernon to Newcastle, Jan. 23, 1739/40, S.P. 42/85, f. 122.

[2] Wager to Vernon, June 10 and July 9, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 13, 16; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica* (Kingston, 1797), iii. 563; Act of May 8, 1741, C.O. 139/15.

[3] Trelawny to Wager, Sept. 12, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Tassell to Walpole, Sept. 11, 1739, Add. MSS. 32694, f. 41.

sent the Governor a pompous message, and gave him time to remove all the valuables from the town, to occupy the pass, and to send the news to Panama.[1] The scheme was ruined. Wentworth, who never cared much for it, declined to proceed any farther, saying that his force was reduced too low by sickness; and Vernon can have hardly felt all the surprise he affected, when Governor Trelawny, the chief promoter of the expedition, insisted in a huff on going home to Jamaica to do other business.[2]

There was little more that Vernon could do; soon afterwards, he retired to England, with 'his laurels handsomely tipped with gold'. He spent the rest of his life quarrelling with the Admiralty, publishing pamphlets, presiding at meetings of the Order of the Anti-Gallicans, and making ranting speeches in the House of Commons. The great offensive against the West Indies had come to an end for a time, and Ogle was left with orders 'to protect the trade of the King's subjects in those parts, to hinder the return of the Spanish Treasure to Europe, and to prevent the Spaniards from opening or carrying on any trade at Cartagena, or Portobello'.[3] In the very fag-end of the war Knowles revived some semblance of activity by his destruction of Port Louis and his attempt on Santiago, and conceived a further scheme of attacking Vera Cruz; until then, the annals of the Jamaica station are free from expeditions. There was an attempt upon La Guayra and Porto Cabello, two ports of Venezuela, under Knowles in 1743. This expedition was sent out from England and strengthened with ships of the Leeward Islands station; for Venezuela is so far to windward as to be quite out of the way of the Jamaica squadron. For that reason

[1] Council of War, Jan. 20 and 22, 1741/2, C.O. 5/42; Trelawny to Newcastle, Jan. 31, C.O. 137/57; Beckford to Knight, April 30, 1742, Add. MSS. 12431, f. 124; J. Morris to Wager, May 1742, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Col. Burrard's diary, March 30, 1742, Add. MSS. 34097, f. 67. Vernon's best excuse was that he tried to kill two birds with one stone, and that he delayed so long off Cartagena because he hoped to intercept succours coming out from Spain (see the minute of the Council of War, March 4, 1741/2, S.P. 42/92, f. 77). Trelawny had wanted Vernon to undertake this expedition in 1741, but Vernon refused, and Wager approved his refusal because the rainy season had been coming on. For that matter, Wager appears to have vindicated Vernon in 1742, for the same reason and because if 500 men had been landed behind Portobello there would not have been enough to land before it (Wager to Vernon, Aug. 18, 1741, and Aug. 1742, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 49, 62).

[2] Vernon to Newcastle, Feb. 11 and 25, March 5 and 15, 1741/2, March 31 and April 27, 1742, with enclosures, S.P. 42/92, ff. 1–149 *passim*.

[3] Newcastle to Ogle, Aug. 5, 1742, Add. MSS. 32699, f. 360.

its valuable trade was hard to intercept, and the best way of attacking it was to seize the terminal points and deprive the shipping of any refuge on the coast.[1] Knowles made a mess of it, and the attempt produced no benefit whatever.

§ iv. *Trelawny's Interference on the Moskito Shore*

After so many pompous failures, there is some satisfaction in dealing with an effort which, however small, met with any success at all. This was the interesting attempt of Trelawny to extend English influence and trade among the Spaniards of Central America, and to consolidate the logwood-cutting colony in Honduras.

Trelawny believed in the possibility of breaking up the Spanish Empire from within, by encouraging the Creoles and Indians to revolt. Like many other Governors of Jamaica, he took a special interest in the tribe of Moskito Indians. They dwelt on the east coast of Nicaragua, which was then known to the English as the 'Moskito shore'. They had long had friendly relations with the English; indeed, in a later controversy with Spain, we claimed that they had made us a cession of their territory in the reign of Charles I, which, if it really took place and was valid, would have given us a title to it under the American Treaty of 1670. Needless to say, Spain disputed both the fact and the lawfulness of this surrender. Be that as it might, the Indians' friendship to the English nation had continued intermittently.

Nearly all the witnesses, from Dampier downwards, described them as a very small tribe; some writers attributed to them no more than five hundred fighting men. The younger Hodgson, writing in 1757, said they had once numbered ten or eleven thousand people, but were much reduced after 1730 by the small-pox, which they caught in a successful expedition against the Spaniards; in his day they were eight thousand souls, with fifteen hundred fighting men. He distinguished among them

[1] 'A Proposal for the taking of La Guaira and Porto Cavallo', Vernon-Wager MSS.; paper of Daniel Campbell, July 22, 1741, ibid. The Spaniards, according to Admiral Richmond, had two months' notice of this attempt. Lord Hardwicke believed that Knowles himself had been talking about it before he left London (Hardwicke to Newcastle, May 27, 1743, Add. MSS. 32700, f. 148), but the French Minister, who usually got wind of projects almost before they were out of the authors' mouths, only learnt about this one after some months, and described the secret as perfectly kept (Bussy to Amelot, March 15, N.S., 1743, A.E. Angleterre, 416, f. 352).

three separate bodies of people. There were the pure Moskito Indians in the south, under a 'Governor'; in the centre, round Black River, they were ruled by a 'King', and consisted chiefly of Samboes, descended from the conquest of Indian wives by two shipwrecked cargoes of negroes;[1] in the north there was a mixture of Indians and Samboes under a 'General'. The King, Governor, and General were more or less coequal, but the English of Jamaica had accorded a pre-eminence to the first, on account of his title; he thus belonged to the class of native rulers who owe their state to the convenience or the defective imagination of the English authorities. The chiefs had little power, and the real decisions were taken by assemblies of elders—such worthies of fame in war and weight in council as 'Admiral Dilly', 'Colonel Morgan', and the like. They entertained a lasting hatred of the Spaniards, which Uring accounted for by supposing that they had been expelled by the Spanish authorities from the land of their fathers, a good land, into the disagreeable swamps in which they lived when the English knew them.[2] There is no telling whether that was the truth, or a prejudice instilled into them by the English and then repeated as their own opinion; but certainly one of the ways of attracting them to an alliance was to promise them the land of their forefathers. Their manner of life seems to have been a not extraordinary mixture of laziness with violent activity in fishing and hunting, punctuated by almost interminable drinking-bouts which usually ended in a 'general rape'. They had always been valued by the privateers as expert if temperamental fishermen, and gallant fighters so long as they were encouraged by proper example.[3]

To them Trelawny sent in 1740 a 'romantic' character or 'Don Quixote' named Robert Hodgson. He really seems to have been a fit man for the post; he felt some sympathy for the Indians, but tried to restrain the vices which he could not strongly condemn because he considered them to be chiefly due to contact with the English. He believed (what was probably

[1] This was not an uncommon accident, the Black Caribs of St. Vincent had a like origin. [2] Uring, *Voyages and Travels* (1928 reprint), p. 159.

[3] The best connected accounts of this tribe are to be found in Dampier, *A New Voyage Round the World* (1699), i. 7–11; Uring, pp. 156–9; Hodgson to Trelawny, April 8, 1740, quoted above, and *The First Account of the State of that Part of America called the Mosquito Shore in the year 1757*, by Robert Hodgson (the son, I think), C.O. 123/1.

wrong) that the Moskitomen were descended of the race of Montezuma, and therefore looked for a deliverer from the 'grey-eyed people'; Hodgson had the modesty to doubt whether he could play the part.[1]

The Moskitomen were valuable allies. They lived mostly by desultory hunting, fishing, and turtling, and left the care of their plantain-walks to their wives; a high proportion of their men was, therefore, always available for expeditions against the Spaniards. A useful by-product of this military activity was their need for arms; Hodgson saw a good opening for trade here, and lamented that before he and Trelawny could make any use of it, the privateers would probably have supplied the want.

On the other hand they had their limitations. They were ungovernable, and needed disciplined troops to keep them in order; and they were a diplomatic liability. They had difficulty in accepting Hodgson's opinion, that the King of England was the best judge of the proper time for peace or war with the Spaniards; this gave little trouble during the war, but it was to cost Hodgson some anxiety and effort after the peace. They used their Spanish prisoners cruelly, which Trelawny instructed Hodgson to prevent so far as he could; for though it might be very convenient to browbeat the Spaniards into trading with us by threatening to set the Moskito Indians on them if they refused, the barbarity of these uncontrollable allies was a nuisance when it was not exercised according to plan. It could not, in any case, commend itself to a man like Trelawny, who hoped to work for an Anglophile Creole Revolution within the Spanish Empire. The behaviour of the Moskitomen to the other Indians was even more embarrassing. They had two dependent tribes called Piacos and Puttocks, but they were at perpetual enmity with certain other Indians, generally called 'wild', or Bravo Indians. Whenever they went warfaring, they insisted on treating their prisoners with great cruelty or enslaving them. In fact, they made a business of slave-raiding; it was deposed in 1762, before the Council of Jamaica, that they had reduced a small tribe of their neighbours from 300 people to 47 by this practice.[2] This gave a handle to all the critics of Trelawny's

[1] Hodgson to Trelawny, April 8, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Trelawny to Wager, July 26, ibid.

[2] Deposition of Richard Jones, in Council Minutes, Nov. 17, 1762, C.O. 140/42.

schemes; for how could we develop good relations with the Indians in general, as Trelawny wished to do, when our chief Indian allies did us more harm than good with the other tribes? Hodgson tried to prevent it, but he was not very successful. As he could not stop the enslavement of enemy Indians, he bought their freedom and sent them to Jamaica, whence Trelawny tactfully returned them to their homes.[1]

On his first appearance in 1740, Hodgson procured a new cession of the country from King Edward,[2] distributed some presents, immediately exhausted his supplies of rum in ceremonial visits, and persuaded the tribe to make an expedition against the Spaniards. Wager had been particularly interested in the scheme of a certain Captain Lea, who reported that the people of Guatemala and Nicaragua were ripe for revolt if they could receive some help against their Government; he supposed that the Moskito Indians could usefully take part in such an expedition.[3] Hodgson wanted the Indians to go to leeward, perhaps against Truxillo, but had been forestalled by an English privateer captain who had enlisted their reluctant support for a campaign to the southward, to some gold-mines at Veragua. It probably made little difference where they went, for though they surprised some places and destroyed some small Spanish forces, their ungovernableness in the hour of victory prevented them from profiting by it. The same useless success attended Hodgson in a second expedition which he made in 1742 with 700 Indians whom he had raised too late to take part in the attempt on Panama.[4] Beyond this the Moskitomen had no other military value in this war, except that in 1747, when the Spaniards were getting ready an expedition to destroy the English settlements in that part of the world, the Moskito war boats cruised actively against them and molested their preparations. Still, the tribe was a thorn in the side of the Spaniards which they could not draw out so long as the English were at Black

[1] Hodgson to Trelawny, April 8, 1740; Trelawny to Wager, July 26 and Aug. 29, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, iii. 563, April 24, 1741; comments of Gerrard on Trelawny's letter to Stone, October 1742, C.O. 137/57.

[2] Declaration of Edward King of the Mosquito Indians, March 16, 1739/40, C.O. 123/1.

[3] Wager to Vernon, June 21 and Aug. 20, 1741, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 46, 51.

[4] Trelawny to Wager, Aug. 29 and Sept. 12, 1740, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Trelawny to Newcastle, July 20, 1743, C.O. 137/57.

River, for it could only be attacked to any purpose by sea, which the English warships and the small craft of the few settlers prevented or rendered much more difficult.[1]

Trelawny had another interest in that part of the world—the promotion of an illicit trade with the Spaniards. He believed their country could be penetrated up rivers and Indian paths which their authorities could not watch, and that in return for English manufactures we could extract great quantities of Spanish produce, especially the fine Guatemala indigo, the best of its kind in the world. There was hardly any cultivation of indigo in the British colonies, that of Jamaica having languished into unimportance and that of Carolina being barely started; this was therefore a tropical product that would be the more welcome because it did not compete with any of our own, and furnished a dye which was useful to the English textile industries. Besides this, a way might be found to the Pacific sooner or later, and thus a South Sea trade established by an alternative to the Panama route.[2]

There were also some English settlers on the Moskito shore, living dispersed up and down the coast by fives and tens.[3] Some of them were mere misfits who chose to vegetate among the swamps surrounded by half-caste families. Others were traders of exceptionally low morals; so Hodgson said, but as he and Trelawny intended to combine a little private trade with politics he may have been prejudiced against them by their competition. Others again were rich 'masters of barcadiers' from the logwood settlements who thought their property safer behind the shoals and bars at Black River than at Belize.[4]

The most important of these was William Pitt, or Pitts, a man of great fortune and influence among the settlers, to whom the first establishment of the English at Black River was generally

[1] Spanish paper of Jan. 19, 1746, Add. MSS. 17566, ff. 170–7.

[2] Trelawny to Stone, Oct. 1742, C.O. 137/57; to Newcastle, Dec. 10, 1743, with paper enclosed, ibid.; 'Account of what has been done at Black River', ibid.; Vernon to Newcastle, Dec. 30, 1742, S.P. 42/92, f. 318; letter to Vernon, enclosed in his letter to Newcastle, Feb. 4, 1743/4, f. 328. See also a letter of William Lea, late South Sea Company's factor in Guatemala, March 3, 1740/1, Add. MSS. 32698, f. 145. This letter and Lea himself were sent out to Vernon at the end of 1741.

[3] In 1753 there were 106 whites and 240 coloured British subjects (C.O. 137/25, X 136). The character of the settlement is pretty clearly shown by the fact that the white men vastly outnumbered the white women, while the coloured women outnumbered the coloured men.

[4] A *barcadier* is the West Indian term for a wharf of any sort.

ascribed. He seems to have been the chief capitalist of the colony and to have bought a great part of its produce. He and some others continued to live on the Shore for safety while their partners cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras.[1] Whenever there was real danger from the Spaniards, the entire population removed from Honduras to Black River. Some said that this happened every year during the rainy season, but another witness denied that, for he said there was no time of the year when the cutters were not profitably employed on the spot; in the dry season they cut the logwood, and in the wet season, when the floods made cutting impossible, they floated it down the creeks to the shipping. However that might be—and the Board of Trade did not believe that this witness gave a fair account of the matter—there was some connexion between Belize and Black River.[2]

The 'Baymen', or logwood-cutters, had quite left their first and greatest head-quarters at Campeachy, and were now established round Belize in the Bay of Honduras. There were said to be about 500 of them. They were reputed to be more industrious and regular people than the squatters of Black River; they lived in comparative peace under a government of their own setting up, and some writers celebrated the probity and punctuality of their dealings. But their way of life troubled the imperial authorities, because, although they were mainly English subjects, they sold most of their wood—some said as much as three-quarters—to the Dutch. A great deal of the shipping which took off their produce was from New England; but that too carried it directly to Holland. This was an anomaly of long standing, but none the better for that. Since their settlement could hardly be called a British colony—in spite of the claims made on their behalf against the Court of Spain—this trade with foreigners could not technically be a breach of the Acts of Navigation; but could not this difficulty be overcome by giving them an established government and making them a regular colony?[3] Once or twice they had demanded such a

[1] Cusack to Vernon, Sept. 25, 1742, C.O. 137/57; Gerrard's comments, Feb. 23, 1742/3, ibid.; Cunningham to Trelawny, Dec. 1743, ibid.

[2] Gerrard's comments, Feb. 23, 1742/3, ibid.

[3] Cunningham to Trelawny, Dec. 1743; undated paper on Honduras, Vernon-Wager MSS.; Trelawny to Vernon, July 27, 1741, S.P. 42/90, f. 318; Vernon to Newcastle, Nov. 3, 1741, f. 389; Hodgson to Board of Trade, April 3, 1744, C.O. 323/11, N. 65. The same proposal had been made in Queen Anne's war (*C.S.P. Col. 1704–5*, 164, ii).

government for themselves, provided it were accompanied by a proper defence, such as the building of forts or stationing a ship of war in their river. The Dutch, they said, had offered them protection, if they would contract to sell them all their logwood; but they had declined it, preferring if possible to live under the dominion of His Majesty.[1] Now, plainly, was the time for a measure of this kind. Belize could not very well be annexed in time of peace, for fear of offending Spain; but since we were already at war, this was an opportunity to do it openly and then maintain it at a peace.[2]

This, however, was not Trelawny's scheme or Vernon's. They were more impressed by the possibilities of the little island of Ruatan, or Rattan as they called it, not very deep in the Gulf of Honduras.[3] It had one of the best harbours that were to be found in that part of Central America—though the champions of Belize said theirs was good enough—and a port so far to leeward might sometimes be useful to the men-of-war of the Jamaica station. As an island, it would be a suitable refuge for Baymen, Moskitomen, and settlers from Black River; but this merit was really less than it looked, since the Spaniards were unlikely to attack except by sea, and would find it harder to advance up a creek than to land on an island. Rattan was to be a sort of general head-quarters, or base-camp, for all the Englishmen and English shipping on both sides of Cape Gracias à Dios, a starting-point for illicit trade with Spaniards, and perhaps a post from which men-of-war or customs authorities could enforce the laws of Navigation and drive the Dutch out of the logwood trade.[4]

Some critics complained that Rattan was out of the way; that the logwood ships never came near it, so that it could be no protection to them; that the Baymen never had time or occasion to go so far afield; that Belize offered the same opportunities for

[1] Gerrard's paper of Feb. 23, 1743; Inhabitants of the Bay to Trelawny, April 28, 1743, C.O. 323/11, N. 67; Inhabitants to Parke Pepper, May 22, 1746, ibid., N. 84; Inhabitants to Caulfield, June 8, 1745, C.O. 137/57.

[2] Petitions of Parke Pepper, July 24 and 27, 1747, C.O. 323/11, N. 84 and 85.

[3] Hodgson afterwards claimed the merit of suggesting the settlement of Rattan (Hodgson to Knowles, Dec. 19, 1752, C.O. 137/60).

[4] Trelawny to Vernon, July 27, 1741, S.P. 42/90, f. 318; Vernon to Newcastle, Nov. 3, 1741, f. 389; Trelawny to Stone, Oct. 1742; Hodgson, 'Reasons for settling Rattan'; Trelawny to Newcastle, Dec. 10, 1743, C.O. 137/57; *Original Papers relating to the Expedition to Panama* (London, 1744), pp. 12, 131, 140.

illicit trade with the Spaniards as Rattan or Black River, and that to consolidate the settlement there would cost the Government nothing, while Rattan would—and did—cost a great deal.[1] There was probably truth in all this; for in spite of fortifications and a garrison of American soldiers, a ship of war generally stationed there, the influence of one of the chief logwood magnates, the liberal grants of land which Trelawny allowed him to make, the elaborate proclamation offering a free port, lands free from quit-rents for twenty years, a year's subsistence for every immigrant and his slaves—in spite of all this, the colony did not prosper.[2] After an auspicious beginning, the illicit trade with the Spanish dominions was not developed. The soil of the island was bad. Few inhabitants were attracted to it. Perhaps, as Trelawny said, they were afraid the Government would restore it at a peace; this was no uncommon reason for the shyness of settlers in new colonies. Trelawny lost most of his interest in it; his greater anxiety for the safety of Jamaica caused him to neglect that of Rattan.[3] It served some of the purposes for which it was intended, for in 1747, when almost all the Baymen were driven out of their settlements by fear of the Spaniards, they came to Rattan; but as they were afraid to venture back into the Bay from thence, they might just as well have been anywhere else.[4] When Rattan was restored to Spain according to the treaty of 1748, nobody seems to have much regretted it except Hodgson and the orators of the Opposition who wanted an opportunity of declaiming against the peace. The Spaniards themselves, when they tried to settle the island, found it impossible to attract inhabitants. The two more important settlements of Belize and the Moskito shore were saved by the want of formal annexation from the necessity of formal restitution.[5]

§ v. *Anson in the Pacific*

There was only one performance in America, during this war, that added anything remarkable to the history of the

[1] Gerrard's paper of Feb. 23, 1743, C.O. 137/57.

[2] Armstrong to Wentworth, Oct. 16, 1742, C.O. 137/57; Order in Council, Feb. 2, 1743/4, C.O. 323/11, N. 58; *A.P.C. Col.* iii. 761–9.

[3] Trelawny to Board of Trade, Dec. 19, 1743; C.O. 137/24 W. 64; Jamaica Council Minutes, July 20, 1747, C.O. 140/32.

[4] Trelawny to Newcastle, Aug. 9, 1747, C.O. 137/57.

[5] The English Government had some shadow of authority over Rattan in the nineteenth century; it was not formally ceded to the Republic of Honduras until 1860 (*Archives of British Honduras*, ed. Burdon, iii. 52–231, *passim*).

navy; that was Anson's campaign in the Pacific.[1] Anson received a general commission to do what he could where he could, and to take and fortify, if possible, some port or island as a permanent base for refitting the English squadrons. Only one definite enterprise could be recommended to him which would have any bearing upon the general course of the war; he was to try to communicate overland with Vernon, when he arrived off the Isthmus of Panama, and to concert a joint attack upon Panama city. This was no doubt a fruit of Bladen's original suggestion, out of which the plan of Anson's expedition grew: it had been represented that a settlement at Darien could not expect to maintain itself unless we held some posts on both sides of the isthmus—at Darien and Choco, or St. Mary's, or Panama itself.[2] For this purpose a strong naval force would be very useful. When, however, Anson at last approached Panama, he learnt that Vernon had already failed, so that no attempt at joint operations was ever made.

Anson's was not the first English force to penetrate the South Seas. Besides Sir John Narborough, who performed very little more than a voyage of exploration, there was a long list of privateering expeditions: Drake, Cavendish, the buccaneers who entered the Pacific over the Isthmus of Panama; Dampier, Woodes Rogers, and Shelvocke. Anson had, therefore, the light of some experience, some general principles were laid down; and his squadron, though a larger and more respectable force than its predecessors, only confirms their truth by its history.

The voyage out was a long one, the preparations must be exceptional and could hardly be concealed; Anson's voyage, like those of Dampier and Woodes Rogers before him, was no secret. In fact, the news was half round the world before he started. The delay was the fault of the Government, which was preoccupied by larger undertakings and unstable in its resolutions. It was indeed so long, that Anson had to get round Cape Horn in the very worst season of the year (from which his historian Walter deduces all his misfortunes and disappointments, especially the separation and shattering of his fleet and the enfeeblement of his crews by scurvy). The Viceroy of Lima

[1] See above, p. 76, for the connexion of this voyage with the proposed liberation of Spanish America.

[2] Tassell to Walpole, Sept. 11, 1739, Add. MSS. 32694, ff. 41–5; Anson's instructions, S.P. 42/88; Wager to Vernon, Aug. 6, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, p. 19.

had not only heard of his coming but had waited for him until he concluded the news could not be true, and accordingly revoked his precautions. If any secrecy could have been observed in England, it would have been broken on the way; for a squadron on so immense a voyage must call at some place for refreshments before attempting Cape Horn, and the custom was to take them in at St. Catherine's island off Brazil. From this place, by the perfidy of the Portuguese Governors or the ordinary trading intercourse of the River Plate, the news could not fail to reach Buenos Aires, whence it would be carried overland to Lima. Walter may have imagined that he was the first to point out this danger; but Shelvocke, in his advice to commanders intending for the South Seas, had earnestly recommended them to avoid the coasts of Brazil, for this very reason.[1] Walter, however, made a suggestion which had an important sequel; he asked whether we could not use the Falkland Islands as a stepping-stone to the Pacific?[2] This suggestion he presumably had from Anson himself, under whose influence the Board of Admiralty projected in 1750 a voyage to explore them, which was countermanded out of delicacy for the Court of Spain. The scheme survived Anson, was executed after the Peace of Paris, and produced the very acute Anglo-Spanish crisis of 1770.

Once in the Pacific, various questions arose. Where to go for wood and water? Where to cruise for the trade? What to do with the prizes? They nearly always answered themselves in the same way. For refreshment after the passage of Cape Horn, the two favourite places were Chiloe and Juan Fernandez Island; later in the cruise, in the latitude of Panama, it was Gorgona or the Galapagos islands. As the English adventurers repeated themselves, the Spaniards, who were ready to provide against the obvious though quite unprepared for the unexpected, got the habit of watching the likely places. A small squadron was sent at once to Juan Fernandez, on the news of Anson's approach, and had only just given him up and left it when he arrived. The island was much valued by the English for the wild goats who had multiplied there. The Spaniards, therefore, resolved to exterminate them by importing a race of dogs, who, if they did not succeed in killing them, nevertheless

[1] Shelvocke, *A Voyage Round the World* (reprint of 1928), p. 230.
[2] Walter, *A Voyage Round the World* (4th ed.), pp. 128–9.

deprived the English of them by rendering the survivors so agile that nobody could take them. In other known resorts of privateers the Spaniards took precautions to the same effect.

All the trade of the Pacific coast proceeded in an almost straight line north and south. The adventurers, therefore, need only stand in the track and take. They must not let anything that saw them escape them, or the alarm was raised. A general embargo would then be declared, and the game would be up. When their presence was known, as it must soon be, they might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb, and attempt to seize one of the towns in which some treasure might happen to lie. The greatest possible dispatch and surprise were necessary, or whatever was valuable, including the Governor, would be removed into the mountains, even a ransom would be denied, and bands of horsemen would appear on the heights behind the town, ready to fight. Anson could hardly have acted with more secrecy and speed than he did at the taking of Payta, yet he got little enough for his pains.

Suppose a great number of prizes or a rich plunder taken, it was often valueless. If it was money or provisions, very well. Never were portability and durability, those commonplace virtues of the precious metals, more highly appreciated than by captors in the South Seas; for they seldom had very much room in their own ships for what they took, and had an immense voyage over the Pacific before them, for which they must stow all the water and provisions they could carry. They might indeed man some of their prizes; but that could not go very far, for their crews could not suffice for many, even if they had all come round Cape Horn in perfect health, which was very unlikely. One captain at least (Clipperton) had suffered for weakening his forces by dividing them among too many prize ships. Therefore, unless the prizes contained provisions or goods of great value and small bulk, they were nearly useless. The captors might ransom them, or sell them to the Spaniards on the coast; but though this might be very well for privateers, it was beneath the dignity of a gentlemanly commander like Anson. Moreover the Spaniards often beguiled the captors in such bargains with a view to overcoming them by a surprise attack, or bullied them over the price, knowing they could not take the stuff away and could make nothing of it if they did not sell.

These expeditions to the Pacific always ended with an

attempt upon the Manila galleon off the coast of California. This was reported to carry the richest single cargo in the world, and was, therefore, a magnet to privateers. It conveyed the silver from Acapulco in Mexico to Manila, and returned laden with East India and China goods. The route and time of its arrival and departure were fairly regular, and as it came from such a distance, the returning galleon from Manila could hardly be forewarned against any definite danger. It was impossible, however, for the authorities at Acapulco not to know of it; and if there was any rumour of enemies on the coast, the sailing of the outward galleon from Mexico was commonly put off, as Anson found to his cost. The outward galleon carrying only money could disengage her lowest tier of guns; the returning galleon could not, for she was nearly always overloaded with bulkier goods. For all these reasons, it was generally the ship from Manila that was taken, not the galleon with the Mexican silver. Anson missed the first, and the second was not allowed to start while he was in the waters of Mexico. His originality, and the source of his great fortune, consisted in returning from Canton, where he went to refit, and taking the galleon which had sailed at last from Mexico, as it approached the Philippines.

After the attempt on the galleon, there was a long and dangerous voyage to be undertaken across the Pacific. The provisions and water were likely to give out, especially as the opportunities for procuring them on the Californian coast were not very good. The first islands in the route were Spanish; and to those that went farther, the jealous Dutch of Batavia gave cold comfort. Never was anybody in more danger of perishing than Anson, in this part of his voyage. From the East Indies the way was easy and frequented; but any cruise, however long, had to end in a new danger at the mouth of the Channel. Anson in fact found his way providentially through a French fleet which might very well have put an end to his career within sight of home, as the French South Sea ships *Louis-Érasme* and *Marquise d'Antin*, after rounding Cape Horn twice, were taken in fight off the Azores.[1]

[1] For the sources of these generalizations, see William Dampier, *A New Voyage Round the World* (1698); account of Dampier's 1703 voyage in Harris, *Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca* (1764); Woodes Rogers, *A Cruizing Voyage Round the World* (1712); Frezier, *A Voyage to the South Sea* (English translation, 1717); accounts of Betagh's and Clipperton's voyages in Harris; G. Shelvocke, *A Voyage Round the*

§ vi. *The Interception of Spanish Trade*

So much for expeditions. They were not the whole war. Some people, like Vernon, thought it could very well be fought without them, and that Spain would be most effectively reduced to terms by the destruction of her trade and shipping. At first sight this doctrine was absurd, for Spain had not a large merchant marine, and England stood to lose a great deal more, absolutely if not relatively, by a war of trade destruction. That indeed was one of the chief arguments of Walpole and his supporters against entering into one; but the Opposition turned it into a reason for directing all our efforts to the conquest of the West Indies.[1]

But if the whole maritime commerce of Spain in Spanish ships was small, some parts of it were very rich and very necessary. These were the *flotas* and galleons, the *azogues* and Register-ships, the Manila Galleon and the Armadilla of the South Sea. It had been a commonplace since Queen Elizabeth's reign that the way to fight Spain was to intercept the galleons; and considering the many times it was attempted and the few times it succeeded, the legend may be said to have lived a hard life and died a hard death. Piet Hein had taken a treasure-fleet in Matanzas Bay in 1628; Blake had taken some of the galleons and burnt the *flota*; the allied expedition to Vigo in 1702 had surprised them after their arrival in Spain; and Wager and Littleton had caught and destroyed some of them in 1708 and 1711. These successes were just enough to keep up hope; the more so as the value of the prize was so great in

World (1726); R. Walter, *A Voyage Round the World* (1748). See also the chapter on Anson's Voyage in Sir Herbert Richmond's history.

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 1193 (Hervey), xii. 253 (Talbot); *Britain's Mistakes in the Commencement and Conduct of the Present War* (London, 1740), p. 46. I do not know of any reliable statistics which show how far this expectation was fulfilled. Those of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, which give a comparison of English and Spanish losses down to Jan. 1, 1742, are very vague. They give 332 English losses against 231 ships taken by the Spaniards; but the valuation, by which they make the two figures almost balance each other, is obviously arbitrary; besides, like almost all English statistics on this point, they include neutral ships on the profit side. It appears fairly certain that Spanish trade was, on the whole, a lean prey, in spite of one or two extraordinarily rich captures, and that our gains did not balance our losses before the last years of the French war (vol. xi, pp. 689–98). Two interesting pamphlets were written on this subject: *Hireling Artifice Detected* (London, 1742) is hostile to the Ministry, and therefore makes the most of the losses and the least of the gains; it is controverted by *The Profit and Loss of Great Britain and Spain . . . impartially Stated* (London, 1742).

proportion to that of any other Spanish shipping that could be attacked.[1]

The last galleons had gone in 1737, and were still in Cartagena. A *flota* was to have sailed in 1739, but when the war broke out the voyage was cancelled. At that moment it happened that some *azogues* were at sea in their return to Spain, and the eyes of all England—all Europe, indeed—were fixed upon them. Haddock lay in wait for them off Cadiz; Vernon was ordered to halt in his voyage to Jamaica and cruise for them; but all preparations were vain, for instead of making for Cadiz or Galicia, they appeared unexpectedly at Santander in the Bay of Biscay.

After this, one of Vernon's chief objects was to deal with the galleons already at Cartagena. The treasure was still on the way from Lima, and the great fair of Portobello had not yet been held. The first thing Vernon did, after he arrived on his station, was to take Portobello and pull down the fortifications; and to make sure of his purpose, he destroyed, a few months later, the castle of Chagre, where the overland route for bulky goods from Panama came down to the sea. By doing so, he adjourned the fair *sine die*, or caused it to be held with great inconvenience elsewhere, for the galleons could never have ventured into an undefended harbour. Indeed they would probably not have dared, even if Vernon had left Portobello untouched, so long as he remained in superior force at Jamaica; for Portobello was well known to be much less defensible than Cartagena (and this was one of the reasons why the galleons never stayed longer there than they could help). Perhaps, therefore, Vernon's action did not make so much difference as he expected; moreover Portobello was not the only place where the fair could be held. All the trade of Santa Fé and Quito was usually done at the 'little fair' of Cartagena. The route from Cartagena to the Pacific was not easy, because of the Andes beyond Quito, but it was just practicable, as the precautions show which the Spanish Government had lately taken, in the interest of the regular fair of Portobello, to prevent it from being used.[2] In

[1] The Danes, of all people, thought of seizing the *flota* without any declaration of war, in order to revenge themselves upon Spain for some injuries and unpaid debts. The Court of France was very angry with them for this silly notion (Rouillé to Ogier, July 21, 1755, A.E. Danemark, 129; Ogier to Rouillé, July 22 and Aug. 12, ibid.).

[2] Juan and Ulloa, *Relación Histórica del Viage á la América Meridional* (Madrid, 1768), i. 108–10.

fact the galleons, which could do nothing at Portobello after Vernon had dismantled the forts, did hold a sort of a fair at Monpox, near Cartagena.[1] However, the trade had been fatally disorganized. The cargoes had to be sold on long credit, the assortments had been broken up and could not be replaced from Europe. Thus the seizure of Portobello and the long detention at Cartagena made a fine harvest for the illicit trade of Jamaica and Curaçao.

There was nothing more that Vernon could do against the galleons, unless he could destroy them in port or take them in their voyage. The first of these he tried to do at Cartagena by the useless bombardment of 1740, which his enemies described as 'using guineas to break windows'; next year he tried to effect the purpose by conquering the town. Neither he nor his successors could prevent the homeward fleet from collecting at Havana and returning to Spain with Torres in 1744;[2] but that was the only time, in the nine years' war, that a regular treasure fleet returned to Spain from the West Indies.[3] Reggio was preparing for a second attempt in 1748 when he met Knowles between Vera Cruz and Havana, fought an indecisive battle, and escaped into Havana; he did not come home, therefore, till after the peace was declared.

The interruption of the Spanish trade in general continued throughout the war to be a very important part of the navy's business, especially in the West Indies. Some very rich prizes were taken. The effect of these losses and delays upon the Spanish Government was not so great as it was expected to be;

[1] Vernon to Eslava, Oct. 13, 1741, S.P. 42/90, f. 396; Eslava to Larnage, Sept. 13, 1741, A.N. Colonies C^9 A. 55; Larnage to Maurepas, Oct. 13, ibid.

[2] Ogle seems to have made no attempt to intercept Torres, although he had kept back at Jamaica some almost unseaworthy ships in order to make himself equal to it. The reason for this may have been his natural lethargy, or the bewildering reports of his cruisers as to Torres's motions (but he seems to have got news before May 8 that Torres meant to sail home at the end of the month, which might have been almost time enough to try to find him, especially as he had a great part of his force together ready for an emergency). Or the real reason may have been that he was expecting a declaration of war against France and watching the motions of the French at St. Domingue. All he did was to send home an express to the Lords of the Admiralty, in order that they might, if they pleased, order the interception of the Spanish fleet in European waters; he had in fact already prepared them for the possibility of its departure (Ogle to Corbett, April 21 and May 8, 1744, Adm. 1/233).

[3] One Fournier complained in February 1747 that the owners of some French cargoes which had been sent out in 1730 and 1735 had not yet got their effects returned (A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2007, f. 124).

but they made a great difference to the regular lawful trade of the Spanish Empire. Only one treasure-fleet came back to Spain, and no galleons or *flotas* set out during the war. The form of the trade was entirely altered; instead of fleets, single 'Register-ships' sailed by special permission. The system was not entirely new, for it had long been used in the trade of minor or distant markets, such as Buenos Aires, Havana, and Campeachy, which could not conveniently supply themselves from the galleons and *flotas*. The 'register' was a list of the cargo, outwards and inwards, upon which duties or *indultos* were charged. All unregistered goods were subject to confiscation. Needless to say, there was a great deal of them, for the temptation to avoid the duties was very strong. In this respect the Register-ships did not differ from the galleons and *flotas*; what was new in the War of 1739 was permitting them to sail to the ports usually served by the galleons and *flotas*, and the greater latitude allowed them in choosing the port of their return. The Spanish Government drew the line, however, at Spanish ports; a Register-ship which returned, for example, to France on the pretext of necessity (but for the real reason that unregistered goods and moneys could more conveniently be unloaded there), got its owners, and especially those of the registered goods, into infinite trouble.[1] Another novelty—though it had precedents—was granting some permissions for Register-ships to foreigners, especially to Frenchmen.[2] Even Englishmen seem to have received them. Indeed, if they could settle matters with their own Court and their own privateers, they were more eligible candidates for such a favour than anybody else could be. That was not so easy. Messrs. Linwood and Clarmont petitioned the English Government for a pass for such a Register-ship, but although they pleaded the advantageous market for English manufactures, their proposal was rejected. However they might belittle them, the advantages which the Court of Spain was to receive by duties and the safe transport of its treasure would have been very great. It would indeed have

[1] A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 80, ff. 105 et seqq.

[2] Many of the Register-ships were French, and other vessels were sent out from France straight to the Spanish dominions, without any warrant from the Court of Spain. La Rochelle had fourteen ships out on the coasts of Spain in 1743, and the safety of these investments gave the Chamber of Commerce much anxiety; it tried in vain to persuade Maurepas to take measures for protecting this trade (E. Garnault, *Le Commerce rochelais au XVIII^e siècle*, vol. iii (Paris, 1891), pp. 79–82).

been a complete stultification of the war to break our own blockade in this way, and even Newcastle hardly wavered.[1]

These reforms of the galleon system were not unlike those which the French had desired in the War of the Spanish Succession. Neither the French nor other licensees of Register-ships had cause to be wholly satisfied with the new regulations. The Spanish Minister Campillo revenged himself for the smuggling of the English in America, which he could no longer prevent, by throwing every possible difficulty in the way of the French smuggling in Spain, which he could still in some measure control. In fact, the critics of his policy complained that his increased precautions against abuses by Spaniards or neutrals played into the hands of the English.[2] Registers were only granted at a great price, jealously, and for small quantities of money. In order to detect the unregistered, seals were broken, private correspondence read, and decrees of confiscation founded upon the evidence so obtained. These terrors fell equally upon the innocent and the guilty; for as the goods had still to be shipped in the name of a Spaniard, and the same Spaniard acted this part for a great number of foreigners, anything unlawful done by any of their correspondents, with which he was found to be connected, forfeited the goods of all his clients.[3]

Besides these official vexations, the trade was disorganized by the unusual method into which it was now thrown. The buyers of America, accustomed to reckon with galleons of more or less regular period and calculable value, could never tell in advance how many Register-ships would be granted or for what ports; so for fear of being undersold, or in hopes of a better bargain from later comers, they bought from hand to mouth. The 'strong purses' were shut, and the prices, after exceptional fluctuations, fell below the usual level. At the same time the exports from Spain to the West Indies were smaller than they would have been for the same period in the normal régime of galleons and *flotas*. For as the great middlemen discontinued or reduced their operations, their customers might as well buy from the English and Dutch smugglers. The first Register-

[1] A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 80, f. 66; *A.P.C. Col.* iii. 770–2; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 6, 1743, Add. MSS. 35407, f. 281; Hardwicke to Newcastle, Oct. 7, 1743, Add. MSS. 32701, f. 151.

[2] A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 82, ff. 44, 65–6.

[3] Ibid., vol. 80, ff. 105, 109; vol. 82, ff. 38 et seqq.

ships of the war made good profits because they came after a long suspension of trade; but those which frequented the Terra-Firma provinces round Cartagena were hardly able to sell their cargoes at all; and to make the matter worse, the merchants of Peru ordered back their treasures from Panama in the hope that Register-ships would come directly into the Pacific to deal with them.[1] Besides, the Register-ships were often taken, even though their tracks were more scattered and less predictable than those of the galleons and *flotas*. The author of a *mémoire* in the French Foreign Office calculated that out of 118 Register-ships which sailed from Cadiz between May 20, 1740, and June 27, 1745, 69 had been lost.[2]

These alterations had permanent results, for though the Mexican *flotas* were restored after the peace, the Portobello galleons never were. The economist Ulloa had discussed whether the trade-fleets ought to be kept up after the war, and decided for it. He believed that single Register-ships would overstock the markets. However, he recommended certain reforms, such as a larger tonnage, greater regularity of sailing, and direct voyages to the Pacific colonies; also the establishment of permanent warehouses in the colonies to supplement the annual fairs. The smugglers would have been discouraged and the prices kept steady by these means. Most of Ulloa's advice was disregarded, and the effect of the change was considerable. It diminished the profit of smuggling, especially at the Isthmus of Panama, for the Pacific colonies were better supplied by the ships which came round Cape Horn. The French Intendant at St. Domingue complained in 1755 that the Spanish trade was almost dead, except in provisions, and everything as cheap in the Spanish colonies as in the French. He wished for the galleons again; what better testimony to the Register-ships could there be?[3]

§ vii. *The Protection of Trade with the Spanish Enemy*

At the same time that the English navy interrupted the lawful trade between Spain and her colonies, the Government

[1] A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 82, ff. 45 et seqq.; vol. 81, ff. 175, 180.

[2] A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2007, ff. 105 et seqq.

[3] Ulloa, op. cit., ii. 99–128; Laporte-Lalanne to Machault, April 11, 1755, A.N. Col. C^9 A. 97. See the very similar remarks of Trelawny, in his 'State' of Jamaica, 1752, C.O. 137/25, X 101.

ordered it to defend the English smugglers. This was nothing new. The interlopers had been countenanced and protected in the War of the Spanish Succession, and the pretence that the Spanish colonies favoured or might be induced to favour the English candidate for the crown, was so thin that nobody can have thought of it as the real reason for this intercourse. The allies had made a self-denying ordinance against trade with the enemy; the Dutch were the first to break it, and the English in America could not long be restrained from following their example. The Governors of colonies were ordered to encourage the trade, except in provisions and contraband stores, and to restrain the privateers from interrupting it. The traders of Jamaica were convoyed to the Spanish coast and protected there, and the Board of Trade condescended to inform the London merchants whether English goods were wanted there according to its last advices. Finally, in 1707 Parliament passed an Act which forbade any molestation of the Spaniards in the important region of the isthmus, between Rio de la Hacha and Chagre. The Government approved of Gilligan's attempt to settle a slave-trade between Barbados and the Spanish colonies, and only drew the line at breaking the Navigation Acts by allowing Spanish ships to import goods into the English colonies.[1]

Vernon had been employed on the West India station in that war, and its precedents were not lost on him, as he showed by his first measures in 1739. 'I have a particular pleasure', he wrote to Newcastle, 'in the pleasing hopes of a revival of a trade so beneficial to his Majesty's subjects, that I have formerly seen flourishing here in great prosperity.'[2] One of his strongest reasons, though not the most ostensible, for demolishing the forts at Portobello and Chagre, was the help such a measure would give to the interlopers. They could only gain by the destruction of the strong places within which their enemies the *Guarda-Costas* were used to retreat. If those places should become open roads, at the command of any English ship of war, the trade of a *Guarda-Costa* would be a difficult one to follow. The neutral smugglers benefited from this liberation of their

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1702–3*, nos. 472, 487 (i), 1059, 1208 (i), 1243; *1704–6*, nos. 50, 116 (i), 285 (iii), 739, 871, 894, 994 (i); *1706–8*, nos. 350, 503, 593, 1073, 1108, 1250, 1477; *1708–9*, nos. 100, 111, 210, 226 (i), 445, &c. See also *C.S.P. Col. 1719–20*, nos. 247, 341 (i), 575.

[2] Vernon to Newcastle, Jan. 18, 1739/40, S.P. 42/85, f. 108.

trade as much as the English. This unexpected result annoyed the jealous English pamphleteers. Still, the Dutch were some sort of allies to us though they took the halfpence and left us the kicks; and their smugglers helped to make the Galleon Fair not only impossible but pointless, and lessened the returns to Spain.[1] It is significant that Knowles obtained help from the Dutch smuggling island of Curaçao for an expedition which should serve Porto Cabello as Vernon had served Portobello. The Dutch even imitated Vernon's example unofficially on their own account; the Spanish Ambassador had to complain at The Hague that a small force of small craft from Curaçao had destroyed the fortifications at Tucacas.[2]

The same desire to encourage trade evidently explains Vernon's surprising moderation at Portobello, where he spared the town and all it contained in order to make a good impression on the Spaniards. He published a proclamation offering them protection, and invited them to a free trade with all His Majesty's subjects.[3]

The Secretary of State, the Admiralty, the Opposition, and the merchants all applauded his prudence. At the request of the traders to Jamaica, the Government drafted a circular letter which ordered the colonial Governors to protect and favour the trade with Spanish America. Queen Anne's ministry had actually given such orders, but in 1739 the letter was not sent after all.[4] However, the Act of Parliament against trading with Spain during the war applied only to Spain in Europe, which

[1] Vernon to Newcastle, April 21, 1740, S.P. 42/85, f. 195; Pulteney to Vernon, Aug. 17, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, p. 25; *Hireling Artifice Detected*, p. 47; Ogle to Newcastle, Aug. 19, 1744, S.P. 42/89, f. 146.

[2] *Journal of the Expedition to La Guira and Porto Cavallos* (London, 1744), p. 29; St. Gil to the States-General, Dec. 28, 1741, S.P. 84/396, f. 9.

[3] Vernon to Burchett, May 26–31, 1740, Adm. 1/232. The value of Vernon's self-sacrifice is uncertain. His enemies made the least of it by hinting that there was nothing worth taking, but the Governor of Panama, who ought to know, remarked with astonishment in an intercepted letter that Vernon gave up 700,000 pieces of eight, of which his own share would have been an eighth (Martinez de la Vega to Philip V, Feb. 12, 1740, S.P. 43/90). Of course Vernon seized the King's treasure which he found in the fortress. A certain Colonel Burrard tried to account for Vernon's obstruction of the Panama expedition in 1742, by attributing it to partiality for the people of Portobello who had paid him well for it. This is ignorant and vindictive military tittle-tattle, and deserves no more credit than what Vernon's admirers said of Wentworth. Vernon was not that kind of knave (Add. MSS. 34097, f. 67; see also Silhouette to Amelot, March 28, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 407, f. 231).

[4] C.O. 5/5; Cabinet Minute, Nov. 12, 1739, Add. MSS. 33004, f. 23.

was as plain a hint as could be given without words, that intercourse with the Spanish colonies would be allowed.[1] The Government ordered Vernon to do all he could to protect and convoy it. The Act for encouraging privateers contained a clause which safeguarded the right of His Majesty's subjects to carry it on. The Opposition leaders and pamphleteers expatiated with pleasure on the useful trade which Vernon had opened with the Spanish settlements. Wager was loud in denouncing an English privateer who violated, a few months later, this neutrality of Portobello.[2] Merchants congratulated each other on the new markets for negroes and manufactures, and the orders that came into London for supplying them.[3] Indeed, it would not be too much to say that in the eyes of some people, the increase of our trade with the Spanish colonies was in itself a sufficient justification and motive of the war with Spain.[4]

Only the Spaniards and their friends deplored the success of these measures; not merely because it spoilt the market for the Cadiz trade, in which they were interested, but also because they believed that England, fortified by this new source of income against the severest taxation, would be able to continue the war for ever. Besides, it would accustom the merchants of the Spanish colonies to dealing with the English smugglers, and the habit might prove to be a permanent one when the war was over. English writers preferred to state the matter another way: we suffered great injury by our exclusion from the markets of old Spain, and it was only right that we should recover our losses in those of the new.[5]

In this war, as in the last, convoys were granted to the traders, even to the prejudice of services more important tacti-

[1] Byng to Board of Trade, Sept. 20, 1740, C.O. 28/25, AA 98.

[2] Wager to Vernon, June 10 and July 9, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 13 and 16. The people of Jamaica wanted Trelawny to put into the privateers' instructions a special clause forbidding them to molest anybody in Portobello, but Trelawny was not sure if he had the power to do it (Manning to Wager, March 25, 1740, C.O. 137/56, f. 331).

[3] Henry Lascelles and son to Richard Morecroft, March 28, 1740, W. & G. i; 'Paper procured by Mr. Stone's friend', July 3/14, 1740, S.P. 43/92.

[4] *Considerations on the War* (London, 1742), p. 34; *The Present Ruinous Land-War Proved to be a H——r War* (London, 1745), p. 24.

[5] Harris, *Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca*, i. 254; Van Hoey to States-General, Sept. 20, 1740, copy in A.E. Hollande, 436, f. 266; Silhouette to Amelot, Nov. 26, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, ff. 289–90; Larnage to Maurepas, Sept. 1, 1740, A.N. Col. C^9 A. 52.

cally.[1] Vernon was by no means indiscriminate in allowing all kinds of goods to be exported to the enemy; he exacted from the merchants an undertaking to load no contraband on their ships.[2] This given, he was ready to have them convoyed to the Bastimientos near Cartagena or the South Keys of Cuba. At the Bastimientos or at Baru, the ship of war lay at anchor, while the traders went off, or sent their boats, to neighbouring bays. Her commander had an opportunity, which he sometimes exercised, of taking into custody any ship which he suspected of carrying contraband. He seems to have accorded an equal protection to privateers and traders so long as they did not molest each other. Sometimes they even played into each others' hands, for the privateer would bring in prisoners whom the traders or the men-of-war could send with a flag of truce to the neighbouring Spanish towns, and create thereby a further opportunity for communication and trade. In the absence of a man-of-war, the traders were apparently protected by a fascine battery on shore. They sometimes made expeditions of their own against the Spanish forces gathering for the purpose of interrupting their business.[3] At the South Keys the warship had to stand a long way off the land; the traders or their boats went inshore every day to trade, and came out under her guns every evening. Sometimes she would send her boats with them, heavily manned and armed, to protect their trade. Whether this was a precaution against the Spanish officials or the mules who were an important item in this commerce, does not very clearly appear. The men-of-war would sometimes hunt out the galleys or xebecs which guarded this coast against illicit trade, and burn them or drive them into the swamps so far that the bushes hid them.[4]

[1] Ogle excused himself for making no attack on the French colonies at the outbreak of war in 1744, by the dispersion of his fleet in convoys (Ogle to Corbett, June 3, 1744, Adm. 1/233).

[2] Vernon to Newcastle, Jan. 18–31, 1739/40, S.P. 42/85, f. 107; Orders to Maynard, Oct. 1, 1740, ibid., f. 358.

[3] There is an account of an expedition of this kind, fitted out in September 1742 by two English vessels, four Dutch, and two French, against some Spanish *piraguas* preparing to surprise them (Deposition of the second mate of the *Fortune*, de Kaudran, H.C.A. 42/28).

[4] Captains' Logs, H.M.S. *Montague*, Adm. 51/615; *Sea Horse*, Adm. 51/903; *Fowey*, Adm. 51/340; *Enterprize*, 51/319; *Biddeford*, Adm. 51/110. A comparison of the trade of Jamaica and Barbados shows the importance of the convoys. The trade of Jamaica with the Spanish colonies increased during the war; that of Barbados declined, so that the slave-dealers had to look out for new markets. The difference

The convoys saved the traders great expenses in the manning and arming of their ships. The commanders-in-chief on the station charged a fee for these services—five per cent. was said to be the rule. It was contrary to orders and tradition to demand convoy-money; but the payment was masked under a more respectable charge for freight of the bullion which the men-of-war would, for greater safety, bring home to Jamaica for the traders. The Lords of the Admiralty thought this allowable, though five per cent. seemed, as they said, an extraordinarily high rate of freight. It was not complained of in this war until the great quarrel between the merchant Edward Manning and Admiral Davers in 1745, in which it appears that Manning was angry with Davers because he would only grant a general convoy, not a private one for Manning's sloops alone.[1]

The Spaniards were not the only enemies against whom the traders had to be protected. The old Jamaica antagonism between traders and privateers reappears in this war. Some of the privateers declared, what was probably true in law, that they had the right to take His Majesty's subjects found in trade with His Majesty's enemies. One John Ford put this detestable doctrine in practice by shadowing, and attempting to seize, a Jamaica ship trading at the South Keys. Christopher Edzery, or Edsbury, revived a still more injurious custom from the last war. He appeared off the South Keys, where he had been known as a trader, and sent in to the merchants the list of an imaginary cargo; when they came out to deal with him, he seized them and the money they had brought with them. The trading interest of Jamaica exclaimed with virtuous horror to Vernon, who sent a special convoy under Captain Boscawen, to protect the trade against such spoil-sports, and to restore the shaken confidence of the Spaniards on the south side of Cuba.[2]

can only be explained by the lack of convoy from Barbados (Robinson to Newcastle, Nov. 27, 1742, C.O. 28/46).

[1] Deposition of Manning, Nov. 10, 1745, Adm. 1/233; Counter-address of merchants to Davers, Nov. 23, 1745, ibid.; Lords of the Admiralty to Newcastle, Sept. 29, 1746, S.P. 42/31, f. 245. Commodore Kerr had given great offence by demanding money for convoying the traders of Jamaica in 1707 (*H.M.C., H. of L. MSS., N.S.*, vii. 99–111; *Lords Journals*, xviii. 449–50. According to an anonymous memorial of 1724, a percentage of the value of cargoes was usually paid to the men-of-war captains for this purpose (C.O. 388/28 R 155).

[2] Petition of the Merchants to Trelawny, ? Sept. 1740, S.P. 42/85, f. 355; Affidavit of Richard Lee, f. 356; Boscawen to Vernon, Nov. 27, 1740, f. 420; Vernon to Newcastle, Jan. 5, 1740/1, S.P. 42/90, f. 4. Perhaps the excesses of the English

This official protection from our own privateers was only enjoyed by the ships in the Spanish trade; on the contrary, in the trade with the French West Indies it was sometimes the privateers who protected the contrabandists against the men-of-war.[1]

The trade was so well protected during the war, that it probably increased. This is not quite certain, because the shipping registers of Jamaica hardly exist for the 1730's; but the vessels returning from the Spanish West Indies were more, absolutely and in relation to the total shipping of Jamaica, during the years 1743–6 than in any period for which deductions can be drawn after the peace.[2] Too much, however, must not be built upon these figures. In the first place, the smuggling trade of Jamaica was only one way of sending goods to the Spanish colonies during the peace; in war it was almost the only one, and might reasonably be expected to carry more goods. Besides, many of the ships returned to Jamaica in ballast or with unsold goods during the war. Ballast might be the sign of a good voyage, for when vessels brought home the returns in money (which is never declared in these statistics), they had to come in ballast. Returned goods, however, can only signify some kind of failure; but the statistics do not reveal the quantities, still less the cause, whether obstruction of the trade by Spanish officials or merely overstocked markets. Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that the trade of Jamaica to the Spanish colonies flourished best in war, and there were many complaints of dull markets in Jamaica after the peace, which were attributed to the cessation of trade with the Spanish colonies.[3]

The same statistics show a decline after 1743. In that year

privateers were the reason why the dispatch of vessels from Jamaica to Portobello was countermanded at the end of 1740, 'it being looked upon as too hazardous' (Henry Lascelles to Murray Crymble and George Peete, Jan. 27, 1740/1, W. & G. i). For a description of similar practices in the War of the Spanish Succession see *Parl. Hist.* x. 840 (Bladen), and *C.S.P. Col. 1704–6*, nos. 739, 871.

[1] For a further discussion of this subject, see Chapter IX.

[2] C.O. 142/15. I have to take the years 1743–6, for which the figures are nearly perfect; if those of 1740–2 had existed in full, they would probably have strengthened the impression, for the trade seems to have been better in the beginning than the middle of the war.

[3] *Gentleman's Magazine*, xix. 410; Trelawny's 'State of the Island of Jamaica, 1752', C.O. 137/25, X 101; petition of the Council and Assembly to George II, Nov. 20, 1752, ibid., X 115; William Lloyd to Henry Lloyd, April 29, 1749, *N.Y.H.S. Collections*, 1926, pp. 421–2. There is a good account of the trade in Add. MSS. 38373, ff. 130–1, a document of about 1763.

84 ships returned to Jamaica from the Spanish colonies, in 1744 there were 44, in 1745 there were 38, and 47 in 1746. Complaints of loss and dullness of trade had already been made in 1742;[1] they may have been caused by the number of Registerships granted by the Court of Spain, or by the admittance into Spain of English goods in Dutch bottoms.

However, there were great schemes on hand. Some ships with quicksilver and Papal Bulls bound for Vera Cruz had been carried into Jamaica. If ever there was a cargo which the Spaniards would wish to ransom, it was quicksilver and Papal Bulls; without the former, the silver of Mexico could not be refined, and the latter were among the commonest necessaries of life all over Spanish America. A treaty was set on foot between Edward Manning and the Viceroy of Mexico, through the mediation of the French Governor's secretary at St. Domingue.[2] It came to nothing because the Viceroy would not admit English ships into Vera Cruz, and the Navigation Acts and Anglo-French Treaty of 1686 forbade not only Spanish but French ships from coming to Jamaica.[3]

Later in 1744, one Pedro de Estrada appeared in Jamaica with a recommendation from Governor Tinker of the Bahamas, in order to buy and carry away the Spanish prize goods.[4] It often happened that the ransom or repurchase of prize cargoes served as a pretext or introduction to a more extensive trade between enemies. It was so in this instance. The Bulls and quicksilver seem to have been an unprofitable venture, but next year Estrada was back again with a licence to the Governor of Havana to propose a trade for '2,000 Negroes, flour, rice, pulse, hams, sheet-lead, tin, pictures, linseed-oil, window-glasses, sail-cloth, several sorts of merchandise, and other effects as household furniture, diamonds set, looking-glasses and other small things'.[5] Some of these articles, such as sail-cloth and cordage, both Trelawny and Davers thought improper to be exported; but for the rest, they were willing to let the scheme go forward.

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, xii. 218, 601.

[2] Edward Manning had been an agent of the South Sea Company, and had some of its effects in his hands at the outbreak of war—most of which he succeeded in detaining for ever. At first an enemy, then an ally and perhaps a partner, of Governor Trelawny, he was later a leader of the mercantile or Kingston party in the Assembly, of which he became Speaker.

[3] Larnage to Maurepas, March 11, 1744, A.N. Col. C^9 A 64.

[4] Trelawny to Newcastle, Aug. 16, 1744, C.O. 137/57.

[5] Paper enclosed by Trelawny to Newcastle, Nov. 15, 1745, C.O. 137/57.

Trelawny seems to have doubted whether he did right to allow it, but in view of what had been practised throughout the war, his nervousness is hardly comprehensible unless he was interested in Manning's scheme or it was one of unusual size. Though there might be a distinction between a loose, unauthorized smuggling and a formal contract with a Viceroy, this was not the first instance of the latter kind. Trelawny consoled himself with the authority of Governor Tinker, and with the reflection that if we had not accepted this trade it would have fallen into the hands of the Dutch. The Council of Jamaica supported him; it expressed the opinion that the trade to the Spanish colonies was a beneficial one, especially because it promoted the exportation of prize goods. It desired that this trade might be put under some definite regulation in order that the merchants engaged in it might be emancipated from the caprices of the naval commanders-in-chief.[1]

Estrada was the cause of one of those elaborate and noisy quarrels into which Governors and Admirals often got themselves in the West Indies. Davers seems to have repented of his consent, and to have set up his friends in the Assembly to make difficulties. They denounced Estrada as a spy, and accused him of causing the Jamaica shipping to be captured by reporting its movements to the Spaniards. No doubt he saw what he could; nobody who went about that kind of errand in the West Indies omitted doing so. He was embarrassed by his connexion with the Havana Company; it had introduced into the Caribbean the xebecs which preyed with such unexampled success upon the illicit traders in the South Keys. This was not the only way in which he injured the South Keys traders. They would probably be superseded (though some denied it) by an authorized trade to Havana; nobody will smuggle through the back door when the front door is open to him. Perhaps this is why the body of small merchants were on Davers's side against Manning in this dispute as in that of the convoys. The other aspects of the quarrel are unimportant. Very likely, as Estrada said, the clamour was raised by those merchants who had not succeeded in coming to terms with him, against the pernicious projects of those who had. Other sources of bitterness became mixed with the controversy; nothing definite can be extracted

[1] Trelawny to Newcastle, Nov. 15, 1745, C.O. 137/57; Jamaica Council Minutes, Nov. 11, 1745, C.O. 140/31.

from it, but I have the impression that on this issue, as on others, Davers supported the small traders against Trelawny who was in sympathy—his enemies said in partnership—with the big business firm of Manning and Ord.[1]

This venture seems to have come to no good in spite of the countenance with which it was started. Messrs. Lascelles and Maxwell, who did not think very well of the Havana Company or its credit, later advised a correspondent to have nothing to do with it.

'We know, that people of Jamaica have had contracts with the same Company, to supply it with Negroes and a proportion of flour, that Messrs. Manning and Ord have introduced many negroes into the Havannah, where we are informed, a huge balance is due to them, and although Manning has often gone there since the peace, he has not been able to recover payment.'[2]

They referred later to another misadventure.

'We remember an instance of the Governor of the Havannah executing a passport for the introduction of Negroes who died soon after, and some people from that island under the sanction thereof, sent down a cargo of slaves in the last war to the Havannah, where they were actually seized and condemned under pretence of an illicit trade. The owners of the cargo it 's true appealed from the sentence to the Court of Spain, and after many years' trouble and a vast expence, obtained a reversal of the sentence, and an order for restitution from the Treasury, at the Havannah of the money arising from the sale of the cargo. There was some restitution made of money, but it fell short one third of the original cost and cargo of the charges. We have heard of other instances of the kind, and we think that no people of common prudence would ever be drawn into such a precarious trade however alluring the prospect may be made to them of great gain.'[3]

Although the English Government protected and encouraged the trade with the Spanish colonies, it forbade all intercourse with Spain in Europe. Philip V decreed the exclusion of English manufactures from all the Spanish dominions, no matter by

[1] Trelawny to Newcastle, Nov. 15, 1745, C.O. 137/57; Council Minutes of Jamaica, Nov. 11 and Dec. 2, 1745, May 14, 1746, C.O. 140/31; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, iv. 21–37.

[2] Lascelles and Maxwell to Dominick Lynch, Jan. 10, 1753, W. & G. vi.

[3] Same to Thomas Stevenson and Sons, May 6, 1758, W. & G. viii; see also Manning to Drake and Long, Feb. 21, 1753, S.P. 94/145; Estrada to Drake and Long, April 18, 1755, S.P. 94/148.

whom imported, and the English Parliament retaliated by an Act which contained some remarkable omissions; it only applied to Europe and only restrained imports. Even this limited prohibition was not universally held to be wise. Some pamphleteers defended it as a necessary reprisal for that of Spain, and argued that it would hurt Spain more than ourselves; most of our imports from Spain were luxuries, or they could be replaced from other countries, and if there was any article like dyestuffs which we must have from Spain, it should be excepted from the prohibition.[1] The commerce between Englishmen and Spaniards in Europe was thought to be equally advantageous to both; indeed, some maintained that we were Spain's best customer, and took off most of her wine, oil, and fruit. The smuggling trade which was carried on in America was advantageous to us alone. Therefore we should do Spain as much injury as possible by cutting off the former, and developing the latter in spite of her.[2] The author of the *Essay on the Causes of the Decline of the Foreign Trade* withered these calculations with a breath of reason. He showed that by prohibiting the use of Spanish goods we were only giving other nations an unnecessary monopoly against ourselves. For example, the price of Gallipoli oil had almost doubled since the prohibition.[3] If Spain had taken the lead in this absurd policy, she only hurt herself and there was no reason for us to follow her. Why tax ourselves unnecessarily in order to hurt the Spaniards, just at the time when we needed all our resources for carrying on the war?[4]

In spite of these arguments the Act stood, though it was not entirely in force. Both imports and exports to Spain sank to less than a fifth of their ordinary volume, but they did not cease altogether.[5] Moreover the King of Spain succeeded better in blocking our exports than the Parliament of England in restraining our imports. In 1740 and 1745 the latter exceeded the former—the only times that this happened for half a century. This appears to disprove the assumption that our trade was more necessary to Spain than hers was to us. It is not certain

[1] There was a special Act of Parliament in 1708 for allowing cochineal to be imported from Spain (*H.M.C., H. of L. MSS., N.S.*, viii. 557, 562, 592).

[2] *The Advantages and Disadvantages which will attend the Prohibition of the Merchandizes of Spain, impartially examin'd* (London, 1740).

[3] See the petitions in *C.J.*, Feb. 2, 8, and 9, 1742/3, xxiv. 401, 410, 413.

[4] In Lord Overstone's *Select Tracts*, pp. 263–5.

[5] See Sir Charles Whitworth's tables, *State of the Trade of Great Britain* (1776).

how much ought to be allowed for exports through neutrals. The Dutch and the French were the most likely to do this business for us. In fact our exports to France were considerably higher than usual between the outbreak of the Spanish and French wars; those to Holland rose little before 1743. Although the Spanish Government at first forbade the importation of English manufactures in any kind of ships, there are evidences that the neutrals, especially the French, broke this rule quite early in the war. The Dutch shipping entered at Cadiz did not increase at all between 1738 and 1742, but the French almost doubled.[1] In 1742 the Spanish Ambassador announced verbally at The Hague that his Court would admit English goods in Dutch bottoms.[2] From that time the Dutch may have carried more English goods to Spain. Before the end of the war the prohibition of English goods in Spain was described as a dead letter.[3] However, it caused enough inconvenience to make the trading interest of England very anxious to remove it. Horace Walpole, who had introduced the Bill of 1739 for prohibiting the trade with Spain, moved in 1747 for its repeal; and though the proposal was not passed into law, the House of Commons requested the King to take off the prohibition as soon as Ferdinand VI removed it on his side.[4] The King of Spain declined to remove it, perhaps believing that the English were now more desirous than his own subjects for a renewal of commercial relations, and that the suspension would put more pressure on

[1] A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 82, f. 46.

[2] Trevor to Carteret, May 1, 1742, S.P. 84/397, f. 38.

[3] A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 82, f. 16.

[4] Walpole to George II, Jan. 19, 1746/7, in Coxe's *Horatio Walpole* (1802), p. 317; *C.J.*, Feb. 24, 1746/7, xxv. 299. According to a note in the *Gentleman's Magazine* (xvii. 76), the reason for the repeal was the smuggling of Spanish wines. The chief objection to it was the breach of the Navigation Acts which it must involve, by letting neutral ships carry on a trade which England did not allow in time of peace. It was hardly to be expected that Spain would let English ships enter her ports in time of war, even for the purpose of carrying off Spanish produce. In fact we learn that she did not, from the intercepted letter of Squillace to Moreno, Feb. 20, 1762 (Adm. 1/4125, no. 57). Squillace announced that the King of Spain would grant the people of the Canaries the same favours as in 1741 and 1743, namely the right to admit provisions and other necessaries of English manufacture in the shipping and for the account of neutrals but not of English subjects. At the end of 1746 the Canary merchants of London tried to obtain from the English and Spanish Courts permission to carry on this trade in English ships, but I do not think they succeeded (Add. MSS. 32709, f. 215). The New Englanders continued, however, to import Teneriffe wines disguised in Madeira pipes (see the case of the *Orotavo* discussed by Weeden in his *Economic and Social History of New England*, p. 604).

England than on Spain.[1] The trade was not reopened until the preliminary treaty had been signed.

There was nearly an important exception in the last year of the war. Although there had been no great conquests or campaigns on the West African coast, the French slave-trade had been almost completely destroyed.[2] Perhaps the Spaniards could have relied on the Dutch or Portuguese, but these must have been insufficient, for in 1747 the Ministers of Ferdinand VI allowed Don Joseph Ruiz de Noriega to come to England in order to make a contract with the merchants for furnishing, 3,000 slaves at Cartagena. The English Government seems to have permitted one George Fryer to deal with him. Fryer, having made his bargain, petitioned for English passports to cover his ships. The South Sea Company suddenly intervened, urging that to relieve the Spanish colonies' need of slaves was to relieve the Spanish Government's need of peace. It complained also that if the markets were overstocked with slaves during the war, the renewal of its Assiento at the peace would be valueless. Plainly the Company hoped to make enormous profits by supplying the Spanish dominions with an article of which they had been more or less starved for nine years. It is not very clear what happened. Newcastle seems to have been impressed by the Company's arguments, and to have refused the passports. Fryer appears, however, to have begun to carry out the contract so far as it lay in him to do so; and it was the Spanish officers at Cartagena who put an end to the business by ordering his negroes back to Jamaica. He failed to get satisfaction out of Noriega, who died insolvent, so he petitioned the King of Spain after the peace and got permission to introduce the 3,000 negroes in his own name.[3]

The war of 1739 was unmistakably a war for trade. Its effect was to protect and increase certain branches of illicit commerce with the Spanish dominions. It may only have done this at the expense of other branches; moreover it would perhaps be too much to say that this was the only object for which the war was

[1] Le Man to Huescar, Feb. 16, 1748, Add. MSS. 32811, f. 169.

[2] Gaston Martin, *L'Ère des négriers* (Paris, 1931), pp. 225–9. The figures given for Nantes, the chief slave-trading port of France, are probably representative.

[3] Memorial of Noriega, Add. MSS. 32809, f. 55; Tabuerniga to Newcastle, July 15, 1747, f. 53; South Sea Company to Newcastle, May 21, vol. 25561, f. 101; Fryer to Stone, March 24, 1747/8, vol. 32714, f. 373; Bedford to Keene, April 10, 1749, S.P. 94/135; Keene to Bedford, Oct. 13, 1749, S.P. 94/136.

begun. However, it was certainly one of the objects; and the neutrals, who saw the result quite clearly, could hardly be expected, in that age of imperialist competition, to sit quiet and see the English merchants, supported by the English navy, run away with the most envied prize of America.

IV

FRENCH INTERVENTION, 1739–41

§ i. *French and Dutch Interests in Spanish America*

Up to this point the relations of England and Spain have been treated, for the sake of convenience, as if they had been isolated from the interference of any third power. In fact, however, the diplomacy of other courts was very much concerned with those relations and with their consequences. England and Spain became the centre of a storm which threatened to cover all western Europe. The Dutch Republic struggled with ingenuity and success to preserve its neutrality, but only an accident saved France from entering the war in the winter of 1740–1. After a very narrow escape, the English and French Governments kept up the appearance of peace at sea for the next few years, and did not come to an open rupture until 1744.

Any dispute which affected the Spanish West India trade interested all the commercial nations of Europe, particularly the French and Dutch. The settlement which had been internationally guaranteed at Utrecht was the foundation of the balance of power in America, and no innovation could be made by force or agreement without arousing the diplomacy of France and the Dutch Republic to vigilance and action.

The English Government tried to persuade them that they were as much interested as itself in securing the free navigation in America. That was only a half-hearted and unsuccessful hint to France, but to the States-General of the United Netherlands the argument was insistently and plausibly repeated. The difference is easily explained. Exemption from the right of search was not the most important interest that France had in the question, but it concerned the Dutch more closely.

The interests of the Dutch were nearly the same as those of the English. Curaçao was to them what Jamaica was to us, a base for smuggling into the Spanish colonies. It was an older settlement than Jamaica, and had never existed for any other purpose. Some merchants of Holland traded through Cadiz as well—so did some merchants of England; but the Dutch Government, like the English, identified itself with the American smuggling rather than the regular trade. The Spaniards

treated the shipping of Curaçao in the same way as that of Jamaica, and its grievances were the same. The *Guarda-Costas* took Dutch vessels not only between Curaçao and the Spanish coasts, but on the way home to Europe. Vandermeer, the representative of the States-General at Madrid, had the same complaints to make as Keene, and they made a practice of supporting each other.[1]

A dispute had arisen between Spain and the States-General at the same time as that of England and Spain which ended in the War of Jenkins' Ear. Keene intended that both these negotiations should run the same course to the same result, and that Spain should be forced to yield to the simultaneous pressure of the two nations, whose unanimous firmness might compel what neither could obtain alone. With that view he stiffened Vandermeer's memorials, and drew attention, in their joint interview with La Quadra, to the menaces which he had himself inserted. He hoped the States-General would enforce their requests and commit themselves to acting with England, by arming some ships of war. He was disappointed. La Quadra, though firm, was not outrageous, and the wrath of the Dutch petered out in indecision, as it so often did.[2]

Keene was displeased; a few months later he was furious, for he believed that the States-General were about to give away England's case as well as their own, by offering to forbid their subjects to trade with the Spanish West Indies. He wrote on this subject a letter which is a remarkable example of national selfishness.

'The Republic, by going such lengths barely for beginning a negotiation, would throw away and deprive itself of one of the best and most essential means of carrying on and concluding a negotiation, that may have been successfully begun; and 2^{dly}, by this previous step they would forestall and undersell, what His Majesty may possibly think proper to offer, according to the course and exigency of our negotiation; it being certain, that as France has made some tacite agreement on this head, and that if the States should be now so hastily coming into it, the Court of Spain would attempt to draw us into the same measures, merely out of the force of example, and not by an equivalent allowed us for a new precaution we have never, as yet, formally taken in favour of the

[1] Newcastle to Keene, Sept. 26, 1737, S.P. 94/129.

[2] Keene to Newcastle, June 23 and 30, July 7, Aug. 18, Dec. 15, 1738, S.P. 94/131.

exclusive commerce of Spain, and in terror of such of the King's subjects as should intrude upon it, in contravention to the treaties. I do not pretend, My Lord, to insinuate, that such measures may be agreeable to our constitution, or the present temper of our people. For let me suppose they are not, or ever will be so, yet it seems highly important to His Majesty's service, that the Dutch should not be so generous, at our expence, since no art will be able to convince these people of the sincerity of our intentions, if we do not consent to the same methods of prohibiting illicite commerce, that the popular Government of Holland would so hastily and roundly agree to. But if on the other hand, it should both be thought feasible and necessary . . . in that case, it will be impossible for us to get as much, or indeed any advantage from such a concession on our parts, as if we had the sole management of it, both as to the substance, the time, and the manner of making and agreeing to it.'[1]

In other words, the Dutch were to stand out when we stood out, and climb down when we climbed down. When we both stood out, they were to have at least half the danger and reproach; when we both climbed down, they were to have less than half the merit. That was the usual English conception of Anglo-Dutch co-operation, and it is no wonder that the States-General were beginning to shrink from such a leonine partnership.

Their controversy with Spain drifted gently to and fro without much definite direction—all Dutch negotiations of the time had a natural tendency to do that; and when the war broke out between England and Spain, the States-General were by no means implicated in it. Possibly there was a good reason why the question was a less pressing one for them. The Governors of Curaçao seem to have granted reprisals against the Spaniards; some of the smuggling vessels of that island went heavily armed, and in their encounters with the *Guarda-Costas* they gave as good as they got.[2] Perhaps this made the dispute harder to settle in the end, for it was complicated by counter-complaints of counter-depredations; but it was a reason why the States-General should be in no hurry to take the initiative of settling it, for their subjects could in some degree defend themselves.

[1] Keene to Newcastle, March 16, 1739, S.P. 94/133. The question is dealt with in an interesting letter from Trevor to Keene, of which there is a copy in the Waldegrave MSS. (April 9, N.S., 1739). Trevor thought the Dutch quite undetermined whether to throw in their lot with us or to make a better bargain for themselves; and if the latter, whether by *complaisant* or vigorous measures.

[2] See the Resolution of the States-General, Oct. 14, 1739, translated in S.P. 84/382, ff. 50–8; Trevor to Harrington, Nov. 6, 1739, ff. 76–7.

The situation of France was very different. There were, indeed, French colonies whose lawful navigation was exposed to the same dangers as the English. In particular, the French half of Hispaniola was very much in the same position as Jamaica. All its outward trade was forced to pass near the coasts of Spanish S. Domingo, and the shipping of the southern and western quarters might also find it convenient to go home round Cuba and through the Gulf of Florida.[1] Some Frenchmen admitted the existence of this difficulty, and their Government openly, though perfunctorily, recognized it, in order to claim the merit of impartiality by insisting that France was no advocate of the right of search.[2] The argument was even turned ingeniously against the English: France, it was said, being herself interested in the freedom of navigation, had a right to prevent the English smugglers from provoking the *Guarda-Costas* to an excessive severity; it was not fair that all trading and colonial powers should suffer for the abuses of one.[3]

The French colonies had also their smugglers to the Spanish West Indies. In the routine instructions to Governors and Intendants, the Minister of the Marine said that this trade was thought advantageous upon the whole, though it was liable to abuses. If it was properly carried on, it provided a market for rum and molasses, the by-products of sugar, which could not be used in France because they would compete with the brandy of the country; it might also be a means to dispose of some French manufactures. The return cargoes consisted of mules, which were indispensable to the production of sugar, and money, which alleviated the apparently incurable shortage of currency in the colonies. It was true that the colonists used the licences for this trade in very improper ways, by carrying sugar to the English and Dutch colonies and smuggling home slaves, but that could be prevented with care, and the trade was in itself worthy of encouragement.[4]

In spite, however, of this official benevolence, the trade did

[1] Most of the instances of this are in the French wars with England; they seem to be accounted for by the presence of English warships off Cape Nicola, rather than wind or weather.

[2] Fénelon to Amelot, Sept. 15, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Silhouette to Amelot, Dec. 24, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, ff. 360 et seqq.; A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, 9, f. 104.

[3] Conversation of Fleury, reported by Van Hoey to States-General, Sept. 10, 1740, copy in A.E. Hollande, 436.

[4] Instructions to Ranché, Intendant of the Windward Islands, Jan. 22, 1744,

not flourish like that of Curaçao and Jamaica. It is difficult to see why. No French colony was so admirably situated for smuggling as Jamaica or even Curaçao; but St. Louis, on the south side of French St. Domingue, ought to have been well enough placed, and Martinique was not too far to windward. There was no lack of merchants with capital and ability; for the *commissionnaires* of Martinique were at least as active and powerful as those of any English island except Jamaica. Martinique had plenty of seamen and shipping, and what trade was done between the French and Spanish colonies, mostly centred there. In St. Domingue the men and capital were probably all employed in the immense task of developing the plantations.

Perhaps the comparative failure of the French in the smuggling trade is best accounted for by supposing that they were undersold by the Dutch and English; they seem to have preferred the Cadiz trade, which was all based on calculations for keeping up prices, to the freer competition of the speculative smugglers, who were often in danger of overdoing their markets or suffering by the arrivals of galleons and *flotas*. One or two French writers, drawing, as it would seem, a bow at a venture, suggested that the French traders demanded higher profits than the English, who would not only take less, but spared out of their gains enough to bribe the Spanish Governors more handsomely than their rivals.[1] This was probably the wrong way of putting the facts; it was not so much a love of excessive profit as the high overhead charges which hindered the French competitor. French shipping seems to have been less cheaply navigated than English, and if, as the French ambassador told Keene, it was heavier armed and manned in this trade, the difference in favour of the English must have been accentuated, especially as the English were sometimes saved by convoys from the counterbalancing risks of the *Guarda-Costas*. Perhaps the French traders and manufacturers at home had smaller resources than the English; but the returns through Cadiz were so slow that at least the same capital must have been necessary to procure the same profits as in the smuggling trade, and on a smaller volume of business.

Whatever the reasons, the French traders and the French

A.N. Colonies B. 78; to Conflans, Governor of St. Domingue, July 16, 1747, B 85; Machault to Vaudreuil and Laporte-Lalanne, Jan. 31, 1755, B 101.

[1] A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2009, 'Annotations', ff. 171 et seqq.; 'Mémoire sur l'Amérique', A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2008, f. 82.

Government identified themselves with the trade of the galleons and *flotas* rather than that of the American colonies; their interest in the controversy with Spain was therefore not the same as that of England and Holland. They were certainly not eager to yield to the Spanish right of search; but they considered the prevention of the English and Dutch smuggling to be more important, and as they thought the entire abolition of the right of search would make that impossible, they must either find a middle way or give up the smaller interest for the greater.[1] The French ambassador at Madrid seldom complained of seizures in American waters—partly, as he said, because the French ships, like the Dutch, were better armed than ours and could look after themselves; partly because the French Government could easier afford to ignore complaints which would have made an intolerable noise in England.[2] His business consisted rather in getting grievances redressed in the Cadiz trade.

The two unchanging objects of French commercial diplomacy were to have the *indulto* fixed and to get permission to export coin from Spain. One of the things that most oppressed the shippers on the galleons and *flotas* was the arbitrary *indulto*, a duty which was levied at whatever rate the King of Spain chose to name. Like most Spanish taxes which were not tied down by law or treaty, it showed a certain alacrity in rising. The more it rose, the more it added to the already insupportable burden which the Cadiz trader had to bear, and offered, in effect, a premium to the smugglers in America.[3] The King of Spain could not afford to see this; even at the beginning of the war with England, when he could not conceal his need of a French alliance, he said he would rather go without it than give up the privilege of raising the *indulto* upon an emergency.[4] The other grievance—the prohibition of exporting bullion—was one which interested not only the nations engaged directly or

[1] As one anonymous memorialist puts it, 'we must take care not to sacrifice our own rights while sacrificing those of the English' (A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, 9, f. 104); see also Silhouette to Amelot, March 12 and 31, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 407, ff. 187–8, 252.

[2] Keene to Newcastle, Dec. 13, 1737, S.P. 94/128; Vaulgrenant may have been speaking truth in his time, but during the war his successor Vauréal made several demands for restitution of ships seized in America.

[3] The Deputies of the French Conseil de Commerce said, in a *mémoire* which should be dated, I think, about 1744, that the duties amounted to about 70 per cent. of the value of the goods (A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2009, f. 91).

[4] Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la Cour de France*, iv. 538, 547.

indirectly in the Spanish American commerce, but all those that traded to Spain at all. It was the European counterpart to that system which treated all Spanish coin on board foreign ships as contraband. It had now subsisted so long that a thorough reformation could hardly be hoped for; and Keene would rather procure individual orders for exemption than attack the general principle.[1]

For these reasons, the English Government could not hope for more than a perfunctory support from France.

In November 1737 the French Prime Minister, Cardinal Fleury, excused himself, upon various pretexts, from joining his influence to those of England and the Dutch Republic in order to procure satisfaction for the violences of the *Guarda-Costas*. Maurepas affected to wish it, and Fleury himself regarded the depredations as a grievance; but he would only promise that Vaulgrenant should hold the same language as Keene and Vandermeer, though not in conjunction with them.[2]

Moreover, even if the interests of France had coincided with those of England, the profits of neutrality would have tempted her to keep out of the quarrel. In fact the French traders welcomed the war between England and Spain as an occasion to substitute their own manufactures for the English, to give the Spanish Americans a permanent taste for French goods, and to cultivate the art of imitating such English goods as were obviously indispensable.[3]

Keene had to reckon with a very determined and dangerous opposition from the French ambassador. For besides her commercial interests in the matter, which were opposite to those of England, France had political reasons for supporting Spain. She had endured a terrible war for the sake of the Bourbon succession, and she was not willing to lose the fruit of her blood and treasure. There were certainly times after the Peace of Utrecht when family quarrels seemed to stultify family ambitions, and others when Elisabeth Farnese's insatiable appetite for Italian duchies rendered Spain a diplomatic liability to France rather than an asset. There was no love lost between her and Cardinal Fleury; she taxed him with treachery and he less openly accused her of extravagance. But when it came to

[1] A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 80, ff. 111 et seqq., 'Observations' of 1749 or 1750.
[2] Waldegrave to Keene, Nov. 18 and 20, N.S., 1737, Waldegrave MSS.
[3] A.E. Mém. et Doc. France, 2007, ff. 105 et seqq.

the point, France could hardly be expected to stand by and see Spain the victim of a serious and successful attack by England, which might compel her to make undesirable concessions. There was also a slight and almost negligible danger that the Queen of Spain, disappointed in her expectation of help from France, would be glad to make peace with her open enemies at the expense of French commerce. This was hardly possible, and need not have been considered at all if she had not been notoriously vindictive and reckless when she was crossed, and rebounded already into one or two curious alliances.[1]

Lastly, there were influences which might drive Fleury into a war with England, quite apart from the merits or importance of the Spanish dispute. Maurepas, the Secretary for the Marine and Colonies, was a lifelong enemy of England; and as he was almost the only French Minister who was credited with a will of his own not entirely subservient to Fleury's, his animosity was the more to be feared.

§ ii. *English Opinion on the Prospect of French Intervention*

The question before Walpole and Newcastle was, therefore, whether France would support Spain outright or try to find a middle way between the English and Spanish pretensions, presumably a profitable one for herself and inclining to the advantage rather of Spain than of England.

Lord Waldegrave, our representative at the French Court, did not quite know what to make of Fleury's attitude. He knew from May 1738 that the Spanish ambassador, La Mina, was moving heaven and earth to bring about an alliance between the two Bourbon courts; but Fleury often protested that he was bound by no engagements to Spain and had given no assurances or encouragement to La Mina, whom he disliked exceedingly. Waldegrave was never quite sure whether he believed Fleury's word. He thought on the whole that France would maintain her neutrality as long as Fleury lived; but how long would that be? Fleury was a very old man, and subject to fainting-fits; nobody would have prophesied that he would keep his hold on life and power until the beginning of 1743. By August 1738 Waldegrave had convinced himself that 'France will be against us, especially if the Card[1] dies, and his life grows worse and

[1] Cambis to Amelot, Sept. 14, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 148; Silhouette to Amelot, Dec. 24, 1739, f. 366.

worse every hour'. For some months longer, in spite of La Mina's triumphant boasting, Waldegrave, Keene, and their masters continued to pray for the Cardinal's health. Waldegrave would not 'insinuate as if he thought we were likely to receive any advantage from the real friendship of this Court towards us', and 'should be sorry to try how far they might be pushed to the contrary', but hoped that so long as the Cardinal lived, we should see no experiments of that nature. But at the beginning of February 1739 there were rumours of a double marriage between the royal houses of France and Spain. Waldegrave had to acknowledge that 'things were going into their old channel', that is to say, that the Bourbon alliance was being revived, and that 'tho' the Card[1] dos not love the Queen of Spain better than heretofore, the name of Bourbon makes him overlook all private grudges'.[1]

The English Ministers soon made up their minds to expect no good from Fleury. Their suspicions were justified, but not exactly as they conceived them; for though negotiations for a treaty of alliance were carried on between Spain and France from the summer of 1738, and with some prospect of success, they do not seem to have had any direct influence on the course of the dispute with England. So far from it, that the Court of Spain seems to have taken all its decisive steps towards war at moments when the hope of concluding the alliance at once were dimmest, and to have shown the greatest disposition to accommodate matters with England when her negotiation with France seemed most forward. The Convention of January 1739, which might have led to a settlement of the controversy over the right of search, was made at a time when Fleury seemed likely to come to terms quickly; it was actually concealed from him in the hope that before it was known, the treaty of alliance between Spain and France might proceed to a conclusion. On the other hand, Villarias's serious words to Keene in April 1739, and his determination not to pay the £95,000, coincided with stoppages in the discussions between Spain and France.

There were reasons for these syncopations in the rhythm of Spanish diplomacy. Elisabeth Farnese was bargaining twice as hard with her friends as with her enemies. She hoped to

[1] Waldegrave to Keene, May 13, June 6, July 1, 14, 21, and 28, Aug. 11 and 28, Sept. 2 and 13, Oct. 27, Nov. 28, N.S., 1738; Feb. 3, June 22 and 27, N.S., 1739, Waldegrave MSS.

carry the day by a mere appeal to the sentimental cant of kinship which the rulers of the House of Bourbon employed when they wanted each other's help for nothing. She presumed, too, that when France saw Spain in difficulties, she must come to her help without being paid for it; with this view, she naturally hastened to get into the difficulties as soon as she could. Fleury seems to have acknowledged in his heart the force of this reasoning; he therefore tried to hold her back until he could make his market of her. He shrank from giving her *carte blanche*, knowing that her eyes were really set on Italy and that she could hardly obtain all she wanted without a general European war, which he was determined to avoid; and even against England she formed such designs as the recovery of Georgia, Gibraltar, and Minorca, for which he was unwilling to promise the help of France in all cases. Besides, he meant to be paid for the treaty of alliance by a treaty of commerce, and insisted on having them concluded to his satisfaction on the same day.[1] If there was to be a war between Spain and England, which would annul the commercial treaties between them, France would find an excellent occasion for transferring some of the English privileges to herself and obtaining other new ones without having to let Spain impart them to her rivals. Fleury did not mean to lose this opportunity; Spain, however, intended to have the alliance at once and postpone the commercial concessions to the Greek Kalends. Whenever she condescended to discuss them, she made so many difficulties as to justify her contention that the alliance could not wait for their settlement.[2]

The English Ministers could not see all this; with a commonplace judgement of his character, they soon gave Fleury credit for too much villainy and determination, and too little complication. After their eyes were opened to his dealings with Spain, they suspected him of having engineered the crisis, when he had really done little more than profit by it. They did not understand that he could hardly be said to desire an English war, or even a Spanish alliance, as an end in itself. Besides, they only knew the more alarming facts, without any of the reassuring difficulties. It happened that most of the letters

[1] Instructions to La Marck, French ambassador in Spain, Sept. 14, 1738, *Recueil des Instructions, Espagne*, iii. 201–3.

[2] This summary of the relations between Spain and France is drawn from the admirable account given by Mgr Baudrillart, op. cit. iv. 453–562.

which they intercepted were those of the over-confident La Mina, all hopes and no doubts.[1] Even Keene, who might have judged better, supposed that the double marriage treaty would give France a hold over Spain (whereas Elisabeth Farnese meant it to give Spain a hold over France), and that Fleury would use that hold to stiffen Spain's resistance to England. In fact Fleury did nothing of the kind for the next few months.[2]

The news of the double marriage reached England in time for the debates on the Convention, and may have been one of the things which determined Newcastle to leave Haddock's force on the Spanish coasts after all. A little while later, Newcastle got hold of some papers which purported to be drafts of the new treaty of alliance. He jumped to the conclusion that those treaties would very soon be signed, and that they explained the unusual obstinacy which La Quadra had lately shown, and his delay in paying the £95,000.[3]

England had therefore to make up her mind whether she would fight France as well as Spain, or yield to the combination. This choice had been discussed in public ever since the Spanish crisis had begun. Sir Robert Walpole and his supporters in the Cabinet had made no secret of their opinion that the strongest reason against precipitate measures with Spain was the unfavourable situation of England in European diplomacy. Some powers were likely to intervene against us, and none could certainly be expected to support us. This was a delicate and disagreeable argument for Walpole to urge, for the lack of allies was attributed to his own and his brother's policy. Their

[1] The most alarming of these intercepts were one of June 2, 1738, forwarded by Keene to Newcastle, Aug. 2, and one of Sept. 8, forwarded Oct. 13, S.P. 94/131. La Mina was the Spanish ambassador in Paris.

[2] Keene to Newcastle, April 24, 1739 (most private), S.P. 94/133. Fleury had other enemies at home who made criticisms equally ill informed. The Marquis d'Argenson taxed him with having got himself into Elisabeth Farnese's pocket by the Bourbon marriages, and attributed all the uppishness of Spain since their announcement, to assurance of French support. The Court of Spain may have felt such certainty, but not through any fault of Fleury. D'Argenson was a disciple of Chauvelin, Fleury's disgraced rival; he exaggerated the fatal results of the intimacy with Spain, in order to point the moral that Fleury ought not to have allowed her to be France's only ally; and the attitude towards Spain which he recommended was one which Fleury was trying hard to keep up (d'Argenson, *Journal et Mémoires*, ed. Rathery, 1859, ii. 294, 303–4).

[3] Newcastle to Keene (private and particular), May 8, 1739, S.P. 94/134; Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 26, 1739, Add. MSS. 32692, f. 53; Horace Walpole to Trevor, March 16, April 17, June 1, 1739, *H.M.C. XIVth Report*, App. IX, pp. 27, 28, 32.

neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession was especially criticized; it had offended our traditional friend, Austria, and earned no real gratitude from our traditional enemy, France. Walpole might urge that whatever our recent relations with Austria had been, we could hardly expect much support from her at present, for she was engaged by a disastrous war with the Turk; but that was small comfort, though it might be some justification, and did not affect the question whether France would take part in the war.[1]

The Government did not push its argument so far as to recommend submitting to Spain; it only pleaded for delay and caution. Since hardly any powers in Europe were prejudiced in our favour, we must be careful to conduct our case so as to convince the world that we only wanted to secure our lawful rights, not to make new conquests in Spanish America or force Spain to grant us a free trade to her colonies. If once the other trading nations should begin to fear for the equilibrium established by the peace of Utrecht, they would visit heavy displeasure on the first power to disturb it. These arguments were never better put than in a speech attributed to Newcastle.

'This, my Lords, has always been looked upon as a necessary step towards preventing any one nation in Europe from becoming too rich and too powerful for the rest; and the preserving the sole right of navigation and commerce to and from the Spanish settlements in America, to the Spaniards themselves, was not the effect so much of the Spanish policy, as of the jealousy which the powers of Europe entertained among themselves, lest any other should acquire too great a property in that valuable branch of commerce. They knew that while the treasures of the Indies were the property of the Spaniards, or at least while they centred in Spain, that sooner or later their subjects must have a proportionable share; because that monarchy is destitute of many of the advantages, which the other nations of Europe enjoy, from their manufactures and the industry of their inhabitants; and that, consequently, it was not in the power of the Spaniards, let them have never such an aspiring and politic prince at their head, to monopolize these treasures. Whereas, should too large a share of them come into the hands of any other nation in Europe, whose situation, power or trade, render them perhaps already formidable to their neighbours, they might be

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 693 (Walpole), 670 (Pulteney), 708 (Henry Pelham), 722 (Wyndham), 1254–5 (H. Walpole), 1268 (Sanderson); xi. 635 (Carteret), 645 (Newcastle), 1067 (Carteret), 1095 (Newcastle), 1270 (Pulteney).

employed to purposes inconsistent with the peace of Europe, and which might one day prove fatal to the balance of power, that ought to subsist amongst her several princes. In such a case there is no doubt but that a formidable alliance would be made against the power thus aspiring; and should the differences at last come to be made up by a treaty, it would be found that the most probable way to secure the general peace, is to suffer the Spaniards to remain in the same situation, as to their American settlements, they are now in.'[1]

The Opposition took two lines of argument which led to one conclusion. Some of them asserted that we could impose on France by bold action against Spain, and intimidate her into putting pressure upon Spain to yield. They also pointed out that France was concerned, like ourselves, to resist the right of search, and that she would have a strong inducement to keep quiet, from the profits which neutral traders would naturally make out of a war. In fact whatever we did, France would not interfere, therefore we ought to do what was right in our own eyes.[2] Her intervention was said to be a bugbear of Walpole's; he was compared to a spider, frightening his fellow spiders with the dreadful threat of an invasion of flies.[3] This was unjust at least to his sincerity; he really feared a French invasion, because he really feared a restoration of the Pretender. Most of his contemporaries thought one bogy as unreal as the other, and could not imagine that he believed in either; but it appears more likely that he earnestly believed in both.

Others treated French intervention as probable, but indifferent. Argyll announced that we could fight all the fleets of the world and should therefore dictate to all the trading countries; Pitt, with the oratory of theatrical jingoism, played upon the perennial hatred against the whole House of Bourbon. If France defended Spain against a cause so righteous as the liberty of navigation, then she declared that we could not have justice; and against such a denial of justice there was no remedy but war, let the success be what it might. If we abstained from pressing Spain out of deference to France, we allowed her to

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 772. The same arguments are in Walpole's second speech on the Convention, p. 1313. Perhaps I may here excuse my frequent references to the Parliamentary debates. The attributions of the speeches are not much to be relied upon, but whoever wrote or spoke them, they are for the most part far better argued than the average pamphlet or newspaper article.

[2] Ibid. 780 (Chesterfield), 849 (Pulteney); xi. 252 (Wyndham).

[3] 'Extrait d'une lettre de Londres', A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 16.

prescribe our conduct and keep us in vassalage.[1] Nor did these orators profess to believe that a French war would add much to the difficulties of the Government; for the trade and therefore the taxes of France as well as Spain would be diminished by the interception of the treasure from Mexico and Peru. Wyndham appeared to think that the boldest way with France was the best; let her declare herself, even if it be against us, for we had nothing to gain from her false friendship and little to lose by her enmity. This is only one of many examples of the doctrine that neutrals are worse than open enemies.[2]

Of course this was extravagant rhetoric, but it helps to explain why those who had made up their minds to fight Spain were quite ready to fight France also. So successful was the campaign, and so much did the country believe that a war with France was unavoidable, that as soon as the first orders were gone out for hostilities against Spain, the provinces were filled with rumours that the Pretender had already landed with a French force.[3] Even the Government had come to believe what the Opposition declared. Whatever arguments Walpole and Newcastle may have used a year ago, they too were convinced by the Bourbon marriage and the discovery of the Franco-Spanish treaties, that if they were to enforce the nation's claim against Spain they must reckon with the very likely risk of French intervention. That risk they determined to take; for which reason it had very little deterrent effect upon them after the war was begun.[4]

§ iii. *Neutral Rights; the 'Azogues'*

The conduct of the war was almost certain to raise a more definite question. How could England put pressure upon Spain without injury to the real or supposed interests of France? The two easiest and most obvious ways of reducing Spain to submission were to conquer her colonies and intercept her treasure-fleets. But the colonies could not be conquered, or at any rate

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 848 (Pulteney), 985 (Wyndham), 1136 (Argyll), 1185 (Chesterfield), 1281 (Pitt); *French Counsels Destructive to Great Britain* (London, 1740); *French Influence upon English Counsels Demonstrated* (London, 1740).

[2] *Parl. Hist.* x. 986.

[3] De Vismes to Amelot, June 25, N.S., 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 404, f. 386.

[4] Newcastle to Waldegrave, June 8, O.S., 1739, S.P. 78/220, ff. 233–7. But the only thing that made Newcastle somewhat afraid of declaring war in October was the fear that France might prove to be formally engaged to defend Spain in such a case. (Stone to Waldegrave, Oct. 4, 1739, Add. MSS. 32801, f. 290.)

annexed, without upsetting the equilibrium of 1713, and the treasure-fleets could not be seized without involving the Government in disputes over neutral property. Very little of the cargoes on board the galleons and *flotas* belonged to Spaniards, and most of it was thought to be French property; the exact proportion cannot be known, but it was estimated as high as seven-ninths and as low as three-fifths. There was much debate in Parliament, before the war broke out, whether this time-honoured method of attack could prudently be employed. The difficulty was heightened by Pulteney's Bill of 1738 for giving the whole property of prizes to the captors. It would have prevented the Government from restoring at discretion neutral cargoes found in enemy ships.

The international law of the time, and our treaties with France in particular, unquestionably recognized the principle that neutral property in enemy ships was lawful prize. Besides, the trade of foreigners to the Spanish colonies was all carried on and registered in the name of Spaniards, so that even the cargoes, as well as the vessels, were technically Spanish. Moreover, this trade might be said to be contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht, by which the King of Spain bound himself not to let foreigners trade directly or indirectly to his colonies. If France complained of the Jamaica smugglers, England might retort that the trade through Cadiz was no more lawful, and demand an inquiry into its abuses, which would show that the French had contravened the Treaty of Utrecht quite as much as the English.[1] Opposition orators made the most of this point; but, as Bladen replied, it might be very undiplomatic to insist on the law in a case of this kind. French merchants and Dutch insurers would complain, and our attitude, however righteous, would prejudice their governments against us.[2] The difficulty might take another form; the French fleet might be sent to escort the *flota* out from Cadiz, and bring back the galleons as well. Here again France might be in the wrong, for the right of neutral warships to convoy enemy trade was far from established. That would not be the point, since the matter was one of politics rather than law, and the question to be decided was

[1] *Parl. Hist.* x. 855 (Pulteney), 985–6 (Wyndham), 1193 (Hervey), 1213 (Bathurst), 1409 (Carteret); xi. 840 (Carteret).

[2] Ibid. x. 838 (Coster), 839 (Bladen); Bladen to Harrington, June 12, 1739, Add. MSS. 32694, f. 21.

not whether France would intervene justly, but whether she would intervene at all.

The debates of 1738 were academic, for Pulteney's Bill did not pass. Next year, as soon as the Government gave orders for reprisals, the issue became an immediate one. The *azogues* were at sea on their way home from Vera Cruz. They carried rich cargoes of silver, for the account of the French merchants and the King of Spain, and their seizure would be a small triumph which the hard-pressed Ministry of Walpole could not afford to lose. Without hesitation it took all possible measures to intercept them. Walpole declared publicly that he hoped to see them brought into the Thames, thus announcing that he did not intend to be frustrated in his warlike designs by the fear of France.

Fleury took the question of the *azogues* very seriously.[1] He expostulated strongly to Waldegrave, the English ambassador, upon the privileged or international character of the Spanish treasure-ships; all nations were interested in them, and the Court of Spain itself regarded their cargoes as a *depositum*, not subject to retaliation for national wrongs.[2] This was special pleading for a trade which had no higher title than that of collusion; Fleury would have done better to insist more on the argument that neutral property could not be seized without any declaration of war.[3] Waldegrave asked him how we could do ourselves justice upon Spain if we were not to attack the only kind of shipping whose loss would affect her seriously. If we must keep our hands off it, we must endure whatever injuries Spain pleased to put upon us. Walpole and Newcastle approved and adopted this argument, which had until lately been the undisputed property of the Opposition.

[1] The chief English spy in France—an unreliable twaddler to be sure, though he was a high official in the Foreign Office—even reported on August 8 that Fleury had sent word to the Court of Spain that the seizure of the *azogues* would be a *casus belli* between France and England (intelligence forwarded by Waldegrave to Newcastle, Aug. 8, N.S., 1739, Add. MSS. 32801, f. 172). Amelot had in fact written to La Marck that Fleury would tell Waldegrave that such seizure would amount to a war (Baudrillart, op. cit., iv. 531), but one cannot gather anything of the kind from the much milder language reported by Waldegrave. Perhaps this is one of the cases in which his lazy confidence in Fleury's friendship led him to misunderstand or misrepresent his words.

[2] Waldegrave to Newcastle, July 22, Aug. 15, 1739, S.P. 78/221, ff. 9, 80.

[3] He did use it a few weeks later. It was chiefly because the English Government recognized this difficulty that it converted the reprisals into a declared war in October 1739 (Horace Walpole to Trevor, Oct. 26, 1739, *H.M.C. XIVth Report*, App. IX, p. 35).

Walpole expressed no surprise at Fleury's language, and hoped to gain time by general promises of justice and favour to French subjects; but he would not allow the naval operations of the Government to be hindered by sacrifices to a precarious neutrality. Newcastle adopted a more definite suggestion which had lately been made by his colleague Harrington, and in Parliament by Carteret. Waldegrave was empowered to promise that the King should restore any proved French property that might be taken on the *azogues*, if the owners would pay him the *indulto* which they would have paid to the King of Spain, and if the French Government would undertake to remain entirely neutral (which Newcastle did not believe it would do). He was only to make this offer if he was sure that the *azogues* were the most important consideration in Fleury's eyes. Newcastle believed that they were not; but it appears from a letter of Amelot, the French Foreign Minister, to La Marck that this might have been an acceptable suggestion, and that France might on these terms have declined to take up arms on behalf of Philip V.[1] Waldegrave withheld the suggestion, contenting himself with vague and banal promises, and Fleury continued to ask him to promise that we should not take the *azogues* at all.[2] The danger of a serious dispute on this subject was soon afterwards removed by the unexpected appearance of the *azogues* in the port of Santander, where no English cruisers were waiting for them. The incident therefore ended ridiculously for England, but it shows the Government unwilling to give itself very much trouble to avoid a rupture with France.

The English Government believed at the beginning of 1740 that a French squadron would accompany the *flota* from Cadiz to America, and ordered Haddock to attack it, convoy and all, if he should find himself strong enough, or to send word to Vernon in order that he might do so in America.[3] However,

[1] Baudrillart, op. cit., iv. 531.

[2] Waldegrave to Newcastle, July 22 and Aug. 15, 1739; Newcastle to Waldegrave (most secret), July 27, S.P. 78/221, ff. 9, 49, 80; *Parl. Hist.* x. 1409 (Carteret); Newcastle to Hardwicke, Aug. 12, 1739, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 138.

[3] Norris's diary, Feb. 4, 1739/40, Add. MSS. 28132, f. 145. There must, however, have been some doubts of the propriety of intercepting the Spanish fleets under French convoy, for Wager made a note, on November 6, 1739, from which it appears that he or some of his colleagues thought it might be imprudent to attack the galleons if French warships should escort them out of Cartagena (Vernon-Wager MSS., Library of Congress. See also Waldegrave to Newcastle (most secret), Aug. 15, 1739, Waldegrave MSS.).

the neutrality of the treasure-fleets did not give any more trouble in this war, for the fleets themselves were almost completely paralysed by the danger of moving. Some French warships actually convoyed a sort of *flota* from Vera Cruz in 1745, but France was by that time as much a belligerent as Spain. In fact all the other disputes of international law, to which this war and the next gave rise, turned rather on enemy goods in neutral ships.

§ iv. *Proposals of Mediation, and Negotiations in Holland*

France and England still had to face the other and more important question—that of the equilibrium of Utrecht and the conquests in Spanish America. But for some time before it came to an issue, the possibilities of French mediation took up the foreground of the picture.

Fleury did not make much attempt at offering mediation by himself. He knew very well that he was suspected of partiality to Spain, and that his proposals would be received with caution.[1] However, he plucked up his courage to suggest in August 1739 an expedient which would have gained a little time for discussion. Spain should pay over the £95,000 into the hands of a third party, and Haddock should withdraw from the Mediterranean. This idea seems to have come to him from Count Lynden, a Dutch politician; he made a curious use of it. He sent word to The Hague that these terms could not possibly satisfy Spain, and that the English must withdraw not only Haddock but the reinforcements from Jamaica and Georgia as well; yet at the same time he entirely adopted the original suggestion behind the backs of the Dutch.[2] Newcastle, however, would not hear of this compromise; indeed it would only have served for a breathing-space, and offered no basis of final settlement.[3] If Fleury had now made up his mind to the Spanish alliance, a breathing-space was all he wanted, in order to make himself indispensable to Spain and to bargain for the services he should otherwise have to give perforce.

[1] Amelot to Fénelon, Aug. 3, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Silhouette to Amelot, Nov. 26, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 287.

[2] Fénelon to Amelot, July 28, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Amelot to Fénelon, Aug. 3, 1739, ibid.

[3] It had also the disadvantage that it gave the Dutch an excuse for doing nothing to help us or defend themselves. (Horace Walpole to Waldegrave, Sept. 8 and Oct. 1, 1739, Waldegrave MSS.)

Fleury never openly proposed a definite plan for accommodating the disputes of England and Spain; it is not certain what terms he would have suggested.[1] He did not wish to mediate alone; he would rather act jointly with the States-General, in order to render his suggestions acceptable to the English Ministry, and to prevent it from leading the Dutch into something more dangerous than mediation, namely a war with Spain.

Holland was the great battleground of English and French diplomacy in these years. England might appeal to the memory of William III and Marlborough, in whose days the Dutch Republic had been unequivocally her ally and the enemy of France; but those expensive glories could not be revived. Lesser men now steered an uneasy course, not exactly midway between the two great powers, but so as to incline on the whole to England without incurring the anger of France. The Stadhouder party, strongest in the smaller provinces, in the country districts of the greater ones, and in the mob of the towns, was still devoted to England. It received some of its little influence—for the Stadhouderate was in abeyance—from the marriage of the Prince of Orange with George II's eldest daughter. There was another party, apparently much smaller, which was definitely pro-French, because it feared a reinstatement of the Stadhouder. This party was particularly afraid of every kind of war, because it reasoned rightly that military danger was the likeliest thing to restore the Stadhouder to his powers. Most Dutchmen seem to have been moderate Republicans, drifting between the two parties and hoping that Europe would never fall into such troubles as would make it necessary for them to choose one side or the other.

Fear played a great part in the determination of Dutch policy; fear of an invasion by land from France, and of a suspension of Dutch navigation by England. These threats antagonized as much as they intimidated the interests to which they were addressed. It was the landed classes and the provinces

[1] There are many memoranda on this subject in the archives of the French Foreign Office: Silhouette to Amelot, Dec. 24, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, ff. 360 et seqq.; March 12, 1740, vol. 407, ff. 180 et seqq.; 'Réflexions sur les differens de l'Angleterre et l'Espagne', A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, 9, ff. 104 et seqq.; 'Plan de Negotiation', ff. 111 et seqq.; 'Observations sur la liberté de la Navigation', ff. 122 et seqq.; 'Mémoire sur la liberté de la navigation dans les mers des Indes occidentales', A.E. Mém. et Doc. Espagne, 82, ff. 116 et seqq.; Mémoire annexed to Mirepoix's Instructions, 1749, A.E. Mém. et Doc. Angleterre, 41, ff. 188 et seqq.

most exposed to a land war which were most anti-French, while the merchants were at least very jealous of England, though their hostility was somewhat mollified by their heavy investments in English funds. Besides, the shipping and trading interests were open to the highest bidder. England had little of her own to offer them, for the Navigation Acts excluded them from some important branches of her carrying trade. The most she could do was to help them to conquer some valuable privilege from France and Spain, as she had done in the War of the Spanish Succession. Spain was so intractably obstinate that nothing was to be expected of her, but France could prevent England from earning gratitude at her expense, and procure it for herself, by concessions to the long-standing ambitions of Dutch traders, especially in the fishery. She did so more than once when she found herself badly in need of Dutch favour; and it happened that, at the very moment when the war between England and Spain began, she was dangling before the noses of the States-General a nearly completed treaty of commerce. Fleury and his representative at The Hague proposed to make the fullest use of it, in order to keep them in a respectful suspense.[1]

Horace Walpole, the Prime Minister's brother, was titular Ambassador at The Hague and had obtained a considerable influence in Dutch politics. He had been on the point of retiring, but was now hurried off for a last visit, to procure a declaration of war against Spain, or at least a large increase of land and sea forces which might lead the States-General to that conclusion down the path of embarrassing inquiries and yet more disagreeable explanations. It became the English policy, in the later years of the struggle with France, to encourage the Dutch to increase their army but not their navy, because the former was calculated to annoy France and could be used against her, while the latter was even more likely to be directed against England. At present, however, this distinction was not perceived, and as the Dutch could only attack Spain by sea, England regarded an increase of their fleet as a favourable symptom. In fact, Horace Walpole was a little put out by the project of increasing the land forces at this moment, because though excellent in itself it would clog and retard the more important proposal of new warships.[2]

[1] Fénelon to Amelot, July 2, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433.

[2] Horace Walpole to Harrington, Aug. 18, 1739, S.P. 84/381, f. 68.

He took with him a somewhat threadbare outfit of ready-made arguments. He pointed out the parallel between the interests of the two nations, and their grievances against Spain. Nothing but force, he said, could make Spain listen to reason; the Dutch would find it out when they had exhausted in vain all the recourses of diplomacy.[1] He used some documents from the controversy of Keene and La Quadra, which illustrated Spain's extravagant claims to sovereignty in the American seas. He received a little help here from the imprudent Marquis of St. Gil, the Spanish Ambassador, who would not be restrained by his French colleague from publishing a justification which asserted those claims. Yet though Walpole's arguments made a certain impression, and the augmentation which he set in motion was afterwards resolved upon, he had to return home, leaving Robert Trevor in charge of the negotiation, without bringing about any decisive step which would commit the States-General to war.[2]

The identity of interests upon which he insisted was not so great as English Ministers liked to believe. It was a piece of cant, a survival from the past, rather than a reality. The trade of Curaçao and Jamaica was the same, but they took somewhat different measures to defend themselves. Some people, moreover, believed that Curaçao depended on the monopoly which it existed to break.[3] Besides, so far as the Dutch and English interlopers carried on the same trade, their very identity was a cause of competition. This applies to the commerce of both nations in general. Moreover, when one great trading and maritime power goes to war, its chief rival is overpoweringly tempted by the profits of neutrality, however obviously common their cause. The English knew this very well, and did not conceal the irritation with which they saw the 'damt Dutch' run away with the carrying trade; no doubt this was one more reason why they strained so hard to drag their dear friends into their war.[4]

[1] Horace Walpole to Harrington, Sept. 15, 1739, S.P. 84/381, ff. 135–40; Hendrick Hop to Cornelis Hop, April 5, 1740, S.P. 107/41.

[2] Horace Walpole's paper to the Pensionary, Sept. 16, 1739, N.S., ibid.; St. Gil's 'Raisons justificatives', in Rousset's *Recueil*, vol. xiii, part ii, pp. 179–90; Walpole's reply, pp. 191–234; Amelot to Fénelon, Sept. 3, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Fénelon to Amelot, Aug. 29, Sept. 8 and 22, 1739, ibid.; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 7, 1739, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 160.

[3] Fagel to Hop, Nov. 17, 1739, S.P. 107/34; Hendrick Hop to Cornelis Hop, April 5, May 3 and 9, 1740; Cornelis Hop to Hendrick Hop, April 12 and 27, S.P. 107/41–3.

[4] Hop to Fagel, Oct. 30, 1739, S.P. 107/32. Under-Secretary Couraud thought

The Dutch had yet another reason for neutrality. Unlike the English, they did not live upon an island; they had very nearly been subdued by a French invasion within the last hundred years. There was a chain of barrier fortresses between them and the French armies, but its efficacy was doubted, with only too good reason as the French marshals were soon to show. England could cheerfully face a Spanish war which might turn into a French war; Holland could not. For England, but not for Holland, it would still be a naval war.[1]

The Dutch could have only one strong motive for taking part in the war between England and Spain. If England should fight and win, before they had settled their own dispute with Spain, they might be in a disagreeable situation. England could extort some important concessions, which she would be under no obligation of gratitude to impart to the Dutch. Spain, defeated and humbled, would have every inducement to satisfy her anger at the expense of a less powerful and less respectable claimant for redress.[2] No doubt it was this possibility which caused the Dutch to regard with such attention the opening moves in the naval campaign. If the English squadrons had taken the *azogues*, the States-General would have been encouraged to enter the war; but the failure made them think twice of it.[3]

This at least was the opinion of the Marquis de Fénelon, the clever, perhaps too clever, diplomat who represented France at The Hague. It was his business to bring Horace Walpole's efforts to nothing. What exactly was the point of those efforts? Here Fénelon probably made a mistake through too much subtlety. He recognized in time that Walpole meant to induce the States-General to declare war, but his first thought, which he did not entirely abandon, was that the object of the farewell

it was unfair to exempt foreign ships from the embargo in our ports, 'for the moment they knew our own ships were embargoed, many of them flocked hither to carry the goods which our own people should have been the bearers of, who consequently lost the freight' (Couraud to Waldegrave, July 27, 1739, Waldegrave MSS.).

[1] Horace Walpole often encountered this argument (see his letters to Harrington, July 7 and 17, 1739, S.P. 84/380, ff. 119–21, 162–3; Aug. 18, N.S., S.P. 84/381, ff. 67–8).

[2] Hop to Fagel, July 14, 1739, S.P. 107/29; *Vrai patriote hollandois*, Aug. 1740. Horace Walpole hinted at this (see his letter to Harrington, July 3, 1739, S.P. 84/380, f. 107).

[3] Fénelon to Amelot, Sept. 1, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433.

visit was a more recondite one. He saw that although the war was nominally begun because Spain had not paid the sum appointed by the Convention, the English immediately started to justify it as a crusade against the right of search. Of course this was necessary in Holland, because the Dutch were no parties to the Convention and were interested in the right of search. But Fénelon, putting the cart before the horse, supposed that the real aim of the English Ministry was to divert attention from the discredited Convention which had conceded the reference of questions of search and navigation to plenipotentiaries —a concession which he thought the English Ministers wanted to take back. So long as the war was waged by England alone it was a war about the Convention, and if Spain were to offer to execute the Convention, England could not reasonably refuse. If the Dutch joined in it as well, it could not be a war for the execution of the Convention, and must be a war against the right of search; the Convention could be conveniently forgotten, and an offer to fulfil it would be no excuse for stopping the war.

Fénelon might well believe this because he thought, like other Frenchmen, that it was not Spain that had broken the Convention by refusing to pay the money, but England by refusing to continue the plenipotentiaries' sittings.[1] As that opinion was not shared by the English Ministers, they did not feel they had any reason to be ashamed of their conduct in this respect, and the motive postulated by Fénelon did not exist. In Horace Walpole's instructions of June 1739 there is no sign of the plan which Fénelon attributed to him. True, the English Ministers did not mean to go back, now that they had made up their minds to a war, and they would have been embarrassed by a belated execution of the Convention. No doubt that was why Horace Walpole sternly rebuffed Count Lynden's attempt to propose a temporary appeasement; he said the state of the controversy was not what it had been before the Convention was broken.[2] He had also to shift the discussion from the Convention to the common grievances of English and Dutch traders

[1] Fénelon to Amelot, July 23, Aug. 18, Sept. 15, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Fénelon's error was evidently shared by Amelot, the French Foreign Secretary, who was angry with St. Gil for talking publicly about the right of search and free navigation, instead of putting England in the wrong by sticking to the Convention (Amelot to Fénelon, Sept. 3, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433).

[2] Fénelon to Amelot, Aug. 11, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Horace Walpole to Harrington, Sept. 15, N.S., S.P. 84/381, ff. 134–41.

against Spain; but that was because the breach of the Convention was no argument for war in Holland.[1] Fénelon's error was not as important as it was ingenious, but perhaps it accounts for the embarrassing proposal which was suggested by Lynden, possibly under Fénelon's tuition, and put forward by Fleury in August.[2]

Fénelon was soon engaged on a business no less complicated and more material. Fleury and the States-General became involved in an elaborate contest about mediation. The object of each party was to make the other propose something definite without doing so itself. There is always, in all bargains, an advantage in making the other side speak first; the principle is as well known to Levantine peddlers as to Cardinals and Grand Pensionaries. In this instance there was a more solid and particular reason. Each party pretended to be impartial; the pretence was equally false on both sides, though there was a great difference in their desire to see the dispute settled and their intention of intervening in it themselves. The States-General preferred the interests of England almost as much as France preferred those of Spain, though they had less wish to fight for their allies, and had, unlike France, a strong interest of their own in the controversy.[3] They were not willing to annoy England by proposing something unacceptable. Fleury had even stronger reason against indisposing the Court of Spain, from which he was still trying to extort a commercial

[1] Instructions to Horace Walpole, June 12, o.s., 1739, S.P. 84/380, ff. 87–9; Horace Walpole to Harrington, July 17, N.S., ff. 162–3. [2] *V. supra*, p. 145.

[3] French diplomats do not seem to have entirely understood the interest of the Dutch; they seem to have thought they could appeal to them, as a nation using the Cadiz trade, by dwelling on the excesses of the English smugglers. Some even had a faint hope of drawing the States-General into a war against England (Silhouette to Amelot, Dec. 24, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 368). It must have been a misconception of this kind that led Fénelon to declaim to the Dutch Ministers against Vernon's throwing open the trade to interlopers by destroying the forts at Portobello and Chagre. He should have understood that the Dutch were themselves an interloping nation, and that Vernon's action had made a great harvest for the traders of Curaçao (Fénelon to Amelot, Sept. 15, 1740, A.E. Hollande, 436). He had a better card to play when he excited the jealousy of the Dutch against the size of Cathcart's expedition and the vast schemes which it seemed to portend. Some Dutchmen were afraid that if England made conquests on the mainland, she would put a stop to the interloping trade of other nations in the provinces which came under her control (Trevor to Harrington, June 6, 1741, S.P. 84/393, f. 10). Others, such as Van Hoey, the celebrated ambassador in Paris, professed to believe that England would want to annex the French and Dutch colonies as soon as she had conquered the Spanish (Waldegrave to Trevor, April 11 and 22, 1740, Waldegrave MSS.; Trevor to Waldegrave, April 14, ibid.).

treaty. As no regulation of the questions at issue could be proposed which would satisfy the combatants, and as the combatants would be much more angry with their friends than with their enemies for attempting it, the reluctance of Holland and France to commit themselves to anything definite needs no explaining.[1]

For the English party in Holland, mediation was to be avoided as long as there was any hope of drawing the States-General into a war, and only to be tolerated as a second-best when there was none.[2] Horace Walpole believed that the only way to deter Fleury from taking the part of Spain, was to make the Dutch show some vigour on our side.[3] But mediation had its uses, even to the English, in spite of their abrupt rejection of Fleury's and Lynden's proposals in August 1739. In the first place, it might be possible to tie Fleury up, by an endless negotiation, from actively taking the part of Spain, or proposing a mediation of his own on terms which England could not accept. Fleury was equally anxious to entangle the States-General; but he did not mean to be tied himself, and warned Fénelon against encouraging any assumptions of reciprocity which would keep the Dutch neutral only so long as France remained so.[4] It was partly for this reason that Fénelon was told to hint that France had her own grievances against England, which might justify her intervention quite apart from the merits of the Anglo-Spanish dispute. Perhaps it was also why Fleury insisted, when he sent the French fleets to the West Indies in 1740, that France had taken this abrupt and warlike measure on her own and Europe's account, and not as an ally or partner of Spain. The danger against which he thus tried to guard was a real one, for in fact Trevor made the most of the argument that the junction of France and Spain would justify a similar union between the States-General and England.[5]

[1] Fénelon to Amelot, Aug. 7 and 11, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Amelot to Fénelon, Oct. 18 and Nov. 29, 1739, vol. 434; Resolution of the States-General, Oct. 29, 1740, translation, vol. 436; Amelot to Fénelon, Nov. 6, 1740, ibid.

[2] Horace Walpole to Harrington, Sept. 15, 1739, S.P. 84/381, ff. 134–41. Trevor, instructed by Harrington, resisted an effort of the French party to tack an offer of mediation on to the augmentation of the forces.

[3] Horace Walpole to Waldegrave, Aug. 27, 1739, Waldegrave MSS.

[4] This was the only condition on which England would allow the Dutch to be neutral (Harrington to Walpole, Oct. 2, 1739, S.P. 84/381, ff. 235–6); even that was more than Horace Walpole thought proper (Walpole to Harrington, Oct. 9, ff. 222–3).

[5] Amelot to Fénelon, Aug. 23, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Nov. 12, 1739, vol.

The Dutch had, moreover, an interest of their own in the matter, and saw a very good opportunity of killing two birds with one stone. They had not yet settled their own dispute with Spain about the rights of navigation. If they could now procure from Spain, directly or through France, a satisfactory adjustment, it would serve as a model for a reconciliation between England and Spain, and a bridge over which the English Ministry could crawl to peace and safety without dishonour. Fénelon saw through this design, but seems to have made the mistake of thinking that it was much more welcome to the English than it really was.[1] If, on the other hand, the Dutch should not succeed in bringing England into a peaceful settlement of this kind, at least it would be something to have got their own grievances redressed, for they would never have a better opportunity than a time of war between Spain and England, when they could threaten to join England if they were not satisfied.

As it was France's object as well as Spain's, or even more than Spain's, to prevent them from taking part in the war, the Dutch could make France pull this chestnut out of the fire for them by her diplomatic influence at Madrid. Fleury actually lent himself to their scheme; for he did not need to be told how important it was that Spain should satisfy the Dutch. If he was destined to enter the war on behalf of Spain, he certainly had the right to demand that he should not have the Dutch as well as the English on his hands; that would be coming near to the general war which he dreaded. Horace Walpole and his successor Trevor insisted chiefly on the argument that only force could extort any satisfaction from Spain; Fleury would therefore play a trump card if he could prove that the Dutch had more to gain by peaceful discussions and the influence of France, than by adhering to England and her warlike measures.[2] He never ceased to preach to Spain the necessity of detaching the Dutch by a slight concession, but he had little enough

434; Sept. 9, 1740, vol. 436; Horace Walpole to Waldegrave, Sept. 8, 1739, Waldegrave MSS.; Trevor to Harrington, Sept. 24, 1740, S.P. 84/387, f. 42.

[1] Trevor to Harrington, Dec. 15, 1739, S.P. 84/382, ff. 162–4; Harrington to Trevor, Dec. 11, ff. 180–1; Fénelon to Amelot, Aug. 25, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Amelot to Fénelon, Aug. 30, ibid.; Fénelon to Amelot, Oct. 8, 1739, vol. 434.

[2] Amelot to Fénelon, July 12 and Aug. 30, 1739, A.E. Hollande, 433; Fénelon to Amelot, Oct. 8, 1739, vol. 434; Sept. 23, 1740, vol. 437; Resolution of the States-General, Sept. 27 and Oct. 29, 1740, ibid.; Amelot to Fénelon, Oct. 9, ibid.; Trevor to Harrington, Sept. 24, 1740, S.P. 84/387, ff. 42–7.

success for his pains, and the States-General thought in the summer of 1740 that they might as easily get what they wanted by direct negotiations at Madrid.[1]

Whether intentionally or not, their Ambassador Vandermeer seems to have promised that they would remain neutral during the war if they received satisfaction. This at once elicited a fulsome declaration from St. Gil. He protested that the King of Spain accepted the neutrality with gratitude, that he had never meant to infringe the lawful navigation of Dutch subjects, and would be glad to enter into discussions for preventing the abuse of that freedom by contraband traders. Vandermeer's supposed promise of neutrality gave great scandal in England,[2] and the reward which St. Gil offered seemed too small when closely examined; for nothing that he had said proved any real departure from the Spanish doctrine of 'suspicious latitudes' and the straight course to and from the colonies, which England had been unwilling to accept. Besides, the whole concession appeared to be conditional on some satisfaction to Spain on the question of smuggling, which could hardly be congenial to the owners of Curaçao. The Dutch therefore, both on their own account and on England's, continued to ask for higher terms. They hinted that they could take no part in mediation until Spain had redressed their own grievances, and that they could not accept any guarantee of free navigation which was conditional on an arrangement about the smugglers. Let Spain give an unconditional guarantee, and discuss the smugglers afterwards.[3] France would not treat on such terms, which were obviously designed to favour the interloping at the expense of the Cadiz trade; and if she had been willing, she could not have made Spain accept them, nor did she wish to incur her displeasure by asking her to do so.

[1] La Marck had told the Dutch ambassador as early as June 1739 that he was to put in a word for the claims of the Dutch in order to detach them from England (Keene to Newcastle, June 22, 1739, S.P. 94/133; see also Baudrillart, op. cit. iv. 530).

[2] Bussy said the Ministers secretly welcomed it, but I can find little evidence of this in dispatches (Bussy to Amelot, June 23 and 27, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 407, ff. 398, 401); the *Pro-Memoria* of St. Gil, June 20, 1740, and Trevor's account of it, Trevor to Harrington, June 24, 25, and 28, July 1, 1740, S.P. 84/385, ff. 155–61, 163, 167–8, 186–7, 191–3; Harrington to Trevor, June 18, f. 183.

[3] States-General, Resolutions of Sept. 27 and Oct. 29, 1740; Cornelis Hop to Hendrick Hop. Oct. 18, 1740, S.P. 107/46; Hendrick Hop to Cornelis Hop, Oct. 25, 1740, ibid.; Cornelis Hop to Hendrick Hop. Nov. 18, 1740, S.P. 107/47.

Thus the whole complicated discussion ended with a deadlock. Fleury had no more need to continue it, for he actively interposed between England and Spain at this point. It was no longer very likely that the States-General would take equally strong measures on the other side. Very soon afterwards they forgot the whole matter in their preoccupation with the outbreak of a new European war. The Dutch, with their weak land frontier, were more sensitive to that than England, and at last became really anxious that she should name the terms on which she would make her peace with Spain, and end the maritime war in order to devote all her strength to the continental troubles.[1] But the conversion of England to continental measures was neither so sudden nor so complete; and when it was made, it did not take the form of courting mediation, whether French or Dutch.

§ v. *Fleury threatens to intervene*

During the course of these elaborate machinations, the relations of England and France had come to a crisis. Fleury naturally wanted to intimidate the English Government and keep it in suspense. Until he had come to terms with Spain, he could hardly do anything else. For this reason he had made a great fuss over the search of some French ships by Admiral Haddock off Cadiz. In their hearts he and Amelot did not take this incident very seriously, saying it was only the ordinary usage of war.[2] But they complained to Waldegrave and sent back their Ambassador Cambis from his furlough to London with an almost violent memorial upon the subject.

'The delay of satisfaction', it concluded, 'for grievances so well founded and of such importance to the honour of his Crown, would give His Majesty so much the more concern, as it would be looked upon throughout all Europe as a mark of the little regard Your Majesty would appear to have to his just complaints, if you should any longer refuse to cause a stop to be put to them, and to redress them.'[3]

Cambis presumably did not soften the rigour of his communication, for he prided himself on his fiery manner of executing his office, which had caused George II to cut him dead

[1] Trevor to Harrington, June 6 and 27, 1741, S.P. 84/393, ff. 10, 65.
[2] Baudrillart, op. cit. iv. 352.
[3] Cambis to George II, Aug. 30, o.s., 1739, S.P. 100/7.

in the Drawing-room.[1] Indeed, he hardly seems to have been the man to smooth over differences between the two Courts. His secretary justified him after his death against the charge of being too pro-English: in his last illness his attendants had been obliged to divert the conversation from the grievances of Spain against England, as it was a subject on which he felt so vehemently that he might do himself harm by discussing it. 'He never varied for a moment from these sentiments, and I have never seen him desire anything with more passion than to see a war well kindled between France and England'[2]—a curious qualification for a French ambassador at the Court of St. James. He nearly made matters worse on this occasion by threatening to reject Newcastle's reply. It was certainly very inadequate and tried to intimidate France from pursuing these controversies any farther.[3] All this was ado about nothing. Fleury only meant to create a vague uneasiness.

'You will notice', Amelot had written to Cambis, 'that the *mémoire* is drawn up in such a way as to inspire fear of definite action on our part, without representing it as taken or ready to be taken. You must speak in exactly the same sense, so that neither the English Ministry, nor that of Spain (from what it may hear of the matter) may be free from the uncertainty in which we must at present, on account of the state of our affairs, appear to be.'[4]

So long as Fleury lived, disputes over neutral rights had very little effect on the relations of the two Courts. Maurepas was credited, now and later, with a desire to make the most of them in order to bring on a war with England; but he never had his way.[5] Bussy was sometimes ordered to make complaints, which the English Ministers neglected with impunity—at one time he said he had given in over sixty to which no sort of reply had been returned.[6] When France refused to expel the Pretender and declared war in the spring of 1744, one of the chief reasons given was the breach of treaties and the violation of the rights of neutrals.[7] This was only a justification which Amelot had

[1] Cambis to Fénelon, Sept. 22, 1739, S.P. 107/32.

[2] De Vismes to Amelot, March 3, N.S., 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 407, f. 152.

[3] Couraud to Waldegrave, Sept. 6, 1739, Add. MSS. 32801, f. 252; Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 9, vol. 35406, f. 144; to Cambis, Sept. 7/18, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 162; Cambis to Amelot, Sept. 14 and 21, ff. 158, 173.

[4] Amelot to Cambis, Aug. 30, 1739, A.E. Angleterre, 405, f. 86.

[5] Waldegrave to Newcastle, Jan. 9, 1740, Add. MSS. 32801, f. 361; Jan. 15, vol. 32802, f. 3.

[6] Bussy, memorial of Dec. 4, 1742, S.P. 100/8.

[7] Thompson to Stone, June 26, 1743, S.P. 78/228, f. 222; to Newcastle, Feb. 25, 1744, S.P. 78/229, f. 188.

held patiently up his sleeve for four years; it was not a real motive. The diplomacy of France was governed by grander and subtler considerations than mercantile complaints. The security of her overseas trade was not a matter of life and death to her, as it was to the Dutch, and she did not condescend to the desperate nagging with which the States-General urged their similar complaints against England.

This little storm was therefore allowed to blow over like that of the *azogues*, and the two Governments lived for some months in apparent cordiality. Fleury pursued his bargain with Spain, without ever reaching a conclusion. The English Ministers followed with alarm what they could learn of these negotiations. Waldegrave had told them that it was not consideration for England, but inability to make his terms with Spain, that made Fleury so passive in the first months of the war. They always expected that the signature of the treaty of alliance would be followed by a declaration on the part of France, and were almost prepared—so at least Bussy reported—to make that of the treaty of commerce a *casus belli* on their own account.[1]

Another very difficult problem began to arise out of the conduct of the war. What would be the attitude of France to the great expedition going out under Lord Cathcart to the West Indies, and to the glorious and profitable conquests which it would doubtless make? It is hard to comprehend the uncertainty of the English Ministers on this subject. Before the war or even the reprisals were begun, Fleury had told Waldegrave that France could not stand by and see England annex any important part of the Spanish dominions in America.[2] He repeated it again and again, after the war was declared, and further pointed his moral by applauding Vernon's behaviour at Portobello and Chagre, where the conquered towns had not been annexed or garrisoned, but had been virtually thrown open to the trade of all nations.[3] He had also shown great

[1] Bussy to Amelot, Oct. 3, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 122.

[2] Sir R. Walpole to Newcastle, July 17, 1739, Add. MSS. 32692, f. 152; Horace Walpole to Trevor, Oct. 24, 1738, *H.M.C. XIVth Report*, App. IX, p. 24. I cannot find the letter from Waldegrave to which Walpole refers in his letter of July 17. By the dates it ought to be that of July 22, N.S., but none of the dispatches which Waldegrave wrote on that day quite fits the description. On June 26, N.S., Waldegrave had sent Newcastle a long description of Fleury's state of mind, from which he concluded that Fleury would probably take no part at present.

[3] Waldegrave to Newcastle (most private), Nov. 23, 1739, Jan. 4, 1740, S.P.

interest in the proclamation by which the English Government offered to guarantee to private adventurers the possession of whatever territories they should take from the Spaniards in America. This proclamation (which was founded on Pulteney's Act of Parliament for that purpose) was hardly compatible with an intention to preserve the equilibrium established by the Peace of Utrecht; but the chances of private conquests were small, and the Government was not restrained from restoring places which might be taken by its own armies.[1]

Even if Fleury had never uttered a word of his intention, Newcastle might very well have guessed it, for it was easily deduced from the doctrine of the American balance of power, which Fleury and most of his diplomats held and proclaimed.[2] What makes Newcastle's uncertainty yet more curious is that he had made up his mind, before the war broke out, that France meant to enter it sooner or later in support of Spain; until the spring of 1740 he believed, in spite of Waldegrave's denials, that she would intervene that year. He then allowed himself to be converted to the view that Fleury would not meddle with Cathcart's expedition; he was not only surprised, but comically aggrieved, when Fleury did so.[3]

There are three possible explanations of this puzzle. The first is that Fleury meant to have the credit of giving fair warning, and the advantage of not being believed. He was so old and feeble, that he could easily deceive by an affectation of senility. He could appear not to mean what he said, and to say what he had meant to leave unsaid. Waldegrave, good easy man, was very much under his influence, and would believe anything that

78/221, ff. 272, 353; March 12, April 3, vol. 222, ff. 157, 233; July 22, vol. 223, f. 207; Jan. 15, 1740, Add. MSS. 32802, f. 3; July 8, 1740, S.P. 43/91.

[1] Waldegrave to Newcastle, May 4, 1740, S.P. 78/222, f. 321. *V. supra*, p. 67.

[2] Fénelon was already saying in July 1740, a month before the French fleet sailed, that 'an invasion of the Spanish possessions in America by us, is as much a *casus foederis* for France, as one of England by the Spaniards would be for the Republic' (Trevor to Waldegrave, July 28, 1740, Waldegrave MSS.).

[3] Newcastle to Waldegrave (most secret), Aug. 3, 1739, S.P. 78/221; Jan. 22, Feb. 27, 1739/40, S.P. 78/222, ff. 78, 129. See also his private letter of Feb. 27, in which he says: 'I dare say all their bravadoes are only to intimidate us, and prevent our American expedition, but that shan't do, it shall go on, with all possible vigour and expedition. Tho' this is the most probable conjecture, the consequence is too great to depend upon it, and therefore we must look out, and act, as if their intentions were as bad as possible, and if the Cardinal should drop, nobody can tell how soon, they might make us a visit here, and therefore we must always have an eye to that' (Waldegrave MSS.).

Fleury could pass off as the involuntary confidence of a dotard. So great in fact was Fleury's skill in handling Waldegrave, that it is almost an injustice to him as an artist to suppose that the curious effect which he produced in this instance was unintended. But it will not do. Fleury was an artful and tortuous old man, but he was not a devil. He was not the man to go out of his way to engineer an unnecessary war. Still less would he do so, before he was sure of his alliance with Spain.

It must therefore be supposed that Fleury intended the hint to be taken, and that it was not his fault if it was neglected. The blame then rests on Waldegrave, for it was he who persuaded Newcastle that Fleury would stay quiet and continue to watch events. He reported Fleury's threats, but either explained them away as meaningless, or prophesied that they would never be carried out because Fleury was too much afraid of a general war. Poor Waldegrave was lethargic, for he was dying of dropsy; he was unduly sure of his ability to penetrate Fleury's intentions. He was for these reasons a bad ambassador, and Horace Walpole (who as his predecessor would be more likely than anybody else to criticize him) had already found reason to complain of him on these accounts.[1]

Newcastle himself was as much to blame as anybody. If he had not wanted to be convinced by Waldegrave, he would have stuck to his first opinion. When he wanted to carry a point, he did not scruple to play fast and loose with the facts. In April 1740, when he was trying to dissuade George II from one of his unpopular visits to Hanover, he argued that France was likely to interfere with our expeditions or even to invade us. He therefore concealed from the King the strong assurances of Waldegrave that Fleury would take no part that year.[2] A few weeks later he turned round, and used Waldegrave's wrong information in his controversy with Walpole over the disposition of the forces. He had always wanted to press forward with the preparations for Cathcart's expedition, regardless of any danger, and to send as many ships as could be spared to the West Indies. Sir Robert Walpole began to argue that because the French were likely to intervene, the fleet must be concentrated

[1] Horace Walpole to Trevor, March 16/27, 1739, *H.M.C. XIVth Report*, App. IX, p. 27.

[2] See the two interesting letters of Newcastle to Waldegrave, April 11 and 18, 1740, in the Waldegrave MSS.

for defence in the home waters; for he believed that the hostility of France would take the form of an invasion of Great Britain or Ireland. This was not a very easy argument to answer—indeed, nobody was more fearfully aware of its force than Newcastle, sixteen years later. The best way of dealing with it was to deny that Fleury would interfere at all. Some reassuring letters had lately come from Waldegrave, and Newcastle used them in the Cabinet. Ogle and his ten ships could not possibly be sent to the West Indies if France was likely to strike some unpredictable stroke in the next few months; but Newcastle was determined that Ogle should go, therefore he believed that France would do nothing.[1] For the time Walpole and his supporters triumphed. Ogle was kept at home; but Newcastle was now quite converted to his new opinion; he announced to Vernon, and to Waldegrave himself, that he no longer thought France would take any part in the war that year.[2]

Not everybody agreed with him. Wager wrote in August that France must enter the war sooner or later. George II had already predicted that she would send her squadrons to the West Indies, in order to avoid giving a *casus foederis* to the States-General, who were bound by treaty to defend us against an invasion of our European, but not of our American, dominions. Harrington, the Secretary of State who accompanied the King to Hanover, thought that, a few days before Cathcart's expedition was ready to go, Fleury would put an embarrassing question as to its destination, or announce that he could not allow it to sail at all.[3] Newcastle persisted in believing that

[1] Newcastle to Waldegrave, June 12, 1740, S.P. 78/221, f. 111. But at the same time that he argued in this way, he prepared a private instruction for Sir John Norris, who was to command the Channel fleet, empowering him to get between the French and Spanish fleets if they should try to join in Ferrol harbour, and prevent it by force (Norris's diary, June 22, 1740, Add. MSS. 28133, f. 15). Fleury was very much afraid at this time that the English fleets would commit a sudden attack on French warships. This appears not only from Amelot's letter to Bussy of July 21 (which may have been meant to be intercepted, as in fact it was), but also from Maurepas's instructions to the commanders of ships in the Channel (Maurepas to d'Antin, July 26, 1740, A.N. Marine B^2 311, f. 25). See also the accounts of proceedings in Cabinet, May 6 and 22, 1740, Hervey, *Memoirs*, ed. Sedgwick, iii. 933–40.

[2] Newcastle to Waldegrave, June 12, 1740, S.P. 78/223, f. 111; Newcastle to Vernon, July 23, 1740, Add. MSS. 32694, f. 239.

[3] Wager to Vernon, Aug. 6, 1740, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, p. 18; Harrington to Newcastle, June 6/17, July 11/22, 1740, S.P. 43/25; Newcastle to Harrington (private and particular), June 24, o.s., S.P. 43/90; July 4, S.P. 43/91; July 22, S.P. 43/92.

nothing of the sort would happen. He had lately had a letter from Waldegrave, saying that Fleury had spoken 'as strongly as he could, to satisfy me he actually meant to declare against us, if the case happened. But for all that', the Ambassador continued light-heartedly, 'I wish to God, we took something from the Spaniards that would make it worth our while to stand a chance of his resentment.' Newcastle sent this off with satisfaction to Harrington, adding that the Cabinet was 'humbly of opinion, that what was thus said by the Cardinal does not import a resolution to make any declaration or demand relating to my Lord Cathcart's expedition, previously to his going hence. But however that may be, their Lordships continue firmly of opinion, that no alteration in the measures determined to be taken by His Majesty, can anyways be made, or the measures delayed by it.'[1]

Soon afterwards, however, a rumour reached Newcastle: Fleury had told Waldegrave outright that France could not let us make any conquests in America. This indeed was exactly what Fleury had always said, but Waldegrave had not reported it so. Newcastle now wrote to him for further light, and received a reassuring reply. Waldegrave thought that whatever Fleury had let fall to him was said 'in order that, without his appearing to menace, we may see what he would have us think he would resent, as well as what would be agreeable to him by keeping him out of the cases, in which, perhaps, he may have promised to assist Spain'; and that 'the Cardinal never had the least notion that any thing he ever said to me on these subjects, could be looked upon as a declaration or demand upon any intention of His Majesty for pursuing the war against his enemies'.[2]

At first sight this does not quite explain why Newcastle was so outraged when Fleury sent off d'Antin's fleet to the West Indies; for if Waldegrave's explanation of Fleury's words was comforting, the words themselves were dangerous. Yet there is really no puzzle at all. Newcastle was only sure that Fleury would say nothing about Cathcart's expedition 'previously to his going hence'. He knew perfectly well, for even Waldegrave's good-natured blundering could not conceal it, that

[1] Waldegrave to Newcastle, July 8, 1740, S.P. 43/91; Newcastle to Harrington, July 4/15, 1740, Add. MSS. 32693, f. 443.

[2] Newcastle to Waldegrave, July 15, 1740, Add. MSS. 32802, f. 158; Waldegrave to Newcastle, Aug. 10, 1740, S.P. 78/223, f. 268.

Fleury would interfere when he heard of victories in Spanish America. But he was prepared, like Waldegrave, to take his chance of that. He imagined that when Fleury said he could not suffer us to make conquests in America, he meant literally that he should do nothing until we had made them. He never thought that Fleury might try to prevent us from making them at all. He tried to steal a march on Fleury, and was surprised and grieved when he found that Fleury had stolen one on him. He complained that he had been cheated, because he had not been allowed to—I will not say, cheat Fleury, but it was something very like it. For while Waldegrave had purposely eluded giving Fleury a promise that we would keep none of our conquests, Harrington had allowed Trevor to deny that acquisitions were the object of the war.[1]

There was also an equivocation on Fleury's part. If Waldegrave may be trusted—which is admittedly doubtful—Fleury had never told him in so many words that it was Cathcart's sailing to make the conquests, and not the conquests themselves, which was to be the signal for his intervention. Probably he did not even give him to understand it. Certainly Waldegrave did not understand it. Nobody can blame Fleury for not announcing his movements in advance; but why did he order Fénelon and Bussy to imply that he had made it clear Cathcart must not sail?[2] His ubiquitous reiterations that the English Ministers could not be surprised at the step he had taken, indicate that he knew he had in fact surprised them.

He had surprised them indeed. Maurepas had sent out four ships to the West Indies earlier in the summer, but that had only reassured the English Ministers, who presumed he would send no more, or would at the worst reinforce them by inoffensive ones and twos until he had collected a respectable force there.[3] They had known very well that preparations were making at Brest and Toulon, but hardly a rumour, let alone any authentic news, had escaped as to the real destination of the squadrons. It was one of the few naval movements of the eighteenth century which were kept a complete secret from the

[1] Harrington to Trevor, April 15, 1740, S.P. 84/384, f. 174.

[2] Bussy's declaration, Sept. 18, 1740, S.P. 100/7; Amelot to Bussy, Sept. 11, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 64; Amelot to Fénelon, Sept. 9, 1740, A.E. Hollande, 436.

[3] Bussy to Amelot, Sept. 21, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 88; Waldegrave to Newcastle, May 4, N.S., 1740, Add. MSS. 32802, f. 131.

enemy; and this is the more remarkable because the two countries were not at war.

I do not know when Fleury first took his resolution to send d'Antin to the West Indies. Maurepas and the Spanish party were urging him to do so in May;[1] but the first written evidence of his intention is in d'Antin's instructions of August 14, N.S.[2] Perhaps he was determined by a letter which Bussy, the French Minister in London, wrote him on July 30, N.S. Amelot had written to ask whether it was true that Cathcart's expedition was bound to the Canaries. Bussy replied positively that he was sure its real objective was Havana, as he had announced for some months past.[3] He added a copy of Cathcart's draft proclamation to the Spanish colonists, which might in itself have been decisive in the eyes of the French Government, if they had not already had one in May from Silhouette.[4] It may have been Bussy's report of the Government's fixed intention to attack the strongest point in all Spanish America, which determined Fleury to go to the rescue at once.[5] Or it may have been Bussy's singularly ill-judged remark in the same letter, that 'it seems to me, from all I can hear, that the Ministers here were expecting that we should have explained ourselves more openly about the limits which we wish them to put to the progress of the war, and the expedients which we think proper for restoring peace'. There was nothing which they were more anxious to avoid.

Whatever else may have prompted Fleury's action, it was not Spanish influence. The measure was in no way concerted with the Spanish Court, which was not informed of it until d'Antin was already on the point of sailing, and had no time to order its naval commanders to co-operate with him until he was gone.

[1] Waldegrave to Newcastle, May 4, N.S., 1740, S.P. 78/222, f. 321.

[2] Between March 1700 and September 1752, the English calendar was eleven days behind that of the rest of western Europe. August 14, New Style, was August 3, Old Style, in England.

[3] Amelot to Bussy, July 21, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 407, f. 443; Bussy to Amelot, July 30, ibid., f. 465; Amelot to Bussy, Aug. 3 and 16, vol. 409, ff. 2, 23. Bussy was not quite right; most of the Ministers hoped Cathcart would attack Havana, but it was not absolutely prescribed to him, and the final decision was to be taken by a Council of War. See also Newcastle to Harrington (private and particular), June 24, O.S., 1740, S.P. 43/90.

[4] *V. supra*, p. 75.

[5] Although both Bussy and Cambis had reported that Cathcart's force would probably go to Havana, they had not announced it as certain; and Maurepas does not seem to have known its destination on June 30 (Maurepas to Larnage, June 30, 1740, A.N. Colonies B 78).

In fact, at the same time as Fleury rendered it this remarkable assistance, he suddenly suspended the negotiation of the treaties of commerce and alliance. This curious scruple is hard to understand. It was quixotic to take such an abrupt and decisive way of proving to the world the disinterestedness which he claimed in his public manifestoes. He can hardly have hoped to avoid a war, for d'Antin's orders were almost sure to provoke one. Fleury did not mean to be the first to declare it, but he had little doubt of England's doing so, and had a *mémoire* drawn up about the naval and diplomatic steps necessary to be taken in that case.[1] The abandonment of the Spanish treaty of commerce was too high a price to pay for putting England in the wrong, even assuming that Fleury could do so, which was more than doubtful after the instructions he had given to d'Antin. The two chief reasons which he gave—fear of offending the Dutch by provoking their commercial jealousy, and of being dragged by Spain into a general war—might have justified him if he had never entered into the commercial negotiations at all, but do not seem to explain his withdrawing from them at this point. Perhaps he felt that they could never come to any good end, and chose a moment for suspending them when the Court of Spain would have other grounds of gratitude to him.[2]

§ vi. *D'Antin's Expedition to the West Indies*

Laroche-Alart sailed from Toulon on August 26, N.S., and d'Antin from Brest on the 3rd of September. For some days the news was kept secret; but Fleury soon admitted, without embarrassment, that d'Antin at least was on his way to the West Indies. He did not mean, he said, to go to war with England, to attack or molest any of her ships, or to deprive her of any of her possessions; but he must prevent her from becoming too powerful in America, and above all from engrossing the whole trade of the Spanish West Indies. He had reason to believe that the immense preparations for Cathcart's expedition portended something more than the seizure and dismantling of fortresses as at Portobello and Chagre. Amelot wrote to Bussy in very much the same strain. Fénelon was ordered to make a declara-

[1] *Mémoire* of Aug. 20, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 30. Yet Fleury declared to Van Hoey that though he did not suppose the first reaction of the English public would be towards peace, he hoped they might come round to it (Van Hoey to States-General, Sept. 13, 1740, A.E. Hollande, 436).

[2] Baudrillart, op. cit. iv. 560–1.

tion to the States-General, which should serve as Fleury's manifesto to neutral powers; d'Antin was furnished with another, which he should publish as soon as he had struck the first blow in America. All these documents harped upon the pacific intentions of France, and her disappointed hope that England would have pursued her controversy against Spain by peaceful arguments, or would at least have confined her ambitions in the war to obtaining redress of her grievances and securing a free navigation for her lawful trade. France was acting not only in her own interests but in those of Europe, and without any collusion with Spain; she would do no more than was necessary to preserve the equilibrium set up by the Treaty of Utrecht, and to defend the Spanish colonies against aggression.[1]

The world in general might infer from this pompous display of innocence that d'Antin was only instructed to prevent the attack which Vernon and Cathcart were to make against Havana or Cartagena. This was what the English Government believed. How far it was from the truth, will appear from d'Antin's instructions.

Torres, with the Ferrol squadron of fourteen ships, had sailed a few weeks before d'Antin, and there were six Spanish warships already in the West Indies. Against these, Vernon at Jamaica had only ten of the line, but he was to be reinforced by a fleet of whose size the French were not certain, which might have sailed, or be setting out, or on the point of setting out, when d'Antin took his departure. When d'Antin had sent back the escort which had strengthened his squadron in the Channel, and picked up three ships waiting for him at Martinique, he would have twelve or fourteen ships of the line, of which he was to leave one at Martinique.[2] Eight more under Laroche-Alart were to join him in the West Indies. At his first setting out, he had no orders to co-operate with Torres, so that he had to rely on a force of twenty ships, against Vernon's ten at Jamaica, and an uncertain number—his instructions said six—which would probably not yet have reinforced Vernon.

He was to stop at Martinique and take on board some regular

[1] Waldegrave to Newcastle, Sept. 11 and 16, 1740, S.P. 78/223, f. 385, 78/224, f. 10; Fénelon to States-General, Sept. 14, 1740, copy in Add. MSS. 35406, f. 233, with copy of declaration to be made by d'Antin; Note of Bussy's declaration, Sept. 18, 1740, S.P. 100/7.

[2] He was given the option of sending home four or six ships when he was clear of the Channel.

troops and volunteers whom the Governor was to raise. He was to seek and fight the English, in one way or another. If he reached the West Indies before the English reinforcement, he was to waylay it in the Windward Islands without even waiting for Laroche-Alart to join him. If he could not do this he was to attack Vernon, whose squadron was said to be in a very bad condition. If he should not be able to meet either Vernon or the reinforcement before they joined, he must naturally wait until Laroche-Alart came up, when he would again be equal or superior to the combined English fleet. He was then to attack and destroy it, or blockade it in Port Royal, and if it escaped he was to follow and fight it at sea. Having defeated it he was to concert an invasion of Jamaica with the Governor of St. Domingue, who would have troops and volunteers ready for the purpose. He need not conquer and annex the whole island, but should confine himself to destroying the principal towns and forts, and carrying off the greatest possible number of negroes from the plantations. If, however, he took possession of it, he was to do so in the name of the King of Spain. He might find, on his arrival, that Vernon, already reinforced, had gone to the siege of Havana. If so, he was to follow him and drive him away. If the English should have divided their forces, he might do the same, provided each detachment could be superior to the English squadron to which it was opposed; otherwise, he was to keep his fleet together and deal first with any English division which might be attacking the Spanish possessions. As soon as he had struck any definite blow, he was to publish the manifesto with which he had been provided, and to send word to the Marquis de Champigny, Governor of the Windward Islands, in order that he might forestall the English in taking possession of the neutral island of St. Lucia.[1]

Two months later the situation was much changed. The French Government had come to some understanding with that of Spain about co-operation between their fleets, and the reinforcement which Ogle was taking to Vernon had been considerably strengthened as a result of d'Antin's departure. Maurepas wrote to d'Antin at first that Ogle was still waiting to set out, and that the increased size of the English fleet need make no difference to the execution of his instructions. But on October 23, when Maurepas knew that Ogle was to have between

[1] Instructions to d'Antin, A.N. Marine B² 311, Brest, ff. 58 et seqq.

twenty-one and twenty-four ships, he saw that even the united fleet of d'Antin and Laroche-Alart would be too small to deal with them, and dispensed d'Antin from that part of his instructions which enjoined him to intercept the reinforcement on its way to Vernon. The rest of his orders could still be executed, especially as Torres had been told to join him if it should seem advisable. He was to take all possible measures for the security of the French and Spanish colonies—particularly, of course, the former—against any attack the English might make. Torres also had been allowed a considerable latitude of acting as he should think best after informing himself of the position and number of the English ships. He was to fight Vernon, if he could find him alone and unreinforced, or to get between him and Ogle; and he might join with d'Antin for an expedition against Jamaica.[1]

This was Fleury's disinterestedness and moderation; this is how he interpreted his promise to respect the lawful commerce of the English in America, and to abstain from annexing a foot of English soil. It was a long time before he was found out; the English Government believed that the French fleets would try to hinder its operations against the Spanish colonies, but it had not an inkling of these elaborate plans of aggression. It only intercepted one of Maurepas's later letters to d'Antin, in which the full extent of the French schemes was not clear.[2]

Newcastle was shocked by what he regarded as Fleury's duplicity, though he did not know the half of it. Yet though he was staggered, he was not for a moment intimidated.[3] The first step of the Government was naturally to increase Ogle's strength so that the force he was taking out should make Vernon more or less equal to the combined French and Spaniards. The exact adjustment of this matter required a great deal of argument. It was not certain at first whether the Toulon squadron had gone, like that of Brest, to the West Indies; then each of them sent back to France a detachment which had strengthened it in the dangerous waters off the coasts of Europe. Something

[1] Maurepas to d'Antin, Oct. 7 and 23, 1740, ibid., Brest, ff. 172, 208; Copy of Torres's instructions, f. 173.

[2] The letter of Oct. 7, 1740, C.O. 137/57. It appears from Newcastle's private letter to Vernon, Oct. 15, 1741 (Add. MSS. 32698, f. 157), that they had found out by that time what d'Antin had really been instructed to do.

[3] Newcastle to Harrington, Sept. 6, 1740, Add. MSS. 32695, f. 6; Newcastle to Waldegrave, Sept. 5 and 20, S.P. 78/224, ff. 6, 68.

also depended on the movements which Vernon was going to make after he received this reinforcement. Admiral Norris thought Vernon would have to make for Cartagena, because the season of Ogle's arrival would be the wrong one for attacking Havana; he believed that Vernon would almost certainly have to deal with the French, and must therefore be as strong as possible.[1]

Another difficulty arose from Walpole's reluctance to strip the British Islands of all their naval defence. He continued longer than most of his colleagues to believe that the Toulon squadron had not really gone to the West Indies, but would prove to be employed in an invasion of Great Britain or Ireland; and when that was disproved beyond reasonable doubt, he still held out against Newcastle's plan for sending almost the whole available force of the navy to the West Indies.[2] For at one moment it was Norris's Grand Fleet of thirty-three of the line which was to go.[3] This proved to be unnecessary when it became clear that not all the ships which had left Brest and Toulon had gone to the West Indies. Finally Ogle took with him twenty-five ships, which would give Vernon thirty-five of the line against thirty-nine (or forty-one) if all the French and Spanish ships in the West Indies should join together.

This was the first time that so great a proportion of the fighting strength of three nations had been concentrated in the West Indies.[4] The French had orders to fall upon the English if they could do so with advantage. The English Ministers did not know this, so they presumably thought they were taking a very daring step when they instructed Ogle and Vernon to attack

[1] Norris's diary, Oct. 21, 1740, Add. MSS. 28133, f. 66.

[2] Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 1, 1740, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 237; Newcastle to Vernon, Sept. 12, Add. MSS. 32695, f. 47.

[3] Newcastle to Harrington, Sept. 9, o.s., 1740, S.P. 43/94; Stone to Cathcart, Sept. 9, Add. MSS. 32695, f. 30.

[4] On Feb. 4, 1740/1, Vernon commanded thirteen third-rates, seventeen fourth-rates, twenty-two frigates, fire-ships, &c. He had so many small and middle-sized ships that there were not enough left for convoy and cruising in the Channel; this is probably the reason why the Spanish privateers were more successful there between March and December 1741 than at any other time (*A Short Account of the late Application to Parliament, made by the Merchants of London upon the Neglect of their Trade* (London, 1742), p. 13). The Government was criticized for fitting out so many capital ships in Europe, which were not wanted so long as France remained neutral; but what else was it to do when so many third- and fourth-rates were in the West Indies? (Wager to Vernon, June 21, 1741, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, p. 47; *Hireling Artifice Detected* (London, 1742), pp. 53, 56.)

the French. Though they anticipated that the French fleets in the West Indies would only hamper us and defend the Spaniards, they had no intention of submitting even to so much. 'For if the French and Spaniards get the better of us in the West Indies, which they do, if they hinder our expeditions, or the success of them against the Spaniards, we must for ever after be at the mercy of France.'[1] Vernon was therefore ordered not only to proceed with his plans against the Spanish colonies, regardless of any obstruction which the French might interpose, but to attack the French themselves if he should have sufficient force for the purpose. Even Ogle, with his lumbering convoy of transports, was told that if he should meet d'Antin on the way out and find himself in a condition to fight him, he need not scruple to do so.[2]

Here then was a strange situation. Each Government had sent out its fleet to the West Indies with orders to commit an unprovoked aggression against an enemy who was expected to remain on the defensive. Each Government must therefore have spent the winter waiting to hear of an explosion in the West Indies, for which it believed itself to be entirely responsible.[3] Each side reckoned on attacking, and reckoned without being attacked. Maurepas at least seems to have thought it possible that d'Antin would have to defend the French colonies, when he saw the huge additions made to Ogle's squadron; he had not provided for this in his original instructions to d'Antin, but gave him orders for it in his later dispatches.[4] Wager, however, his counterpart in England, entertained no such doubts. He wrote cheerfully to Vernon that he thought it no bad thing if d'Antin and Laroche-Alart should arrive in the West Indies a couple of months before Ogle; they would have time to fall ill before the fresh English crews could come upon them. Wager had been Commodore on the Jamaica station in Queen Anne's reign, when France had sent squadrons to convoy the Spanish galleons home. He was under the impression that this

[1] Newcastle to Harrington, Sept. 6, 1740, Add. MSS. 32695, f. 7.

[2] Orders to Ogle and Vernon, Sept. 25, 1740, Add. MSS. 32695, ff. 138, 147; Newcastle to Vernon, Feb. 28, 1740/1, vol. 32696, f. 140. This suggestion seems to have come first from Harrington, Sept. 14/25, 1740, S.P. 43/26.

[3] Norris told the Cabinet that 'if I did not believe, thair would be an engagement, I should not be of opinion to send any ships to west indias; considering the grate stres that was layed on our week situation at home' (*Diary*, Oct. 21, 1740, Add. MSS. 28133, f. 66).

[4] Letters of Oct. 7 and 23, already quoted.

was the chief purpose of d'Antin's expedition, and that it was meant to do very little more. As he believed that the treasure could not be ready for some months after d'Antin's arrival, he was quite content to let him stew for a while in St. Louis. Besides, he saw better than anybody else how hard it would be for d'Antin and Torres to victual and repair such huge squadrons in the tropical colonies.[1] Yet he could not have been so light-hearted had he known the terrible danger to which Ogle's delay would have exposed the inferior force of Vernon for two months, if d'Antin had done his duty. Nobody in the Ministry seems to have seen that but Lord Chancellor Hardwicke (who often noticed points of strategy which were not revealed to professional soldiers and sailors). The Jamaica interest in London also saw this point; it invariably scented a danger to that rich and defenceless island at least as soon as one existed. Neither Hardwicke nor the absentee planters could make any use of their forebodings; for if d'Antin was between Ogle and Vernon, with intention to cut them off in detail, there was nothing for it but to hope they would join without meeting him, and to order Vernon to keep his squadron safe in Port Royal harbour.[2]

The English Ministers were of half a mind to go farther, and declare war. Fleury fully expected they would do it, and deliberated accordingly upon his preparations for fastening a neutrality or mediation upon the States-General, fitting out privateers, and attacking the credit of the English funds (this was a stock article of French plans of campaign against England, but I have never seen any convincing details of the way it was to be done).[3] Newcastle ransacked a similar store of well-tried expedients. He thought of obliging the States-General to declare war against France, either by appealing to the defensive alliance of 1678, which did not apply to the defence of possessions outside Europe, or by making the most of the new French fortifications at Dunkirk; these were certainly a technical violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, and the Dutch might well be induced to resent them. He threw out suggestions of a grand

[1] Wager to Vernon, Oct. 11, 1740, and Feb. 24, 1740/1, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, pp. 26, 32; May 3, 1741, Vernon-Wager MSS., Library of Congress.

[2] Hardwicke to Newcastle, Sept. 12, 1740, Add. MSS. 32695, f. 56; Knight to Sharpe, Oct. 2, f. 178; Newcastle to Vernon, Sept. 12, 1740, f. 47.

[3] *Mémoire* of Aug. 20, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 30; Amelot to Bussy, Oct. 16, 1740, f. 156; see also Bussy to Choiseul, July 17, 1761, vol. 444.

anti-Bourbon alliance, although the difficulty of engineering it had been one of the chief arguments against going to war with Spain in 1738. He even gave a moment's consideration to the curious project of maintaining a neutrality in Europe while the two nations attacked each other's possessions in America—a sort of recurrence to the seventeenth-century doctrine of 'no peace beyond the line'. The historian would have a hard task who attempted a serious account of every fantastic idea that flashed across Newcastle's mind and found its way into his memoranda. This one was peculiarly impracticable, as Newcastle himself admitted in the same breath that suggested it. There would have been no trusting to such a precarious neutrality, which might expose the British Isles to a sudden danger of invasion; moreover we should lose the use of one of our chief weapons against France, namely the destruction of her European trade.[1]

In the end the Ministers decided to do nothing, and wait on events. For a few days they thought war unavoidable, and drew up declarations against France, but after a little reflection they decided to give Bussy no answer until the King returned from Hanover; in the event they did not answer him in writing at all.[2] Newcastle merely complained by word of mouth that France was making war upon England without declaring it. The King's Speech at the opening of the session announced vaguely the intention to pursue the war against Spain, whatever obstacles should present themselves; but it made no open reference to the dispatch of d'Antin to the West Indies. The French representatives in London judged that the English Ministers would be content to make war without declaring it, reserving the right to come into the open if news of a clash should arrive from Vernon or if the Opposition should insist on it.[3]

[1] Newcastle to Harrington, Sept. 6, 1740, quoted above; 'Considerations', Oct. 7, 1740, Add. MSS. 35406, f. 266.

[2] Newcastle to Harrington (private), Sept. 19, 1740, S.P. 43/94. There are three drafts of an answer to Bussy in Add. MSS. 35406, ff. 243–7. They all denounce the conduct of France, but none of them declares war. The Duke of Richmond, who was in the confidence of some of the Ministers, told Lord Waldegrave that 'The French sending these squadrons to the West Indias is I think as plain a declaration of war as can be made, and you will hear that it is looked upon as such here' (Richmond to Waldegrave, Sept. 11, 1740, Waldegrave MSS.).

[3] Bussy to Amelot, Sept. 21, Oct. 3 and 13, Nov. 28, Dec. 5, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 409, ff. 88, 122, 148, 263, 305.

The Opposition leaders announced to Bussy, of all ill-chosen confidants, that they might be obliged to roar loudly against the Ministry for suffering d'Antin to set out and Dunkirk to be rebuilt; they might even have to demand a war with France. They gracefully palliated this intention by explaining that they should do so out of no animosity against France, but only a desire to get rid of their own Prime Minister. They suggested that when he had been ruined, and they had conquered political power for themselves, they would be in a much better position than he had ever been, to make a peace on terms which would satisfy Fleury. This was not to be believed, for they numbered among themselves not only many of the loudest shouters against France, but some of her worst enemies.[1]

The winter passed, but no echo of the awaited explosion reached Europe from the West Indies. Both the elaborate trains of powder, which the two Governments had laid, had missed fire altogether.

It would be a depressing business to relate in detail the series of misfortunes which so easily overcame d'Antin's will to execute his instructions. At Martinique the soldiers were unready and the volunteers non-existent. Governor de Champigny had failed to collect the first or to inspire the second.[2] D'Antin found the same state of affairs at St. Louis, on the south coast of St. Domingue, which he reached on November 7, N.S. Here the reason was a more respectable one. The *Fée*, sent out with instructions to Governor de Larnage, had been seized by H.M.S. *Norwich*, on pretext of a difference of opinion about a salute, and carried into Jamaica. After she had been very improperly searched for her dispatches, which had been thrown overboard, she was released, but she met with an accident on her way to St. Domingue, and never arrived at all. Larnage therefore did not hear of the great expedition which he was to

[1] Bussy to Amelot, Nov. 28, 1740, A.E. Angleterre, 409, f. 263. When Bussy came back to England in 1761 he lamented that 'there were no longer any Opposition leaders to enlighten foreign Ministers as to the Government's difficulties' (Bussy to Choiseul, June 26, 1761, vol. 443). The Opposition of 1739 tried to depreciate Walpole by expressing an exaggerated admiration for Fleury's talents (Silhouette to Amelot, Nov. 26, 1739, vol. 405, f. 286; to Fleury, Dec. 31, f. 394). This compliment took a less courtly form in the popular caricatures of the time, in whose tasteless and overcrowded allegories Fleury always appeared as the successful villain—Fleury rocking the English lion to sleep, Fleury winning the European race astride a fox, Fleury receiving the crown of three continents.

[2] D'Antin to Maurepas, Oct. 1740, A.N. Marine B^4 50, f. 77.

organize against Jamaica, until d'Antin arrived and demanded the troops.[1]

D'Antin had been expressly ordered to keep his ships in harbour as little as possible, in order to avoid sickness among the crews. But he had only ten ships on his arrival; two more joined him on November 22. He would not risk his ten ships against Vernon's ten, especially as the latter was not so badly provided as he had been led to expect; and he was further intimidated by a short-lived rumour that Norris had arrived at Cape Donna Maria with the whole English fleet. This was only Vernon himself with some transports from North America; but those very transports diminished the already faint hope of a successful attack on Jamaica, because d'Antin had in various ways been disappointed of the land force that was to accompany him. D'Antin therefore stayed in St. Louis and waited for Laroche-Alart; as he expected him to arrive soon, it would perhaps have been a mistake to delay the junction of their forces by a very problematical expedition against Vernon. Laroche-Alart had an exceptionally bad passage, and did not come in until December 15. By that time d'Antin's crews were very sickly, and he was himself laid low by a fever which probably weakened his resolution.[2]

In the meantime a fresh cause for delay had arisen. Maurepas's dispatches of October 7 had arrived, and announced to d'Antin the project of co-operation between him and Torres. It was plainly d'Antin's duty to get into touch with Torres, and (less plainly) to stay where he was until he had done so. He sent off a messenger who was intercepted; another had to be sent after him, and Torres's reply did not come back until December 30. The difficulty of concerting action between commanders of two different nations now began to make itself felt. Their first duty was to defend two different sets of colonies, and their junction only optional. Torres had met a hurricane off Porto Rico; Ogle would have met it too if his Government had not decided, with a flash of common sense, not to send him off so as to arrive in the season.[3] Torres had put in to port, badly dismasted. Since then he had got to Cartagena and joined the

[1] D'Antin to Maurepas, Nov. 13, 1740, ibid., f. 79; Larnage to Maurepas, Nov. 9 and 13, 1740, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 53.

[2] Larnage to Maurepas, Nov. 20 and 26, Dec. 5, 1740, ibid.; d'Antin to Maurepas, Dec. 22, 1740, A.N. Marine B^4 50, f. 81.

[3] Newcastle afterwards claimed that this decision had been taken, but I can find

galleons. D'Antin had suggested that they should unite forces, but Torres replied by making difficulties as to the place. He could not get so far to windward as Santa Marta, or even, perhaps, to St. Louis. He therefore proposed that d'Antin should pick him up off Cartagena, or at Cape Corientes, at the west end of Cuba, and they should then proceed to attack Jamaica or relieve Havana.[1]

D'Antin was now beginning to be affected by two motives which only too often deterred French commanders in the West Indies from bold enterprises. In the first place, he had not unlimited time for action. This was because his victuals were running short. He and Laroche-Alart had been provided with six months' rations, and told to execute the whole campaign on them if possible. Maurepas had sent after him enough for another month, and empowered him to procure further supplies in the colony if he could, and if it seemed important that he should stay longer. The Governor and Intendant were able to furnish him with a month's victuals, but it was doubtful how much farther they could go. The southern quarter of St. Domingue, where his fleet lay, was thinly settled and produced little; the communication with the other quarters was difficult. It would have been just as easy to bring provisions from the Windward Islands as from Cape François or Leogane; but they had been stricken by the hurricane a few months earlier, and most of their ground-crops had been destroyed. There remained the recourse of Jamaica, from whence, strange as it may seem, Larnage and Maillart had already drawn supplies of flour which they resold for the use of the galleons; but that was stopped at present by an embargo. It began therefore to look as if d'Antin must make sure of being home by the end of April. That would still have given him two months for his campaign in the West Indies. To Vernon this would have been an unquestionable argument for doing something at once; in d'Antin it seems to have inspired doubts whether he should be able to do anything at all, and reconciled him to the thought of doing nothing.

He had, besides, another reason against accepting Torres's

do trace of it; perhaps it was Newcastle's *ex post facto* justification of an unintended nelay (Newcastle to Vernon, Feb. 28, 1740/1, Add. MSS. 32696, f. 142). The hurricane season was generally reputed to end in the middle of October.

[1] Larnage to Torres, Dec. 6, 1740, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 53; Larnage to Maurepas, Jan. 2, 1741, vol. 55; d'Antin to Maurepas, Jan. 5, 1741, A.N. Marine B^4 50.

offer. Since he had received Maurepas's dispatches of October, he had been charged with the additional duty of protecting St. Domingue against a possible invasion by a large English force. If Torres could not be sure of coming up from Cartagena to St. Louis, it could not be safe or justifiable for d'Antin to go down from St. Louis to Cartagena. What if the English should attack the colony behind his back? Could he be sure of returning to the rescue? Still greater was the danger of going down to Cape Corientes and Havana. D'Antin consulted Larnage, who presumably did not fail, as Governor of the colony, to put forward this point of view, though he afterwards denied that he had said anything to deter d'Antin from decisive action. For these reasons d'Antin determined to stay where he was, holding himself ready to succour Torres at Cartagena or Havana if he needed it.

Torres accepted the offer; but in the meantime two events took place which made it less likely than ever that d'Antin would join him. Ogle joined Vernon at Jamaica; the arrival of four more French ships under Roquefeuille was very little to set off against this colossal English reinforcement. On their way, some of Ogle's ships met some French men-of-war coming round from Petit-Goave to St. Louis. They fell into an engagement, in which each side showed great gallantry and some stupidity, and parted without being sure whether their action had provoked a war between the two nations. All this put an end to d'Antin's prospects of action. He deliberated with Larnage and Laroche-Alart whether to procure another month's victuals in the colony, and cruise against Vernon and Ogle or blockade them in Port Royal. They decided against it. They were not sure of persuading Torres to come up to windward and join them in time, without whom they would be inferior to Vernon's fleet. Moreover, they thought Ogle's fleet could not leave port for a month, because it would be employed in watering its ships and refreshing its crews, so that there would be little point in blockading a force which did not mean to come out in the period for which they could afford to keep it shut up. They little knew Vernon; and Maillart, the Intendant, seems to have believed they could have found victuals for more than a month, though Larnage denied it. If anything more had been needed to keep d'Antin at St. Domingue, it was the fight of the four ships with the English. The English captains did

not appear to have had orders to attack French warships and possessions (Ogle having presumably kept his instructions to himself, for use by the whole squadron if an opportunity occurred); but it was not certain such orders would not be given after the incident had taken place.

The only other service d'Antin could have performed was to protect the General of the galleons in holding the fair, and carry the treasure back to Europe. There seems to be no word of this in his original instructions, but Maurepas afterwards signified that he thought it very important. But even if d'Antin had tried to set about it from the first moment of his arrival, he could hardly have had time for it. The fair could only be set in motion by a long train of comings and goings. Messages had to be sent to Panama and thence to Lima, and the treasure had to come back along the same route. Some of the merchants had their money at Panama, but most of them had sent it back to Peru. There was also a difficulty which was held to be almost invincible: Portobello was destroyed, and the fair must therefore be held, if at all, at some place whose communications with Peru were even longer and worse. For all these reasons d'Antin had little hope of doing this part of his duty, or even leaving Roquefeuille behind to do it.[1]

He therefore returned ignominiously home. He was conscious of his failure, and wished he had given orders for hostilities against English ships as soon as he heard of the seizure of the *Fée*. It was Larnage who dissuaded him from it, by the very sensible argument that it would be doing too much or too little. Hostilities ought to be signalized by a decisive act or not at all. That was certainly the spirit of d'Antin's instructions, and Larnage rightly added that d'Antin would do the French colonies a great disservice if he provoked Vernon against them without destroying his power to hurt them, and then went home at the end of the season, leaving them exposed to Vernon's vengeance.[2] D'Antin had, in fact, done the Spaniards an ill turn

[1] Minute of Larnage and d'Antin, Feb. 2, 1741, A.N. Marine B^4 50, f. 223; Roquefeuille to Maurepas, Feb. 7, 1741, f. 277; Larnage to Maurepas, Jan. 10 and 12, Feb. 6 and 17, March 29, 1741, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 55; Torres to Larnage, Jan. 22, 1741; De Lezo to Larnage, Jan. 23, 1741, ibid.; Maurepas to Maillart, Aug. 10, 1741, A.N. Colonies, B 72; Maurepas to d'Antin, Nov. 14 and 15, Dec. 30, 1740, A.N. Marine B^2 311, Brest, ff. 245, 246, 313.

[2] Larnage to Maurepas, Dec. 7, 1740, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 53; Feb. 6, Sept. 22, 1741, vol. 55.

of this kind. His expedition had attracted to the West Indies a much larger English force than had first been intended for them. Without doing anything to weaken or frustrate it, he sailed back to France at the end of six months and left Torres to face it. Torres might be to blame for the difficulty he made of joining the French squadron; but for all he knew, it was come to help him and not to be helped by him, and he had a legitimate grievance when he was forced to leave Cartagena defenceless on his departure to Havana. This injury was long and bitterly remembered at the Court of Spain.

D'Antin left Roquefeuille behind him for a few weeks with six ships, to offer in vain a junction with Torres off Cape Tiburon, which was not on his route to Havana. The main French squadron sailed sadly back to France, and d'Antin, received with obvious coldness by Maurepas, died at Brest a few days after his arrival.[1]

The French squib had petered out; would the English squib explode? Fate was somewhat unkind to Vernon as well as to d'Antin; but he met her with a manlier resistance. He had meant to meet Ogle off Cape Donna Maria (the south-west end of St. Domingue) instead of letting him come into Port Royal. Unfortunately, the letter he wrote to Cathcart for this purpose did not reach him, and Vernon, waiting at Jamaica for news that the reinforcement was ready to join him at the rendezvous, was surprised to see the whole fleet preparing to come into harbour. There was no help for it. The ships must have wood and water, and might as well take it in at Kingston. Meanwhile the Council of War could be held, to determine the first objective. The commanders took a brave and wise resolution. They had orders to attack the French fleet if they thought fit; and they saw the danger to which they would expose Jamaica if they went off to any other destination and left a large French force ready to strike from the windward. They decided that no expedition could safely be undertaken against the Spaniards until the French had been cleared away; it was therefore the French whom they went out to seek.[2]

It was time wasted, for d'Antin had already got round Cape

[1] Instructions to Roquefeuille, Nov. 12, 1740, A.N. Marine B^4 50, f. 91; Roquefeuille to Maurepas, Feb. 7, 1741, ibid., f. 277; Begon to Maurepas, April 20, 1741, ibid., f. 279; Maurepas to d'Antin, April 26, 1741, A.N. Marine B^2 313, Brest, f. 123; to Roquefeuille, April 26, 1741, f. 127.

[2] Wentworth to Newcastle, Jan. 20, 1740/1, C.O. 5/42.

Tiburon, unnoticed by the English cruisers, and was now slipping away from Petit-Goave. The delay was aggravated by the wrong information of Vernon's scouts, who mistook some merchant ships for the French fleet, and kept him off the coast of St. Domingue for more than a week longer than he should have needed, to find that the bird was flown. All these accidents made him lose nearly six weeks of his time, and arrive at Cartagena nearer the beginning of the sickly season. He might also have found and destroyed Torres's ships in the harbour if he had come sooner. This was all the service that d'Antin had done to the Spaniards by his presence; but perhaps it was enough, for the expedition miscarried at Cartagena, and the English squib went out as foolishly as the French.[1]

There were moments in 1741 when the history of 1740 nearly repeated itself. The French representative in London was almost imploring his Government to make war upon England while so large a part of her naval force was away in the West Indies and the Mediterranean.[2] In the late summer Maurepas thought of sending out Roquefeuille to intercept the reinforcements which the English were sending to Vernon. He was not to go so far as the West Indies this time, but he was to interfere quite as effectively with the great West India expedition. This design was given up, but perhaps the English Ministry had some inkling of it, for Newcastle told Vernon in October that a squadron was reported to be destined from Toulon to the West Indies, and instructed him to serve it, if he met it, in the same way as he was to have served d'Antin.[3] The necessity for this did not arise, and the two nations kept the peace at sea till the spring of 1744.

[1] Vernon to Newcastle, Feb. 24, 1740/1, S.P. 42/90, f. 20; Council of War, minutes of Feb. 8, 16, and 23, ff. 25, 28, and 39.

[2] Silhouette to Amelot, July 10, 1741, A.E. Angleterre, 412, f. 191. The prospect of this made Wager very uncomfortable. (Wager to Vernon, Aug. 18, 1741, *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor*, p. 48.)

[3] Maurepas to Roquefeuille, July 19, Oct. 2, 1741, A.N. Marine B² 314, Brest, ff. 26, 121; Newcastle to Vernon, Oct. 15, 1741, Add. MSS. 32698, f. 157.

V

THE WARS AGAINST FRANCE IN THE WEST INDIES

§ i. *The Objects of West Indian Campaigns, 1739–59*

In the West Indies the war with France was a very different kind of struggle from the war with Spain. The former was dictated by the rivalry between one set of sugar colonies and another, the latter by an impulse to acquire new establishments, or at least new trades, complementary to those which already existed within the Empire. The French war was what the Spanish war was not, a matter of life and death.

The English and French had already been at war many times in the West Indies. Only one small territory—the French half of St. Christopher's—had changed masters in those conflicts. Even for this meagre acquisition there was a special cause. The Whigs had not stipulated for it at the negotiations of Gertruydenburg in 1710, but the English planters pointed out to the Tory Government soon afterwards that the division of the island between the two nations was an opportunity for illicit trade and a source of insecurity which discouraged settlers and investors.[1] So French St. Kitts was kept at the Peace of Utrecht. Perhaps if England had conquered more in the West Indies that war, she would have kept more; yet that is by no means certain, for the instructions proposed by the Admiralty for the expedition of 1703 seem to indicate that if either Martinique or Guadeloupe had been taken, it was to have been depopulated of Frenchmen and the plantations destroyed, but not colonized by the English.[2] On that occasion Sir Hovenden Walker—certainly no favourable critic of colonists—alleged that the Creoles did not want to keep possession of Guadeloupe, because it would reduce the price of sugar;[3] this was not the last time such a charge was made. The Government afterwards intended some revenge for the French devastation of Nevis and St. Kitts; but there is no proof that it meant to annex any of the French sugar colonies. At the same time the Secretary of State told Governor Parke that he was on no account to

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1710–11*, nos. 336, 520, 810 (i).
[2] *C.S.P. Col. 1702–3*, nos. 170, 192.
[3] Ibid., no. 737.

favour an attempt on Porto Rico, because it would lead to a further depopulation of the strategically important Leeward Islands.[1]

The spokesmen of the West India interest were not so foolish as to proclaim aloud their aversion to new sugar colonies, or to veto annexations; but there was a remarkable silence on this head in the plans of operations which they put forward. James Knight, for example, in the suggestions which he made to the Ministry, offered many reasons for destroying the French West Indies but none for their permanent conquest. He argued that the French of St. Domingue were dangerous competitors to Jamaica in peace and still more dangerous neighbours in war, when they could threaten the shipping bound for England in the Windward Passage, or run down suddenly before the wind and sack the east end of Jamaica. We ought to prevent this by weakening them; it would diminish the trade and navigation of France, enable the English sugar colonies to recover their foreign markets, and encourage them to improve their settlements and re-establish the cultivation of indigo.[2] Governor Trelawny suggested more bluntly that 'unless French Hispaniola is ruined during the war, they will, upon a peace, ruin our sugar colonies by the quantity they will make and the low price they afford to sell it at'.[3] Instances could be multiplied, in which the same point was implied or stated with more decent vagueness. The French Government knew it very well. In the Seven Years War the French Ministers of Marine, Machault and Moras, were sure that England would attack St. Domingue before any other French colony in the West Indies, because it most excited their envy and rivalry; Moras only had a slight doubt how much of his forces Pitt would think it worth while to apply to a purely destructive conquest.[4]

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, no. 591.

[2] Knight to Newcastle, Oct. 21, 1740, Add. MSS. 32695, f. 309; July 22, 1744, vol. 22677, ff. 53–7.

[3] Trelawny to Newcastle, March 12, 1747/8, C.O. 137/58. But Trelawny wrote with apparent enthusiasm, a few weeks later, that the planters of St. Domingue might be induced to submit by guaranteeing them a free enjoyment of their religion and property (Trelawny to Newcastle, April 5, 1748, ibid.).

[4] Office minute of Aug. 31, 1755, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 97; Machault to Vaudreuil, May 20, 1756, B 103; Moras to Bart and Laporte-Lalanne, Oct. 7, 1757, B 105. They proved to be mistaken, for St. Domingue was almost the only important French colony which the English did not try to conquer in this war. That was because even Pitt was afraid of offending Spain by exciting her fears for Cuba and

These are the ambitions of the respectable tradesman who hopes to increase his custom by hiring the racketeer to destroy his neighbour's shop[1]. They were not peculiar to the English planters. The French colonists seem to have disliked the prospect of expansion quite as much, in spite of their greater progress in sugar cultivation and the more flourishing air of their establishments. Those of St. Domingue were very much alarmed by the rumours that Corsica was to be exchanged for the Spanish half of their island, because they were afraid of the effect of expansion on the price of sugar;[2] at Martinique, Governor de Champigny did not want to allow sugar cultivation in the Neutral Islands. Nor did the Government's projects or instructions for attempts against the English colonies usually aim at annexation. D'Antin, for example, was to blow up the fortifications of Jamaica, destroy the towns, and carry off as many negroes as possible, but not to keep the island—or if he did so, it was to be in the name of the King of Spain. There might be a special reason for this in Fleury's desire to uphold his tattered reputation for disinterestedness; but that could not account for Maurepas's instruction to Caylus to take Barbados, 'not so much, however, in order to keep it as to destroy it and take away all the negroes'.[3] The need of slaves often inspired French strategy in this way. Always under-supplied, especially in time of war, the planters were only too willing to help themselves at the expense of the English. In fact, they had often done it during Queen Anne's reign, when they had matters very much their own way in the West Indies. The expeditions to St. Kitts and Nevis in 1706, and to Montserrat in 1712, seem to have been made for little other reason: 3,200 slaves were taken from Nevis, and the inhabitants obliged to sign a capitulation—not to surrender the island, but to hand over 1,400 more who could

S. Domingo. When Spain threw off her neutrality, the French colonists and Government recognized that the danger of St. Domingue was increased. (Bart to Berryer, May 25, 1761, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 108; Louis XV to Bory, Oct. 13, 1761, B 111.)

[1] 'By a well-managed descent upon their sugar islands, of which they are as tender as the apple of their eye, we should at once ruin them, and promote the welfare of our own for many years. This might be done by only destroying their *ingenios* or sugar-works, and carrying off their slaves.' (*The Present Ruinous Land-War proved to be a H——r War* (London, 1745), p. 24.)

[2] Larnage to Maurepas, Sept. 27, 1740, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 52.

[3] Instructions to d'Antin, Aug. 14, 1740, A.N. Marine B^2 311, f. 59; instructions to Caylus, Oct. 6, 1744, A.N. Colonies B 78.

not at present be delivered, because they had regained their liberty during the invasion and taken to the mountain.[1]

Both Governments showed themselves indifferent to the acquisition of sugar islands during the war of 1744; the French only projected expeditions which would destroy without acquiring, and the English left expeditions alone altogether, except for the attempt which Admiral Townsend was empowered to make against Porto Rico or St. Lucia in 1745. This enterprise does not really prove any great interest in the conquests proposed. Townsend's mission was to save the Leeward Islands from invasion by Caylus, and he was only recommended to attack the French and Spanish colonies if he should find—as he did—that no such invasion had taken place and he had therefore nothing, else to do. He did nothing, because he met with no support from the planters and little from the Governors in this undertaking. Neither Barbados nor the Leeward Islands would give any help to an expedition against St. Lucia; Governor Mathew talked of attacking Porto Rico, but would rather send Townsend to sweep the roads of Martinique and Guadeloupe, in order to distress the French sugar colonies and to destroy their privateers which did so much damage to the trade of Antigua.[2] So far as the English Ministry had any desire for conquests at the expense of France in America, it looked to Canada and Cape Breton. This was very natural, for there the colonists were as eager for new territory as those of the West Indies were indifferent to it; they not only made the expulsion of the French from Canada a popular object in England, but proved their zeal by the expedition against Louisbourg in which they took the greatest part. It was therefore the colonies of settlement, not the tropical colonies of exploitation, that chiefly inspired the fervour of annexationists in this war.

There was, however, one interesting action in the West Indies. Admiral Knowles and Governor Trelawny wound up the war in 1748 by taking St. Louis, the strongest fort in St. Domingue. They do not seem to have set very much store by it, for they meant to attack Santiago de Cuba first and St. Louis only second, and it was the winds that compelled them

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, no. 357, ii–vii; *1712–14*, no. 38.

[2] Orders to Townsend, June 18, 1745, Adm. 2/64, p. 285; Townsend to Corbett, Oct. 1, 1745, Adm. 1/305; Robinson to Townsend, Sept. 14, ibid.; Mathew to Townsend, Sept. 23, ibid.

to change the order. The motives of this enterprise are not very clear from the English records. Both Knowles and Trelawny spoke of battering down all the forts of St. Domingue and putting the inhabitants at His Majesty's mercy. It might be supposed that they conquered for the mere sake of conquering; but the French officers took a different view, and so did Knowles's enemies in Jamaica, whom he called the 'Scotch party'. They thought he meant to engross the trade of the southern quarter of St. Domingue.

This was very likely true. The English had always had their eye on this quarter. It was the nearest part of the colony to Jamaica, and the best field for an illicit trade because it was the most neglected by the French merchants, and being the latest to develop, had more need of labour than any other. The merchants of Jamaica had diligently smuggled negroes there for some years before the war. The captains of His Majesty's ships of war did not disdain to protect this traffic and to dip into it for themselves, and Knowles had given particular cause of complaint to the French Governor. It would not be surprising if one of his first schemes, when he came back to the station as Admiral, was to take steps for starting the trade again. His friend Trelawny had had his finger in several big dealings with the Spanish enemy during this war, and might not share the common prejudice that while it was all very well to trade with the Spaniards who were not rival producers of sugar, there was something wrong in trading with the French, who were. Their actions gave colour to this view. The capitulation which Knowles imposed upon St. Louis provided expressly that English warships should enter the harbour unmolested. It did not add that English merchant vessels might do the same, perhaps because Knowles and Trelawny meant to keep the trade to themselves. Knowles and his officers repeated several times to the inhabitants of the quarter, that they meant no harm but to the French King's ships and forts, and were ready to 'favour' the planters. They particularly insisted that they must not be disturbed or opposed in wooding and watering their ships; considering the abuses to which wooding and watering had given rise on that coast, it is not unreasonable to suspect that it was meant to cover some kind of trade in this instance. Lastly, how else did Knowles come to receive, endorse, and remit to Europe in this year a bill drawn by merchants of St. Louis? No ransom

was payable according to the capitulation, therefore this bill must be accounted for by some commercial dealings.[1]

Naval officers may be shocked by a suggestion which reflects so much upon the honour of their service, but the records prove that this kind of practice was very far from uncommon at that time. The officers of the navy seem to have traded again with the French islands after the war. Commodore Holburne and Captain Falkingham of the Leeward Islands station were complained of; and the commanders of French frigates who were sent out there to suppress smuggling were instructed to circumvent the English men-of-war so far as they could politely do so, and even to use or threaten force if they thought it safe.[2]

Both Governments changed their attitude to West India conquests in the Seven Years War. Great expeditions were sent out on both sides. France designed four for the West Indies, whereas she had only sent one in the last war. No doubt one reason why she could afford to do so was the unimportance of Mediterranean operations after the capture of Minorca. The Toulon fleet was released for service elsewhere; it was to have sent squadrons to the West Indies in 1757 and 1759.[3] In 1758 and 1761 detach-

[1] Knowles to Newcastle, March 13, 1747/8, C.O. 137/58; Knowles to Anson, Nov. 6, 1748, Add. MSS. 15956, f. 163; Chastenoye to Maurepas, March 26 and April 8, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 72; Rancé to Maurepas, April 9, vol. 73; Lascelles and Maxwell to Knowles, Aug. 6, W. & G. iii. Knowles's smuggling of slaves had been the subject of a diplomatic representation by Amelot to Waldegrave, June 2, 1739, S.P. 44/225, p. 3; Larnage and Maillart to Maurepas, July 2, 1739, A.N. Colonies C^9 A 50. The capitulations of the town and fortress are in Adm. 1/234.

[2] Bompar to Grenville, May 21, 1751, C.O. 28/29, CC 128; minute of Nov. 1749, A.N. Marine B^4 62, f. 217; Puysieulx to Albemarle, May 23, o.s., 1750, S.P. 78/236, f. 72. Of course Holburne denied the charge (Holburne to Clevland, Sept. 28, 1750, Adm. 1/306).

[3] The squadron of La Clue, which Osborn intercepted at Cartagena in the winter of 1757–8, was on its way to St. Domingue. I cannot find any evidence for Sir Julian Corbett's statement that La Clue was to have gone on to Louisbourg. Both Machault and Moras believed St. Domingue to be particularly threatened with an English invasion; La Clue was certainly to stay there until August or September 1758, when St. Aignan was to join him. He was then to receive further orders, but whatever they could have been, they could hardly have been to go to Louisbourg at that time of the year (Moras to La Clue, Sept. 19, 1757, A.N. Marine B^2 357; to St. Aignan, Sept. 19, ibid.). La Clue's fleet which Boscawen caught at Lagos in 1759 is supposed to have been sailing round to Brest in order to join Conflans for an invasion of England; but there is some evidence that it too was at one time designed by Berryer for the defence of the West Indies. Berryer told Beauharnois on July 26 that he must expect no help before the end of the year, because the Government needed all its strength for the invasion of England; but in another dispatch of July 29, he distinctly implied that La Clue was to go to Martinique (A.N. Colonies B 109). La Clue was under orders to go to Cadiz, for

ments were made from the Atlantic fleet itself—so highly did the French Government value the preservation of Martinique. Bompar and Blénac, their commanders, had orders to recover any French islands that had been taken by the English, or to retaliate by seizing some English colonies; and whereas d'Antin had been ordered not to annex Jamaica at all in 1740, or to do so in the name of the King of Spain, Blénac was to take it, if he could, for the King of France.[1] This, however, does not prove that the French Government was converted to a policy of annexation, for whatever France had conquered after 1758 could only have served to redeem her losses.

The English subdued all the Windward Islands in this war, and annexed the Neutral Islands too.[2] This is the more surprising, since the avowed object of the war was not the West Indies but North America. Yet there was logic in Pitt's strategy. He attempted no conquest in the West Indies until he was sure of Cape Breton and the entrance to the St. Lawrence. His friend Beckford, the West India millionaire, said he had never been for any West India expedition until Cape Breton was ours, but now pressed warmly for an attack on Martinique. Such a demand for West India conquests by the leader of the sugar interest may seem to give the lie to all I have said about its dislike of expansion; but notice Beckford's arguments. He did not propose to keep Martinique; we were to take it in order to exchange it for Minorca, and so avoid paying for that lost island by restoring Cape Breton a second time.[3] In fact the war had entered the stage of collecting counters to be used as currency in peace negotiations, in order to keep the conquests which we really cherished. It may be asked, why then did Pitt not wait a little longer, until he had conquered Canada, before he diverted his strength to eccentric operations of this kind?

which he was making when Boscawen came up with him. Berryer told Aubeterre, at Madrid, that La Clue was to go on to the West Indies (A.N. Marine B^2 363). Berryer might have changed his mind, or concealed it from Aubeterre; but after La Clue's disaster, when there was no reason for pretence, he told Beauharnois that the squadron had been designed for Martinique (Berryer to Beauharnois, Nov. 9, 1759, A.N. Colonies B 109; *mémoire* of March 3, 1760, C^8 B 10). This is not surprising, for Berryer was very anxious for the safety of Martinique, and believed the English would have attempted it the next season after the conquest of Guadeloupe, instead of waiting till 1762.

[1] Private instruction to Bompar, Nov. 15, 1758, A.N. Marine B^2 359; to Blénac, Oct. 12, 1761, vol. 368.

[2] For the history of the Neutral Islands, *v. infra*, pp. 195–216.

[3] Beckford to Pitt, Aug. 26, 1758, G.D. 8/19.

Several answers suggest themselves. To attack the French colonies in two places at once would be to disorganize the defensive combinations by which Machault and Moras had kept up the war. If Pitt wanted Canada he had the key of it already, for we had taken Louisbourg. Moreover, Pitt did not yet think the annexation of all Canada a necessary condition of the peace; he only insisted on establishing a satisfactory military frontier, and the rest of the province was no more a *sine qua non* than Louisbourg with its fisheries, Goree with its command of the slave trade, or even Guadeloupe itself.[1] Therefore 1758, rather than 1759, was the year when the prize was in our power, and the war became a general contest of endurance in which all ways of damaging the enemy and reducing him to submission were equally good, no matter whether they resulted in conquests which we had a mind to keep permanently.

§ ii. *The Conquest of Guadeloupe*

Pitt's first success in the West Indies was the conquest of Guadeloupe by Commodore Moore and Generals Hopson and Barrington in the spring of 1759. It was an open question whether the island would be permanently annexed to the Crown at the peace, but there were some questions which must be decided at once. What was to become of the French planters? Were they to stay on the island, and what rights were they to enjoy? Many English colonists expected that if we were to keep Guadeloupe, we should clear the French inhabitants off it and settle Englishmen in their room. Nothing of the sort took place, because it was uncertain at first whether the conquest would be permanent or provisional, and still more because the English commanders signed a capitulation which was very favourable to the French; indeed it was far better than the islanders had any reason to expect, for their own Governors had tried to fire their patriotism by foretelling that the English would drive them off the island.[2]

Moore and Barrington even allowed the capitulants to be neutral between England and France. They were to have complete religious freedom, and security for church as well as lay

[1] Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 31, 1759, Add. MSS. 32897, f. 520; *v. infra*, pp. 216–26.

[2] Nadau du Treil to Massiac, Dec. 25, 1758, A.N. Colonies C^7 A 17; Beauharnois to Nadau, Feb. 8, 1759, C^8 A 62. This was an allusion to the unhappy fate of the Acadians.

property. They were to enjoy their old laws, which were to be administered by their own officers. For the present, they were to pay no more duties than they had paid to the King of France; if the island was kept at the peace, they were to pay the same duties as the most favoured of the English Leeward Islands—that presumably means the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on exports. They were to have the same freedom of trade within the Empire as any of His Majesty's subjects, saving the Navigation Acts and the privileges of companies. They should not be obliged to furnish barracks for troops or *corvées* for fortifications; negroes should only be employed on that work with the consent of their masters, and their hire should be paid. This was a remarkable concession, for it put the Guadeloupe capitulants in a better position than any other slave-owners in the West Indies, whether English or French. Owners of property in Guadeloupe might leave it for Martinique or Dominica after they had paid their debts in full. Absentees, and those in the service of the King of France, might keep their estates in Guadeloupe and manage them by attorney. Planters might send their children to be educated in France and remit there for their support. Perhaps the most remarkable of all the articles was the eleventh, which promised that British subjects should not be allowed to acquire any lands in Guadeloupe before the peace was signed; only then, if Guadeloupe remained an English possession, might the planters sell their lands to Englishmen.[1]

The planters of Guadeloupe cannot have looked upon themselves as losers by these terms. On the contrary, their submission to English rule was followed by a sudden transition from misery to plenty. Few ships had come from France to Guadeloupe in time of peace, and none at all in war. Its trade was in the hands of the *commissionnaires*, or factors of St. Pierre, Martinique, who took their toll of the feckless planters and had many of them in their debt. In war-time, the coasting trade from one island to another was at least as much interrupted as the voyages across the Atlantic. Therefore Guadeloupe obtained victuals and plantation stores with even greater difficulty than Martinique, and had large stocks of perishable sugar decaying on the plantations for want of transport. The English conquest made a great difference to all this. At first indeed it was

[1] Capitulation of Guadeloupe, Adm. 1/307. The English and French texts of the eleventh article do not quite agree, but this appears to be the sense.

a difference for the worse, because the island had been reduced to submission slowly and a great deal of valuable property had been destroyed; also some slaves were seized as plunder before the capitulation, and sold off the island.[1] But the English and American merchants soon rushed in to supply Guadeloupe with everything for which it had starved, and thus the planters had the direct trade with Europe, of which they had been deprived so long.

The capitulation was not quite perfect. There seems to have been a difficulty about importing coffee into England, or else it was less advantageous than sending it to the rest of Europe; the planters accordingly smuggled it out to St. Eustatius, and smuggled in French wine, which they could not very well obtain from England or any of its dominions. The English Governors tried hard to suppress this trade; the colonists, on the other hand, sent a certain Deshayes to London to get the capitulation modified and the inconveniences remedied. Nevertheless, these were only small grievances to set off against the immense advantage of a free and safe export of sugars to one of the best closed markets in the world.[2]

Barbados soon complained that the price of victuals was raised by the vast shipments for Guadeloupe. North American traders hurried their ships for the first market, hoping to arrive while the famine prices for lumber and provisions continued and produce, especially molasses, could be picked up dirt-cheap. Hasten as they might, most of them were too late, for a normal equilibrium of prices was soon restored. The slave-merchants made the best harvest of all. Although the captors had carried off a number of negroes at the conquest, there were 7,500 more in February 1762 than there had been in 1759; at the peace, the Liverpool merchants alone claimed to have imported 12,437

[1] Dalrymple to Egremont, Feb. 16, 1762, C.O. 110/2. William Mathew Burt, the commissary for the sale of captured goods, complained that the plunder of negroes was very small because the capitulation was too favourable and the army co-operated with the planters in keeping as much as possible out of his hands. We cannot rely much on the evidence of an official cheated out of commissions and a planter of a neighbouring island who disliked the leniency shown to Guadeloupe (Burt to Pitt, May 2, 1759, and March 7, 1761, G.D. 8/24).

[2] *Mémoire* on Deshayes's business, June 1760, C.O. 152/29, CC 52; Crump to Pitt, Oct. 4, 1759, Kimball, *Correspondence of William Pitt with Colonial Governors*, ii. 176; Dalrymple to Pitt, July 15, 1761, ii. 450. Choiseul said in 1762 that the fall of Martinique would bring relief to the absentee sugar-proprietors, who would at last be able to get some of their crops remitted to Europe (Choiseul to Ossun, April 5, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536; Paris news of April 12, 1762, S.P. 84/499).

slaves into Guadeloupe.[1] As if the unprompted alacrity of the English merchants were not enough, the planters instructed Deshayes to stimulate them to send out goods on credit. This was very necessary because the island had lately been devastated, and because otherwise the *commissionnaires* of Antigua would get the planters as much into their hands as those of Martinique had done.[2]

The planters were presumably delivered for a time from the need of settling their accounts with the *commissionnaires* of St. Pierre, but they fell quickly into debt with their new purveyors. The laws of the French colonies were notoriously insufficient to enforce the payment of debts (though perhaps they were not so very much worse than those of the English islands, and the horror with which they inspired Governor Dalrymple was partly due to his inexperience of the West Indies). The protection of most forms of property from distraint for debt made it easy for the planters to avoid paying anything at all, unless the decisions of the law were enforced by the military officers, who were the real rulers of the French islands. The French Governors had not always been inclined to use this sanction. Punctuality in the payment of debts was not one of the points of honour upon which the accepted code of behaviour most insisted.

Dalrymple set himself to protect the interests of the English merchant creditors, by measures which may have existed on paper under the French rule but had seldom been executed. He introduced a summary jurisdiction for debt, with the penalty of imprisonment. This was the more necessary, and the more unpopular, when it became obvious that the Government

[1] Barbados Assembly Minutes, Oct. 2, 1759, C.O. 31/29; Caleb Cowpland to Thomas Clifford, June 14, 1759, Clifford Correspondence, ii, no. 185, H.S.P.; Thomas Tipping to Clifford, July 7, no. 195; Thomas Wharton, jr., St. Kitts, to Thomas Wharton, Jan. 2, June 18, and July 28, 1759, Wharton Papers, Box II, H.S.P.; Dalrymple to Egremont, Feb. 16, 1762, C.O. 110/2; *Considerations on the Present Peace as far as it is relative to the Colonies*, pp. 11–13. Already on June 27 George Dodge reported to his owners that molasses was very scarce and dear at Fort Louis; vessels were arriving daily—there were already twenty in the island—and they were raising the price so fast by their demand that it would soon be as dear as in the English islands (Dodge to Timothy Orne and Co., June 27, 1759, Timothy Orne MSS., xi. 77, Essex Institute). The market continued to disappoint the captains of Orne's vessels (John Hodgson to Orne, Feb. 4, 1761, xi. 101). Molasses rose in a year from 6½ pieces of eight to 11 at Guadeloupe, and touched 14 in 1761; by 1763 it had fallen back to 11.

[2] *Mémoire* on Deshayes's business, quoted above.

was going to give Guadeloupe back at the peace; for unless exceptional measures were taken, during the remainder of the English occupation, to collect the debts or at least to have them ascertained beyond the possibility of evasion, there was little hope that any real payment would be made within the period allotted for withdrawing English effects.[1] The French, on the other hand, became more determined than ever to avoid paying. By the transference from France to England, they had escaped from the old creditors to the new, and had obtained access to good markets for their produce. They now proposed to make the same advantage from their restitution to France: to escape back again from the new creditors to the old, and to send their produce as soon as they could to the French market, which had been very short of sugar since the loss of Martinique and would offer high prices to the earliest comers. For both these reasons they tried in the last months of the English occupation to withhold their effects from their creditors, and Dalrymple did all he could to prevent them from doing so.[2]

No doubt his popularity suffered for it; but in the main, the English rule was mild and well received in Guadeloupe. One or two of the articles of the capitulation were broken. For instance, Dalrymple threatened in 1761 to sequestrate the estates of such capitulants as still served in the French army at Martinique; this he did in order to sow dissension there on the eve of the English invasion, but he did not carry out his threat after the siege was over.[3] His predecessor General Crump seems to have introduced justices of the peace, which were not provided for by the capitulation, but were a necessary substitute for the rule of the military officers. They were ineffective according to the former *commissaire-ordonnateur* Marin, who

[1] These provisions opened a door to abuses by which Guadeloupe molasses continued to claim the benefit of a lawful importation into the English colonies some time after the peace. Such goods purported to be the effects of English creditors withdrawn from the island within the prescribed period; but it would appear that the value of the 'creditors' certificates' was doubtful (Israel Lovitt to Timothy Orne and Co., June 8, 1764, Timothy Orne MSS. xii. 63, Essex Institute).

[2] Dalrymple to Pitt, Feb. 21, 1761, C.O. 110/1; Sept. 14, Nov. 16, 1761, C.O. 110/2 (printed by Kimball, ii. 467, 483); Dalrymple's proclamation about weights and measures, May 4, 1761, C.O. 110/1; Dalrymple to Egremont, Oct. 21, 1762, Feb. 26, May 8, June 11 and 26, 1763, C.O. 110/2; Dalrymple to the merchants of Guadeloupe, Jan. 15, 1763, ibid.

[3] Dalrymple to La Touche, Dec. 25, 1761, C.O. 110/2; to Egremont, April 9, 1762, ibid.; Egremont to Dalrymple, Aug. 7, 1762, ibid.

thought they allowed too much licence to the lower orders of the people. Other departures from tradition were more welcome to the politicians of the island. The *Conseil Supérieur*, which had led a repressed and meagre existence under the French Government, was allowed more influence and consideration by Crump and Dalrymple, and some kind of representative assembly was called together upon several occasions.[1] The political leaders of the island seem to have used this freedom saucily, but Dalrymple overlooked it, as he was convinced that they only wanted to make a merit in case the island should be restored to its former master, by showing themselves good Frenchmen at small risk and expense. The Governors appear to have exercised a kind of patronizing tact and common sense, and though they doubtless flattered themselves with too high an estimate of their own popularity, it is certain that they were not hated.[2]

In fact the French authorities at Martinique soon began to hint that their subjects envied a little too openly the prosperity to which Guadeloupe had been admitted by the conquest—cheap slaves and necessaries, good prices, rapidly increasing cultivation, new creditors with clean slates. Whether this consideration was in any sense a cause of the speedy surrender of Martinique in 1762, is a matter open to doubt. The planters were happier and brisker under Governor Le Vassor de la Touche than they had been for some time past, and their spirits had been revived by a plenty of provisions, arising from a great number of English prizes. La Touche does not seem to have suggested this reason for the haste with which the inhabitants capitulated without the consent of their leaders.[3]

[1] Crump to Pitt, Oct. 4, 1759, C.O. 110/1 (printed by Kimball, ii. 176); Dalrymple to Pitt, Feb. 21, 1761, ibid.; Dalrymple to Egremont, Feb. 16, 1762, Feb. 26, 1763, C.O. 110/2; Marin to Berryer, July 10, 1759, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 62; Le Mercier de la Rivière, *mémoire* on the siege of Martinique, Aug. 5, 1762, C^8 A 64. Martinique seems to have had a similar assembly under English rule; its original purpose was the raising of funds (see its petition to Rufane in C.O. 166/2); Rufane to Egremont, July 19 and Dec. 1, 1762, ibid.

[2] Dalrymple's letters on the questions of language, laws, and religion show a very fair degree of enlightenment and understanding, and form an interesting appendix to the better-known history of the beginnings of English rule in Canada. The harshest thing he did was to dock the negroes of their too frequent Church holidays.

[3] Beauharnois to Berryer, May 17 and Oct. 2, 1759, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 62; Le Mercier de la Rivière's *mémoire* already quoted. Berryer took the view that if there was any discontent or disposition to envy the lot of Guadeloupe, it was due

In the meantime the Governors of Guadeloupe had at least as much trouble to endure from their fellow countrymen as from the French. The capitulation had not introduced English law; in fact it expressly excluded it. Governor Crump was therefore forced to treat all English merchants as camp-followers of the army, and to govern them by the Articles of War. The Board of Trade half-heartedly suggested the establishment of an English judicial system for English subjects, but its hint does not seem to have been taken. The merchants remained subject either to the French law, or in their dealings with each other to the jurisdiction of the Governor as Chancellor. Some of them gave vent to a few cant expressions about the liberties of Englishmen, but Dalrymple made short work of them. As there were no English courts, though he had pressed for their establishment, and no English laws in force except the Acts of Trade and the Articles of War, he told the merchants that if they did not wish to live under such a government they must leave in three weeks. They stayed. Dalrymple was a good friend to them, as he showed by the zeal with which he helped them to collect their debts before the English occupation should terminate.[1]

When the terms of the capitulation were known in London, some West India planters were very angry. Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke, with a shade of alarm,

'Lord Anson told me there were letters in Town from some American proprietors, who are not satisfied with the capitulation; as the island, upon their total submission, is left as it was with regard to the inhabitants and their effects, whereas they wished to have had it destroyed, their negroes taken, and the whole demolished. But it is always a good thing to have in hand.'

(This last sentence shows that Newcastle thought of Guadeloupe rather as an asset to bargain with than as a permanent acquisition.) Hardwicke made light of the planters' selfish objection.

to recent misgovernment; see his letter to Beauharnois, July 26, 1759, and to Beauharnois and La Rivière, Aug. 27, A.N. Colonies B 109; see also May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique* (Paris, 1930), p. 288.

[1] Crump to Pitt, Oct. 4, 1759, C.O. 110/1, printed by Kimball, ii. 176; Dalrymple to Pitt, Feb. 21, April 15, 1761, C.O. 110/1; Oct. 20, 1761, C.O. 110/2; to Egremont, Jan. 27, 1762, ibid.; Board of Trade to George II, Aug. 31, 1759, C.O. 153/18, pp. 155–64; John Harper to Thomas Clifford, Dec. 24, 1761, Clifford Correspondence, iii, no. 264, H.S.P.; Rufane to Egremont, July 19, 1762, C.O. 166/2.

'They have but one point in view, which is how it may affect their particular interest; and they wish all colonies destroyed but that wherein they are particularly interested, in order to raise the market for their own commodities.'

Orators and journalists continued to deplore the capitulation, which had turned what might have been a great advantage into a positive injury.[1]

The terms made it certain that Guadeloupe would remain a wholly French island under the English flag, at any rate until the end of the war. English merchants might reap the advantages of its trade, but planters could not establish themselves there.[2] Everything moreover was offered to the French that might persuade them to stay, even after the peace. This was exactly the kind of acquisition that did the old sugar colonies as much harm and as little good as possible. There was no opportunity for English planters, and the London market was flooded with Guadeloupe sugars. There were other reasons for the great fall of sugar prices in 1760, but the conquest of Guadeloupe was certainly one of the most important.[3]

How differently some West Indians would have treated the French colonies, may be seen from the 'Reflections on the true Interest of Great Britain with respect to the Caribee Islands', written by a planter of Barbados and sent home in manuscript by Governor Pinfold.[4] This author assumes that we must keep Martinique, Guadeloupe, and all the Neutral Islands. The Neutral Islands will never be settled, and the older English colonies will never be safe, so long as Martinique remains in French hands. If necessary, all the Frenchmen must be evicted from Martinique; force will not be needed, if the Government will edge them out by over-taxation, by exacting the oath of allegiance, and by setting up a representative form of government to be enjoyed by Englishmen alone. The French planters may also be encouraged to leave Martinique by the offer of land on extraordinary terms in the other conquered islands, where the military governors may administer French laws. The production of sugar must be forbidden in the other islands, and only allowed to the English population in Martinique, on

[1] Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 14, 1759, Add. MSS. 32892, f. 59; Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 15, f. 88; see also the complaint of W. M. Burt, already referred to, March 7, 1761, G.D. 8/24.

[2] It seems that Englishmen could rent plantations of the French.

[3] *V. infra*, pp. 481–2.

[4] C.O. 28/50.

account of its strategic importance. Cocoa and coffee are not so objectionable, as they are complementary to the crops which are already grown within the Empire. A conquest in this style would not hurt the older English colonies like that of Guadeloupe.

A great deal of this argument was very weak, though Rodney agreed with the author on the strategic importance of Martinique and the difficulty of settling the Neutral Islands while it remained in French hands. This pamphlet illustrates the readiness of some West Indians to consent to new acquisitions on condition that they were not permitted to hurt the interests of the older colonies.

Since the Government would not impose such harsh terms upon the conquered islands, the planters could only make the best of a bad business. They tried hard to persuade the Treasury that the capitulation was not to be interpreted as admitting the produce of Guadeloupe to the English market on the same terms as their own. They argued that the island could not be deemed an English colony until it was annexed to the Crown by Act of Parliament, and that the importation of its sugars would be a breach of the Acts of Trade; but they were baulked by an opinion of the Law Officers and dared not bring the question to a trial.[1] After this they could only declaim, and hope that future conquests would not be spoilt by such disastrous capitulations. Some of them must have been disappointed with that of Martinique, which did not vary much from the terms given to Guadeloupe.[2] It did not contain the obnoxious clause against alienating lands to Englishmen—perhaps that would have been beside the point, for nobody expected the island to be kept at the peace. The privileges of neutrality between England and France, and the confirmation of the religious orders in their rights and properties, were imitated from the Guadeloupe model. The existing laws and taxes, however, were only to continue until the King's pleasure should be known. In this and in some smaller points, Monckton was a harder bargainer than Barrington. Even so, his work did not satisfy everybody. The Barbados planter who has already been quoted, was particularly displeased with the clauses which

[1] Lascelles and Maxwell to Gedney Clarke, June 19, Aug. 3 and 31, 1759, W. & G. viii.

[2] Adm. 1/307, and C.O. 166/2.

allowed religious freedom and ecclesiastical landholding; the speculators of the neighbouring English colonies appreciated the value of a dissolution of the monasteries as well as speculators always do, and besides, the deprivation of these privileges might have driven the French inhabitants off the island.[1]

It would have been impossible to avoid giving Martinique a capitulation; but the English commanders did not want to grant any terms at all to the weaker French communities on the Neutral Islands. Rollo made Dominica surrender at discretion, and Rodney meant to force St. Lucia and St. Vincent to do so too, though he was ready to allow the small French colony at Grenada the same terms as Martinique. He probably differentiated thus between his conquests because he knew that the Government would very likely keep the Neutral Islands after the war; he meant therefore to leave it a clean slate for whatever policy it should think fit to pursue on the subjects of colonization, landholding, and political rights.[2]

iii. *The Neutral Islands*

All the greater West India islands and most of the smaller had been occupied by Europeans in the seventeenth century. Only one group had been left open for future development and conquest. These Neutral Islands, as they were called, were some of the smaller members of the chain which lines the Caribbean Sea to windward. Their pretensions to neutrality were various. St. Vincent and Dominica were supposed to belong to their Carib inhabitants; but Governor Caylus reported that the French had bought nearly half the lands of Dominica from the savages—he seemed to think that this gave the King of France a claim to the whole island.[3] St. Vincent was the head-quarters of the Caribs; the original stock of Yellow Caribs numbered about 400, and the Black Caribs, descended from the union of shipwrecked negroes with Indian women, about 1,100. St. Lucia and Tobago were only neutral

[1] Postscript to the 'Reflections on the true Interest of Great Britain', C.O. 28/50.

[2] Rollo to Pitt, June 8, 1761, C.O. 110/1; Rodney, orders to Hervey, Feb. 24, 1762, G.D. 20/2, p. 137 (in spite of these orders some provisional terms were granted to St. Lucia); orders to Swanton, Feb. 17 and April 17, 1762, pp. 131, 203; Rodney seems to have had his eye on some land in St. Vincent, and applied to the Ministry for a grant of it (Egmont to Rodney, Aug. 19, 1763, G.D. 20/20).

[3] Caylus's *mémoire* on his government, ? 1749, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 58; instructions to Bompar, Aug. 25, 1750, B 91.

in the sense that their title, disputed between England and France, had never been clearly established one way or the other, and neither nation openly occupied them.

Whether they were neutral or merely without a recognized sovereign, all four islands were inhabited or frequented by English and French. The latter far outnumbered the former as settlers, but did less than half the trade. In fact there were seldom found more than a handful of British families, most of them Irish. The number of Frenchmen was often overestimated; probably there were never more than 400 men fit to bear arms on St. Lucia, and rather less at St. Vincent and Dominica. There were only a few dozen French families and no English at Tobago, but the turtlers of both nations often went there and sometimes set up huts for the season.

Some of the French families on Dominica were said to have lived there from father to son since 1660.[1] How and why they went there, is no mystery. All the West India colonies were largely peopled at first by the restless, the unsuccessful, and the misfits. In their early days they had wars, rapes, and disorders enough to content them; but when the hand of discipline tightened its grip about 1660, and the cultivation of sugar introduced or revived the difference of rich and poor, there were still some colonists whose original hatred of government, and of a stratified social system, was strong enough to make them prefer a slovenly hole-and-corner existence elsewhere. Buccaneering, and the newer settlements of Jamaica and St. Domingue, had carried away many adventurers from the Windward Islands for one more round of riot and disorder. But even Jamaica and St. Domingue, even the buccaneers themselves finally turned respectable for the most part. Piracy was suppressed. Those ways of escape were closed, and there only remained such distant backwaters as the Moskito Shore, the French establishments at Darien, and the Neutral Islands. People were still going to those islands in 1740 to get away, as they said, from laws, taxes, and governments.

Not all were good-for-nothings; no doubt there was a great deal of sober enterprise. The population of Martinique was abundant and almost all the cultivable soil occupied; the system

[1] Bompar to Grenville, May 21, N.S., 1751, C.O. 28/29, CC 128. Bompar's statement may not be worth very much, for he was making the most of the arguments against expelling the inhabitants.

of inheritance promoted large families, whose younger members could find little place as independent producers in a heavily capitalized agriculture. So long as there was uncleared bush in Martinique, they struck out into it for themselves; but when they had filled it up, their successors had no recourse but to emigrate to Guadeloupe or the Neutral Islands. These had no authorities which the Government recognized in time of peace, but seem to have elected their own commandants. Intendant La Croix appointed notaries, who sometimes acted as judges.[1]

These small communities were scattered up and down the islands; how widely, may be judged from the report of Commandant de Longueville, who complained that it took a week for 150 men to assemble in St. Lucia upon an alarm.[2] There were a few fair-sized estates in Dominica, but even the largest were understocked with slaves.[3] The people raised provisions and the minor West India crops—cotton, coffee, cocoa; they cut dyewoods and hardwood timber.[4] This last article was important, for the sugar mills of the settled islands needed a great deal of it; the lumber of North America was unsuitable, and the Dutch settlements on the mainland were the only other places where supplies were to be had. The sugar-planters of each nation were therefore interested in the sovereignty of the disputed islands, and pressed their Governments to claim it as the only way to avoid depending on foreigners for this kind of timber.[5] They also valued highly the ground provisions which they imported from these islands. The French seem to have needed these more than the English. They were worse supplied

[1] Poinsable to Maurepas, Jan. 8 and Feb. 8, 1744, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 56. May, in his *Histoire économique de la Martinique* (p. 101), gives another reason for the emigration to St. Lucia: the cocoa-trees of Martinique were destroyed in 1727 by a hurricane, and some of the ruined planters had to leave the island.

[2] Longueville to Maurepas, Jan. 12, 1745, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 56.

[3] R.P. Camille de Rochemonteix, *Le Père Antoine Lavalette à la Martinique* (Paris, 1907), p. 71.

[4] They do not seem to have produced any sugar, perhaps because nobody would dare to invest so large a capital as a sugar-plantation required, without a valid title to the soil and an assurance of the political future of the islands. Father Lavalette, who bought and cultivated a large estate on Dominica after 1748, would not begin a sugar-work, though he made preparations for doing so when the title to the island should be cleared up (Rochemonteix, op. cit., p. 74).

[5] Barbados Committee of Correspondence to Agent Sharpe, Oct. 31, 1753, C.O. 28/42; petition of John Maynard, 1754, ibid.; Lascelles and Maxwell to Philip Gibbes, Jan. 10, 1750/1, W. & G. v.

from North America, and perhaps they took less care to cultivate negro provisions.[1]

The French sugar-planters had yet other interests in these islands. They depended in part upon the negroes which were smuggled by that channel. Always under-supplied by their own traders, they were glad to receive the surplus of the Barbados slave-market. Both Governments objected to this commerce; it contravened the Treaty of 1686, by which they had agreed to restrain all intercourse between their West India possessions. The French Ministers of Marine never tired of repeating fruitless edicts, regulations, and penalties. The English Government took less trouble. That energetic martinet Sir Thomas Robinson, Governor of Barbados, complained of this trade in 1742; he thought it had increased since the outbreak of the Spanish war, which had forced the slave-dealers of Barbados to look for new customers. He feared it would result in the smuggling of French luxuries into the English colonies.[2] Be that as it might, the trade did not rest in war or peace. It was carried on briskly between Barbados and St. Vincent in 1759, when Commodore Moore's efforts to detect it cost him his popularity.[3]

The military value of the Neutral Islands was even greater. Tobago was to windward of Barbados; in French hands it would be a very dangerous base for interrupting the trade from England and North America as it arrived in the West Indies. The harbour was believed to be good and free from hurricanes.[4] St. Vincent and Dominica were chiefly valuable to France because they assured the communication of Martinique with Grenada and Guadeloupe.[5] St. Lucia was the most necessary

[1] This is only an inference from the more frequent objurgations of the French Government upon this subject; the English Government interfered much less with things of this kind, so that an equally serious evil might be less noticed in its correspondence.

[2] Instructions to Caylus, Oct. 6, 1744, A.N. Colonies B 78; to Bompar and Hurson, July 6, 1751, B 93; Rouillé to Bompar and Hurson, Feb. 26, 1752, B 95; Robinson to Newcastle, Nov. 27, 1742, C.O. 28/46; instructions to Richard Derby, Dec. 29, 1741, Derby family MSS., x. 2, Essex Institute. The French Government had complained of this trade to Newcastle in 1728 (*Mémoire* of Broglie, 1728, C.O. 28/21, Y 20).

[3] Moore to Cleveland, Oct. 3 and Dec. 13, 1759, Feb. 8 and 26, 1760, Adm. 1/307.

[4] Caylus's *mémoire* of 1749, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 58.

[5] Maurepas to Caylus, Nov. 23, 1745, A.N. Colonies B 81; Caylus to Maurepas, Dec. 24, 1746, C^8 A 57; Beauharnois to Nadau, April 9, 1759, C^8 A 62.

of all to the security of the French Windward Islands. The soil was not so good as that of the other three islands, but its military importance made the French Government take more interest in it. It was just to windward of Martinique, and had one of the finest small harbours in the West Indies. The English knew this, but their views were purely defensive. They did not want to own the island themselves, so much as to prevent the French from doing so. St. Lucia in French hands would be an advanced post for French privateers, would interrupt the trade from Barbados to the Leeward Islands, and disorganize the squadron on the station.

There was only one purpose for which the Governments and colonists did not want the Neutral Islands. They had little or no wish to conquer them and plant them as sugar colonies. On the other hand, so far as they still hoped to compete in the world market, they would hardly be better pleased to see their foreign rivals settle the Neutral Islands. Thus Governor Grenville of Barbados said of the French colony on Tobago, 'The vicinity of this island is such that in times of war it will cut off the trade here by hostilities, its fertility is such that in times of peace it will undo this island by its crops.'[1]

The opposition of the sugar interest to expansion is very well illustrated by the history of these four islands. Already in 1664 the people of Barbados had shown themselves somewhat averse to an expedition to St. Lucia. Later in the seventeenth century, two English companies were formed to colonize Tobago under the authority of the Duke of Courland, one of the claimants to its sovereignty; but the first, under Pointz, was frustrated by the opposition of the Barbados sugar-planters, and the Courland agent who made the second agreement had to allow a clause forbidding the cultivation of sugar in the new colony.[2] For a

[1] Grenville to Sharpe, Jan. 26, 1748/9, C.O. 28/29, CC 23. The author of *The Alarm Bell, or Considerations on the Present Dangerous State of the Sugar Colonies* (London, 1749) calculates the rate of increase of sugar cultivation in the French and English islands; one of the measures he proposes for redressing the disproportion is to insist that the Neutral Islands shall remain unoccupied.

[2] He is reported to have said: 'This is an important article, and I do not believe the island will ever be settled unless this prohibition is inserted in the treaty; for the Barbados merchants are so far from being willing to join the Company that they rather begin to put difficulties in the way. I know very well how and why the wretched Pointz was ruined in the time of Charles II. Although the King himself gave him underhand encouragement, so that he got several ships ready in the Thames to carry the colony out, he (the King) changed his mind as soon as the Governor of Barbados whispered in his ear that if he allowed the settlement

long time the routine instructions of the Governors of Barbados contained a clause forbidding them to grant lands in any of the Neutral Islands, which were supposed to be within their jurisdiction; but in 1721, when drawing up the instructions for Lord Belhaven, the Board of Trade decided to make a change. They proposed that he should be allowed to make grants of not more than 300 acres in Tobago. He was not to grant any land to planters who already had estates in the older colonies, and it was to be an express condition of every patent that no sugar was to be grown. The first of those provisos was evidently designed to preserve Barbados from being weakened by emigration; the second, whose tendency is even more obvious, was disallowed by the Privy Council.[1]

About the same time two attempts were made to settle St. Lucia and St. Vincent—by Marshal d'Estrées on behalf of France, and the Duke of Montagu on behalf of England. Neither of these enterprises succeeded. That of Montagu was directly frustrated by the hostile intervention of the Governor of Martinique.[2]

The result of these attempts upon the Neutral Islands was to bring the matter under the eye of diplomacy. After some argument, the English and French Governments agreed to evacuate the islands pending a determination of the title. The proposal seems to have come from France, but was almost equally congenial to England. Since neither Government wanted positively to colonize these islands and each aimed only at preventing the other from colonizing them, there was little reason why the islands should not remain unoccupied for ever. However, there was a great difference in the zeal of the two nations to make the evacuation a reality. So long as the islands were left alone they were virtually French, and capable of becoming openly so at the first opportunity. The French Government would certainly suffer from the continuance of the illicit trade, which it took very seriously;[3] but that was a slight thing com-

of Tobago, the English sugar plantations, and especially those of Barbados, which paid such great taxes every year, must be ruined' (J. C. P., *Tobago Insulae Caraibicae in America Sitae Fatum*, Groningen, 1727, pp. 105–6).

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1720–1*, nos. 6 (i), 148, 659 (i), 666, 693 (i); *1722–3*, no. 36 (i).

[2] *C.S.P. Col. 1722–3*, nos. 10, 36 (i), 126, 266, 419, 483, 820, 821.

[3] No doubt this explains why it was the French Government which added to the draft order for evacuation the clause forbidding all trade and navigation at the islands except for ships' wood and water. The English Board of Trade did not want to have breaches of this prohibition punished by confiscation; it would go

pared with the possibility of acquiring St. Lucia, the inconvenience of injuring a vested interest, and the injustice of depriving French subjects of an established means of livelihood.

It was therefore the English Governors who were always pressing for a real evacuation, and Governor de Champigny who showed himself uncommonly fertile in pretexts for delay. The proclamation for the removal of all inhabitants was published at St. Lucia in 1735, and that was all. If the settlers ever withdrew, they came back in a week or two. The six months which they were allowed for taking off their crops lengthened into five years; and in 1740 Governor Byng was still pressing Champigny, and Lord Waldegrave was still pressing Cardinal Fleury, to evacuate the islands in good faith. Champigny later said that he determined in 1740 not to comply with any order for removal he might receive, but to preserve St. Lucia for France. He seems to me to post-date this good resolution by at least five years. As for Fleury, he was assuring Waldegrave, a month before d'Antin sailed, that effective instructions should be sent at once;[1] but a few days afterwards Maurepas told Champigny that as soon as he heard of d'Antin's first blow in the West Indies, he was to forestall the English in seizing St. Lucia.[2] No blow was struck, so that the 'neutrality' of St. Lucia was allowed to continue four years longer, until the war broke out at last. Byng and the legislature of Barbados became so impatient that they asked the Admiralty to have the French settlements destroyed outright.[3]

The English made little attempt, all this time, to colonize St. Lucia. The Duke of Montagu's title to it was one great obstruction; nobody liked to have the fatigue and danger of a settlement, only to find, if the English claim to the island should

no farther than invoking His Majesty's displeasure, which, as experience had proved and was to prove again, was not enough to kill a fly in the West Indies (Poyntz to Newcastle, March 4, N.S., 1730, copy in C.O. 28/21, Y 18; *Mémoire* of Broglie, 1728, Y 20; Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, Sept. 17, 1730, Y 25 (i); Newcastle to Board of Trade, Y 43 (i); Board of Trade to Newcastle, Nov. 26, 1730, C.O. 29/15, f. 218).

[1] Byng to Newcastle, Feb. 23, 1739/40, C.O. 28/45, f. 430; Waldegrave to Newcastle, July 28, 1740, S.P. 78/223, f. 208; Champigny to Maurepas, June 7, 1745, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 56; Champigny to Byng, March 13 and May 2, N.S., 1740; Byng to Champigny, March 27, O.S., all in Barbados Council Minutes of April 29, 1740, C.O. 31/21.

[2] Instructions to d'Antin, Aug. 14, 1740, A.N. Marine B^2 311, Brest, f. 60.

[3] Barbados Assembly Minutes, Jan. 10, 1739/40, C.O. 31/22; Warren to Corbett, Feb. 6, 1742/3, Adm. 1/2653.

be made good, that he was an unauthorized squatter without rights against the noble Proprietor. Montagu was several times asked for some general permission to grant and take up lands; but he never gave it until the first year of the war.[1]

The French Government had not the same designs on St. Vincent and Dominica. It considered that the French population in the Windward Islands was enough to fill and defend two or three colonies, but not five. Besides, the settlements on St. Vincent and Dominica offered opportunities and excuses for illicit trade. Maurepas therefore ordered Champigny to recover the Frenchmen from those two islands, and keep them in Martinique and Guadeloupe—especially the latter—to strengthen the militia. Later, when the war broke out, he told him to send them to St. Lucia instead. Champigny was either very lazy or very obstinate, and did nothing of the kind. The French Government wanted the islands reserved for the Caribs, according to a treaty of 1660. That was the most convenient way of blocking the English claim without insisting on an inconvenient acquisition; but the settlers continued to buy out the Caribs in Dominica, and to obtain a hold over those of both islands by the two most powerful agents of imperialism, rum and missionaries.

There was nothing that could be called a French colony in Tobago before Caylus's expedition of 1749. The Indians were supposed to be subject to the Governor of Barbados, but some injuries done them by English privateers disgusted them, so that they fell under French influence and accepted presents and a 'General' from the French Governor as they had formerly had them from the English; later, however, they returned to their earlier affection for England.[2]

As soon as the war broke out in 1744, Champigny made ready to throw some soldiers into St. Lucia. The chief difficulty arose from the superiority of the English at sea; their warships might have intercepted the little expedition, or bombarded the

[1] John Bennet to Montagu, Sept. 17, 1726, C.O. 28/19, X 20; Robinson to Newcastle, July 7, 1745, C.O. 28/46.

[2] Maurepas to Champigny, March 17, May 15, Oct. 30, 1744, A.N. Colonies B 78; Poinsable to Maurepas, Jan. 8 and Feb. 8, 1744, vol. C^8 A 56; Champigny to Maurepas, Aug. 8, 1744, ibid.; instructions to Caylus, Oct. 6, 1744, vol. B 78; Robinson to Newcastle, Nov. 27, 1742, C.O. 28/46; Tyrrell to Moore, Oct. 19, 1757, C.O. 28/31, EE 17; Barbados Council Minutes, March 6 and April 10, 1759, C.O. 31/30.

batteries before they were set up, or landed a force and cut off all communication between St. Lucia and Martinique. If they took any of these measures, the new colony could not survive. Champigny was inclined at first to wait for a naval reinforcement which Maurepas had promised him for this purpose; but later he decided to take the risk. He succeeded, so far as any English opposition was concerned; a detachment of 400 Martinique militia and 50 regulars was landed, the cannon were safely sent, and the batteries raised without any interference by Commodore Knowles.[1]

The inaction of the English forces was criticized, and is a little hard to understand. Everybody on both sides knew that the longer the defences of St. Lucia were allowed to grow, the harder they would be to destroy; and Knowles had several months in which to use his superior force. The omission is the more remarkable in Knowles, for he was enterprising to a fault, and very much interested in the conquest of St. Lucia. (Later in the war, he asked leave to come southwards from Cape Breton and attempt St. Lucia; and while he was in the Leeward Islands for a few days on his way to Jamaica, in January 1748, he proposed to Pocock an attack on one of the French islands.) We can discount the suspicion that, having married a Barbadian wife, he was infected with the dislike of expansion which prevailed in that island. According to his own account, he now thought of destroying the new batteries, but preferred to go up to Barbados and get an expeditionary force to possess St. Lucia. There he found that nobody would volunteer. The ostensible reason, which was given to Knowles, was the Duke of Montagu's patent; so long as it was unextinguished, adventurers were afraid to undertake a settlement.[2] No doubt there were other reasons in the planters' minds, as the events of the next year plainly showed.

In the autumn of 1745 Vice-Admiral Isaac Townsend appeared on the Leeward Islands station with a large force. He proposed an expedition against St. Lucia; Governor Robinson passed on the suggestion to a select meeting of Barbados

[1] Champigny to Maurepas, May 26, Aug. 6 and 8, Sept. 7, 1744, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 56.

[2] Robinson to Newcastle, March 24, 1744/5, July 7, 1745, C.O. 28/46; Knowles to Corbett, Oct. 15, 1744, Adm. 1/2007; Lords of the Admiralty to Newcastle, Jan. 12, 1744/5, S.P. 42/28, p. 10; Knowles to Anson, April 30, 1747, Add. MSS. 15956, f. 136.

politicians. The deliberations were traversed by the violent faction which raged in the island on account of the Governor's refusal to call the Assembly, which meant to inquire into the peculations of his stepson-in-law; but even if the project had not been so unfortunate as to be patronized by Robinson, there were genuine reasons why it should have failed of acceptance. The Speaker and the Attorney-General, the two most artful leaders of the Opposition, played upon the strongest passions of the planters. It was impossible, they said, for Barbados to spare a man without great danger; indeed, the colony was itself in need of further support and an increased garrison of regular troops. Besides, it was not to the interest of Barbados that St. Lucia should be settled; rather it should be left neutral.[1]

That was almost the end of English ambitions in the Neutral Islands during this war, but it was not the end of the troubles of St. Lucia, which came rather from within.[2] The Martinique militia had departed for that island unwillingly; Champigny had meant to raise six hundred men, but could only get together four hundred.[3] The colonial militia were always reluctant to leave their plantations exposed; how much greater must be their distaste for an expedition to another island, in which their communications with their home might, indeed must, be cut off. Champigny was to encourage them by a promise of land in St. Lucia, but he did not want to do so. He argued that it would be better to wait until a regular scheme could be adopted, so as to avoid abuses; but his real motive was the fear of new sugar colonies which might thrive at the expense of the old. Champigny was a planter as well as a Governor, and he did not want to bring down the price of sugar. Longueville, the new Commandant of St. Lucia, built more upon his hopes of making a fortune in the new island than on any property he may have possessed in the old; he was for allowing and encouraging sugar plantation in St. Lucia. He insisted that the colony would never be set on its feet without it; that the settlers already in the island

[1] Robinson to Townsend, Sept. 14, 1745, Adm. 1/305; Robinson's answer to charges, no. 15, Feb. 27, 1745/6, C.O. 28/47; Lascelles and Maxwell to Thomas Applewhaite, Jan. 15, 1745/6, W. & G. ii: 'We are intirely of your opinion that you did right not to send any of your people to make conquests of the French islands, as it would diminish your strength on which you are to depend when it may happen to be your turn to be attacked.'

[2] The Admiralty recommended Legge to take St. Lucia if possible (Instructions, Nov. 7, 1746, Adm. 2/68, f. 395).

[3] Longueville to Maurepas, June 20, 1744, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 56.

had willingly furnished their negroes for the public works in the expectation that they would be rewarded by liberty to grow sugar; finally, he said, Champigny ought to know that the more sugar was made, the more was consumed. The Government ordered Champigny and Intendant Ranché to grant lands to people with capital and negroes, but Champigny continued to obstruct. He brought himself to issue 150 licences for small settlers to line and strengthen the sea-shore; but these were not the stuff of which sugar-planters were made, and hardly anybody applied for the licences.[1] In fact, nothing had been done before the summer of 1745, when Champigny was superseded by Caylus. Even then there was little progress for some time. The Government's surveyors proceeded with their business very slowly, and it was nearly the end of the war before any lands were actually granted.[2]

Besides land, the settlers wanted negroes. Martinique had never had quite enough for her own plantations, and could spare few to St. Lucia, especially as the French slave-trade was almost completely paralysed by the war.[3] Nor had owners of negroes much inducement to send them to the new settlement, where the *corvées* for work on the fortifications were exceptionally heavy.[4] Besides, there was a serious doubt whether the Government would see fit or be able to keep St. Lucia at the peace; this was increased by the delay to set up any regular authorities. Longueville said of the inhabitants in 1746 that 'until they see a regular Government established, clergy in the parishes, a judge, grants of land and troops to preserve the whole, they will never be reassured, whatever one may say to them'. He frequently repeated that the colony would never make much progress while the actual and possible planters remained uncertain of its political future.[5]

For all these reasons the forced enthusiasm of Martinique for its daughter-colony very soon cooled away. The detachment of

[1] Longueville to Maurepas, June 20, 1744, Jan. 12, 1745, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 56; Champigny to Maurepas, June 7, 1745, ibid.; Maurepas to Champigny and Ranché, Oct. 30, 1744, B 78.

[2] Ranché to Maurepas, Sept. 20, 1746, C^8 A 57; Longueville to Maurepas, Nov. 9, 1746, ibid.

[3] Caylus to Maurepas, July 19, 1745, C^8 A 56; Longueville to Maurepas, March 15, 1747, vol. 57.

[4] Twelve days' *corvée* in the year for each negro was a good deal for a colony that had not been used to regular taxes.

[5] Longueville to Maurepas, Feb. 3 and Nov. 9, 1746, C^8 A 57.

militia could not be relieved, for the gallant planters hid in the woods to escape enrolment. The first four hundred trickled home, so that in January 1745 there were only a hundred left, and when Caylus arrived there were no more than nineteen.[1] The fifty or a hundred regulars were not enough to defend the colony: Longueville asked for five hundred. Thus St. Lucia was in immediate danger of conquest by the English, if only they should show a little spirit—a fact which naturally discouraged any but adventurers from embarking their fortunes in it, and may well have given the old-established squatters some cause for anxiety.

These squatters could muster, if they chose, four hundred armed men; but besides that it took them a long time to collect in sufficient numbers, not all of them had enough goodwill to appear at an alarm. As Longueville said in the next war, at least a third of them would stay behind in an emergency to mind their women and their slaves. Most of them were ready at first to contribute their negroes to the *corvées* (though some concealed or understated the number of their slaves), but they were soon discouraged. Longueville had to deal with a concerted opposition to *corvées*; but he put it down by banishing the ringleader off the island.[2] As for the land, the Government had to deal with a somewhat awkward state of affairs. Many of these squatters, who were expected to be the mainstay of the colony, had arbitrarily taken up and now claimed far more land than they were cultivating. Maurepas ordered Champigny to cancel those titles and all sales based upon them, and to regrant such lands as the squatters should require and deserve by the capital and labour at their command.[3]

It is not surprising that the population of St. Lucia increased little. Champigny and Caylus were ordered to transfer to it the French of Dominica and St. Vincent; but it was no easy matter to induce them to leave their habitations where they had been prosperous and happy in a higgledy-piggledy way, especially as they could not (at any rate before lands began to be granted in St. Lucia) be assured of any better title in their new homes. Both Champigny and Caylus therefore neglected this duty.

[1] Champigny to Maurepas, Nov. 17, 1744, A.N. Colonies C[8] A 56; Longueville to Maurepas, May 12, 1746, vol. 57.

[2] Longueville to Maurepas, Jan. 12, 1745, C[8] A 56.

[3] Maurepas to Champigny and Ranché, Feb. 10, 1745, B 81.

Champigny simply did not try to perform it; Caylus excused himself from doing so, because Dominica at least assured the communications between Martinique and Guadeloupe. Maurepas approved of Caylus's departure from his orders. In fact the people of St. Vincent and Dominica were so far from emigrating to St. Lucia that there was some movement the other way. No doubt some of the squatters of St. Lucia were true frontiersmen, ready to retreat a step for every one that regular government and orderly society advanced. Their repugnance to authority might perhaps be increased by the severity of Longueville. Both Champigny and Caylus complained of it; Caylus, who hardly ought to have cast the first stone, accused Longueville of behaving as if he thought he was God the Father.[1]

Longueville's fears for St. Lucia were well justified. The French Government hardly tried to keep it at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. It instructed St. Séverin to ask for it, and to argue that the English did not need it because they had more land than they cultivated in the West Indies, while it would suit France very well to possess it on account of its neighbourhood to Martinique. As Sandwich, the English plenipotentiary, belonged to the same family as the Duke of Montagu, St. Séverin was told to bribe him with an offer to compensate his relative for the extinction of his title. Sandwich, however, had no love for Montagu, and thought it very important not to sacrifice the Neutral Islands. He prophesied that if the matter was neglected, 'under the general description of renewal of former treaties, the French will remain in possession and the thing neglected until some time after the peace; and then we must come to the fatal result of either leaving them there, or beginning a fresh war to drive them out'. He therefore asked for orders to insist on the evacuation of the Neutral Islands. He received such orders, but could not execute them, and the islands were left to be covered by the ambiguous clause of the *status quo*.[2]

Sandwich could not have prophesied more truly the troubles which arose from this uncertainty; but even he can hardly have expected them to develop as quickly as they did.

[1] ? Ranché to Maurepas, July 18, 1744, S.P. 42/27, p. 455; instructions to Caylus, Oct. 6, 1744, A.N. Colonies B 78; Maurepas to Caylus, Nov. 23, 1745, B 81; Caylus to Maurepas, Dec. 24, 1746, C^8 A 57.

[2] Instructions to St. Séverin, Feb. 29, 1748, *Recueil des Instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France, Hollande*, iii. 131; Sandwich to Bedford, Aug. 29, 1747, *Bedford Correspondence*, i. 243.

A few weeks after the peace was signed, Maurepas wrote to Caylus and Ranché that he presumed the English would demand the evacuation of St. Lucia by virtue of the Treaty. If they did so, the King would reply (and Caylus was to do the same if any demand was addressed to him) that St. Lucia was a French island long before Champigny placed any troops there; but if the English insisted, the King was ready to have St. Lucia evacuated by both nations, and St. Vincent and Dominica left to the Caribs. In fact, if the Governor of Barbados should already be empowered to do his part, Caylus was to co-operate by ordering the settlers to leave at thirty days' notice. Maurepas added for Caylus's benefit that the King had no intention of giving up St. Lucia, but hoped the English would recognize his right to it upon a fair examination.[1]

Before this letter was received or even written, Caylus had acted for himself. He had already projected some lucrative scheme in St. Lucia, in partnership with the notorious Father Lavalette, the *Procureur* and afterwards Superior of the Jesuits.[2] He was therefore very unwilling to carry out the orders for evacuation. He now planned a new colony on Tobago. The excuse was, to find an occupation for ex-privateers which would prevent them from becoming pirates, as they had done at the end of the last war. This was in itself prudent enough, though founded on what proved to be a false analogy, for the privateers did not take to freebooting this time. Very likely, however, Caylus had some concern of his own in the enterprise, for there never was a Governor, English or French, who devised so many methods of enriching himself—and that is saying a great deal. He had lately asked for the grant of a whole island, to let or sell the land for his own profit; a mere estate would not suffice him, as he had no negroes to work it. In November 1748 he wrote to Maurepas that his measures for a colony on Tobago were in good forwardness, and he hoped to be able to send a commandant and some troops; he had not granted any lands yet, but had licensed a squatter who was already upon the island to continue his cultivation.[3] Governor Grenville of Barbados got wind of this, and took the empty precaution of sending a war-

[1] Maurepas to Caylus and Ranché, Nov. 25, 1748, A.N. Colonies B 87; to Caylus, Nov. 25, ibid.

[2] Caylus to Maurepas, March 19, 1747, A.N. Colonies C[8] A 57; Maurepas to Caylus, Sept. 14, 1747, B 85; see also Rochemonteix, op. cit., p. 70, note 2.

[3] Caylus to Maurepas, Nov. 11, 1748, A.N. Colonies C[8] A 58.

ship to assert King George's right to the island and to warn foreigners off. This gave Caylus the excuse he wanted. It became necessary to uphold at once the affronted dignity of his master; he therefore sent some troops to build a fort, and some warships to protect them.[1] There followed an awkward interview between their commander and an English captain, in which each represented himself as having stood his ground and the other as having gone off and left the field clear. Luckily they were content with high words; no shots were fired, but Grenville wrote home indignantly, and within a short time diplomacy was once more busy on this subject.[2]

The matter fell in the province of Bedford, still an enthusiast for colonies, and he took it up warmly. He ordered Colonel Yorke to declare in Paris that the King would on no account give up his right to Tobago, but would even repel foreign usurpations by force, if need be. Puysieulx and Rouillé overlooked this vivacity, and the affair was soon accommodated by agreeing that the island should be evacuated by both sides, and the title to it determined by commissaries.[3]

This treatment was extended to the other three islands a little later in the same year, and in good time the English commissaries came to Paris to exchange enormous memoranda on this and several other subjects, and to bicker over the order of priority of business until they produced a perfect deadlock. There never was a set of negotiators who had less chance of negotiating anything; even the Anglo-Spanish plenipotentiaries of 1739 had more. On the French side (if we may judge by the letters of Maurepas and Rouillé to the Governors of Martinique), there was no intention of giving up anything in dispute. The French Foreign Office seems to have thought, and perhaps with very good reason, that its case was overwhelming and that the English commissaries could not fail to accept it.[4] The

[1] Grenville to Board of Trade, Oct. 27, Dec. 12, 1748, C.O. 28/29, CC 15, 18. Both English and French foreign offices seem to have assumed that Caylus's expedition to Tobago was provoked by Grenville's proclamation; but the dates of his letters convict him of having intended it before, and it was actually the rumour of his intention which induced Grenville to send the proclamation.

[2] Captain Wheeler, H.M.S. *Boston*, to Grenville, Jan. 5, 1748/9, ibid., CC 24.

[3] Bedford to Yorke, March 23, 1748/9, S.P. 78/232; Yorke to Bedford, April 9 and 16, 1749, ibid.; Bedford to Albemarle, Sept. 21, o.s., 1749, S.P. 78/233. Puysieulx was at this time French Foreign Secretary, and Rouillé succeeded Maurepas in the spring of 1749.

[4] Rouillé to Caylus, May 2, 1749, A.N. Colonies B 89; Louis XV to Caylus, Dec. 19, 1749, ibid.

English Board of Trade, relying upon a different set of facts, did not see the matter in the same light; but it was not very much interested in St. Lucia. The controverted boundary of Nova Scotia was what it had most at heart; and much of the commissaries' time was taken up in arguing whether (as we wished) Nova Scotia should be discussed before anything else or (as the French insisted) it should be considered concurrently and at alternate sittings with St. Lucia. Newcastle at first resisted any such connexion of the two subjects, but later yielded. In the equation of these two disputes there might have been some hope of a compromise: that we should yield St. Lucia if the French would give us satisfaction on Nova Scotia. Perhaps this was what Puysieulx and Rouillé meant by joining the two things together, and the same idea seems to have occurred to Shirley, one of the British commissaries, and later to Holdernesse, who succeeded Bedford as Secretary of State. Since, however, the Nova Scotia business proved quite as intractable as that of the Neutral Islands, there was little hope there.[1]

It would not be worth while to follow the fortunes of the commissaries, or of the direct negotiation between the two Courts, which followed their obvious failure. Meanwhile successive Governors of Martinique were playing a tedious comedy over the evacuation.

Caylus had paid no attention to Maurepas's warning of 1748. So far from advising the settlers to make ready to withdraw from St. Lucia, he still allowed them to extend their cultivation. He told Longueville that he hoped no evacuation would be necessary; for which reason the people of St. Lucia were—or professed to be—very surprised when they first heard the rumour of what was to befall them. Caylus seems also to have been organizing a regular French Government on St. Vincent in 1749, taking advantage of the good relations of the settlers with the Carib chiefs.[2] The first order for evacuating the four

[1] Instructions to English commissaries, July 30, 1750, S.P. 78/238, ff. 96–103; commissaries to Bedford, Aug. 22 and 28, 1750, ff. 128, 134; Shirley to Bedford, Sept. 5/16, 1750, S.P. 78/237, f. 35; Bedford to Albemarle, Oct. 4, 1750, f. 82; Newcastle to Albemarle, Aug. 31 and Oct. 1, 1750, ff. 7, 78; Halifax to Newcastle, July 20, 1750, Add. MSS. 32721, f. 406; Newcastle to Bedford, Sept. 23, 1750, vol. 32824, f. 135; Holdernesse to Newcastle, May 15, 1752, vol. 32836, f. 301.

[2] Caylus to Maurepas, Dec. 22, 1748, A.N. Colonies C[8] A 58; Caylus, *mémoire* of 1749 (?), ibid.; Longueville to Rouillé, June 5, 1750, ibid.

islands must have reached Martinique in the spring of 1750. Grenville sent down Commodore Holburne with his duplicate of the French order, to supervise the evacuation in detail. Caylus chicaned, lied, and picked an irrelevant quarrel in order to delay the evacuation; finally he died, and the interim Governor died too a fortnight later. The next successor refused to take the responsibility of executing the King of France's order, because he said he had not the legal power to do so.[1]

Nothing therefore could be done before the arrival of the new Governor-General, Maximin de Bompar. He was ordered to have the islands evacuated, if it had not been done already, and if it had, to see that the English loyally complied with the order, for which purpose he might use force.[2] Two months later he was given an instruction of a very different tendency. The King of France had only consented to the evacuation on the condition that the title to the islands should be decided as soon as possible; but Rouillé had now made up his mind that the English did not mean business. He thought their object was to avoid acknowledging the French claim until a suitable opportunity occurred for seizing the island, which he imagined they might do by surprise, without declaring war. Therefore, though Bompar was to proceed with the evacuation, he was to prepare for the reoccupation of St. Lucia, and was in fact to forestall the English if he should seriously suspect them of any designs upon it.[3]

Probably Rouillé had no direct justification for his guess. The English commissaries had excited his suspicion by refusing at first to discuss St. Lucia at the same time as Tobago, and by insisting that St. Lucia could not possibly be considered until the evacuation was complete. The French Government had pointed out that the evacuation had not been made a condition of the appointment of commissaries, and argued that it was hard to expel the settlers so relentlessly when their right might so soon be acknowledged. This reasoning exposed France in her turn to the suspicion of bad faith; it looked as if she meant to delay the evacuation until a favourable verdict, at least as much as England meant to delay the verdict for the evacuation. As for Rouillé's conjecture that the English Government would

[1] Grenville to Board of Trade, March 13, 1749/50, April 2 and 30, 1750, C.O. 28/29, CC 52, 74, and 81; Albemarle to Bedford, Sept. 2, 1750, S.P. 78/236, f. 383; Rouillé to Caylus, May 23, 1750, A.N. Colonies B 91.

[2] Instructions to Bompar, Aug. 25, 1750, A.N. Colonies B 91; Rouillé to Bompar, Sept. 2, 1750, ibid.

[3] Rouillé to Bompar, Oct. 29, 1750, ibid.

give orders in full peace for the seizure of St. Lucia, that too was probably groundless, in spite of a few vapouring threats which Newcastle flung out from time to time. Yet though the English Government did not mean to do such a thing at present, it might have meant it one day, as it showed a few years later by its precipitate conduct in North America.[1]

These instructions of Rouillé, however founded, were not of a kind to make Bompar very earnest or thorough in performing the evacuation. He made as many difficulties as he could, and in particular he tried, upon various pretexts, to confine the evacuation to St. Lucia. The proclamation, ordering all settlers to withdraw, was finally published in all the four islands; the troops and cannon were withdrawn, and the fortifications pulled down.[2]

As in 1735, this was only the first step, not the last. What if the settlers would not go? Bompar said that would be very bad behaviour, and he should have to write home for further orders. He would not drive them out by force, nor let anybody else do so. This was the point on which the controversy turned for the next five years. Bompar's humanity to the settlers might not be unreasonable; but the fact remained that nothing short of force would drive them away, and as he had been instructed to use force to keep the English out of the islands, he ought hardly to have complained of Holburne for claiming the same right against the French.

Grenville continued to pester Bompar with nagging letters, demanding the expulsion of the inhabitants and offering to join his forces to those of Bompar for the purpose. Lord Albemarle continued to urge the French Ministers to do something effective, and to tax them with never having intended the evacuation at all. Puysieulx and his successor St. Contest warmly denied this. Puysieulx argued that Bompar had done enough, because the Governments had only agreed upon a military evacuation like that of 1720; but as Commissary Mildmay pointed out, that of 1735 had been meant to be complete.[3] Rouillé took an indecisive and ambiguous line in his dispatches to Bompar. He

[1] Newcastle to Albemarle, Aug. 31, Oct. 1, o.s., 1750, S.P. 78/237, ff. 7, 79; Albemarle to Bedford, Nov. 14/25, 1750, f. 167; March 6/17, 1751, S.P. 78/240, ff. 237–8.

[2] Holburne to Corbett, Jan. 21, 1750/1, Adm. 1/306; Bompar to Rouillé, Jan. 9, 1751, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 58.

[3] Grenville to Bompar, May 3, Sept. 2 and 30, Nov. 2, 1751; Bompar to Gren-

thought Bompar had done right to refuse to drive the settlers out, and to decline Grenville's offer of joint operations against them; and once or twice he ordered him afresh to take care that the English should not seize St. Lucia. At the same time, however, he declared that the King of France meant to fulfil his engagements in good faith, and that the islands must be evacuated. Bompar was to confiscate the property in the other French islands of those who would not go. He was even to give them the impression that he was about to use force; but he was not to use it. If there were any English among the inhabitants, Bompar would be in an unfortunate position. As he would not drive out the French by violence, he could hardly do so to the English; he must therefore confine himself to complaining of them to Grenville. If they came for the purpose of illicit trade, he could easily disgust them of it by applying the penalties very heavily; if they were planters, 'could he not find some French settlers who, without compromising him, might give the English to understand that they would not allow them to make establishments at a time when he was pressing all the King's subjects to abandon theirs'?[1]

By 1751 Puysieulx had gone so far as to argue that no more could be done until the commissaries gave their decision. Rouillé was still willing to suggest that both sides should bring the unrepentant settlers to heel by forbidding all trade with them—a proposal which would suit him remarkably well, as it would stop up the channels of the illicit trade which he took such pains to prevent.[2] A year later he too had reached the same position as Puysieulx.

Meanwhile the English were losing patience. They did not break out into any violent projects, but they ceased to consider the evacuation as binding on themselves. Sir Thomas Robinson, the new Secretary of State, hinted to Albemarle that this would be the consequence of the French delays; but it had

ville, May 21, Sept. 17, Oct. 17, Nov. 17, 1751, C.O. 28/29, CC 127–8, 130–2, and 28/30, DD 2, 3, 5; Bedford to Albemarle, April 11, 1751, S.P. 78/240, ff. 313–19; Albemarle to Bedford, April 29 and May 5, 1751, ff. 330, 345.

[1] Rouillé to Bompar, May 19, 1751 (two letters), Nov. 9, 1751, A.N. Colonies B 93; Feb. 16 and 18, 1752, B 95.

[2] Yorke to Newcastle, 'Separate', July 16/27, 1751, S.P. 78/241; Bompar and Hurson thought that Rouillé went too far in this respect, and that his strictness would destroy the harmless trade in provisions, timber, &c., between Martinique and the Neutral Islands (Rouillé to Bompar and Hurson, Feb. 26, 1752, A.N. Colonies B 95; Instructions to Bompar and Hurson, July 6, 1751, B 93).

already resulted before he wrote. The people of Barbados had wanted for some time to cut hardwood timber once more in the Neutral Islands. At first they respected Grenville's proclamation against resorting to the Neutral Islands, but in 1753 a brigantine went to Tobago with a large crew to cut fustic. Grenville sent a warship to dissuade them, but in vain. On the brigantine's return, he tried to prevent her cargo from being entered at the Custom House, but Attorney-General Blenman, always ready to put a spoke in the wheels of government, told him he had no right to do it. This, as Grenville pointed out, showed how hard it was to enforce a royal proclamation in the colonies without an Act of Parliament. The owner, Maynard, and the master, Cranston, were prosecuted for high misdemeanours. When Bompar complained that English warships prevented Frenchmen from loading timber at the Neutral Islands while they allowed Englishmen to do so, the President of Barbados pointed with pride to this prosecution. But a prosecution without a conviction or penalty is nothing to boast of; and a few months later the President was obliged to have it discontinued, because no Barbadian jury would have convicted on a criminal charge of this kind. The public opinion of the island felt deeply the injustice of a prohibition which it considered to be one-sided. The legislature instructed its agent in London to represent the hardship of making the English observe the neutrality of the islands when the French did not, and to ask that until the French should act in good faith, the Barbadians might have leave to continue their valuable trade of cutting hardwood timber, which they must else buy at enhanced rates from the Dutch or the French themselves.[1]

On both sides, therefore, the evacuation was a complete sham. In the autumn of 1755 Bompar suddenly seized St. Lucia again. His pretext was the capture of the *Alcide* and the *Lys*, which had virtually started the war in North American waters; but obviously he had been on the alert for a long time. Machault approved his action warmly; it was the signal for the beginning of the war in the West Indies.[2]

[1] Robinson to Albemarle, Oct. 3, 1754, Add. MSS. 32851, f. 14; Grenville to Board of Trade, April 21, 1753, C.O. 28/30, DD 26; Bompar to Weekes, Jan. 28, 1754, ibid., DD 43; Weekes to Holdernesse, April 9, 1754, C.O. 152/46; Memorial of John Maynard, C.O. 28/42; Barbados Committee of Correspondence to Sharpe, Oct. 31, 1753, ibid.

[2] Bompar to Weekes, Sept. 15, 1755, C.O. 28/42. Machault had ordered

The history of the Neutral Islands in this war very much resembles that of the last. Longueville returned with some regular soldiers to St. Lucia, and hastily put together some fortifications which already had a tumble-down air within a few months. Once more he required more *corvées* than the inhabitants could or would support, especially as it was harder than ever to feed the negroes. In 1759 he had to suspend all further building. The inhabitants were no more and no fewer than they had been in 1744. The obstacles to the settlement of the island were the same as before—the danger of conquest, the oppressive negro *corvées*, the uncertain future of the colony. These drawbacks seem to have frightened prospective settlers even more than in the last war, for they were pointed out by that recent experience. Communications do not seem to have been improved, for Longueville still complained of the difficulty of getting his militia together in case of an attack. If he collected them beforehand, the victuals would run out, and if he did not, he would be overpowered before they could assemble.[1] In St. Vincent and Dominica, the Governors of Martinique continued their diplomacy among the Caribs. Le Vassor de la Touche instructed the chiefs of St. Vincent that the promises of the English were deceitful and their real purpose to enslave the natives. He obtained from them valueless promises of help in case Martinique should be invaded. Commodore Moore repeated Knowles's attempt to oblige the inhabitants of Dominica to a neutrality. Unlike Knowles he succeeded, but the neutrality seems only to have lasted until his back was turned, and then the French willingly returned to their natural allegiance.[2]

At the end of the war these islands were all conquered by the English. The conquest could not have been secure, even if it was possible, before Guadeloupe and Martinique had fallen into our hands. A force from North America descended upon Dominica in June 1761, and obliged the inhabitants to surrender at discretion; Rodney had no difficulty in reducing St. Lucia

Bompar on Feb. 17, 1755, to seize St. Lucia on the first information of a rupture between the two nations (A.N. Colonies B 101).

[1] Bompar to Machault, Aug. 1, 1756, A.N. Marine B^4 73; Longueville to Machault, July 14, 1756, A.N. Colonies C^8 A 61; to Moras, Oct. 11, 1757, ibid.; to Berryer, Aug. 5, 1759, and Feb. 22, 1760, C^8 A 62.

[2] Beauharnois to Nadau du Treil, April 9, 1759, C^8 A 62; Croissier de la Berthodière to Beauharnois, April 22, 1759, ibid.

and St. Vincent to submission after the fall of Martinique. Tobago needed no conquest, for it was already to all intents and purposes in our power.

§ iv. *The Terms of Peace in the West Indies, 1761–2*

By these successes we won more than enough counters to set off against our losses and those of our allies. Indeed the game was so much too easy and successful that it began to embarrass the Ministers. They could not afford to throw all their gains away, and must keep something besides the original objects of the war. What was it to be?

This question was thrashed out in the celebrated controversy of Canada against Guadeloupe. Grant and Alvord have given such excellent summaries of the argument that very little need be said of it here.[1] The chief reason for keeping Canada was the necessity of preventing for ever such another dispute in North America as had caused the present war, and securing the frontier of settlement against the French and their Indian allies. The advocates of Guadeloupe answered that the annexation of Canada was too much or too little for the purpose. Too much, because a smaller adjustment of the boundaries would create a sufficient 'barrier'; too little, because if we wanted to prevent the French from making any more trouble for us in North America, we must expel them from Louisiana too. (Some Ministers thought of doing so, and the public expected that Amherst would be sent on that service in 1761 or 1762.) Besides, if French Canada could destroy the peace of mind of our Northern colonists, French Martinique was just as fatal to that of our sugar-planters. The cost of defence must also be considered. If the French were to be evicted from Canada, where should we find colonists to fill it? If the French were to remain, what sort of subjects would they be? We should have to keep an immense army in Canada, whereas the West Indies could easily be defended by a naval force. (This last argument might seem satisfactory at that time, because nobody guessed that England's enemies would ever again be a match for her at sea; it would not have appeared so convincing, if anybody had foreseen the misfortunes which the West Indies suffered in the

[1] W. L. Grant, in *American Historical Review*, xvii. 735–43; C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (Cleveland, 1917), i. 49–74.

next war for want of the naval superiority which was so glibly postulated.)

The shadow of the American Revolution had begun to appear dimly. It was a capital argument against driving the French out of Canada and increasing our own holdings on the continent. We should thereby destroy the bugbear that kept the colonists loyal, and prepare for the growth of a Dominion so vast, so populous, and so powerful that it could not long continue subject to England. The West Indies, on the other hand, would always be weak; they must depend on the imperial Government for naval defence against foreign enemies and for the internal force which kept the slaves in awe. In reply to this, the advocates of North America could only hope that the colonies would pay for their own defence, and argue that the territory could be cut up into a number of new governments too weak in themselves and too independent of each other to resist the authority of England.

The balance between the northern and tropical colonies had to be considered. Here the argument was clearly in favour of keeping Guadeloupe. One side declared that we could not have too many West India possessions because they alone gave value to our northern colonies; the other replied that we could not have too many colonists in North America because they enabled our sugar-planters to subsist by selling them the necessaries of life. But in fact, though they did not admit it, the sugar-planters already had quite as much northern produce as they could consume; the exporters of North America were even forced to sell their goods in the French islands as well as our own. The immediate value of the trade of Canada was small—the fishery excepted, which was not in question. That of Guadeloupe was much greater, and would at once produce a revenue which would help the Government to pay at least the interest on the cost of the war. Both Pitt and Bute thought that the negotiators of a victorious nation should keep this in mind.[1]

It was argued that Canada, like the New England colonies, would be independent of Great Britain for many of the necessaries of life. Guadeloupe could never be so. This, however, was only true up to a certain point. As a market for English manufactures, the northern colonies were already far more

[1] Bute to Bedford, July 12, 1761, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 32; *Parl. Hist.* xv. 1265.

important than the West Indies. Colonies of settlement whose people, however poor, were nearly all free and white, naturally consumed more than islands full of slaves who bought few manufactures for themselves and had not much more bought for them by their masters. It was true that the northern colonies might one day manufacture for themselves, which the West Indies could never do; but this fear was beginning to be superannuated, and economic writers were beginning to think that an Industrial Revolution was not very likely to happen in America soon. As for victuals, lumber, and other country produce, the West Indies bought very little of these goods from England, so long as the northern colonies existed to supply them. It was only in the American Revolution that England became once more an exporter of agricultural produce to her own sugar islands; therefore manufactures were the only kind of necessaries for which the West Indies depended on England.

Of course the slave-traders were for keeping Guadeloupe; but that only inflamed the irritation of the English planters, who had long thought themselves under-supplied with slaves of the right sort. The traders had committed the unpardonable sin of pouring negroes into Guadeloupe before they knew whether it would be kept or restored at the peace. Thus they did all they could to set a dangerous rival of the English sugar colonies upon its feet. If they were to devote themselves in future to supplying that and other new conquests with negroes, they would presumably neglect the older settlements, and the prices would continue to rise unless the extension of our trade and territories in Africa should keep pace with our acquisitions in America. The planters' advocates argued that expansion in the West Indies was injurious without expansion in Africa which furnished the prime motors of tropical industry. This set the Ministers a new problem, because we had conquered Goree and Senegal in the Seven Years War, and did not know whether to keep both.

Lastly the argument turned on the question where the profits of agriculture in the different colonies would 'centre'. Profits were small in North America, and were spent or invested upon the spot, though a few merchants in the colonies laid out their money in the English funds, and many more speculated in English lotteries. Very few of the continental Americans had

any *animus revertendi*; but most West Indians of tolerable fortune or expectations were sustained in what they considered as a sort of exile by the hope of going 'home' to England—a fact which accounted for the surprisingly provisional character of their domestic arrangements. Not only did they return, but they brought some of their wealth with them, and English industry had the benefit of their often profuse expenditure, and of such capital investments as they were prudent enough to make. However they might be represented by the pamphleteers, these investments were probably rare, since the planters were for the most part borrowers rather than lenders, and at best subsisted upon remittances from the plantations they so cheerfully left behind them. It is therefore doubtful if they contributed much to the accumulation of capital—which must be the thing chiefly meant by the 'centring of profits'. Yet the accepted theory was that they did contribute to it, so this argument, for what it was worth, told in favour of West Indian acquisitions.

Although the weight of the argument was probably on the side of keeping the West Indian islands, yet it was Canada, not Guadeloupe, that was kept. As long as the choice was between those two conquests, there was hardly any doubt. Although it might not be the strongest, the most popular point in the whole controversy was the necessity of driving the French out of Canada in order to cut off the root of all future wars. The statesmen and the mob alike believed this to be the real object of the struggle and the most necessary.

It is sometimes suggested that the West Indian planters used their influence to the same end. Nobody advised the Ministers to keep Canada more strongly than Rose Fuller and William Beckford, the two most important West India absentees in English politics.[1] Rose Fuller was not an entirely typical sugar-planter in his views, but Beckford was class-conscious and proud of it. Yet it is doubtful if the West India interest as a whole resisted the annexation of new sugar colonies as it had

[1] Fuller to Newcastle, June 28, 1760, Add. MSS. 32907, f. 423; Beckford to Pitt, Aug. 26, 1758, G.D. 8/19. See Hardwicke's letter to Newcastle, April 2, 1762 (Add. MSS. 32934, f. 310): 'As to the retention of conquests, Mr Pitt made North America entirely his object. Some of his enemies objected to him that he did this out of partiality to his friend Beckford, and out of condescension to the particular interests of our sugar colonies; but in that I suppose they did him wrong.' See also the very interesting manuscript note of Israel Mauduit, quoted by W. L. Grant, in the *American Historical Review*, xvii. 742.

done in 1740.[1] In fact it had gradually been converted to certain conquests, though not to all.

What brought this about? The fortunes of the sugar-planters were somewhat better than they had been in the late thirties, although the effect of Guadeloupe produce upon the London market had not been pleasant. Prices had taken a turn for the better, and perhaps the planters could better afford to meet new rivals, or hoped to make a profit for themselves in the virgin soil of the conquered islands.[2] Professor Namier suggests, on the strength of a letter of Lord Morton, that there was a division between 'saturated' planters and 'planters on the make'.[3] I am not sure that this is quite right. Certainly a number of people from the older islands started sugar plantations on a large scale in the new. The Bourryaus, Youngs, Olivers, and Morrises of the Leeward Islands, the Blenmans, Husbands, and Clarkes of Barbados are to be found among the earliest proprietors in Grenada and Tobago.[4] But what was the precise difference between a saturated and an unsaturated planter? Had the latter more capital to invest than the former? Many of the new plantations were largely financed by borrowed capital. Were they readier to expose themselves to the dangerous climate of an uncleared island? Many new proprietors of the conquered islands were absentees.[5] Still, though it may not be easy to point out the distinction, there were two ways of thinking upon this subject among the planters.[6]

I think it was another consideration that converted the West India interest to annexation. Although no invader set foot on any English sugar colony during these wars, all were exposed

[1] This was not Bedford's opinion. In 1762 he prophesied that the sugar-planters would no more desire we should keep Martinique 'than they did in relation to Guadeloupe' (Bedford to Bute, July 9, 1761, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 25). However, Bedford never scrupled to exaggerate when he wanted to prove a point.

[2] See the very able letters of Paterson to William Wood, July 5, 1751, and Dec. 18, 1758, Bodleian Library, North MSS. a 6, ff. 174–83. Paterson, like Wood himself, was an expansionist and an officer of the Customs. He reported that the value of estates in Barbados had risen very high in recent years, as a result of the high valuation of sugar there.

[3] *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, i (London, 1930), p. 322.

[4] Daniel Paterson, *A Topographical Description of the Island of Grenada* (London, 1780).

[5] Lascelles, Clarke, and Daling to Samuel Husbands, May 2, 1763, and Feb. 10, 1766, W. & G., vols. ix and x; Lascelles and Daling to Richard Green, Sept. 19, 1767, vol. x; to Timothy Blenman, Aug. 4 and Oct. 7, 1768, vols. x and xi.

[6] So there were among the French; *vide supra*, p. 204.

to some very serious alarms; and above all, their trade was much molested by the privateers of Martinique and Guadeloupe. It is doubtful if the losses were greater in proportion to the shipping of the colonies than they had been in Queen Anne's reign; they may even have been less. But after discounting for the factious exaggeration of the complaints against Commodores Lee, Frankland, and Moore, it appears that, at two or three periods of these wars, Barbados and the Leeward Islands were brought near to scarcity by the interruption of their trade. These losses had an effect upon the colonists' attitude to the war. It can be seen in the increasing readiness of the legislatures to assist the expeditions against the French colonies. In 1745, Barbados had positively refused to have anything to do with the conquest of St. Lucia, and Governor Mathew had not been able to stir up any enthusiasm in the Leeward Islands for an attempt upon Porto Rico. In 1759 and 1762 there was no such obstruction.

Certainly there were misunderstandings which led to a good deal of controversy. The people of Barbados were deeply offended because General Hopson did not eagerly welcome some untrained volunteers under a political colonel in 1759. He did not think it worth while to transport them to the field of action; in consequence they had to be disbanded, and when Barrington sent for reinforcements a few weeks later, only two militiamen offered themselves. This gave a colour to the view that Barbados was still hanging back in order to discourage conquests; but it was probably due to the unfortunate effect which the professional snobbery of the regular soldier nearly always had on the easily outraged dignity of the colonists.[1] In Antigua at the same time the Governor and Council were afraid that the defences of the island would be weakened by the enlistment of volunteers for Hopson's expedition. They declared their satisfaction when the company which went to Guadeloupe was seen to consist chiefly of strangers, presumably privateers. This was only the selfish timidity of the planters, who could not believe themselves safe unless a large force was concentrated at their own island, nor content themselves with knowing that it was next door. The volunteers went, and were accompanied

[1] Barbados Council Minutes, Jan. 4, Feb. 13, March 13, 1759, C.O. 31/30; Pinfold to Pitt, July 10, 1759, C.O. 152/46; *A Defence of the Conduct of Barbados, published in a Letter to General Barrington*, by John Gay Alleyne.

by a large detachment of the regular troops who were stationed at Antigua.[1]

The Assemblies of the islands were more ready to furnish Hopson with negroes as pioneers and general drudges. It is true that they did not all compel the planters to furnish slaves, though they took other steps which conduced more slowly to the same result; nor were they forcing great sacrifices upon the owners, for Hopson had power to promise that the Government would make good any losses or damages which might happen to the negroes during their service. In 1761–2 all these preparations were repeated more thoroughly. This time Barbados furnished six hundred white volunteers for the reduction of Martinique; some of the island Assemblies which had formerly left the recruitment of negroes to the freewill of the planters, now made it obligatory.

Taken in the whole, these are evidences of goodwill and of a real desire to see Martinique and Guadeloupe conquered. Stronger proof is afforded by the congratulatory addresses which were presented to the King on these occasions. George Thomas, who was a member of an Antigua planting family as well as Governor of the Leeward Islands, was willing in 1759 to see Guadeloupe and some of the Neutral Islands annexed. The legislatures of Montserrat and Antigua ordered their agents to second Commodore Moore's request for forces which would enable him to hold Guadeloupe; that of St. Christophers went farther, and empowered its agent to press for the annexation of that and all other French Windward Islands at the peace.[2] The Grand Jury of Barbados petitioned George III that Martinique might ever remain annexed to the Crown of Great Britain. The legislature of Antigua congratulated him on the entire reduction of the French Windward Islands—

'and more especially of Martinico and the rich and fertile island of Guadeloupe, islands of the utmost importance to the preservation of your Majesty's sugar colonies, and to the security of the extensive trade and navigation depending upon them, as they have received more injury and interruption from those two islands while in the hands of the enemy than from any other of the French dominions'.

After a characteristic hint that these newly conquered islands

[1] Antigua Council Minutes, March 1 and 21, 1759, C.O. 9/23.

[2] Antigua Council Minutes, Feb. 7, 1759, ibid.; St. Kitts Council Minutes, Feb. 20, 1759, C.O. 241/7.

ought to pay some compensation for the expense of the war, which would prevent them from competing on too equal a foot with the older colonies, the address concludes thus:

'Permit us to hope for a lasting extension of your southern in proportion to your majesty's northern colonies without which we fear that the enlargement of the latter may redound more to the benefit and advantage of the French than to the British sugar islands, whose future existence seems to depend in a great measure upon an effectual extinction of that superiority which the French have always maintained in these islands, until the glorious era of Your Majesty's most auspicious reign.'[1]

I believe the legislatures meant what they said; their language is not a mere disguise for the victory of the unsaturated over the saturated. The planters had at last convinced themselves that Martinique and Guadeloupe were too dangerous neighbours, and that rival producers within the Empire were less damaging than the Martinique privateers. In other words, just as the North American colonists had always demanded the expulsion of the French from Canada in order to secure themselves against future American wars, some elements in the West India interest were beginning to look on the acquisition of Martinique in the same light. This was not only a military precaution; it had its economic side, for many of the West India planters had borrowed great sums in England, and had already begun to insure their West India property. The rate of interest and premiums would depend in part on the public as well as the private security of their property.[2] A letter from Admiral Rodney to Lord Lyttelton puts the whole point very clearly.

'The planters are divided between avarice and fear, they think if Martinique is retained, they will be obliged to lower the price of their sugars. On the other hand, if it is given up, they fear the loss of their own plantations in case of another war, and that the French will overrun them before they can receive succours from Europe, which as I said before, they may easily do, and the example of this war has taught them a lesson, which I fancy they will never forget.'[3]

The Canada-Guadeloupe controversy does not seem to have had much influence on the decisions of the Ministry or its deal-

[1] Antigua Council Minutes, April 15, 1762, C.O. 9/26.

[2] 'Reflections on the true Interest of Great Britain with respect to the Caribbee Islands; . . . by a Planter of Barbados', C.O. 28/50.

[3] Rodney to Lyttelton, June 29, 1762, Phillimore's *Lyttelton*, ii. 634.

ings with France. In fact the discussion had not much practical importance, though it was long, noisy, and interesting for the sake of the principles which it involved. Pitt once asked in the House of Commons, which of these two colonies he should be hanged for giving back to France? He seems to have been undecided or indifferent in 1759, and again at the end of 1760, whether he ought to demand all Canada or part of it with Guadeloupe.[1] Yet when the negotiation began in earnest, he seems to have made up his mind without difficulty that Canada and the fisheries were indispensable. (Fortunately, though Choiseul hinted to Stanley that he was in the same dilemma, he seems to have been as clearly determined to keep the sugar colonies as Pitt was to acquire Canada.)[2] In fact, so long as the choice was only between Canada and Guadeloupe, it seems to have been an easy one to make, and nearly everybody who had anything to do with the conduct of affairs came to the same conclusion as Pitt.

Hardwicke and Newcastle can scarcely have thought the question a very important one, nor disagreed seriously with Pitt, for there is little proof that they debated it, though they received some probably unsolicited advice. Neither of them appears to have felt much doubt about it until the spring of 1762, when the capture of Martinique shook their convictions. When that event was known, with Rodney's exaggerated eulogy of Martinique as the key of the West Indies—when, moreover, it was plain that all the Windward Islands would fall into our hands within a few weeks—Hardwicke wanted to reconsider the question, for the first time as it would seem. It was no longer a choice between Canada and Guadeloupe, but between Canada and all the French West Indies except St. Domingue. Newcastle replied, 'I own, it startles me, who never was startled as to the sugar islands before.' The whole tone of this correspondence gives the impression that the question now raised was one which he and Hardwicke had hitherto regarded as closed,

[1] Newcastle to Hardwicke, Oct. 31, 1759, Add. MSS. 32897, f. 520; Dec. 3, 1760, vol. 32915, f. 270. As late as March 1761 Pitt told Hardwicke he was not sure if we should be able to keep all Canada (Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 17, 1761, vol. 32920, f. 271). However, there is no proof that this was because he was uncertain whether to prefer Guadeloupe. He had decided by April that Canada and the monopoly of the fishery were to be a *sine qua non* (Newcastle's memorandum of April 10, vol. 32921, f. 381).

[2] Stanley to Pitt, June 12, 1761, Thackeray, op. cit. i. 528; Choiseul to Ossun, April 5, 1762, A.E. Espagne, 536.

or not worth discussion. While Newcastle is usually the worst possible authority for the history of his own opinions, he seems to have spoken truth this time.[1]

At this moment, when the question asked itself seriously for the first time, Newcastle and Hardwicke were on the point of leaving the Ministry, and it was Bute who was left to make the decision. The conquest of Martinique compromised a negotiation which seemed to be leading to an agreement. Choiseul and Pitt had squabbled about the Neutral Islands in 1761, but Egremont was ready in March 1762 to propose a division which would probably have satisfied France—we were to take Dominica and Tobago while France was to have the other two.[2] According to the ideas of that time, the restoration of a conquest must be paid for. The conditions of peace had therefore to be altered after the capture of Martinique, for Bute and Egremont were the last people in the world to expose themselves to the charge of giving anything up to France. It was a little difficult to decide what we should make her pay for Martinique. We could not go back to Pitt's terms and claim the monopoly of the fishery; we could never have a peace that way. Some were for demanding Louisiana, others for Guadeloupe, others again for Senegal and Goree. Newcastle was against making any of these claims, because he believed they would prevent an agreement. Egremont proposed to force Choiseul to choose between Louisiana and Guadeloupe.[3]

Bute was in a dilemma. He probably believed, like Newcastle, that we should get no peace if we asked France to yield us a settled colony; yet he knew he must ask for something. He

[1] Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 2, 1762, Add. MSS. 32936, f. 310; Newcastle's reply, April 2, f. 312. Newcastle had received advice, for the most part uninvited, from Alderman Baker, from Chesterfield, and from Lord Morton, a friend of Hardwicke. I can find no expression of his own opinion, and little proof that he discussed the matter, beyond his letter to Hardwicke of Dec. 3, 1760, in which he gives Pitt's opinion, or lack of opinion, rather than his own. Professor Namier (op. cit., pp. 323–5) seems to me to have underrated the effect of the capture of Martinique upon Hardwicke and Newcastle; naturally it made a difference to the perspective in which they viewed the question.

[2] Bussy's instructions, May 23, 1761, A.E. Angleterre, 443; Bussy to Choiseul, June 11 and 26, ibid.; Choiseul to Bussy, July 15, ibid.; Stanley's minute of Sept. 2, 1761, Add. MSS. 32927, f. 340; Egremont's draft letter to Viry, March 21, 1762, vol. 32936, f. 4.

[3] Newcastle to Devonshire, April 23, 1762, Add. MSS. 32937, f. 324; Egremont's draft answer to Choiseul, April 25, 1762, f. 343; compare this with his letters to Viry of May 1, vol. 32938, f. 3, and A.E. Angleterre, 446.

hit upon a happy compromise; we should content ourselves with Grenada and all the Neutral Islands, and the whole continent of North America as far as the left bank of the Mississippi.[1] This was a very clever proposal; it combined the greatest possible gain for England with the smallest loss for France. It was a way of assuring still further the original object of the war —the security of our North American colonists. If it saddled us in the West Indies with a chain of islands all exposed to attack from the French strongholds, it gave us the best and most defensible frontier in North America. Pitt had never asked so much. The territories which Bute proposed to demand, both on the continent and in the islands, were open fields for English capital and enterprise. They contained few Frenchmen to make political trouble for the Government, or to compete with English producers in the home market. They made an imposing show on the map without costing France many subjects or much pride. The only condition which they did not satisfy was one which Bute had once held to be necessary; they were not likely to pay for the war by bringing in an immediate revenue. Pitt made the most of this defect in his speech on the preliminaries—a factious performance in which he revived the controversy of Canada and Guadeloupe, and attacked decisions in which he had been the first to acquiesce.[2]

The treaty of peace followed the lines which Bute had chalked out. There was a hitch over St. Lucia. Choiseul would not give it up because it was necessary to the security of Martinique. That, as Pitt said, was the best reason for us to insist upon it; and Pitt's imitators in the Ministry tried to do so.[3] Bute made his colleagues yield St. Lucia in order to buy concessions from Choiseul on the other points in dispute.[4] One of these was the Mississippi navigation; and in this sense it may be said that Bute, like Pitt, showed a steady inclination to sacrifice the West Indies to North America. Like Pitt, he conquered in the islands in order to annex on the continent.

[1] Hardwicke to Newcastle, May 1, 1762, Add. MSS. 32938, f. 11; Bute to Bedford, May 1, 1762, *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 75; *v. infra*, pp. 597–601 for the complications between England, France, and Spain over this cession.

[2] *Parl. Hist.* xv. 1263 et seqq. Pitt is made to say that he had been for demanding Guadeloupe in 1761, but had been overruled. This seems to be a lie.

[3] Ibid.; Comte de Choiseul to Solar, May ?, 1762, A.E. Angleterre, 446.

[4] Cabinet minutes of June 21 and July 26, 1762, Add. MSS. 34713, ff. 106, 110; Bute to Bedford, Sept. 28, 1762, vol. 36797, f. 12.

VI

THE DIFFICULTIES OF WARFARE IN THE WEST INDIES

§ i. *The Militia and its Duties*

In describing the warfare of the West Indies, it is not enough to deal with projects of conquest. These were exceptional, and were carried out for the most part by regular forces at the will of the English Government. The merchants and planters were more concerned for the safety of their own property and trade; so far as they made any efforts themselves or exercised any influence over the Government, they directed its attention and their own to the routine of defence. In fact, West India strategy was mainly defensive.

This pre-eminence of weakness over strength is excusable, in view of the past history of West Indian warfare and the extraordinary vulnerability of sugar colonies. The events of 1664–6 and those of Queen Anne's reign had proved beyond doubt the great damage which a small armed force could do in a very short time, given a momentary command of the sea. Nevis, once the 'Garden of the Caribbees', had been reduced to desolation in a few weeks; St. Kitts and Montserrat had suffered the same fate. In the two last, the French were able to destroy most of the property on the islands without obtaining command of the principal fortresses. It was so easy to carry away the negroes, to fire the canes and sugar-works, and to depart within a fortnight, having caused more loss and damage than could be done in the same time anywhere else in the Empire, outside London and the home counties.[1] Neither Nevis nor Montserrat quite recovered from the eclipse into which the disasters of 1706 and 1712 had thrown them. St. Kitts succeeded better, by the help of its extraordinary fertility.

These facts are enough to account for the moans of terror which the West India interest so freely uttered upon the slightest apprehension of a French naval superiority in the Caribbean, and the extraordinary credulity with which it magnified the size of every French force which went that way. It was not enough to know that the enemy had no army in the West Indies

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, nos. 168, 195 (i), 282, 338, 357; *1712–14*, 33 (ii), 38, 57.

which was capable of subduing a colony; the planters were equally afraid of a few ships which could only snatch a momentary opportunity of devastation. 'I think as you do', wrote Knight during the alarm of 1745, 'that the conquest of the island [Jamaica] is out of the question; but if you and I are ruined it is the same thing to us.'[1]

Had they habitually insured their estates, the planters might have been less nervous. Messrs. Lascelles and Maxwell gave an amusing account of the scenes which attended the sharpest of these alarms, when Caylus and Conflans arrived at Martinique with a fair-sized force in the spring of 1745.

'The private insurance offices were seen crowded with planters endeavouring to insure their plantations for 6 months, but some, that had policies to insure £10000 could not get above £800 underwrote at £10. 10 p^{r} Ct. premio. It's said by an insurance broker of our acquaintance, who had several of those policies to get done, that the insurers would have wrote much more than they did but for the dismal countenances of the planters, which made them afraid to write, & had they stayed at home their policies would have been filled.'[2]

As this is almost the only mention of that kind of insurance in their correspondence before 1763, the practice must still have been rare.

Why could not the West India colonies defend themselves without a superior naval force? The chief reason was the smallness of the white population. From the time when sugar culture and large estates worked by slaves had taken the place of the small plantations of tobacco and cotton, the number of white men fit to bear arms had been sinking. Governor Parke had attributed the weakness of the militia to *latifundia* as early as Queen Anne's reign. The militia of Antigua had been depleted by great planters buying out the estates of the small, and elbowing them off the island. This evil was complicated by the planters' love of rank and position, which caused the available force to be divided into a large number of small units with a great many officers and very few men. Parke reported that the company of his enemy Colonel Codrington contained only three officers and one man; the militia of one parish in St. Kitts consisted of six men, of whom four were servants of the

[1] Letter of Knight, Aug. 15, 1745, Add. MSS. 22677, f. 48.

[2] Lascelles and Maxwell to Michael Longbotham, June 18, 1745, W. & G. ii.

captain. Of course both these instances are exceptional.[1] Another great evil was absenteeism, which not only deprived the islands of some of their military population, but may have contributed to the dangerous indiscipline of the negroes by removing the only influence and supervision which kept them in check.[2]

The numbers do not seem to have declined very much after Queen Anne's reign; in fact they began to rise again, perhaps as a result of the laws which were passed for the purpose in some of the islands.[3] No legislature went so far as that of Jamaica in recognizing the principle that the real military salvation of the sugar colonies could only lie in increasing the white population. Some schemes for mass immigration—of Palatines in 1709, of Scots in 1740—came to nothing.[4] Act upon Act went on the statute-book. Large tracts of land were set aside, and large sums of money spent, but the result of this showy and expensive legislation was depressing. In fact the only laws which produced any positive effect were the so-called 'deficiency laws'; they imposed a fine upon the landed proprietors for not keeping up a certain proportion of white servants on their plantations. According to Governor Trelawny, this fine had a slight influence upon the demand for servants, but

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, no. 519; *1708–9*, no. 597 (i); *1710–11*, no. 391; *1711–12*, no. 392.

[2] Jamaica Council Minutes, Dec. 18, 1760, C.O. 140/42.

[3] In 1703 Governor Handasyd estimated the military strength of Jamaica at 3,500 men (*C.S.P. Col. 1702–3*, no. 764); in 1706, at 2,550 including free negroes (*C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, no. 221); in 1752, Trelawny put it at 4,400 and Knowles at under 5,000 (Trelawny's 'State of Jamaica', 1752, C.O. 137/25, X 101; Knowles's 'State', 1755, C.O. 137/29, Y 106). The spokesmen of the West India interest in London naturally gave a much lower figure when they were applying to the Government for help. Governor Parke reported the militia of the Leeward Islands to be as follows: Antigua 700, Montserrat 600, Nevis 250, St. Kitts 450 (*C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, no. 473). In 1742 there were 1,360 militia on Antigua, 500 on Montserrat, 280 on Nevis, and 800 on St. Kitts. The numbers given by Thomas in 1755 are not very different. I cannot account for the great increase in Antigua; that of St. Kitts is presumably due to the extension of cultivation in the former French half of the island, which was almost uninhabited at the time of the earlier statistics (see Mathew's 'State' of the Leeward Islands, Oct. 26, 1742, C.O. 152/24, Y 54; Thomas to Board of Trade, Aug. 25, 1755, C.O. 152/28, BB 65). At Barbados there were supposed in 1707 to be 3,062 foot and 1,050 horse (*C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, no. 1225 (vii)); the whole militia, without officers, in 1762, was 3,827 men (Pinfold's Answers to Queries, June 1, 1762, C.O. 28/32, FF 25). Something under 10 per cent. should be added to these figures for officers.

[4] *Journal of the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 1708/9 to 1714/15*, pp. 58, 63, 75, 79, 82, 83. For the Scotch scheme of 1740, see Add. MSS. 22677, ff. 40, 41; vol. 12431, ff. 116, 120.

it generally became a mere tax, and thus the laws which had been designed to serve a social purpose were too readily diverted to fiscal uses. In fact, a scheme for peopling the island was frustrated in 1743 by the Assembly, which was afraid 'of losing the deficiency law, which if it does not altogether answer the intention of peopling the island, yet it serves to raise a large sum of money'.[1]

The Board of Trade reviewed these policies in 1753, when it tried to explain to the House of Commons why the population and sugar-production of Jamaica were so small. The families introduced into the island certainly could not be numbered by more than a few hundreds, and the cost was very high in proportion to the other normal expenditure of a colony at that time. Knowles summed it up by saying that some 700 persons had cost the island about £30,000. Both he and the Board described most of the immigrants as perfectly unsuitable. Many of them were good for nothing, the others knew nothing of husbandry. They therefore tended to drift into the towns, or to leave the island, whose economic life was so organized that new-comers could find little livelihood, unless they were qualified by patronage or education to take their places as underlings or skilled workmen in the management of the great sugar estates.[2] If they succeeded at all, they succeeded too well, and added to the prevailing *latifundia* by becoming sugar-planters. The legislature began to despair, and to repeal its own acts. However, the military population of Jamaica does seem to have risen, according to the figures quoted above; but the increase is not to be attributed to the artificial encouragements offered by the Government, so much as to the spontaneous spread of cultivation on the north side of the island, which had been very imperfectly settled in Queen Anne's reign.

These difficulties were by no means peculiar to the English sugar colonies. The French Government waged the same unequal struggle against economic forces by trying to impose white servants upon the colonies which no longer had any use for them. Colbert had invented the plan of obliging the master of every ship bound from France to the islands to take out two such *engagés*. But the ship-owners did not want to carry them,

[1] Beckford to Knight, June 18, 1743, Add. MSS. 12431, f. 125.

[2] Board of Trade, Report to House of Commons, Feb. 22, 1753, C.O. 138/19, pp. 405–52; Knowles to Board of Trade, Dec. 31, 1754, C.O. 137/28, Y 43.

nor the colonists to receive them, and a considerable recruitment of population could only be effected by frequent renewal of the edicts and official vigilance in carrying them out. A few years later, the Government gave the captains the option of taking out two muskets instead; this duty was performed as seldom or as badly as the other. In France, as in England, it soon became impossible to recruit genuine agricultural labourers for the sugar plantations, and such *engagés* as could be found were rejected by the colonists as useless scoundrels. From the dregs of the towns they came, and to the dregs of the towns they returned in the colonies.[1]

Although both Governments failed equally to foist population upon the colonies, the French islands were never so weak in men as the English. Their greater size accounts in part for their more imposing numbers. St. Domingue, for example, had 6,000 militiamen in 1739 according to Larnage,[2] while nobody ever claimed more than 5,000 for Jamaica, and that was probably too high. But St. Domingue was a much larger colony than Jamaica—in fact, it was really three colonies rather than one, for the communication between its quarters was difficult. Likewise Martinique was larger than any of its English neighbours, and might be expected to have a larger militia. In 1746 it numbered 3,095 infantry and 710 cavalry besides officers, but Le Vassor de la Touche estimated in 1761 that 8,000 planters could be called upon in an emergency; this is not the same thing as the number of the militia, though it should have been.[3] According to one of its conquerors, Guadeloupe was supposed to contain between 3,000 and 4,000 armed men, but not more than 1,600 appeared in arms.[4] The privateers who made Martinique their head-quarters added something to its available force. Caylus thought there were 2,500 of them, but Le Vassor de la Touche found only 1,200 in November 1761.

[1] Louis-Philippe May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique* (Paris, 1930), pp. 36–9.

[2] Larnage to Maurepas, Dec. 28, 1739, A.N. Colonies C⁹ A 50. Pierre de Vaissière quotes some figures of 1753—4,639 white men bearing arms, 1,853 white boys, 1,332 mulattos and negroes—total, 7,824 (*Saint Domingue*, Paris 1909, p. 116).

[3] Caylus to Maurepas, Dec. 23, 1746, A.N. Colonies C⁸ A 57; Le Vassor de la Touche to Berryer, Nov. 20, 1761, vol. 63.

[4] W. M. Burt to Pitt, May 2, 1759, G.D. 8/24. In 1739 there had been 1,292 men and 1,497 boys bearing arms (Satineau, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe sous l'Ancien Régime*, p. 384).

Le Mercier de la Rivière explained this apparent decrease; many of the privateers left Martinique when they were sure it would be invaded, for fear of being taken prisoners and sent to England.[1] It is impossible to say how many of these privateers were natives of Martinique and how many only used it as a base in time of war. It probably had a greater seafaring population of its own than any other West India island, because it had a greater local trade; the interruption of that navigation by the English blockade must have driven the crews to privateering even if they had no other inclination for it.

The disparity between the French and English populations in the West Indies was not vast; but the English planters exaggerated it and were obsessed by it. It became one of their strongest excuses for demanding that we should always keep a naval superiority in the West Indies. If Martinique was swarming with armed men ready to dash out and invade Antigua or St. Kitts at any minute, it was more important than ever to deny them the opportunity. The English estimated the military population of Martinique at ten or twelve thousand, all ready for an expedition at a moment's notice. How far this was from the truth, can be seen from the history of the meagre and reluctant reinforcement which Champigny scraped up for St. Lucia.[2] Yet there was something to be said for the legend. Though it was not true that the French sugar-planters as a whole greatly outnumbered the English, they really did so in the corner of the West Indies where they were likeliest to attack—namely the Leeward Islands. Martinique or Guadeloupe had many more men than Antigua or St. Kitts, let alone Montserrat or Nevis. If precedent and geography were any guides, it was those islands that were in most danger. They lay to leeward of Martinique; the easiest course of invasion was from windward to leeward, and that is why Barbados was never invaded at all and Antigua, which is set back a little from the others, only once, while St. Kitts, Nevis, and Montserrat were lost or ruined again and again.

The best hope of the Leeward Islands was help or a counter-

[1] Le Mercier de la Rivière, *mémoire* on the siege of Martinique, Aug. 5, 1762, A.N. Colonies C[8] A 64. Commodore Douglas also noticed the departure of the privateers. The reason which La Rivière assigns for it is plausible, for Douglas and Dalrymple had lately quarrelled with La Touche over the exchange of prisoners and begun sending them back to England.

[2] *V. supra*, pp. 204–6.

attack from Barbados, which was comparatively safe and well manned. Lieutenant-Governor Fleming suggested more than once that Barbados should at least pretend to be about creating some diversion. The Barbadians had willingly put themselves on shipboard and gone down to relieve Nevis and St. Kitts in 1666 and 1667; but the Leeward Islands were then lately peopled from Barbados, and every Barbadian planter might well have a friend or relation in the threatened colonies. In later years Barbados was too much preoccupied with its own defence to spend its military strength on behalf of other islands. It sent nothing more than good wishes to Nevis in 1706.[1] When there was question of a regular attack on Martinique, backed by regular troops and a decisive naval superiority, that was another matter; the island then felt itself safe in sparing a few hundred volunteers.[2] But it could not engage in anything more hazardous; for instance, one of the genuine reasons for the refusal to co-operate in the scheme against St. Lucia in 1745 was the feeling that Barbados would expose itself to danger by parting with any of its militia for an expedition without regular troops. How much the more would the colonists decline to succour the Leeward Islands over a sea commanded by the enemy?—for without such command, the French were very unlikely to attempt any invasion.

The selfishness of the Barbados planters was not exceptional, for the French militiamen were just as reluctant to leave their own islands in defence of others. There was a striking example of this in 1759, at the siege of Guadeloupe. The English attack was first aimed against Martinique, and the militia was embodied to resist it, with surprising success. When Hopson and Moore decided to go off to attack Guadeloupe, Beauharnois, who had disbanded his forces, could not send more than sixty-six volunteers to the rescue. The insufficiency of this effort is no doubt explained partly by Beauharnois's own inertia and by the danger of the passage across an uncommanded sea; this, however, was by no means so great as it was represented, especially after the arrival of a French squadron under Bompar had obliged Moore to concentrate his fleet and to leave the windward side of Guadeloupe unguarded. No doubt the

[1] *C.S.P. Col. 1706–8*, no. 383 (ii), 496; Fleming to Stone, Oct. 12, 1745, C.O. 152/44; intercepted letter of Fleming to Pinfold, June 29, 1757, A.N. Colonies C[8] A 61.

[2] *V. supra*, p. 222.

strongest reason was the unwillingness of the militia to leave Martinique on any account.[1]

Only within the Leeward Islands government did one sugar colony send real support to another in time of danger. In Queen Anne's reign the Governors once or twice succoured from Antigua the islands which were attacked by the French, but already the forces they took with them consisted chiefly of regular soldiers. At the beginning of the Spanish war in 1739, Governor Mathew tried to induce all the colonies under his government to pass laws for paying volunteers from the other islands, in case of invasion. One or two of the legislatures complied, but their laws were never put to any use. Mathew himself appeared in the spring of 1745 at St. Kitts, as the point chiefly threatened by Caylus; but he seems to have brought only regulars with him.[2] In the same way Governor Shirley came down from Antigua in 1782, and threw himself into St. Kitts with some part of the garrison. These expeditions were not impossible, even when the command of the sea was lost; for the enemy would naturally attack the main fortresses and towns, which were all on the leeward sides of the islands, so they might leave the coasts clear for the landing of a relief force to windward.

If the whole militia of the colonies had been large and easy to move from one island to another in the face of danger, its quality was still very low. Some of the islands had no militia laws at all, or such bad ones that no sort of discipline could be enforced. The people of Nevis were credited with the opinion that 'Discipline is the first step to tyranny'. Monthly meetings were appointed for exercise in most of the islands;[3] but the fines for absence were so slight that anybody of moderate fortune could quite cheaply buy himself out of the militia altogether.[4]

[1] Beauharnois to Berryer, Jan. 27, 1759, Feb. 15, 1760, A.N. Colonies C[8] A 62. When Beauharnois and Bompar at last screwed up their courage to try to raise the siege, they do not seem to have taken any militia or volunteers with them.

[2] Antigua Council Minutes, Mathew's speech, July 31, 1739, C.O. 9/13; St. Kitts Council Minutes, Jan. 19, 1740/1, C.O. 241/4.

[3] At Antigua, for instance, by the supplementary militia law of July 12, 1756 (C.O. 8/12). The lordly spirit of this militia is indicated by the clause forbidding any private to have his arms carried for him to alarms by negroes. See Mathew's 'State' of the Leeward Islands, C.O. 152/24 Y 54.

[4] Lieut.-Governor Moore complained very loudly against the militia law of Jamaica (Moore to Board of Trade, Nov. 7, 1760, C.O. 137/32 BB 9). It appears from his speech to the Assembly on Sept. 18, 1760, that his chief objection to it was the smallness of the fines for non-attendance.